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In the Netherlands, the most important statesman of the nineteenth century was 
Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798–1872). Thorbecke was the chief framer of the 
Dutch Constitution of 1848, which still forms the basis of the country’s politi-
cal system. Among the various reforms which the Constitution introduced was 
a change in how members of the Senate were selected (in Dutch Eerste Kamer, 
First Chamber). Henceforth, the senators would no longer be appointed by the 
king (as laid down in the Constitution of 1815) but be chosen by the representative 
assemblies of the separate provinces. Although the upper chamber, in contrast to 
the lower chamber, would therefore be elected indirectly and by a more restricted, 
less popular electorate, this reform nevertheless marked a significant shift in the 
balance of political power that saw the upper chamber become more independent 
from the king. This was one of the ways in which the Constitution of 1848 con-
tributed to the transformation of the Netherlands into a constitutional monarchy.
In Thorbecke’s view, the post-1848 Senate was not an ideal institution, but even 
so, he saw it as part and parcel of a new, more sophisticated, more democratic 
institutional framework, including a constitutional monarch, which he envisaged 
in the political philosophy he had elaborated over the previous ten years. One of 
the building blocks of this philosophy was the conviction that constitutions were 
to be moulded in flexible ways, adapting to historical situations, challenges and 
changes. Another key element was its international orientation, especially with an 
eye to the position of small powers. According to Thorbecke, a good constitution 
was more than a formal entity – it was a ‘national force’ that could make small 
countries less vulnerable and could help them in the long run to retain their inde-
pendence in the face of revolutionary and aggressive threats from greater powers 
beyond their borders. He was convinced that small countries in particular needed 
a firmly established political system for this purpose.
This book deals with senates in small constitutional monarchies in the North 
Atlantic world, such as the Netherlands, with powerful neighbours. In particular, 
this book discusses these senates in the nineteenth, twentieth and early twenty-
first century and focuses both on moments when their very existence was in jeop-
ardy or on periods when their role, workings or composition underwent important 
transformations. In line with Thorbecke’s thinking, the contributors to this volume 
consider the foundation and functions of senates to be highly dynamic phenomena. 
Preface
xii Preface
The chapters examine changing relations between senates, monarchs and differ-
ent groups in the populations, as well as the variable relationship between sen-
ates and other state institutions. The question of whether small countries in the 
North Atlantic were especially concerned with the stability of their constitutions 
because of their vulnerable position vis-à-vis great powers, such as France, Ger-
many, Russia, Great Britain and the United States, is also discussed.
This volume is the outcome of a project about the history of senates funded 
by a foundation named after Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, Fonds Staatsman Thor-
becke, which is managed by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(KNAW). This project, based at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, was, under my 
supervision, coordinated by Wybren Verstegen (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) 
and Nikolaj Bijleveld (University of Groningen) with the assistance of Daan 
Jansen and Kariem Ahmed. The first drafts of the studies brought together in this 
volume were discussed at a workshop titled ‘Senates in crises: The Senate and 
the people in North Atlantic small power constitutional monarchies’, held at the 
KNAW in Amsterdam in May 2018. Together with Colin Grittner (University of 
New Brunswick) and David E. Smith (Ryerson University), Bijleveld and Ver-
stegen formed the editorial team which saw to it that the drafts were rewritten as 
chapters for this book. I am confident that this volume, Reforming Senates, makes 
a significant contribution to the fields of political history, political science and 




The rationale for connecting the historiography of the senates in small European 
countries and Canada against the background of the major powers in the North 
Atlantic is illustrated in a quote from George Brown, one of the architects of 
Canadian bicameralism, from 1865:
We are striving to do peacefully what Holland and Belgium, after years of 
strife, were unable to accomplish. We are seeking by calm discussion to settle 
questions that Austria and Hungary, that Denmark and Germany, that Russia 
and Poland, could only crush by the iron heel, or armed force. We are seek-
ing to do without foreign intervention that which deluged in blood the sunny 
plains of Italy. We are striving to settle forever issues hardly less momentous 
than those that have rent the neighbouring republic and are now exposing it 
to all the horrors of civil war.
(Ajzenstat et al. 2003)
During the American Civil War (1861–1865), Canadian politicians worked under 
severe political pressure from Westminster to give their country a constitution 
that would keep this British colony, with its population from French and English 
descent, together. They knew how ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions, as 
well as nationalistic sentiment, could easily tear states apart.
In the nineteenth century, small powers all over the North Atlantic faced similar 
risks, problems and threats. Denmark had a German-speaking minority that aimed 
for secession. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands was divided by linguistic 
and religious barriers that split the country into two states after the revolutionary 
year, 1830. In Ireland, religious differences continue to divide the country to this 
day. In Canada, one of the most important building-blocks of the new constitution – 
and the proposed solution to this division – was the creation of a senate, with 
senators to be appointed by the Crown (the governor-general). It gave and still 
gives power to and could and still can prevent legislation that harms the country’s 
French-speaking minority (Cardinal, this volume; Smith, D. E., this volume).
In the countries scrutinised in this volume – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands – senates were always 
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formed under the more or less explicit supervision of the great powers or at least 
in the knowledge that powerful neighbours might interfere in domestic affairs, 
be it France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, the United States or the dwindling 
might of Sweden in the case of Norway (Smith, E., this volume). A good example 
is the Belgian Senate, created after the revolution of 1830 as an answer to the 
English and French concerns about the potentially radical character of the new 
state (Stengers 1995). This, however, was not the only way in which the existence 
of strong neighbours influenced constitutional thinking in small nation-states. In 
Canada and the Netherlands, for instance, constitutions, including their senatorial 
provisions, were even seen as a way of making nations stronger, i.e. less vulner-
able to aggressive and powerful neighbours (Boyko 2014; Drentje 1998).
The senates selected for this volume share a vulnerability vis à vis the great 
powers, which distinguish them from the often-analysed and more famous upper 
chambers, such as the American or French Senates or the British House of Lords, 
which are still overrepresented in the literature (Schnatterer 2015). Furthermore, 
the countries in this volume share a common heritage with respect both to the Age 
of Revolution and to upcoming nationalism in the nineteenth century. Moreover, 
they also looked to each other when formulating their constitutions or even when 
deciding which role the senate should play, as the quote from George Brown illus-
trates. In all these small powers, senates were criticised every now and again and 
would frequently come under attack. In some cases, they were faced with the 
threat of abolition or were even abolished altogether, especially over the course 
of the twentieth century. Finally, all these senates seem to have gone through a 
process that reveals a lot of commonalities in the way they functioned and were 
reformed and discussed.
In the nineteenth century, bicameralism appeared to be the norm for nation 
states that were gradually transferring away from the traditional division of power 
between a monarch and estates to more democratic forms that left room for a 
novel idea – representation of ‘the people’. This could lead to constitutions with-
out (proper) senates, as in Norway (Smith, E., this volume) and Finland (Pekonen, 
this volume), or to a gradual disappearance of the senate, as in Sweden (Nergelius, 
this volume) and Denmark (Skjæveland, this volume). In that respect, the Nordic 
countries have a special reputation: in all these very stable democracies, senates 
either never existed or were abolished. Examining these nations together helps 
explain the paternity, transformation and relevance of the senates as legislative 
institutions over time.
All senates involved in this study differ considerably from each other, and there 
is no suggestion that they will come to resemble each other in the future. This is 
not due to the constitution-makers in these countries operating in isolation. Of 
course, they worked within their own political context, which generated different 
compromises in different circumstances (Drentje 2004), but they were certainly 
acquainted with the ideas, practices and usefulness of examples in neighbouring 
countries. Norway, for instance, was inspired by the Dutch Batavian Republic 
(Smith, E., this volume); the revolutionary Sister Republics of France looked at 
the United States and France itself for inspiration (Oddens, this volume); and 
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Finland copied ideas from its Scandinavian neighbours (Pekonen, this volume). 
The outcome of the complex processes of making and remaking (but seldom imi-
tating) constitutions was that senators could be appointed or chosen (1) by a large 
or small constituency, (2) at a central or at a regional level and (3) by the rich, the 
experienced or the better educated. They could be chosen directly or indirectly, 
with complicated voting systems, partly by special interest groups or by the same 
people who held a vote for the people’s assembly. While the people’s assem-
blies tended to resemble each other because of, for example, democratic ideals, 
universal suffrage, party politics etc., the senates discussed in this volume differ 
profoundly in terms of how they were constructed, how they operated and how 
politicians were admitted to the chambers (Riescher 2010).
The roles of the senates
From a historical perspective, we see how, in the nineteenth century, these coun-
tries struggled with the transition from the old political regime with a privileged 
position for elites to a new and more democratic system. Exactly how this compro-
mise became manifest in the senate and the extent to which the senators remained 
in power depended heavily on the specific circumstances in which the senates 
were established. These were influenced by specific national ideas, revolutionary 
pressure, pressure from major neighbouring countries, social tensions, war etc. 
Bicameralism appears to have been a generally acceptable solution. A lower house 
would offer ‘the people’ power, while the senate would ensure that the old elites 
(nobility and sometimes the clergy and landed elites) or previously independent 
federal states maintained some of their influence in the new political system. Espe-
cially in the nineteenth century, as Els Witte stresses (this volume), individuals 
were more important than their mandates. As a result and sometimes quite literally, 
as in the cases of Denmark (Christiansen, this volume) and the Netherlands (Van 
den Braak, this volume; Witte, this volume), senates were born from or maintained 
because of the compromise between progressive and conservative forces.
Even though the senate came to represent the old powers, one must not make 
the mistake of interpreting the senate as a classical element that would inevitably 
disappear from the new political parliamentary system. Envisioning bicameralism 
as the result of a compromise makes even more sense when looking at the role the 
upper house was expected to play in the nineteenth century. The newly formed 
senates played – or were supposed to play – an important role in stabilising the 
political situation in their country. In all cases, they served to assure that parlia-
ments would think twice before putting new legislation into practice. Originally, 
even this common idea of what bicameralism was did not exist. In the Revolution-
ary Age, which influenced the political framework of the whole Atlantic World 
(Israel 2017), the idea of installing two councils, one of which was often called a 
senate, did not necessarily result in bicameralism. In some cases, the senate was 
the legislature that proposed laws, and the other council possessed limited power 
and was not seen as being connected to the senate or even as part of the legislative 
edifice in the first place (Oddens, this volume).
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In a time when countries in the Western world were gradually becoming more 
democratic, senates gained more prominence as chambres de réflexion to counter 
overly revolutionary or centripetal tendencies. Under parliamentarism, ‘majority 
rule’, so was the idea, needed a countervailing power. In practice, this also meant 
that the requirements for senators differed from those for the people’s representa-
tives, though these differences tended to diminish over time – for example, how 
they were elected (the franchise) or appointed. A move towards radicalism is, 
however, not the only danger of majority rule. Majority rule sometimes necessi-
tates the protection of the interests of minorities or social groups. This became one 
of the functions of the Senate in Ireland (Dorney, this volume; O’Donoghue, this 
volume) and was especially successful in Canada (Cardinal, this volume). Sen-
ates in other countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark (Christiansen, this 
volume), did not take up such a role, even though these countries had significant 
religious and ethnic minorities. In the Netherlands, religious parties opted for a 
broader representation of the population in the Senate but not necessarily for their 
fellow brethren, which solved the issue of minority representation in a different 
way (Van den Braak, this volume). Federal Canada is a union despite its internal 
differences and gave room to a linguistic minority and, gradually, to other (ethnic) 
minorities. The newly established unitary nation states in Europe, however, aimed 
to unify their citizens under one nation, which interfered with the representation 
of linguistic, religious and ethnic minorities.
The attempts to abolish senates proved to be a long, capricious and sometimes 
futile processes. In Denmark, the first attempt failed after the issue was entan-
gled in other political discussions (Skjæveland, this volume). A second attempt 
succeeded because the issue was linked to matters concerning the future of the 
monarchy. Senates in each country encountered opposition. With the increasing 
emancipation of the people, they were accused more and more often of being 
conservative and sometimes even undemocratic. This accusation persisted, even 
though senates – because of the impact of democratic ideas concerning represen-
tation, franchise and eligibility – gradually came to resemble the lower houses 
in terms of social composition. In and of itself, this critique was obviously not 
enough, since many of the countries in this volume still have a functioning sen-
ate to this day. Path dependency, i.e. the way senates are integrated in the state 
system, the criteria for constitutional changes or the extent to which they differ 
from the lower house appears to explain why abolition can be so difficult to real-
ise. In non-federal states, the old elites lost their power over time, as democratic 
principles became more widely accepted. If a senate did not succeed in reforming 
itself sufficiently, it might become outdated or redundant. Abolition could be sped 
up when the constitution was organised in a way that made fundamental changes 
relatively easy (Nergelius, this volume).
Both the upper house’s ability to be adjusted to meet critique and its opportu-
nities to reform and reinvent itself are closely related and highly relevant in the 
history of the senates. Senates could reform themselves based on the presupposi-
tion that parliament should not make ‘hasty’ decisions. From the nineteenth cen-
tury onwards, senates used their position as a chambre de réflexion to check the 
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quality of laws accepted by the people’s assembly – for example, what occurred 
in the Netherlands. Here, the Senate examined whether new laws were in line with 
existing legislation, whether a new law might generate unforeseen consequences 
and whether a new law was to be considered just in the light of certain principles 
(Van den Braak, this volume). This function explains not only why but also how 
a ‘second’ chamber of ‘sober thought’ was formed in the cases of the Batavian 
Republic (Oddens, this volume) and Norway (Smith, E., this volume) by means 
of selecting certain members from a unicameral parliament to formulate a second 
opinion. The persisting desire to prevent hasty decisions may explain why, after 
the abolition of a senate, some of its original functions reappear in another guise, 
as Asbjørn Skjæveland (this volume) and Eivind Smith (this volume) illustrate for 
Denmark and Norway (cf. Riescher 2010).
‘Thinking twice’, however, does not mean that senates played a conservative 
role from the outset. Senates do more than block or delay laws accepted by the 
lower chamber or promote the interests of the elites. As studies about upper cham-
bers show, their role can be far more fruitful: a senate can foster reconciliation in 
transitional phases (Baturo & Elgie 2018; Nilsson, this volume), prevent disinte-
gration (as in Canada), promote consistency in legislation (as in the Netherlands), 
mollify opposition from conservative elites and put a break on overly rash deci-
sions made by the people’s chamber (Verstegen, this volume). This stabilising 
aspect should not, however, be stressed too much. Most of the countries under 
scrutiny in this volume have been stable democracies for a long time. Though 
created to give stability to parliamentary systems, senates as such, it appears, can 
be useful, but they are not always a sine qua non for this stability, as the Nordic 
countries show.
Structure and themes of this volume
Eighteen case studies have been brought together in this book. Despite the vast 
variety in appearances of the senates and the multidisciplinary character of this 
volume, we can identify clear commonalities between the senates, often related to 
specific historical periods. Without pretending to offer an exhaustive list of issues 
covered by the authors and without using our periodisation as a straitjacket, we 
have ordered this volume thematically and chronologically in three parts. Since 
comparable developments in different nations do not always happen simultane-
ously, there are a few cases for which our thematic approach does not overlap 
with the suggested periods. Finally, it is important to realise that the chapters offer 
many more valuable insights than we can introduce here.
The first part, The need for a senate, concerns the way in which countries dis-
cussed and positioned the senate between the executive – either the monarch or 
the (revolutionary) government – and the people’s assembly. This is roughly the 
period between Thermidor (1794), when France and its Sister Republics intro-
duced senates as a reaction to the Jacobinism of the earlier period (Oddens, this 
volume), and the revolutions and upheavals of 1830 (Witte, this volume), 1837 (in 
Canada, Ducharme 2010) or 1848 (in Europe), which led to important reshuffles 
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in the position of senates in many European countries. In this period, many coun-
tries decided to install a senate, but which exact role it would play was not yet 
clear. Oddens (this volume) illustrates that, during the Age of Revolution, the role 
of the senate was not related to bicameralism as it is today. Another example is 
Norway, which rejected a bicameral system but nevertheless decided to install a 
pseudo-senate (Smith, E. this volume) – possibly because it needed such a body 
or because bicameralism was seen as a sign of national maturity (quoted in Smith, 
D. E., this volume). The case of Denmark shows how nationalistic sentiments, the 
pressure of a war and the impact of revolutionary thoughts contributed to all par-
ties agreeing with quite a liberal Senate (Christiansen, this volume).
All nations treated in this study share a revolutionary past, and all felt the need 
to discuss the installation of a senate. Especially in this period, the role of the 
major, powerful neighbours was of significant importance. During the American 
Revolution and after the downfall of Napoleon, revolutionary threats were feared 
equally by minor powers and the major powers surrounding them. In many of 
Europe’s new monarchies in the early nineteenth century, senates were originally 
envisioned as a ‘bulwarks’ protecting the crown against revolutionary tendencies. 
This function makes clear that the Weberian idea of parliament as ‘a counter-
force, a representation of those ruled by the administration’ does not always hold 
(Palonen 2019). During the Restoration and after the Revolution of 1830, most of 
the small states in Northern and Western Europe saw political reform under the 
watchful eye of the major powers that surrounded them, and they often depended 
on these nations. In 1813, the Netherlands became a new monarchy, followed by 
Belgium in 1830, and both countries installed a senate (Witte, this volume). Swe-
den chose the parvenu Bernadotte as its king in 1818. Finland was torn loose from 
Sweden in 1809, and the Russian tsar became, from the Finnish point of view, a 
new monarch. Even Ireland, as MacCartheigh and Martin (this volume) remind 
us, was in an entirely new political situation after the failed rebellion and French 
intervention of 1798. The country lost its own Parliament after the Act of Union 
with Great Britain in 1800.
Once established, we see that senates periodically encountered crises related to 
wars, nationalist movements and the call for democratisation, which would later 
force the houses to legitimise and reform their role and function. This becomes 
clear in the second part of this volume, titled Democracy, the people and the 
senate, which primarily covers the period after the Revolution of 1848 and the 
1860s until well into the early twentieth century, when nationalism and universal 
suffrage threatened or disrupted the existing order. Ultimately, these processes 
led to the Canadian federal constitution of 1867 (Smith, D. E., this volume) and 
to the installation and reformation of senates in a more conservative direction in 
Denmark (Skjæveland, this volume) and Sweden (Nilsson, this volume) in the 
1860s. As the position of monarchs became less important over the nineteenth 
century and foreign powers stepped back, senates could – though not always 
along a linear path, as the case of Denmark shows – evolve in another, more 
conservative direction which came down to representing the interests of the elite 
(Verstegen, this volume). Colin Grittner (this volume) especially makes clear that, 
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in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Canadian landed elite supported the 
idea of creating an elective upper chamber with high property qualifications for 
voters at the provincial level to safeguard their interests, though they did not suc-
ceed. In Sweden, these attempts were more successful (Nilsson, this volume), and 
in Denmark, a new Senate became a conservative bulwark in 1866, successfully 
dominating Danish politics until 1901 (Bijleveld & Verstegen 2015). Neverthe-
less, as the cases of Belgium and Sweden illustrate, representing the interests 
of the elites did not necessarily mean that the senates blocked all changes. The 
Swedish upper house was quite progressive in an economic perspective (Nilsson, 
this volume), while Belgian senators saw it as their (conservative) duty to ‘the 
people’ to democratise (Beyen, this volume). In Finland however, the support 
for a house of second thought gradually faded as the confidence in ‘the people’ 
undermined the perceived necessity of a separate chamber, and the lack of foreign 
intervention during the Russian Revolution of 1905 gave Finns the room to decide 
not to install a senate.
By the twentieth century, parliamentarism and universal suffrage had been 
accepted, and ‘the people’ had become the true sovereign of the state; as such, 
senates started meeting new challenges. They had to reformulate their legitimacy; 
the claim that senates were ‘representative bodies’ came in for strong criticism, 
which becomes clear in the third part of this volume, titled Does a state still 
need a senate? An interesting case here is Ireland. After the First World War, 
strong foreign intervention led to the installation of a senate. Dorney (this volume) 
makes clear that British interference negatively influenced the legitimacy of the 
Irish Senate, which was considerably reformed from above in the 1930s. As we 
approach the twentieth century, we get closer to the existing literature on senates, 
in which legitimacy is a central issue. An interesting case here is Canada, where, 
according to Adam Coombs (this volume), after the First World War, attacking the 
existence of the Senate was an electoral strategy employed by the Prime Minister. 
In Ireland, the ruling party, Fianna Fáil, used the same argument in the 1930s 
(Dorney, this volume). Such opportunism is a forgotten aspect in the history of 
senates.
These events lead to the next question: why were senates abolished in some 
countries in the twentieth century but not in others? Some of them proved difficult 
to abolish for different reasons, as Meg Russell and Mark Sandford (2002) argued 
convincingly and as David E. Smith (this volume) illustrates for the Canadian 
case and Bert van den Braak (this volume) for that of the Netherlands. Senates 
have been criticised for having too little power or too much power, for being a 
carbon copy of the lower chamber, for not being democratic enough etc. (Rus-
sel & Sandford 2002). In some cases, the critique resulted in their abolition, as 
Asbjørn Skjæveland (this volume) and Joakim Nergelius (this volume) discuss 
for Denmark and Sweden, respectively. From a Nordic perspective, the question 
of whether a state needs a senate can be answered with a clear ‘no’. These coun-
tries have proven that stable democracies can easily do without a senate, but they 
still look for institutions that facilitate reflection and second thought and politi-
cal representation of the people. In the Netherlands, Ireland and Canada, despite 
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endless criticism, senates are still in ‘full swing’, with the Irish Senate surviving 
a referendum on its abolition in 2013 (MacCartheigh & Martin, this volume). The 
Dutch Senate has succeeded in enhancing its power (Van den Braak, this volume) 
and the Canadian Senate has even managed to secure new roles (Cardinal, this 
volume). In Canada, the Senate has gained importance as an institute for ethnic 
and gender representation, while in Ireland, the Seanad was meant to represent 
religious and professional groups in society (O’Donoghue, this volume). This 
ability to reform themselves contests the broadly accepted notion that senates are 
inevitably on their way out. Some would even say that states need senates or at 
least need the room to reflect on legislation.
Theory and history
There is already extensive literature on bicameral systems, especially concerning 
the people’s assemblies and the upper houses of major political powers. The dig-
itisation of newspapers and the proceedings of upper houses and the availability of 
comparative data – as provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, for instance – 
have led to a rise in the number of specialised books on senates, but it is widely 
accepted that the topic still needs more attention (Baldwin & Shell 2001). More 
specifically, Schnatterer (2015), based on a database of more than 1,000 studies 
published from 1970 onwards, has noticed that academics are becoming more 
interested in senates, though this has mainly resulted in studies of senates in rela-
tion to the people’s assemblies. Little research has, however, been conducted into 
their internal dynamics. Our study falls within a more recent trend, as perceived 
by Schnatterer and taking a more actor-centred approach. Still, in these studies, 
senates are not normally associated with political turmoil. On the contrary, they 
are considered to be perhaps the most stable element within any parliamentary 
system. This is probably the legacy of Montesquieu, being the darling of many 
theories about the balance of political forces within states. The fact that senates 
are supposed to stabilise a parliamentary system does not mean that they actu-
ally do so. The nineteenth-century examples of Denmark and Sweden make clear 
that senates can block necessary reforms while undermining their own legitimacy 
(Skjæveland, this volume; Nilsson, this volume). The crises we referred to in our 
conference ‘Senates in Crises’ are firstly those moments in history when the exist-
ence of senates was in jeopardy. Secondly and more frequently, these crises are 
moments of political upheaval, which saw the installation, prerogatives, work-
ings and organisation of senates change. As the chapters by Bert van den Braak 
(this volume) about the Netherlands and by David E. Smith (this volume) about 
Canada make clear, these changes were not necessarily formal in nature. Senates 
can adapt and take on a different role without any constitutional change, which is 
the phenomenon that inspired the title of this volume.
Many studies focus on the legitimisation of senates. Blom (1992, p. 22) calls 
bicameralism a ‘systematically inconvenient aspect of modern parliamentarism’. 
Authors offer a wide range of reasons for the justification of their endurance. 
Here, we see the idea echoed that bicameralism is a reflection of the past, if not 
Post-revolutionary senate reform 9
an impediment for a genuinely democratic future. In this interpretation, a sen-
ate or an upper chamber is a historical successor of the estate of the nobility, 
which is incorrect. As Coakley has pointed out, the way estates functioned in 
historical times was much more complicated, and they were more than just a 
prelude to modern bicameralism. In addition, it is argued that the idea that the 
bicameral system in England was a model for other nations is a political myth, 
both in theory and in practice (Coakley 2014; Drexhage 2015; Haas 2010). The 
problem here is that when we take the British parliamentary system as the model 
of an early bicameral system, theoretical notions of bicameralism create a mythi-
cal history for senates that overlook the huge, innovative jump that was made in 
the Revolutionary Age. The emergence of senates is related to modern constitu-
tional state-building – starting with the American Senate – and is not a remnant of 
pre-revolutionary times. The novelty of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
senates is often overlooked (Haas 2010). As Drexhage (2015) rightly points out, 
‘the American Senate was the first example of a bicameral system that was not 
intended to represent different estates or social classes’.
Our volume deviates from the standard approach of investigating and analysing 
the present-day differences between senates in a selection of countries, treating 
the past as a prelude to the present. It is obvious that the literature on senates has 
focused greatly on the making of classifications and typologies, mostly elaborat-
ing further on the work of Arend Lijphart, in order to get a grip of the subject. 
However, we can agree with Blom that the subject is too amorphous to do so 
successfully, as all classifications differ according to the theoretical hypotheses 
scholars try to prove (cf. Blom 1992; Russell 2000; Haas 2010; Drexhage 2015). 
Interpreting bicameralism as a relic of the past explains why, on a more theoretical 
level, studies about senates often start by wondering why they have not yet disap-
peared altogether (Coakley 2014; Haas 2010; Bijleveld & Verstegen 2019). On 
the contrary, as Nikolaj Bijleveld pointed out during a workshop in Amsterdam, 
recent decades show a revival of bicameralism in newly established (non-federal) 
democracies (cf. Coakley 2014).
Although the chapters presented here are written within the framework of 
nation states, they offer a wide range of insights about the history of senates. 
Of course, all the states considered here have their own peculiarities. Canada, 
for instance, until recently had far fewer inhabitants than the great powers in the 
Atlantic world and could therefore be considered a ‘minor power’, similar to the 
other nations covered here. Because of the country’s growth from the middle of 
the nineteenth century onwards, however, as well as its sheer size and federal 
structure, the role of its Senate is different from what is found in minor powers in 
Europe. In general, a strong link can be noted between federalism and bicameral-
ism (Drexhage 2015). Nevertheless, when comparing the function and the role 
of senates in federal and unitary states, this link becomes less relevant (Coakley 
2014). The effectiveness of upper chambers in federations was recently discussed 
in Gamper (2018).
Much like Canada, Ireland was part of the British Commonwealth for a long 
time and has a traumatic history that cannot be seen elsewhere in the North 
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Atlantic (MacCartheigh & Martin, this volume). Other countries also have their 
own historic peculiarities: we have already mentioned the Belgian revolution of 
1830 (Witte, this volume) and the Schleswig Wars between Germany and Den-
mark (Christiansen, this volume), which influenced the shaping of the upper 
houses. Senates tend to reflect nations’ typical political cultures (Haas 2010) 
and the specific circumstances under which they were established and reformed. 
Furthermore, the way they were embedded in national political systems strongly 
influenced their possibility to adapt and reform, and this level of flexibility proved 
to be very important to senates since it could make the difference between either 
abolition or survival and even adaptation to new roles.
Though each state has a history of its own, comparisons between states are very 
useful as we do not just focus on how senates function within a national frame-
work. We compare how senates, according to political reformers, should function 
and how they adapted or could adapt to new circumstances. The way reformers 
envisioned the roles of senates was influenced by what happened in neighbouring 
countries and reflected these issues and political problems. Senates changed both 
in crises and because of crises. Above all, reformers sought to (re-)invent senates 
in order to prevent the reocurrence of political crises, at home or elsewhere, or to 
adapt them to new political ideologies and practices.
Without aiming to endorse senates – as we know that states can do without 
them – we think our fascination with the subject is at least partly due to the fact 
that senates, as we know them now, were once a new phenomenon, part and parcel 
of the modern Western world, and managed to ride the high tide of democratic 
reforms.
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Part I
The need for a senate  
(c. 1790–1870)    

Introduction
This chapter explores the concept of bicameralism and the idea of a senate in the 
constitutional debates and (draft) constitutions of the most important revolution-
ary states on the European continent at the turn of the eighteenth century. Although 
this volume deals with senates in smaller states, it is, for a proper understanding 
of the paths that were taken in such small states, indispensable to start with the 
constitutional debate that took place in France after the Reign of Terror. In the first 
section I will analyse a particular moment in this debate that marks the transition 
away from unicameralism but, as I will argue, not quite towards bicameralism.
In the second section of this chapter, I will move on to show how the French 
constitution of Year III and the programmatic text accompanying it shaped the 
constitutions of the so-called Sister Republics. One of the most durable of the 
Sister Republics was the Batavian Republic, which was founded in 1795 and 
comprised the territories of the early modern Dutch Republic. In the Batavian 
Republic, the constitutional debate about the organisation of legislature was more 
complex and better documented than in the other Sister Republics, so I will dis-
cuss this debate separately in the third section. The examples provided in this 
chapter demonstrate that, in the Age of Revolution, the idea of bicameralism still 
had the potential to develop in very different directions and that in the minds of 
the revolutionary generation, the concept of a senate, while usually associated 
with mature age and experience, was not necessarily linked to the functions com-
monly performed by upper houses in modern bicameral systems.
France
In the summer of 1794, the French Reign of Terror came to an end with the fall 
of the Committee of Public Safety (Comité de Salut Public) led by Robespierre. 
In the years that followed – the period we know as the Thermidorean Reaction – 
the dominant explanation of how the Terror had come about was that the national 
convention (Convention Nationale) had made a rash and impulsive decision by 
giving a few of its members – Robespierre cum suis – too much power (Gueniffey 
2000). In the eyes of the Thermidoreans, the situation had escalated because there 
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had been no constitution since the summer of 1792. A new constitution had been 
presented and approved in 1793, but it was never implemented.
In April 1795, eleven members of the national convention – which, for the time 
being, continued to exist – were given the task of adapting the 1793 constitution 
in such a way that it could be put into effect. In June 1795, this committee pre-
sented a draft constitution during a plenary session of the convention. Committee 
member Pierre Daunou had been the principal architect of the draft, but the report 
with which the draft was introduced had been written by Daunou’s fellow member 
François-Antoine de Boissy d’Anglas, who also read it in the convention (Boissy 
d’Anglas 1795; cf. Jainchill 2008; Bozec 1996).
The committee started out by stating that it had attempted to keep the good 
elements of the 1793 constitution but that it had come to the conclusion that this 
was impossible (Boissy d’Anglas 1795; cf. Morabito 1996). The committee had 
therefore decided to write an entirely new draft, which it had tried to do in such a 
way that there would never be a second Terror. The committee had devoted much 
attention reforming the legislature, in particular. Boissy d’Anglas reminded his 
colleagues in the Convention that no one knew better than they what could happen 
with a system consisting of just one assembly: ‘You know well to what a point the 
audacity of some wretches, the usurped popularity of a demagogue, and the con-
tinual sport of factions may mislead an assembly without reins or counterpoise’ 
(Boissy d’Anglas quoted in Plan of the New Constitution 1795, p. 4).
The committee had therefore deemed it necessary to split the legislature into 
two assemblies, which would each represent a different power. The Council of 
Five Hundred (Conseil des Cinq-Cents) would propose legislation; the Coun-
cil of Elders (Conseil des Anciens), consisting of 250 members, would reject or 
approve laws proposed by the Council of Five Hundred. The committee defended 
the choice for two legislative councils, which had been weighed and found want-
ing in earlier phases of the French Revolution, by pointing to the constitutions of 
the various American States (Boissy d’Anglas 1795; Jourdan 2008).
The Thermidorean constitutional committee had conceived of this new legisla-
ture within a classical republican framework. Its main source of inspiration was a 
French adaptation of the political treatise A defence of the constitutions of govern-
ment of the United States of America, written in 1787 by John Adams (cf. Gauchet 
1995). This adaptation was produced by Lamare (Adams 1792), about whom little 
is known. Adams had interpreted the constitutions of the various American states 
in the light of the theory of mixed government, which prescribed that the ideal 
type of government consisted of democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical ele-
ments that kept each other in balance (cf. Walsh 1915; Richard 1995). To Adams, 
the first two elements in the American state constitutions were represented by the 
two assemblies of the legislature. The indispensable third element, in Adams’s 
eyes, was an independent executive power – the state governor in the case of the 
American states. In one of the first sentences of his Defence, Adams introduced 
the expression ‘checks and balances’, by which he meant the totality of constitu-
tional mechanisms of control through which the various powers in a mixed gov-
ernment were kept in place (cf. Wootton 2006).
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In the United States, the concept of checks and balances had, in the following 
years, become a popular way to describe the American version of mixed govern-
ment. Apart from this, Adams’s Defence had not met with much enthusiasm from 
the framers of the US federal constitution, who convened in Philadelphia around 
the time of its publication. The problem was that Adams’s explanation of the the-
ory of mixed government did not remind Americans of their state constitutions as 
much as it reminded them of the hated political system of the British monarchy 
from which they had only recently freed themselves. The fact that Adams con-
sidered the senate to be the aristocratic element in the state constitutions made 
Americans think of the privileged position the House of Lords held within British 
society (cf. Wood 1969; Rakove 1997).
The leading framers also had the system of mixed government in mind, but to 
them, the three elements of this system were not represented by the two assem-
blies of the legislature and the president but by Congress as a whole, the courts, 
and the president respectively. Thus, the framers combined mixed government 
with the three powers – legislative, executive, and judicial – that, in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, were usually associated with the work of Mon-
tesquieu. Their checks and balances primarily consisted of the presidential veto 
over the decisions of Congress, the principle of judicial review, and the right of 
Congress to exert control over certain presidential competences (Gwyn 1965; Vile 
1967; Manin 1994).
The Thermidorean constitutional committee, by contrast, went along with 
Adams’s view on the system of checks and balances. The committee was aware 
of the possible negative associations this view could invoke. It tried to tackle 
potential criticism by stating that the Council of Elders should be considered 
an aristocratic body in the functional sense of the word, not in the social sense 
(Boissy d’Anglas 1795). Quoting the French adaptation of Adams’s Defence, 
Boissy d’Anglas said in the convention ‘that there is no good government, no 
stable constitution, without the balance of the three powers’ (the two powers of 
the legislature and the executive power) (Boissy d’Anglas 1795, p. 46). The three 
powers that were identified by the committee represented three different func-
tions: proposing, ratifying, and executing legislation.
For the French, this new orientation on a text that was produced at the margins 
of the American constitutional debate meant a radical break with previous theo-
retical underpinnings of their constitutional framework. Rousseau and Sieyes, 
until that moment the most influential theorists of the French Revolution, were 
both indebted to a tradition of monarchical thinkers, such as Bodin and Hob-
bes, who had rejected the theory of mixed government in their works (Manin 
1994; Richard 1995). The Thermidoreans tried to explain the Terror by resorting 
to a theory that had been made famous by Polybius in classical antiquity. In their 
eyes, the national convention founded in 1792 had had too many characteristics 
of direct democracy and, as the theory of mixed government predicted, France 
had therefore fallen into a state of anarchy on which Robespierre had been able to 
build his reign of terror (Boissy d’Anglas 1795). To avoid this happening in the 
future, the balance between the three powers now needed to be determined by the 
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constitution. Next to the two legislative powers that made up the legislature, the 
constitutional committee envisioned an executive that did not consist of a single 
person – as it did in the United States – but of an institution with five members, 
called the directory (Directoire) (Boissy d’Anglas 1795).
The executive did not have a veto in the French draft constitution, which was 
different from what Adams had advocated, nor could it exert influence on the 
legislative process in any other way. As some contemporaries observed, the con-
stitutional committee had dressed its constitution in the language of mixed gov-
ernment, but, in reality, the very essence of this theory, namely the mechanisms of 
control with which the different powers could keep each other in balance, could 
only be found in the legislative veto that was given to the Council of Elders. The 
committee had, in fact, opted for a form of separation of powers under the guise of 
a system of mixed government and checks and balances (Troper 1980; Gueniffey 
1993; Jainchill 2008).
The ambiguity of the committee’s position becomes clearer when we compare 
Boissy d’Anglas’s report to the draft constitution itself (Constitution de la Répub-
lique française 1795). The chapter on the legislature was called ‘Legislative Power’ 
(Pouvoir legislative) in the singular form, while the plural form would have been 
more consistent with the idea of two legislative powers. Moreover, the draft con-
stitution also contained chapters called ‘Executive Power’ (Pouvoir executive) and 
‘Judiciary Power’ (Pouvoir judiciaire), which suggests a more Montesquieuean 
understanding of the separation of powers. We may thus conclude that Daunou, the 
main author of the draft, and Boissy d’Anglas, the author of the committee report, 
represented two different intellectual strands within the constitutional committee.
In any event, the national convention adhered to the committee’s line of reason-
ing and accepted the system of checks and balances as the underlying principle on 
which the new constitution should be based. The new constitution, which created 
a Legislative Body (Corps legislative) consisting of two councils, was adopted by 
the convention on 22 August 1795. The first session of the two councils took place 
two months later (Lyons 1975; Woronoff 1984).
The Sister Republics
The constitution of Year III, as the French constitution of the year 1795 has 
become known, became an important point of reference in the various smaller 
republics within the French revolutionary sphere of influence, which are often 
called the Sister Republics (cf. Oddens, Rutjes & Jacobs 2015). These republics 
produced and in most cases adopted constitutions of their own. The constitutions 
of the Cisalpine Republic (founded in 1797 in present-day northern Italy), the 
Roman Republic (founded in 1798 in present-day central Italy), and the Helvetic 
Republic (founded in 1798 in present-day Switzerland) were imposed by French 
invaders after little or no constitutional debate, even if native constitutional think-
ers were occasionally involved in framing the draft constitutions (cf. Zaghi 1992; 
Formica 1994; Armando 2000; Böning 1998; Giuntella 1954; Montalcini & 
Alberti 1917; Holenstein 2015; Baumann 2013).
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Nevertheless, the chapters in these constitutions that deal with the legislature 
show both similarities and differences with respect to the French model that are 
worth considering (cf. Archivio delle Costituzioni Storiche 2006; Entwurf der 
helvetischen Staatsverfassung 1798). All three constitutions establish a legislature 
consisting of two assemblies: a larger assembly proposing laws and a smaller 
assembly sanctioning them. The Roman and Cisalpine constitutions, like the 
French constitution, call their legislature ‘Legislative Body’ (Corpo legislativo), 
while the Helvetic constitution opts for ‘Legislative Power’ (Pouvoir legislative, 
gezetsgebende Gewalt). In all three constitutions, the two assemblies of the legis-
lative branch are called, as they were in France, ‘councils’ rather than ‘chambers’ 
or ‘houses’. In France, as we have seen, the use of ‘council’ implied a system in 
which the two assemblies of the legislature were understood to be separate pow-
ers. The formulation of the first articles of both the Roman constitution (‘Il potere 
legislativo è esercitato da due consigli distinti e indipendenti l’uno dall’altro’) 
and the Helvetic constitution (‘Le pouvoir législatif est exercé par deux conseils 
distincts, séparés, indépendants l’un de l’autre’) suggests that this interpretation 
applied here as well.
The titles given to the councils vary. In the Cisalpine constitution, the two 
councils are called the Great Council (Gran Consiglio) and the Council of Elders 
(Consiglio dei Seniori). The Roman constitution opts for Tribune (Tribunato) and 
Senate (Senato), while the Helvetic constitution establishes the Great Council 
(Grand Conseil, Große Rath) and the Senate (Sénat, Senat). This nomenclature 
seems to have been partly inspired by classical antiquity (in the Roman case) and 
the early modern old regime (both Italian republics such as Venice and Genova 
and the cities of the Swiss confederation had legislative institutions that were 
called Great Council). The name change was unavoidable for the lower chambers, 
as they had fewer members than the French Council of Five Hundred. As for the 
upper chambers, the various alternatives are obviously close to the French title in 
an etymological sense, because the original Latin senatus translates as ‘assembly 
of elders’.
Were the members of the various upper chambers in fact envisioned to be older 
or more experienced than those of the lower chambers? In the French and Cisal-
pine constitution, (male) citizens would have to be over 40 and 30 respectively to 
be eligible; in the Roman Republic, this was 35 and 25 respectively. According 
to the Helvetic constitution, members of the great council would have to be over 
25; members of the Senate, over 30. On top of that, however, to be eligible for 
the Senate, citizens would have to be former members of the Helvetic Directory 
(comparable to the French Directoire), the great council, or one of the executive 
or judicial state institutions, and they would have to be married or widowed.
There are also Sister Republics where constitutions were drafted more inde-
pendently from France. One such republic was the short-lived Parthenopean or 
Neapolitan Republic (founded in 1799 in the former Kingdom of Naples) (cf. 
Battaglini 1992; Rao 1994). In the latter republic, which has been called the most 
autonomous of the Italian Sister Republics, a constitutional committee produced 
a draft constitution (Ferrari 2015). This draft was never put into effect, because 
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King Ferdinand VI was restored to power after six months, but it is worthwhile 
considering it because it is accompanied by a report written by Mario Pagano 
(1799), the principal author of the draft, in which the committee’s choices are 
accounted for. Pagano lauded the constitution of Year III, and the Neapolitan 
draft generally follows the French model, but there is a significant difference with 
regard to the legislature in particular.
Pagano wrote that his committee had maintained the French idea of a legisla-
ture consisting of two parts because it slowed down the legislative process and 
gave laws their necessary maturity. The committee had come to the conclusion, 
however, that it was better to attribute the function of proposing laws to a small 
body of older men than to a larger assembly of younger men. In doing so, the com-
mittee had not only followed the example of the ancient republics but also thought 
of a number of reasons itself. In larger assemblies, discussions tended to get side-
tracked and lost in details. As for the proper age of the members, proposing laws 
required ‘cool analysis’ rather than ‘bold genius’. Sanctioning laws, on the other 
hand, was something that could best be done by assemblies consisting of many 
members because that meant that draft legislation would be considered from all 
possible sides. Therefore, the committee proposed a legislature in which a senate 
(Senato) of fifty members proposed legislation, while a council (Consiglio) of 
120 members was given the legislative veto. Members of the council needed to be 
over 30, but members of the senate needed to be over 40, married or widowed, and 
former members of the departmental government or the judiciary.
The most durable of the Sister Republics proved to be the Batavian Republic, 
which replaced the Republic of the Seven United Provinces after the invasion 
of a combined army of French troops and Dutch exiles in January 1795. Unlike 
their counterparts in most other Sister Republics, the Dutch revolutionaries were 
allowed relatively more leeway to conduct their own process of constitution-
building by the French République mère (cf. Oddens 2012b; Rutjes 2012a; Gri-
jzenhout, Van Sas & Velema 2013). Until 1801, the French intervened no more 
than a few times. As we will see in the next section, however, one of these inter-
ventions in particular had important consequences for the way the legislature was 
to be organised.
The Batavian Republic
Between 1796 and 1798, a national assembly (Nationale Vergadering) of 126 
members convened in The Hague. This deliberative assembly, which had legisla-
tive, executive, and constituent powers, served as a provisional governing body 
that was from the outset supposed to be replaced by a new legislature after the rati-
fication of a written constitution (cf. Oddens 2012b). After it had been constituted, 
the national assembly selected, in accordance with what it had been instructed, a 
committee of twenty-one members to frame a draft constitution.
None of the members of the national assembly had any doubt that the specific 
circumstances of the Batavian Republic required a new and original constitution. 
Their constitutional thinking was shaped not only by the recent developments in 
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France but also by their own history and the history of other ancient and modern 
republics. However, with regard to the particular question of how the legisla-
tive branch of government was to be organised, there were considerably fewer 
examples they deemed legitimate. As children of the Enlightenment, the mem-
bers of the national assembly were prepared to seriously consider only exam-
ples grounded in ‘experience’ (ondervinding). From ancient history, the Batavian 
revolutionaries did not know of any cases of representative government (cf. Dag-
verhaal 1796–1798, Vol. 4; Rutjes 2012b). In the more recent past, there was, of 
course, the example of British Parliament, but the Batavian revolutionaries had 
read Thomas Paine carefully enough to be convinced that true representative gov-
ernment could not exist in a monarchical state. The very word ‘parliament’ said 
enough for them: this suggested a talking shop without real power, a consultative 
assembly of sorts that could not make any legitimate claim towards exercising the 
sovereignty of the people (Dagverhaal 1796–1798, Vol. 4).
The only kind of experience that the members of the national assembly deemed 
relevant pertained to representative government in free republics, such as their 
own. This brought their possible examples down to two: the United States of 
America and France. Of these, the Unites States was known to the Batavians as 
a republic that had prospered from the very moment it was founded and that was 
not torn by internal discord. Yet in the Dutch constitutional debate, the American 
model played only a minor role (cf. Rowen 1977; Schulte Nordholt 1988; Oddens 
2012a). This was primarily due to the greater geographical distance, which meant 
the Batavians had only a superficial knowledge of the American political realities 
(Jourdan 2008). Moreover and somewhat paradoxically, the French example held 
more weight for the Batavians precisely because the revolution in France had 
recovered from a major crisis, and in the United States, at least as far as they could 
see, the political system had never been seriously tested. So it happened that the 
experience of the French Reign of Terror was very much present in the Batavian 
debate. The fundamental issue in this debate was the question of to which extent 
the French precedent was actually applicable to the Batavian situation.
One of the questions taken up by the Batavian constitutional committee was 
whether the legislature would consist of one or two assemblies. Both in the com-
mittee and in the plenum of the national assembly – which subsequently dis-
cussed the committee’s draft constitution – two positions emerged. The majority 
position was in favour of two assemblies. The principal argument for dividing 
the legislative branch into two assemblies was the argument, by now familiar to 
us, that in a legislature consisting of a single assembly, abuse of power would be 
unavoidable: demagogues would inevitably capture such a Parliament, and the 
result would be either despotism or anarchy (Dagverhaal 1796–1798, Vol. 3). 
This argument seems to have been directly inspired by the report of the French 
constitutional committee, written by Boissy d’Anglas, which was referred to 
explicitly (Oddens 2012b).
The mostly radical Batavian deputies, who argued against two assemblies, 
did not fear an anarchical or despotic legislative branch as much as they feared 
an all-too-powerful executive who could divide, conquer, and dominate a weak 
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legislature. Moreover, they feared that two independently elected assemblies 
would lead to class distinction: the esprit de corps that would develop in each 
of the two assemblies would spill over into society at large, making the egalitar-
ian Batavian Republic a second Great Britain, with its Commons and Lords (De 
Gou 1975).
The radicals also thought it wrong to follow the French example in this respect. 
While in France it had proved necessary to split the legislature because of the 
passionate national character of the French and because a large country such as 
France required a large legislative body with many members, the phlegmatic char-
acter of the Dutch and the fact that the Batavian Republic was a far less populous 
country made a legislature consisting of a single assembly the preferable option 
(Dagverhaal, Vol. 3, pp. 677–679). The moderate deputies were not convinced by 
the national character argument. As one deputy put it: ‘All humans are humans; 
they all have the same passions’ (Dagverhaal, Vol. 4, p. 721).
The advocates of the two-assembly system won the first battle in the constitu-
tional debate: the constitution that was drafted by the national assembly contained 
a plan for a legislature with two ‘chambers’ that were called great chamber (Grote 
Kamer) and chamber of elders (Kamer der Oudsten) (De Gou 1983–1985). The 
war over the legislature, however, was not yet won. The draft constitution was 
subjected to a plebiscite and rejected by an overwhelming majority of the eligi-
ble voters in the summer of 1797 (cf. De Jong 2018). A new national assembly 
was elected, which nominated a new constitutional committee. This committee 
considered a new variant in which parliamentary debates would first take place in 
two separate assemblies, after which these assemblies would be merged for a final 
debate and vote. The majority of the committee, however, was now in favour of a 
unicameral legislature (De Gou 1988–1990).
The second constitutional committee would never present a full draft con-
stitution to the second national assembly, as an impatient radical minority in 
the assembly staged – with the assent of the French envoy in The Hague and 
the generals commanding the French-Batavian military troops in the Batavian 
Republic – a parliamentary coup in an attempt to force a breakthrough in the dead-
locked constitutional process in January 1798. They deposed their most important 
political opponents in the national assembly and renamed the remaining rump 
parliament the ‘constituent assembly’ (Constituerende Vergadering). They also 
created a provisional executive (Intermediair Uitvoerend Bewind) modelled after 
the French directory and instituted a new constitutional committee.
This third committee, which now consisted wholly of radicals, tended even 
more strongly towards a single assembly than the previous one had, but it now 
found the directory in its way. In exchange for its support of the coup, the French 
Government demanded a say in the drafting of the constitution and provided the 
committee with a list of demands they wanted to be respected, probably drawn up 
by French Director La Révellière-Lépeaux. Aided by the total French ignorance 
of the Dutch language, the committee got away with taking much less notice of 
these demands than the French Government would have wished, but it proved 
impossible to ignore the demands of two legislative assemblies: an attempt to 
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adopt the compromise that had been considered by the second committee earlier 
was blocked by the French envoy. Thus, the third constitutional committee of the 
Batavian Republic ultimately settled for a legislature with two assemblies in the 
draft constitution that was again subjected to and this time ratified by the people 
on 23 April 1798. The radical regime that was responsible for this constitution 
was overthrown by a counter-coup the following June, but the more moderate 
regime that assumed power through this coup decided to maintain the constitu-
tion, so the new ‘Representative Body’ (Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam) stipulated 
by the constitution was constituted on 31 July 1798.
The system that had finally been adopted had certain elements in common with 
its counterparts in France and other Sister Republics, but it also had a number 
of distinctive features. The names featured in the first draft constitution – the 
great chamber and chamber of elders – were abandoned for the more neutral ‘first 
chamber’ (Eerste Kamer) and ‘second chamber’ (Tweede Kamer), which were 
intended to eliminate any suggestion of the two chambers representing different 
social classes. The function of approving or rejecting draft legislation was – in 
contrast to the modern Dutch Parliament, where the first chamber is the upper 
chamber – fulfilled by the second chamber.
Furthermore, the first and the second chambers were not elected independently 
of one another. The constitution established an electoral system that divided the 
Batavian Republic into districts. The number of districts depended on the size of 
the population: one district per twenty thousand inhabitants. At the time of the 
first elections, there were ninety-four districts, each of which elected a deputy for 
the Representative Body. Every year, elections were held in a third of the districts, 
replacing a third of the deputies. While this element was also present in the French 
constitutions of 1793 and 1795, an innovative feature was that every year after the 
elections had taken place and the new deputies had assumed office, all deputies 
convened in a joint session and elected thirty members for the second chamber, 
leaving the remaining members to constitute the first chamber (Staatsregeling 
voor het Bataafsche Volk 1798).
This particular legislative system was designed by a constitutional committee 
that had not wanted two assemblies in the first place and that considered this vari-
ant, which was believed to avoid the formation of esprit de corps in either of the 
chambers, the lesser of two evils. The fact that the members of the second cham-
ber were to be elected by their peers and not chosen by ballot implies some notion 
of a chambre de réflexion, but the age difference between the members of the two 
assemblies stipulated by the constitutions of all the other republics discussed ear-
lier was absent in the Batavian Republic. In practice, the thirty deputies who were 
elected members of the second chamber during the joint session of 31 July 1798 
turned out to be neither older nor better educated nor more experienced than those 
deputies who, as a result, were to constitute the first chamber.
The first constitutional Parliament of the Netherlands, which existed for thirty-
eight months, has hardly been studied by historians, so it is difficult to assess 
how well it functioned (Oddens 2015). What is clear is that, at least according to 
part of the new political establishment, it did not function well enough, because 
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on 17 September the representative body was disbanded in another coup d’état. 
This coup was preceded by a conflict between the legislature and the executive 
about revision of the constitution. While the present constitution stipulated that 
revisions could not be made before 1804, three of the five members of the rul-
ing ‘Executive Government’ (Uitvoerend Bewind) had nevertheless commis-
sioned the drafting of a new constitution. The main argument used by advocates 
of constitutional revision was that, over the past three years, discord in Parlia-
ment had obstructed the legislative process (Alkemade 2014). While they did 
not so much attack the bicameral system as such, the new constitution that was 
eventually implemented after the coup had a single assembly of only thirty-five 
members, called ‘Legislative Body’ (Wetgevend Lichaam). This assembly actu-
ally functioned as an upper chamber, as it could only approve or reject proposed 
legislation; the executive power had been given the exclusive right of initiative 
(Staatsregeling des Bataafschen volks 1801). The Netherlands would henceforth 
remain without a bicameral system until the creation of the States-General of the 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815 (Oddens 2015).
Conclusion
While all the constitutions discussed in this chapter established legislatures consist-
ing of two assemblies, I have in most cases refrained from calling them bicameral. 
To the constitutional committee that was responsible for the drafting of the French 
constitution of Year III – or at least to the author of the influential programmatic 
text that accompanied this constitution – the two assemblies of the legislature rep-
resented two different powers in a constitutional system of checks and balances. 
The assemblies were not called ‘chambers’ but ‘councils’: in this interpretation, 
the two assemblies were seen not as two chambers of the same legislative edifice 
but as entirely separate institutions. Given that the legislative assemblies were 
also called ‘councils’ in the constitutions of most of the other Sister Republics and 
that it was stressed even more than in France that they were ‘distinct, separate and 
independent from one another’, this seems to have been the leading interpretation 
throughout the French sphere of influence from 1795 onwards.
Another common feature in the constitutions of most of the revolutionary repub-
lics was that one of the two councils was more limited in number and reserved 
for older, more experienced men. These councils were called ‘Council of Elders’ 
or ‘Senate’, which etymologically comes down to the same thing. In most cases 
these councils were vested with the power of sanctioning legislation, but in one 
of the discussed constitutions, that of the Parthenopean or Neapolitan Republic, 
the smaller, more experienced council was attributed the function of drafting and 
proposing legislation.
In both respects, the Batavian Republic is the exception. In the Dutch debates 
leading to the draft constitution of 1797, the word ‘council’ had been consid-
ered for the legislative assemblies, but a majority of the members of the national 
assembly ultimately opted for the word ‘Chamber’ precisely because they felt that 
‘council’ implied two legislative bodies that were fully separate from one another, 
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which was something they – unlike the French – did not desire (Dagverhaal, Vol. 
4; Oddens 2012b). One might argue, therefore, that the Batavians were the only 
revolutionaries in continental Europe who, at some point in their constitution-
making process, envisioned a bicameral legislature in the present-day sense of 
one institution with two branches.
In subsequent debates, the choice for ‘Chamber’ was always maintained, but 
the initial plan to create a ‘Chamber of Elders’, which can still be found in the 
1797 draft constitution, was never realised. This plan was abandoned in the Bata-
vian Republic because a radical minority in the national assembly did not want 
a bicameral legislature at all. When these radicals assumed power with French 
support and drafted the constitution that was to be adopted in 1798, they saw 
themselves forced to give in to the French demand of two assemblies, but they 
were careful not to allow any social differentiation between the ‘first chamber’ 
and the ‘second chamber’ – neither in title nor in composition nor even in the way 
the members of both chambers were elected by the people.
The late eighteenth-century revolutions gave rise to the construction of a first 
generation of parliamentary systems on the European continent. Politicians and 
intellectuals assigned with the framing of constitutions considered political writ-
ings and existing foreign models, but their understanding of these examples was 
coloured by their own political experiences and by the constitutional history of their 
state or its predecessors. Their constitution-building process was further shaped by 
internal political struggles and by varying degrees of foreign intervention. These 
dynamics resulted in a number of outcomes that might appear quite similar to each 
other in comparison to later generations of parliamentary systems but on closer 
inspection have significant differences with regard to the organisation of the legis-
lature, its nomenclature, and its place within the constitutional balance of power.
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Norway in a Scandinavian context
The constitution of Norway remains primarily a national phenomenon, despite 
having borrowed important features from (international) political philosophy and 
foreign constitutions. National experiences must be understood in their social 
and historical context. In a number of important respects, Norway’s context is 
Scandinavia, where geographical and linguistic proximity and the presence of 
comparatively strong welfare states contribute to enhancing the impression of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden as a relatively homogeneous group of countries. 
Constitutionally, their common label as constitutional monarchies contributes to 
underpinning the impression of wide-reaching homogeneity. Even the presence of 
purely unicameral parliaments may appear to further confirm the impression of a 
strong cross-border community.
On the other hand, a closer look at the relevant constitutional systems uncov-
ers a number of reasons for warning against the temptation to ratify the impres-
sion of Scandinavian homogeneity. Learning about the systems of government 
that emerged in the two historical centres (Copenhagen and Stockholm) would 
provide a good starting point for those who strive to understand a number of 
differences between the three national systems in the field of constitutional law 
(Krunke & Thorarensen 2018). As a matter of fact, the position of Denmark and 
Sweden as two dominant and opposing powers since the late medieval period 
paved the way for important differences between the three western states that 
appeared later (Denmark and Norway, followed by Iceland) and the two eastern 
ones (Sweden, followed by Finland).
With the exception of the replacement of the absolute monarchy by a con-
stitutional one introduced by the constitution of 1814, Norway never aimed 
at completely abolishing key institutional patterns inherited from the absolute 
Danish-Norwegian monarchy (1661–1814) once its full statehood was re-
established. In the eastern part of the realm, the new state of Finland adopted 
a similar position regarding its Swedish heritage. Here, that position was 
even strengthened by the new state’s resistance to Russian influence within 
the framework of the newly created Grand Duchy (1809–1917), with the tsar 
acting as grand duke. This way, Scandinavia ended up with two overarching 
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systems of public law, albeit with internal differences between the states that 
have grown considerably over time.
The absence of any common Scandinavian heritage is patent even when 
it comes to these countries’ former bicameral (or similar) parliaments. In 
Denmark-Norway, the presence of an absolute monarchy left no room for a 
representative assembly. In Norway, that situation changed after 1814, but in 
Denmark it remained until the king finally curtailed his own absolute powers 
by ‘giving’ the country its first modern constitution in 1849. A bicameral par-
liament formed a key part of the new institutional apparatus in Denmark but 
changed its character over time. During a short period, the members of both 
chambers were elected according to relatively inclusive norms with regard to 
the right to vote. According to the second constitution (1866), adopted in the 
aftermath of Denmark’s military defeat against Prussia (1864), the major part 
of the members of the upper chamber (Landsting) was chosen by an electorate 
dominated by high-income groups, including the still powerful landowners, 
and twelve out of sixty-six members were appointed by the king (Christensen 
et al. 2016). Had the electoral turnout in the subsequent mandatory referen-
dum been sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the time, the 
conservative upper chamber would have been abolished by the new constitu-
tion adopted by Parliament in 1939. By contrast, the constitutional text on 
which Parliament voted (1953) in the aftermath of the Second World War 
passed the test of the mandatory referendum because of both positive support 
and sufficient turnout. Its main contribution to the institutional landscape was 
the establishment of the lower chamber (Folketing, meaning people’s assem-
bly) as Denmark’s single-chamber Parliament (cf. Christiansen, this volume; 
Skjæveland, this volume).
On the eastern shores of Øresund, royal power was less absolute. Sweden 
entered the nineteenth century with the inherited system of estates composed of 
not just three but four chambers (nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie and peasantry). 
The 1809 Instrument of Government kept this pattern until constitutional amend-
ments (1866) replaced it with a bicameral system whose upper chamber was 
elected by and among the members of the county and city councils for eight-year 
terms. From 1905, each of the two chambers was housed in two almost identical 
semicircular halls within the new Parliament, where the interaction between the 
members of the two chambers was further facilitated by architectural features 
such as a monumental corridor linking the two halls. Together with the existence 
of joint committees and, even more importantly, the emergence of a modern 
system of political parties, such features inevitably paved the way for the ulti-
mate abolishment of the bicameral system. The current unicameral Parliament 
(Riksdag) has been in place since 1971 (cf. Nergelius, this volume; Nilsson, this 
volume).
Chronology alone is sufficient to demonstrate that no Danish model was at 
hand when it came to the design of the new Parliament of Norway, nor did the 
1814 Constituent Assembly consider the age-old Swedish ‘model’ of four estates. 
How, then, did modern Norway’s bicameral system come about?
The quasi-bicameral system of Norway 31
How did the Norwegian bicameral system come about?
In the aftermath of the battle of Leipzig, the king of Denmark-Norway, an ally of 
Napoleon, was forced to hand over the kingdom of Norway to the king of Sweden 
by virtue of the Treaty of Kiel, concluded on 14 January 1814. From the Swed-
ish side, the main architect of the arrangement was not the old and childless king 
himself but Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, Napoleonic maréchal of France and elected 
crown prince of Sweden under the name Karl Johan (Charles Jean). The motiva-
tion for his wish to take over Norway was at least partly to compensate Sweden’s 
loss of its eastern provinces (now known as Finland) to the tsar of Russia (1809), 
without having to start new wars against the Russian Empire.
As a consequence of the king’s relinquishing his Norwegian realm, a group 
of prominent Norwegians considered themselves freed from their allegiance to 
the institution that they had considered as their legitimate head of state. Oppos-
ing the treatment of Norway as royal property to be handed over to the coun-
try’s hereditary enemy, they argued on the basis of the increasingly strong ideas 
about popular sovereignty and convinced the residing governor, Prince Christian 
Frederik of Denmark-Norway, to call a Constituent Assembly. Consisting of indi-
rectly elected members from all over the country, the assembly (Riksforsamling) 
gathered in April 1814 at Eidsvoll, north of Oslo, and unanimously adopted the 
Norwegian constitution six weeks later (17 May). Norway’s declaration of inde-
pendence was enshrined in the very first article, separate chapters inspired by the 
new philosophy of enlightenment dealt with the trias politica, and a number of 
citizen and human rights were included in the corpus, not just in a preamble or as 
additional text, like in the French and US constitutions.
By virtue of the norms enshrined in the constitution, the assembly elected the 
residing prince as the first constitutional king of Norway. Among other functions, 
he was the commander of the Norwegian armies during the short war following 
the Swedish attack led by Bernadotte in July–August. According to an armistice 
concluded in August 1814, King Christian Frederik convoked the country’s new 
Parliament for an extraordinary session, handed over his powers and abdicated in 
October of the same year. He returned to Denmark, where he later became the last 
king to remain an absolute monarch for his entire reign. In fact, King Christian 
VIII died the year before his successor accepted the first modern constitution in 
1849. Rather ironically, the young prince who called the Constituent Assembly 
of Norway, inspired by new ideas about popular sovereignty and was elected as 
king of Norway accordingly, refused to take a similar step before he died as king 
of his own homeland, Denmark. The armistice also required that the Norwegian 
constitution be amended in order to establish a kind of personal union between 
Sweden and Norway. By virtue of the amended text, the Parliament elected the 
king of Sweden as the king of Norway in November. The monarchy remained 
constitutional within the relatively unchanged institutional framework that had 
been established by the original constitution of 1814.
A key element of the constitution was the clause in Article 49: ‘The People exer-
cises the legislative power at the National Assembly, consisting of two sections, 
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viz. the Lag-Thing and the Odels-Thing’. In Norwegian, the text adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly explicitly spelled out the name of the plenary chamber 
(Storting or great assembly). As the common denominator of these three names is 
a word inspired by the name given to Norse medieval regional and local assem-
blies (thing), it should be regarded, of course, as an element of the post-1814 Nor-
wegian nation-building efforts based upon real or invented historical traditions. 
At present, we may leave aside that the provision about the legislative power in 
the hands of ‘the people’ was – and formally remains – inappropriate. That power 
does not belong to ‘the people’ alone but is shared between Parliament and the 
king in council. In fact, royal approbation is still required for a legislative text to 
become law (Article 78). Until 2007, the constitution vested the legislative power 
in one assembly split in two. The system has later been qualified as modified uni-
cameral (cf. Hoff 1951).
The Constituent Assembly had little time at its disposal to establish a new fait 
accompli before the probable arrival of the Swedish army. This contributes to 
explaining why no complete minutes exist for the deliberations. Nevertheless, a 
number of key elements are known, including several private draft constitutions 
submitted to the assembly. The bicameral system proposed by the most influential 
of these draft constitutions, written by lecturer Johan Gunder Adler and Judge 
Christian Magnus Falsen (Adler & Falsen 1814), was clearly inspired by ‘The 
constitution for the United States of America’. The importance of this draft was 
enhanced by the fact that Falsen himself acted as chairman of the Constituent 
Assembly’s committee charged with drafting the new constitution, and he some-
times served as president of the assembly itself. Those who supported the idea 
of a bicameral system as part of the new state apparatus needed to address, how-
ever, the fact that Norway nurtured no federal or regional elements even slightly 
similar to those underpinning the bicameral element of the US Congress. Since 
Norwegian nobility was already very limited and would, in any case, soon be 
abolished by the very same constitution, the idea of establishing something akin 
to the British House of Lords did not surface during the deliberations regarding 
the Constituent Assembly.
With few other credible external criteria at hand for the composition of an upper 
house for Norway, the Adler-Falsen draft constitution subsequently proposed a 
single assembly composed of representatives designated by common elections 
organised biennially. Once gathered, the assembly would elect one-fourth of 
its own members to sit in an upper chamber (Lagting), with the remaining MPs 
staffing the lower chamber (Odelsting). Seeing that members of the Lagting had 
six-year mandates, while two years was the general norm, they would not stand 
for election at the end of each ordinary electoral term. Despite its ingenuity, the 
Adler-Falsen proposal was not broadly supported at Eidsvoll, where many pre-
ferred a purely unicameral solution, which could potentially better ensure that 
the will of the majority was not hampered or delayed by a small group of more or 
less self-confident senators. Supported by a majority of fifty-four to fifty-two, the 
final outcome became a modified version of the Adler-Falsen model. According 
to the adopted rules, all members of the Parliament would be elected by virtue of 
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identical electoral rules, eligibility and geographical distribution. Once elected, 
however, the assembly would select one-fourth of its own members to sit in the 
upper chamber (Lagting). The three-year electoral mandate, however, applied to 
all. After a constitutional amendment adopted in 1938, the mandate was extended 
to four years.
It has been suggested that the solution was inspired by the 1801 constitution of 
the Batavian Republic (Stevens, Porier & Berg 2008), which was one of the texts 
considered by the leading figures during the preparation of the constitution for 
Norway. In addition to the US constitution, the list of foreign examples included 
the French 1791 constitution, the Batavian and Cadix constitutions, the Swedish 
1809 form of government and some of the North American state constitutions. 
According to Articles 49–52 of this short-lived republican text, a unicameral Par-
liament would select a minority of its own members to sit in a separate chamber. 
Institutionally, this feature may seem close both to the Adler-Falsen draft and to 
the final solution. When it came to the functions of the two ‘modified unicameral’ 
parliaments, however, the connection between the Batavian and Norwegian solu-
tions is considerably more distant. As a matter of fact, it seems as if the twelve 
members of the upper chamber of the Batavian Republic were selected in order 
to discuss legislative bills, while the plenary assembly was left with the task of 
approving or rejecting the texts subsequently submitted by the upper chamber 
(Article 50) (cf. Oddens, this volume). In fact, this solution appears to be much 
closer to a modern system of parliamentary commissions charged with the prepa-
ration of parliament’s final deliberations than to a system in which two sub-cham-
bers are bestowed with more or less equal powers in legislative affairs.
In comparison with the Norwegian system, the twelve Batavian ‘senators’ were 
tasked with duties that resembled those of the lower chamber (Odelsting) much 
more closely than those of the upper chamber (Lagting). In legislative affairs, the 
Lagting intervened after the lower chamber and was constrained to discussing and 
voting on bills that had already been adopted by the lower chamber. With regard 
to the latter, it had the choice between accepting them in their entirety or rejecting 
them, after which the final say was given to the plenary formation.
The sub-chambers as parts of Parliament
When it was originally adopted, the system was probably thought of as one in 
which most of the affairs that the constitution has vested in Parliament should be 
carried out by the sub-chambers, not in plenary sittings. However, the only subject 
matter for which the constitution clearly provided for deliberation by the sub-
chambers was ordinary statutes. For a bill to become law, it had to be approved 
first by the lower chamber and subsequently by the upper chamber, before finally 
being submitted for royal assent. In cases of disagreement between the two cham-
bers, a second navette was to be carried out. If the two chambers still disagreed, 
the Storting would have the final say but could only adopt a bill with the support 
of a two-thirds majority.
34 Eivind Smith
During the first decades of the new constitution, coinciding with the reign of 
maréchal Bernadotte as king of Norway (1818–1844), the royal veto power was 
used rather frequently. For a Parliament that grew increasingly opposed to the 
king, it thus became important to seek out new ways to avoid the need of obtain-
ing royal assent. It gradually appeared that the best way would be to get around 
the sub-chambers, to which the requirement of royal assent incontestably applied. 
The statutes (lov) for which this procedure was required were poorly specified 
in the constitution, which was one of the reasons that it was possible to exclude 
politically important matters, such as taxation and budgets, from the field of for-
mal statutory law, where both the consent of each sub-chamber and royal assent 
were needed. Instead, such issues were eventually deliberated in plenary sittings, 
thus avoiding the risk of a royal veto.
As part of the overall institutional picture, this development added to the fact 
that the power of constitutional amendment always belonged to the plenary 
assembly. Politically, if not in strictly legal terms, even the fact that the commis-
sions charged with the preparation of the affairs to be deliberated in the successive 
assemblies were essentially common to the entire Parliament paved the way for 
enhanced coherence across the sub-chamber divide. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, the Storting thus gradually became the key political element within the 
national assembly. As soon as ministerial responsibility emerged in parliamentary 
practice, even questions of non-confidence were systematically voted on in ple-
nary sittings.
Only in one field did the constitution keep the functions of the two sub- 
chambers entirely separate – criminal proceedings against ministers, members 
of Parliament and of the supreme court for their conduct ex officio had to be 
adjudicated by a special court (Riksretten, the national court). In such cases, it 
was up to the lower chamber alone to decide whether to initiate proceedings. 
Once proceedings had been initiated, the members of the upper chamber sat on 
the bench together with members of the supreme court in a three-to-two ratio. 
Moreover, the president of the Lagting, not the supreme court, acted as president 
of the national court. The national court was thus a strongly politicised institution. 
It was no surprise, then, that the majority in the parliament, in several of the eight 
cases adjudicated so far, made deliberate use of the possibilities that the system 
offered for ensuring that the verdict followed the preference of the majority. We 
will later discuss the most prominent of these cases – one that had a direct and 
rather dramatic bearing on the constitutional position of the Norwegian monarchy.
A solution shaped by the crisis?
The internal organisation of a parliament is a key part of any effort at drawing up 
a constitution. Two centuries ago, the question of bicameralism became part of 
those considerations. The answer given by the Constituent Assembly of Norway 
was nevertheless close to being negative, and the solution that was ultimately 
reached represents nothing more than the most careful version of a bicameral 
system. As such, the outcome looks more like a somewhat modified unicameral 
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system than a genuine two-chamber parliament. Why did the assembly neverthe-
less bother to adopt elements of bicameralism at all?
One option could be to see it as a product of Norway’s existential crisis, which 
gave rise to the Constituent Assembly itself, a crisis that continued to develop 
during the deliberations of the assembly. In fact, a military attack with the aim of 
ensuring respect for the Treaty of Kiel was expected once the Swedish army had 
had the time to return from the European continent after the end of the campaign 
against Napoleon’s armies. In retrospect, we know that the attack actually came 
in late July.
The deputies were perfectly aware of the overall political situation. As a con-
sequence, their main preoccupation during the deliberations at Eidsvoll was 
deciding whether to simply declare Norway’s independence or to explore the best 
possible union with Sweden, an outcome that influential groups among the depu-
ties regarded to be unavoidable anyway. By contrast, the assembly’s primary aim 
in drawing up a new constitution for Norway was not fundamentally questioned. 
In any case, a great number of the items regarding the shape of that instrument had 
little or nothing to do with the ongoing political crisis. In particular, nothing indi-
cates that the crisis itself influenced the various positions in favour of or against a 
kind of bicameral parliament. There are no indicators that the narrow outcome in 
favour of the weak form of bicameralism that actually found its way into the insti-
tutional apparatus of the new state had any visible bearing on the choice between 
full and limited independence.
An upper chamber in defence of the monarchy?
Another possible explanation might be that the bicameral solution was chosen 
as a kind protection of the monarchical government that would soon be adopted. 
However, formally retaining the monarchy in the constitution was not seriously 
questioned at Eidsvoll or in society, which suggests in itself that the very idea of 
having recourse to a form of bicameralism in defence of the monarchy did not 
occur during the deliberations.
The resident prince, who issued the call for the election to the Constituent 
Assembly and later accepted his election as Norway’s first constitutional mon-
arch, lived amid this turmoil. Residing in a part of the manor house where the 
assembly met, he regularly invited its members to his table without distinguish-
ing between nobles, merchants, military men or peasants. Although he did not 
directly take part in the assembly’s deliberations, he took great interest in the 
ongoing constitution-making process. Nothing seems to substantiate, however, 
that he took any particular interest in the bicameral question that was discussed 
literally next door.
Taking a different approach, it may also be worthwhile recalling that the immi-
nent possibility of some kind of union with Sweden imposed on Norway manu 
militari was present in the minds of the members of the Constituent Assembly. 
This raises the question of why the majority would want to include enhanced 
institutional defence for a monarchy it did not want in the constitution of a reborn 
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Norway. In November 1814, the very first Storting actually adopted the revisions 
to the May constitution needed in order to provide for the personal union with 
Sweden, as foreseen by the August armistice. The fact that the modified unicam-
eral system established by the Constituent Assembly was not touched adds further 
support in favour of the suggestion that the bicameral solution, though a moder-
ate one, was reached in relative isolation from the question of the monarchical 
government.
In any case, the modified unicameral system, in which all members of the Stort-
ing were elected simultaneously and according the same rules, did not leave any 
space for the Lagting as an actor with a radically different political agenda from 
that of the Odelsting. The ultimate test of this proposal came as political divi-
sions between the traditional political elites (supported by the monarchy) and the 
growing liberal opposition crystallised towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
An important battleground was provided by the opposition’s increasingly urgent 
quest for constitutional change in order to give ministers access to Parliament 
with the right to speak but not to vote. This would actually represent a first step 
towards the emergence of a system with governmental responsibility towards the 
Storting, as such a system cannot exist if it is not possible for ministers to discuss 
political options, defend bills and respond to criticism during parliamentary sit-
tings. The executive understood well that giving ministers access to Parliament 
would provide it with strong supplementary instruments of control towards the 
executive.
When the Sorting amended the constitution in 1880, the king, supported by his 
council (the government), declined to give his assent. This was the third time that 
this amendment had been vetoed, despite the fact that the Parliament had already 
adopted an identical version of the amendment twice with general elections inter-
posed. The text of the constitution was silent, however, on the executive’s role in 
the process of constitutional amendment. This gave rise to the opportunity to crys-
tallise the conflict with regard to ministerial access to the Storting into a debate 
about the correct interpretation of the constitution: did the king have the right to 
veto constitutional amendments in the first place? If so, would a veto be abso-
lute? Or would it simply be suspensory? The latter position could be supported 
by analogy to the explicit rules concerning vetoing power with regard to ordinary 
legislation, which gave the king the power to veto bills adopted by the Parliament 
in identical terms twice, with general elections in between. If the same text was 
approved after voting for the third time after the next general elections, however, 
it would become law even without royal assent.
The executive, supported by the conservative groups in the Storting (and by the 
Faculty of Law), regarded the constitution as a kind of pact between the king and 
the people and argued that, as such, it could not be amended without the consent 
of both the legislative and the executive powers. Unsurprisingly, the liberal oppo-
sition favoured the suspensory veto option. At that time, the most radical option 
(no veto power at all) gained no substantive support. Until the amendment met 
its third veto in 1880, the constitutional question regarding the extent of the veto 
power had never become that urgent. Now, it could no longer be avoided: if the 
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Storting accepted the king’s third refusal of the same text, it would entail more 
than just the failure of what was regarded to be a politically important reform. 
Even more fundamentally, parliament’s surrender would imply accepting the con-
servative view of the existence of an absolute veto power against constitutional 
amendments adopted by the Storting according to otherwise uncontested proce-
dural standards.
The situation sparked intense political debate. The liberal party-to-be (Venstre, 
the Left) was as in favour of the constitutional amendment as it was opposed 
to the doctrine of absolute veto in the hands of the executive. In the 1882 general 
elections, it obtained an overwhelming majority in the Storting (83 out of 114). 
This numerical strength was used to pack the upper chamber with the party’s own 
followers, while still ensuring a number of seats in the Odelsting that would be 
sufficient for making sure that the Odelsting would adopt a subsequent proposal 
to prosecute the members of the sitting government for not having formally pro-
tested against the royal veto, according to Article 30, paragraph 3 of the 1814 
constitution. As two-thirds of the members of the national court would ex officio 
be chosen among the members of the upper chamber that all belonged to the 
liberal opposition, it came as no surprise that the verdict given in 1884 led to the 
ministers losing their seats. Nor was it a surprise that the majority on the bench 
outnumbered the supreme court judges that made up the remaining one-third of 
the votes within the national court.
In the absence of today’s parliamentary tools, the national court was actually 
used as a kind of impeachment mechanism. More fundamentally, however, it 
functioned as a kind of constitutional court in the sense that the verdict could 
not have been reached if the court had not interpreted the constitution as estab-
lishing a suspensory veto power rather than absolute power. From then on, this 
became the only possible interpretation de facto, if not de jure. Notwithstanding 
rumours about an imminent military coup, the king finally accepted his defeat and 
appointed the leader of the liberal opposition as the new prime minister. Later in 
the same year, the Storting adapted the controversial amendment of the constitu-
tion in order to avoid any further discussion about its legal validity. As the amend-
ment was now regarded as valid eo ipso, no quest for royal assent was issued.
For reasons already suggested, the amendment represented an important first 
step towards the subsequent emergence of parliamentary government in Norway 
through lasting political practice. The path was not linear, and the principle itself 
did not gain global acceptance by both sides of the political spectrum before the 
personal union with Sweden was finally broken up and a separate Norwegian 
dynasty was installed, which we will return to later. In fact, the legal obligation 
for the government and individual ministers to offer their resignation in case 
of parliamentary non-confidence was included in the constitution only in 2007 
(Article 15).
Regarding the history of bicameralism in Norway, however, the main point is 
that the 1883–1884 crisis provides a dramatic testimony to the absence of any 
credible function of the upper chamber as one in defence of the monarchy (or 
the monarch). On the contrary: the modified unicameral system, in combination 
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with the special court for judging ministers and other top officials, proved a most 
efficient tool for combatting the monarch’s opinions in cases where they stood in 
the way of solutions preferred by a majority in parliament.
A conservative chamber?
Rather than reflecting particular concerns for Norway in the spring of 1814, it 
seems as if the Constituent Assembly handled the particular question of the over-
all organisation of the parliament-to-come in relative isolation from the immediate 
political context. The influence that current political philosophy and knowledge 
of foreign constitutions exerted on leading members of the assembly seems much 
more important. One underlying line of reflection may thus have been that even 
independent Norway should embrace an element so common in pre-Eidsvoll for-
eign constitutions as a bicameral parliament. Which arguments may have deter-
mined the Constituent Assembly’s choice for a modified unicameral parliament?
From a comparative perspective, the idea of a conservative upper house 
provides one possible answer. If we trust the authors of the most influential 
private draft constitutions, however, it clearly appears that they insisted on 
separation of powers between Parliament and the executive as the prime safe-
guard against acts likely to threaten the constitutional equilibrium between 
the two branches of government (Adler & Falsen 1814). They do not mention 
the modified unicameral system that they proposed as an instrument in rela-
tion to this key aspect of the constitutional system. It is worth mentioning that 
even if the Adler-Falsen proposal of a six-year mandate for the members of the 
upper chamber had been adopted, it would have led to two considerably differ-
ent chambers when compared to the model finally adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly.
In any case, it is hard to see why one would want to provide those selected 
to sit in the upper chamber with tools for radical resistance against the opinions 
prevailing in the larger of the two sub-chambers and even in the future Storting. 
The 1883–1884 Riksrett case already provides an illuminating, albeit probably 
unintended, example of the consequences of the opposite choice, even with regard 
to the position of the monarch.
A chambre de réflexion?
In the light of comparative experience of that time, the notion of the future upper 
chamber as a chambre de réflexion appears to be a more convincing answer to the 
question of what convinced a narrow majority at Eidsvoll to adopt any kind of 
bicameralism at all.
It is true that the constitution itself did not establish criteria for parliament’s 
selection of MPs to sit in the upper chamber. Instead, the selection of all the mem-
bers of the great assembly took place according to the same rules on eligibilty 
and the right to vote, the duration of the mandate, etc., regardless of which of 
the sub-chambers the future representatives would sit in. In principle at least, the 
electorate could neither know nor influence the likely status of a given MP within 
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parliament once elected. Nevertheless, it seems that, on average, the number of 
representatives with legal training was considerably higher in the Lagting than 
in the Odelsting (Nordby 2004). In 1814 and 1824, as much as 65 per cent of its 
members had been through this kind of higher education, while only 15 per cent of 
the members of the lower chamber had a similar background. This pattern fits well 
with the notion of the upper chamber as a chamber of reflection, intended to take 
upon itself the task of reviewing decisions made by a lower house packed with 
the bulk of MPs who had little or no higher education – most farmers included.
After 1850, however, the percentage of ‘educated’ members became roughly 
equal in both chambers, and eventually it declined in the great assembly as a 
whole towards the end of the century. With the establishment of political parties 
in the modern age, from the 1880s onwards, the overall de facto norm gradually 
became to distribute the MPs between the two chambers according to the parties’ 
proportional strength in the elections, as reflected by their presence in the plenary 
chamber. In combination with the increasing prevalence of party discipline, this 
development curtailed any possibility of substantive political influence for the 
upper chamber. Instead, the members of the upper chamber would normally act 
according to the party divides, as already reflected in the discussions and votes 
in the lower chamber, rather than as agents of independent reflection or wisdom.
This development contributes to explaining why, during the last years of the 
bicameral system, presumably influential MPs were sometimes assigned to the 
Lagting rather than to the politically more important Odelsting. The purpose was 
not to enhance the prestige or political importance of the upper house, but such 
instances rather reflected the fact that those seats were the less burdensome. This 
was due to the fact that a member of the Lagting could never be tasked with the 
preparation of the final report of the relevant standing committee on matters to be 
presented first in the Odelsting. Instead, the relevant MPs would be free to devote 
more time to party matters, etc.
The final decay
The Bernadotte dynasty relinquished the throne of Norway after a unilateral Nor-
wegian move in 1905, which was later ratified by a bilateral treaty. The consti-
tution was rewritten in order to eliminate the traces of the personal union with 
Sweden, which had been the main outcome of the events of August–November, 
1814. The institutional changes thus essentially involved getting rid of a monarch 
with two crowns and replacing him with one whose only realm was Norway. 
No other reshuffling of the constitution took place. Instead, the Norwegian state 
apparatus, which was in many ways actually very different from the constitutional 
apparatus in Sweden, continued to function more or less as it had during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. Politically, however, it profited greatly from 
getting rid of the more or less constant struggle with regard to the future of the 
Norwegian-Swedish union of the previous decades.
By virtue of the constitutional norms to that effect, the new king of Norway 
was to be elected by the Storting. The election did not take place, however, until 
after a consultative referendum – held upon its own demand – had ensured almost 
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80 per cent support for the proposed pretender. After the new king of the present 
dynasty – the second son of the Danish king Frederik VIII – had presented his oath 
to Parliament in November 1905 under the historically relevant name Haakon 
VII, any foundation for a continued struggle between the monarch and Parliament 
disappeared. Simultaneously, the idea of a possible role for the Lagting in defence 
of the monarchy as such or in any other kind of discussion about the form of gov-
ernment lost its raison d’être.
In order to understand the functions of the modified unicameral system during 
the last century of its existence, however, the general acceptance of ministerial 
responsibility towards Parliament that soon followed is even more important. This 
development is intimately linked, of course, to the solidification of the political 
parties throughout the twentieth century. That process even led to the firm, though 
informal, confirmation of a system of proportionality between the parties with 
regard to the distribution of MPs between the sub-chambers (as in the standing 
commissions). In both chambers, party discipline ended up prevailing to such an 
extent that the upper chamber lost all relevance as an influential or at least mean-
ingful part of the political decision-making apparatus.
In the last decades of its existence, the upper chamber met only because its 
concurring vote was formally needed for making bills pass before the executive 
made them law. In general, the meetings lasted only a few minutes. Once the 
quorum was satisfied, the president’s sole task became to state that nobody had 
asked for the floor, that no vote was needed because nobody had the intention to 
vote against the texts already adopted by the Odelsting and that the meeting had 
come to an end (Smith 2007). With very few exceptions, this became practice 
even in cases where the preceding vote in the Odelsting revealed sharp political 
disagreement.
By constitutional necessity, the system nevertheless continued to function until 
an external event provided the pretext for finally allowing the formal coup de 
grace. This happened as part of a move towards a reform of the national court in 
order to make it more independent from parliament. Some even regarded a similar 
reform as a contribution to reinvigorating the national court as an instrument of 
some practical use: even if the possibility of criminal conduct could not be com-
pletely excluded, the different mechanisms for ministerial responsibility provided 
by the century-old parliamentary system of government made it appear obsolete.
As already noted, the constitution assigned different roles to the sub-chambers 
with regard to the system for penal responsibility. The authors of the reform pro-
posed having Parliament retain the power to initiate proceedings against ministers, 
MPs and members of the supreme court by transferring the role initially assigned 
to the lower chamber to the plenary. At the same time, excluding MPs from the 
bench was supposed to make the Riksrett more court-like. The political relevance 
of the division of Parliament into sub-chambers for legislative matters had long 
faded away. If its role regarding the national court was eliminated by constitutional 
amendment, no convincing raison d’être for maintaining the system would subsist.
The bill on this constitutional amendment was finally submitted to Parliament 
in 2007, and it was framed in accordance with the previously mentioned consider-
ations. In the new system, people selected by the great assembly in the aftermath 
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of each general election among non-acting members of Parliament take care of the 
‘political’ element within the national court. So far, Parliament has chosen former 
MPs according to the political distribution of seats after the last elections. Moreo-
ver, members are given six-year terms rather than being selected for particular 
cases. On the bench, the members of the supreme court are still outnumbered by 
those elected by parliament but have seen their relative share increased to five out 
of the court’s eleven members.
The package of constitutional amendments adopted in 2007 included the formal 
elimination of the modified unicameral system and the corresponding reform of 
the system of penal responsibility for ministers, MPs and members of the supreme 
court. By virtue of an explicit provision to that effect, the sub-chambers never-
theless continued to function until the end of the relevant electoral term (2009). 
Norway has since been among the Scandinavian countries with pure unicameral 
systems (Smith 2008).
At a few crossroads, the initial version of the national court showed its impor-
tance, and it has survived in a revised form. By contrast, Norway’s modified 
unicameral system lacked any clear or compelling purpose and rarely played a 
political role of any importance. After the reform, the only formal relic of that 
system is that the great assembly, no longer its sub-chambers, must adopt statutes 
twice and in identical terms at an interval of a minimum of three days before sub-
mitting the text for executive assent. So far, however, even the occasion for fur-
ther reflection that this delay might provide has lacked any political significance.
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The Nordic countries today
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the defeats of Napoleon (1814–1815), a number of European 
states saw the emergence of restoration regimes in which elements of the modern 
system (citizens with equal rights, freedoms, and political participation; parlia-
ments with legislative and supervisory capacities) coincided with remains of the 
old regime (a strong monarch with subservient ministers, powerful nobility, an 
inflexibly repressive government, etc.). Senates referred to the old regime because 
of the role they ascribed to nobility. In 1814, an interesting version of such a 
restoration regime appeared in the Netherlands – a country with its own constitu-
tion and its own monarch, William I of Orange-Nassau. The founding father of 
this constitution, G. K. count van Hogendorp, ensured that nobility enjoyed a 
protected position. There would be knighthoods (Ridderschappen), i.e. electoral 
bodies consisting of members of the wealthy aristocracy that would exercise a 
powerful role in the States-Provincial and appoint the members of the States-
General. The constitution of 1814 did not, however, provide for a senate (Eerste 
Kamer) (Velema 1998; Van Poelgeest 2013).
William I reached an agreement with England to merge the Northern and 
Southern Netherlands to form a buffer state against France. The other European powers 
agreed to this United Kingdom of the Netherlands (Verenigd Koninkrijk der 
Ne derlanden). In accordance with the Eight Articles, the Southern Netherlands were 
granted the right, jointly with the Northern Netherlands, to determine the content 
of the constitution. In practice, though, the constitution of 1814 was taken as the 
point of departure. Moreover, in the mixed constitutional commission chaired by 
Van Hogendorp, it soon became apparent that the South had its own political cul-
ture and mental framework and would clearly be making its own demands. One 
of these was to have a senate (Witte 2016a). Because the Senate was an initiative 
of the South, which also influenced its composition and functions, I should like to 
focus here on the Southern members of the Senate. There is also a second reason 
why these members of the Senate deserve more attention than they have received 
so far. Unlike their Northern colleagues, for whom little changed until 1848, the 
Southern members of the Senate, following the change of government brought 
about in the revolutionary year, 1830, and its aftermath, had to face a major crisis 
3  Members of the Senate in 
the Southern Netherlands 




that put an abrupt end to their mandates and replaced the restoration Senate of 
1815 with a more modern model.
A Senate for the South
Why the need for a Senate in the South? Of the eleven Southern members of the 
commission, seven were staunch supporters of the idea. The issue of a bicameral 
system was therefore bound to feature on the agenda and would give rise to many 
a heated debate. Five members of the aristocracy – C. count de Mérode, C. count 
de Thiennes, P. count d’Arschot, C. baron de Méan, and F. du Bois – were strongly 
in favour of a chamber that would represent the nobility, but even J. Raepsaet, a 
Flemish traditionalist well versed in old Belgian law, joined the struggle in favour 
of a Senate (Colenbrander 1908–1909). They were well aware that they repre-
sented the interests of the Southern nobility, which, compared with the situation in 
the North, was twice as large and included many high-ranking aristocrats (princes, 
marquises, counts, and viscounts). There was the old hereditary aristocracy going 
back to before the seventeenth century, including a few families that went back 
as far as the Burgundians. In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the 
Spanish and Austrian monarchs had also conferred titles on the basis of exercised 
functions. Over the centuries, the Habsburg emperors, German monarchs, and 
especially the French kings had also raised many to the ranks of the aristocracy in 
the Netherlands. Primogeniture, the system by which the firstborn inherits his par-
ents’ estate, was by and large the rule, which meant that land ownership remained 
concentrated in particular families. However, members of the aristocracy had suf-
fered at the hands of the French republicans and now hoped that their property, 
rights and privileges would be reinstated and that the ancien régime would be 
reinstalled (Witte 2015). ‘Our nobility must be able to live again’ was the wish 
expressed by De Mérode, and De Thiennes referred to the need to maintain the 
moral strength of the nobility.
If the nobility were to be represented separately in the Senate, this would 
restore the prominent role of high-ranking and wealthy aristocratic families in 
the community. This position was most vigorously defended by Raepsaet. He was 
in favour of nothing less than a full return to the old constitutions of the period 
before 1795 and an States-General consisting of three estates. At the very least, he 
believed that the higher clergy should also be granted the right to sit in the Sen-
ate. De Mérode was also in favour of the clergy’s being granted legislative power 
once more. For both these members, as for the other noblemen, the Senate might 
well have consisted exclusively of members of the hereditary aristocracy. The 
aristocrats also had their minds set on members elected from among and by the 
members of the knighthoods and were in favour of a separate voting right based 
on class distinction. A number of noblemen from the Northern Netherlands sided 
with their Southern colleagues in the latter’s struggle to secure a central position 
for nobility in the new system (Colenbrander 1908–1909).
During the restoration period, the memory of the French revolution, the French 
republic, and most certainly the Terror were forcefully driven to the background. 
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Republican principles and especially Jacobin ideas were strongly opposed. It was 
no different in the Netherlands. The restoration elite distanced itself from the 
Batavian republic of the 1790s, which would be associated with civil discord, 
absence of government, and even anarchy from then on. In the South, nobody 
wanted to be reminded of the period of Robespierre. Even in 1830–1831, i.e. 
after the revolution, the Constituent Assembly continued to refer to the period 
with a significant degree of abhorrence. The aristocratic preference expressed by 
Van Hogendorp in the constitution of 1814 was completely in line with this atti-
tude, which was also obvious in the discussions of the constitutional commission 
in 1815 (Velema 1998; Witte 2017). Not only aristocrats but also proponents of 
what would be referred to as aristocratic liberalism made their views known, tak-
ing their inspiration from Montesquieu and Benjamin Constant. These ideas were 
well known: the nobility must be a bulwark against democratic unrest and an 
antidote to the elected element. In its capacity as a mediating body, the aristocratic 
Senate could therefore ensure political durability and stability and guarantee a 
moderate government. This Senate could also mediate between the monarch and 
the people and prevent both the monarch from becoming despotic and the people 
from rising up in rebellion (De Dijn 2008).
But what did the king think about all this? Though he did not personally take 
part in the gatherings of the constitutional commission, he was kept very accu-
rately informed both in writing and orally by Van Hogendorp, and everyone knew 
that long-time Bonapartist C. van Maanen and former minister J. Mollerus could 
be relied upon to uphold the interests of the monarch. It was no secret that the king 
had long cherished ambitions for his now much larger kingdom and that he was 
prepared to use all the power and authority he needed to achieve them. The king 
and Van Hogendorp were therefore not in favour of the English model – with its 
House of Lords and a powerful Parliament. The French Chambre des Pairs was 
more to their liking, with members chosen for life by the king from among the 
hereditary aristocracy. However, since there were less members of the heredi-
tary aristocracy in the Northern Netherlands, Northern members of the commis-
sion were reluctant to follow suit. Nevertheless, the king was aware of the social 
importance of Southern noblemen and was keen to establish a link with them – a 
tie with the monarchy – to associate them with land management and to be able to 
rely on them. This could, of course, be achieved via the knighthoods and States-
Provincial, but a Senate would be an added advantage. The idea of an aristocratic 
Senate appointed by the king was certainly not one to be dismissed. Members 
of the commission who were opposed to a separate estates system might even 
consider appointment by the king as an acceptable alternative. As De Mérode, 
D’Arschot, and Du Bois explained, if the members of the Senate could not come 
from the knighthoods, they could always be appointed by the king (Colenbrander 
1908–1909).
Nevertheless, after many discussions, there were still enough members to 
oppose the idea of an aristocratic Senate – certainly among the Northern mem-
bers, which included Van Maanen, for instance, who was firmly opposed to any 
form of privileged estate and to a specific role for the clergy. There were those 
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who feared that the pairs (peers) could all too easily impose their own views on 
the king. There were also a number of liberal members in the South – administra-
tors and magistrates during the French period, such as Dotrenge, De Coninck, 
and Leclercq, who were equally opposed to privileges for the aristocracy and 
the clergy. Dotrenge in particular took up the fight against privilege and came 
into direct conflict with De Mérode and De Thiennes. Former prefect J. B. Hol-
voet took the middle ground: though he agreed that the aristocracy was politically 
important, he was not prepared to grant exclusive power to aristocrats and became 
the rapporteur of a compromise proposal (Colenbrander 1908–1909).
The compromise cut the Gordian knot and received the backing of a major-
ity of the members: there would not be a real aristocratic chamber. The Senate 
would include members of the moneyed class who could be appointed on the 
basis of services rendered to the state. There was no mention of the clergy, either. 
All members of the Senate were to be appointed for life by the king. De Mérode 
and De Thiennes were now alone in pleading for an aristocratic chamber and 
were left deeply disappointed. The king’s pledge that he would appoint almost 
exclusively members of the aristocracy in the South did, however, provide some 
solace. Raepsaet, who was probably disappointed by the turn of events, had long-
since returned home. The majority could now agree to the principle of a bicameral 
system. As the kingdom consisted of two geographical parts, so ran the argument, 
this could in itself justify expanding the States-General with the creation of a sen-
ate (Colenbrander 1908–1909; Witte 2016a). This was mainly a tactical argument, 
given that the members of the States-General represented the whole nation rather 
than just one of its constituent parts.
The text that appeared in the constitution considered the wise, moderating 
role of the Senate. The people’s assembly (Tweede Kamer) was (by a matter of 
degrees) the elected element. The Senate was more associated with the monarchy. 
Its members were older (at least 40), the location of their assemblies alternated 
between Brussels and The Hague, and the allowance they received (3,000 fl.) was 
higher, but they were less numerous (40–60 members compared with 110 in the 
people’s assembly). Members of the Senate would also be able to pass legislation 
and have the authority to exercise delaying power. By being granted the last say, 
they would also be able to block proceedings in the people’s assembly (De Schep-
per 1990; Van den Braak 1998).
The Senate: le manège du Roi
At the time, the Senate was nicknamed Le manège du Roi (the king’s merry-go-
round), in reference to the subservient nature of the members. This denigrating 
phrase was used especially by the opposition and featured in contemporary sources 
concerning the Senate. The Southern opposition especially stressed the Senate’s 
docile attitude, and during the Belgian constitutional debates (1830–1831), the 
image portrayed of the Senate was particularly negative. The Senate was often 
presented as an example that was not to be followed (National Congress 1830, 
13–18 Dec.). This negative image had much to do with the appointment policy of 
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William I in general. The king was known for applying a kind of patronage system 
based on appointing the most loyal members he could find, from whom he would 
expect little or no public criticism and who would not be allowed to remain in the 
same position for long. In addition, appointments would also be used on occasion 
as a form of discipline. Not surprisingly, the king was often criticised for appoint-
ing too many ‘yes-men’.
The king’s appointment policy in the Senate was hardly any different. Never-
theless, membership to the Senate was a much sought-after appointment. Mem-
bers considered the position to be an honour bestowed upon them by the king, 
the climax of a career in service of the kingdom, and for the dyed-in-the-wool 
legitimists among them, proof of the king’s trust (Van den Braak 1998; De Schep-
per 1990). We may ask, however, what happened in practice. Let us focus on the 
group of Southern members of the Senate appointed between 1815 and 1830–45 
appointments, corresponding by and large to the number of Northern members.
Let us first consider whether the king kept his promise and appointed primarily 
members of the aristocracy (Van den Braak 1998; De Schepper 1990; Almanach 
1840; Wapenboek 1990). This was certainly the case. In theory, the king was 
under no obligation to appoint members on the basis of birthright, though that is 
exactly what happened in practice. Only two members appointed between 1815 
and 1830 are not listed as belonging to the nobility. One of them, P. F. Nicolaï, 
belonged to an old family of magistrates from Liège and became the ruling presi-
dent of the supreme court of Liège after his stint as a member of the Senate.
Two former governors, C. de Brouckère and B. J. Holvoet, joined the ranks of 
the nobility before they became members of the Senate, the former without a title 
and the latter as a knight. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Southern members 
of the Senate belonged to the high and old nobility. This was due to the fact that 
members were recruited from among the king’s court dignitaries (grand marshal, 
chamberlain, etc.), who were required to have seniority going back several gen-
erations, as the dividing line set by the king was the beginning of the seventeenth 
century (Witte 2015). Some ten members of the Senate belonged to this category, 
but other members were descendants of equally old families. The princes De Chi-
may and De Gavre; the marquises De Trazegnies; and the counts De Liederkerke 
Beaufort, De Bethune, De Berlaymont, De Marnix, and Du Chastel were but a 
few prominent examples.1 All were, of course, more than sufficiently wealthy 
to sit in the knighthoods of their respective provinces, in which some, such as 
count Van der Meere de Cruyshoutem, had leading positions. When members 
were appointed, it was important that no province should feel it was being over-
looked, although no formal rules for regional representation existed in the Senate.
How did the king deal with the controversial issue of the presence of the 
clergy? The king had been unable to reach a compromise concerning the relation-
ship between church and state with Archbishop De Broglie and his intransigent 
Catholic followers, as a result of which a major conflict had broken out between 
them. These conservative Catholics were firmly opposed to the religious plural-
ism provided by the constitution and were not prepared to accept any other reli-
gion than Catholicism for the South. The ruling government had to adjust to this 
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situation. De Broglie was prosecuted and forced to flee, after which a compromise 
agreement was made with De Broglie’s successor, F. A. prince de Méan. The new 
archbishop was immediately appointed as a Senate member, which was a clear 
signal that the king was grateful to the archbishop for his help and was prepared 
to meet the Roman Catholics halfway (Van Zanten 2004).
Members of the aristocracy in administrative and political positions were also 
eligible to become members of the Senate. The largest group came from the people’s 
assembly and consisted mainly of non-re-elected members. It included a few mem-
bers of both the old nobility and the noblesse de robe of the Austrian period, such 
as counts De Borchgrave, D’Hemricourt, and De Vinck. A minister and a minister 
of state were also appointed to the Senate: count De Thiennes and baron Goubau 
d’Hovorst. Liège, the two Flanderses, and South Brabant each had a former gover-
nor in the Senate. Count De Carmin moved straight from the States-Provincial to 
the Senate, and knight De Moreau was a former member of the provincial execu-
tive of Namur. Count De Bethune was appointed on the basis of his former position 
as district commissioner of Hainaut province. Knight Membrede was yet another 
example of a counsellor of state who became a member of the Senate. Given how 
members were appointed, it is not surprising that, with time, a number of members 
of the constitutional commission were also invited to sit in the Senate. This was the 
case for counts De Thiennes and D’Arschot and knight Holvoet.
The Senate was thus primarily populated with loyal members from the 
administrative-political sector. But what about the other socioeconomic and 
socio-political sectors? Only Major General Van der Burch, who was a member 
of the general staff, was appointed to the Senate from the army. Most nobles 
were landowners whose large estates could include many villages and for whom 
farming leases were a major source of income. Therefore, agricultural concerns 
were also their concerns. Industrial, commercial, and financial activities had not 
had any bearing on how noble titles were conferred in the past, which meant that 
no representatives of these sectors could be found among the nobles, except for 
members of families in the ore extraction business (Janssens 1998; Witte 2015). 
Baron F. H. d’Anethan, for example, belonged to a family of wealthy steel mill 
owners in the province of Luxemburg. The cultural and scientific sectors also had 
a few representatives. Prince De Gavre was a committed freemason and an active 
member of the Brussels Academy of Arts and Sciences, which had been re-estab-
lished after its abolition by the French. Viscount De Nieuport played a central part 
in the institution not only in his capacity as director but also as a distinguished 
mathematician – one of the few in the South with a truly international reputation 
in the discipline (Biographie Nationale s.d., De Gavre; Van Bendegem 2018).
In short, the Southern group of the Senate had all the features of a classic 
restoration-elite dominated by the nobility. Its members all came from families 
that held different offices in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. These fami-
lies were generally fairly extended and had several different branches, and more 
than one member of more than one generation was typically a public figure. They 
constituted the social peak of the Southern elite and could therefore not easily be 
overlooked by the king.
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Were they all the yes-men they were made out to be? The situation needs to 
be considered with caution, even though little is known about what actually hap-
pened in the Senate. The desire to keep the Senate beyond the reach of the people 
means that sources are very scarce, but it can hardly be denied that the king had 
managed to appoint a majority of loyal figures. What the king understood by loy-
alty can be surmised from the circumstances surrounding the appointment of two 
former governors, De Brouckère and Membrède. Having failed to achieve what 
was expected from them in their inability to prevent the election of liberals in the 
States-Provincial, they resigned, were replaced, and were promptly appointed to 
the Senate, as a kind of punishment. The king always chose the reliable De Thi-
ennes to act as president of the Senate. As a rule, members of the Senate were not 
in the habit of being critical, since they took their oath to the king very seriously, 
and respect for the House of Orange grew fast in their midst (De Schepper 1990; 
Van den Braak 1998; Ramaekers 1989; Witte 2014).
We should also stress the very particular nature of the members of the Sen-
ate. Individuals were more important than their mandates. Some of the nobles 
of the South matched the Orange-Nassaus in terms of pedigree and wealth and 
they were treated with respect. The members of the Senate generally enjoyed 
personal relations with the monarch and his family – certainly if they belonged 
to the royal household or held a position as a minister or governor. Furthermore, 
the king would air his views in personal after-dinner conversations (Gerretson 
1936). Politics were therefore conducted in an atmosphere of ‘like-knows-like’. 
There could, however, also be negative sides to the situation: personal clashes 
could not be ruled out. Differences of opinion of a political nature were common, 
but private tensions also occurred. This was the case with G. de Trazegnies, for 
instance, who was an intimate of the Prince of Orange and was thus tied to the dif-
ficult relationship between the king and his eldest son. Della Faille d’Huyse was 
made to pay because his son was a member of the opposition (De Schepper 1990; 
Colenbrander 1931; François 1987).
Unfortunately, the records of the deliberations of the Senate do not enable us to 
follow the workings of the Senate closely. The members of the Senate convened 
far less frequently than the members of the Chamber of Representatives and gath-
ered for a only couple of days; meetings took place behind closed doors and were 
regarded as being of little interest to members of the public. Absenteeism was wide-
spread. It was also difficult to trigger discussions. During the meetings, the agenda 
was observed strictly because many bills and proposals had to be dealt in very little 
time. The casting of the vote was what mattered. There was little talk of adversarial 
procedure and even less of an exchange of arguments, the sources confirm. It was 
only when Membrède became president that the voting occurred after the delib-
erations (Van Zanten 2004). The Senate had no right of initiative, and its role was 
restricted to accepting or rejecting proposals. Although the latter did occur, it hap-
pened considerably less frequently. Even though the Senate could block bills, the 
fact is that only six bills were rejected, while 430 were accepted. Comments were 
made out of principle or for technical reasons, and some fifteen royal bills had to be 
redrafted, but there were usually few objections (De Schepper 1990).
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Though there was seldom talk of a collective form of opposition in the Senate, 
we can consider the tax bill of 1821 in this context: the economic interests of the 
South were under threat, and even in the Senate, the bill was supported by no 
more than a slim majority, as the Southern members of the Senate – except for a 
few ‘defectors’ – all voted against the bill. Matters related to the corn trade were 
also regarded as sensitive (De Schepper 1990). This, however, does not mean that 
there were no individual opposition members at work in the Senate. Archbishop 
De Méan, for example, who had lent his support to the king in the disputed mat-
ter of the foundation of the Collegium Philosophicum, changed sides and joined 
the group of Van Bommel, De Gerlache, and Sterckx, who defended the interests 
of the church in the name of freedom of education and religion. The attitude of 
the archbishop naturally influenced other Catholic members of the Senate (Van 
Zanten 2004). The king’s policy with respect to the use of languages was yet 
another bone of contention. The fact that Dutch was the official language of the 
central government also generated a great deal of opposition in the South on the 
part of the French-speaking elite in Wallonia, Brussels, and Flanders. The peers 
of the members of the Senate voiced this opposition in the States-Provincial, and 
the members of the Senate expressed their opposition by speaking only French in 
the meetings and by forcing their Northern colleagues to do the same. Moreover, 
French was the language they spoke with the king and the king’s family. Counts 
De Renesse and D’Arschot publicly expressed their preference for French, with 
D’Arschot even referring Dutch as ‘ce jargon barbare’ (that uncivilised jargon) 
(Witte 2016b; De Schepper 1990).
From 1828–1829 onwards, it became obvious that a group of liberal and 
Catholic-liberal opponents in the people’s assembly was becoming increasingly 
more vocal. Southern members set the tone but could rely on a certain amount of 
support from the North. At the centre of the opposition movement were concerns 
about freedom of the press, freedom of education, and ministerial accountability. 
The Catholic liberals focused on religion and freedom of education; the liberals, 
on freedom of the press and the reinforcement of parliamentarism. There were also 
heated budget debates in the people’s assembly, with opposing votes mainly coming 
from the Southern members (Van Zanten 2004). Though this all resonated loudly in 
the people’s assembly, there was still strong support for government policy. How-
ever, there was also a small group in the Senate, including De Trazegnies, Van der 
Burch, and De Bethune, that had grievances about freedom of education, freedom 
of the press, ministerial accountability, and the implementation of the concordat, 
which they wished to impart to the king. Twelve members, mainly in the South, 
supported them, but they were unable to win a majority. We have already seen that 
count D’Arschot was the most fervent opponent – he was the only member of the 
Senate who voted against the 1830 budget – but count De Spangen was also criti-
cal of government policy, which means that the group of members of the Senate 
who criticised government policy was in fact larger than is generally suggested 
(De Schepper 1990). It was also a well-known fact that the sons of some of the 
members of the Senate belonged to the opposition. This was the case with Charles 
de Brouckère and with the family of baron d’Anethan, for instance. Clément, son 
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of the Berlaymont family, joined the pro-Belgian faction, and the son of Van de 
Meere de Cruyshoutem, who had served in the army in the Dutch East Indies, 
became one of the leaders of the revolution in 1830 (Witte 2015). This may not 
have said much about the political position of their fathers, but it certainly did 
nothing to strengthen the trust that the king had put in them. In short, the mood 
of opposition had also taken hold of a minority in the Senate, even though, as we 
shall see, this did not really shake the trust the members of the Senate had put in the 
House of Orange, except for a few notable exceptions.
An elected senate in an independent Belgium
Even if opposition leaders in both chambers wanted to introduce a number of 
changes in the political system, they were not the ones who wanted to take mat-
ters further and aim for a separation between North and South. This role was 
played by the much more radical journalists and other opponents from the edu-
cated middle class. They succeeded in diverting the protest of the lower social 
classes against the social consequences of the economic crisis of 1829–1830 to 
serve their own political aims. The looting that occurred at the end of the month of 
August 1830, preparing Brussels for combat to be able to defend the city against 
the army that would be brought in to restore order, the violent clashes during the 
September days that caused more than one thousand deaths, the (unilateral) dec-
laration of independence, the change of power by force of arms and the election 
of a constituent assembly – all of these were very much in line with their strategy 
(Witte 2010).
The question whether there would be a Senate in the political system of an inde-
pendent Belgium was high on the agenda of the National Congress. The context 
in which these debates took place was very different from that of 1815. A select 
constitutional committee drafted a preparatory text, but it was the plenary Con-
stituent Assembly, consisting of two hundred elected members of Congress, that 
made the final decision. The tax quota for voting rights remained as high as ever, 
but the abolition of the tiered system by the States-Provincial and the introduction 
of a group of voters with voting rights based on education and position (liberal 
professions, priests, etc.) provided for a somewhat broader social makeup (Magits 
1981; Van den Steene 1963). Those in favour saw the Senate as being in line with 
monarchical ideas, and since the monarchy had already been accepted by Con-
gress, they could reassure their European neighbours of the virtue of this move, to 
which the moderate bicameral system also contributed.
There were now fewer conservative aristocrats. The titled nobility represented 
no more than a quarter of the total number of members. Half of them were strong 
supporters of the House of Orange, who sat side by side with noblemen who had 
joined the ranks of the opposition mainly on religious grounds, reacting against 
the religious policy of the protestant King William I (Magits 1981; Stevens 1981). 
Both groups, joined by a number of traditionalists and conservative Catholics, 
defended the interests of the nobility and major landowners. They were in favour 
of separate, hereditary, and aristocratic representation and therefore also in favour 
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of a Senate. A number of members originally supported the idea of appointments 
by the king from a list of candidates exclusively drawn up by eligible voters from 
the aristocracy. Others believed that prelates and high-ranking official dignitaries 
should ex officio be granted a seat in the Senate, a situation that in some ways 
appeared then to be more conservative than in 1815. The same arguments that 
had been used then re-emerged: for example, the socio-economic importance of 
the landowning nobility; its mediating role between the monarch and the peo-
ple – after all, monarchy had been chosen over the republic; its role as a bulwark 
against and mitigating influence on the democratically elected Chamber of Rep-
resentatives; the useful French model of the pairs (peers); and the importance of 
Southern traditions (National Congress 1830, 13–15 Dec.).
Unsurprisingly, these proposals met with a fair amount of aversion on the part 
of staunch liberals and even more so of left-wing liberals, democrats, Catholics, 
and Jacobin-minded republicans. Though the latter group did not command a 
majority, it was certainly very active and particularly assertive. As far as they were 
concerned, the ancien régime was now obsolete, and they were totally opposed 
to an aristocratic chamber. Most of these Jacobins even refused to consider the 
idea of two chambers, as could be expected. The aristocratic element had to be 
driven back and the power of the king curbed as much as possible, which meant 
that a single elected chamber would be sufficient. Furthermore, did a separate 
chamber for the nobility not constitute an infringement of the principle of equality 
(National Congress 1830, 13–15 Dec.)? In short, the Senate caused a divide in the 
National Congress of 1830, and a deep chasm appeared between those who held 
either of the two extreme positions.
The liberals and the Catholics, who had forged a union alliance before 1830 
on the basis of freedom-related principles (freedom of religion, freedom of the 
press, and reinforced parlementarism), wanted to give the new system a chance 
and were therefore prepared to make concessions and build bridges. A number of 
liberals showed moderation and quoted, as their predecessors had done in 1815, 
Montesquieu’s preference for the moderating role of the nobility and large land-
owners, while also drawing on Constant’s very similar ideas. Devaux, for exam-
ple, considered that because they constituted a very influential minority, it was 
important to give this social group what it wanted. Otherwise, he feared ‘that the 
nobles would continue to challenge our freedoms’. As such, no effort was spared 
in trying to find a middle road. After many discussions in the commissions and in 
the central commission, and after long and heated debates in the plenary assem-
bly, a compromise was finally reached, though it was not an easy one (National 
Congress 1830, 16–18 Dec.).
The principle of equality was left untouched. The idea of a separate cham-
ber for the nobility was abandoned, and appointments by the monarch were sup-
pressed. There would be a senate, but it would be an elected senate, mirrorring the 
Chamber of Representatives. An initial proposal allowed the Provincial Councils 
to function as electoral bodies after the model of the Chamber of Representa-
tives in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and thus to maintain a tiered sys-
tem. Critics on the left, however, pointed out that the provinces were no longer 
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political bodies but administrative institutions. The same limited electoral body 
with voting rights based on a high tax quota (but not also on education and office) 
would elect the members of the Senate. The power of the nobles and large land-
owners would still be protected but now indirectly so. The eligibility tax quota 
for voting rights was kept high enough – 1,000 fl. – so that, in practice, the over-
whelming majority would remain in the hands of the wealthy landowners and, 
accordingly, of the nobility so that the group’s privileges would be maintained. 
The eligibility tax was re-adjusted at the last moment. The patent tax was included 
on the strength of a very narrow majority so that wealthy members of the indus-
trial, commercial, and financial bourgeoisie could be granted seats in the elected 
Senate. The theory of equality was thus adapted to the new realities of the socio-
political power relationships (National Congress 1830, 17–18 Dec.; Witte 2016a; 
Stengers 1975).
And what part did the members of the former Senate of the United Kingdom of 
the Netherlands play in all this? With the exception of the staunchly pro-Belgium 
count D’Arschot, count De Renesse, and marquis De Trazegnies, who had both 
been elected as members of congress for their loyalty to the House of Orange, 
none of the members of the Senate took part in the process. They suffered the 
fate of so many who had belonged to the establishment. Some of them were set 
upon during the looting and outbreaks of violence. The residence of Prince De 
Gavre was set alight, and the prince fled to seek refuge in The Hague. The same 
happened to a member of the Goubau family, and a member of the Du Chas-
tel family was also assaulted. Burgomaster De Bethune was also forced to flee 
(Witte 2016b). When, in mid-September, the king summoned the members of the 
States-General to come and discuss the future of the kingdom, members of both 
chambers left the city for The Hague as the revolutionaries taunted and jeered at 
their ‘députaille’. The administrative separation between North and South under 
King William I had now become a negotiable subject and a majority of the south-
ern members in both chambers voted in favour. The same happened in the Sen-
ate (Smits 1983; Gerlache 1843). In October 1830, the Prince of Orange was in 
Antwerp, as he tried to save what could still be saved. Count De Borchgrave and 
baron Goubau were involved in the process, as were members of the Du Chastel 
and D’Anethan families (Witte 2015).
We have already noted that few members of the Senate were inclined to take 
up the struggle in the National Congress against the revolution and for the House 
of Orange. Orangist supporters included members of the Della Faille and De 
Stockem families. The remaining members of the former Senate reflected the dif-
ferent categories of the Orangist countermovement. Some sought refuge in the 
isolation of their castles, remaining silent and politically passive. Count De Thi-
ennes, for example, withdrew from public life to the seclusion of his castle in 
Lombise in the province of Hainaut. Nothing more was heard of C. de Brouckère, 
C. de Keverberg, and Van der Meere. However, there was also a large group of 
people who joined the countermovement and openly aired their orangist sympa-
thies. Among them were some twenty ex-members of the Senate. Some of them 
were even active in the activist core group, including the marquis De Trazegnies, 
54 Els Witte
baron De Vinck, and count De Borchgrave, but all of them would suffer the fate 
of the Orangist families and fall into the gaping chasm between Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Witte 2015).
The former members of the Senate no longer had any ties with the new Senate 
that was elected at the end of August 1831. Only De Renesse stood firm, while all 
the other elected members of the Senate were newcomers, mainly conservative 
Catholics who had also sat in the National Congress. The competition between 
the nobility and the roturiers (commoners) was much more ferocious than under 
William I. The elected nature of the Senate and the change of elite had driven the 
old and high nobility further into the background. The link between aristocracy, 
landownership, and political power remained strong in the Senate, but aristocratic 
institutions, such as the knighthoods, the States-Provincial, and the appointed 
Senate, disappeared and with them also the key role played by the old and high 
nobility. The latter was replaced by nobles who had not held power or had held 
only very little power before 1830 and who, as confirmed Catholics, now stood up 
for the protected position of the church. Accounting for 57 per cent of all mem-
bers, the nobility still had a majority in the Senate and still topped the social hier-
archy, but members of the higher, very wealthy bourgeoisie had now also become 
a force to be reckoned with (Witte 2015; Stengers 1975).
Another difference with the Senate in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands 
concerned the assimilation of the powers of the Chamber of Representatives and 
the Senate. The Senate now had the power to both propose and amend legislation. 
It convened in public, like the chamber, and its minutes were published verbatim. 
Nonetheless, it was still the conservative element in the system. The minimum 
age for membership – the Senate being an institution that was meant to offset the 
more democratic position of the Chamber of Representatives by its considered 
and conciliatory attitude – was still 40. An exception was made for the heir to 
the throne, who was granted the right to vote at 25. He had been given a seat in 
the Senate to help him become familiar with the workings of Parliament. In the 
Chamber of Representatives, however, the minimum age was 25. The Senate also 
remained a smaller body, with less than half the number of members with seats 
in the chamber, but the stabilising element could also be surmised from the fact 
that members of the Senate could hold their seats for a much longer period before 
they had to be re-elected. The term was four years for members of the chamber 
and eight for members of the Senate (Stengers 1999). It soon became obvious that 
the chamber was much more assertive than the Senate. In the post-revolutionary 
years, 1831–1832, the atmosphere in the chamber was often tense. The sittings 
in the Senate, on the other hand, were by and large more serene, and the com-
motion concerning the banks or acrimonious discussions were by no means the 
rule, which was probably helped by the status and age of the members. The gov-
ernment could generally rely on much larger majorities in the Senate than in the 
Chamber of Representatives (François 1999). It appeared, then, that the Senate 
carefully took into account the task it had been assigned by the Belgian constitu-
tional legislator, as mentioned before.
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A brief final comment
Let us by way of conclusion briefly put the responsibilities of the Southern mem-
bers of the Senate of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands into a historical 
perspective. Their main task during the whole period under scrutiny was to act as 
the mouthpiece in Parliament of the nation’s conservative stratum and counterbal-
ance the somewhat more democratic, elected component of the political system. 
They represented carefully considered, prudent legislation, which, at the time, 
was associated with ownership, high social status, and age.
In some respects, this way of thinking was not really new to them; rather, it 
was actually quite familiar to those who had held offices before 1814. The South 
had been part of France for twenty years (1794–1814). Under the Directoire 
(Directory), it had been the task of the Conseil des Anciens (Council of Elders) 
to reject or accept the legislative proposals formulated by the Conseil des Cinq 
Cents (Council of Five Hundred), and though the Senate, which was appointed by 
Napoleon himself, had been a backup instrument rather than an autonomous body 
under Napoleon, its members – all over 40 – were required to carefully scrutinise 
all legislation.
In the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Senate was an integral part 
of Parliament (Staten-Generaal) whose task was to examine the legislation of 
the Chamber of Representatives and decide whether it could be accepted. It 
would be difficult to speak of vigorous action on the part of the Senate, but 
the members did what was expected from them, some much more diligently 
than others. The government had to be assisted constructively, but the Senate 
was more than a group of sycophants. For quite a few members of the Senate, 
being a member was not simply an honorary position. Furthermore, though 
the Chamber of Representatives thought otherwise, they took their activities 
fairly seriously.
They had to give shape to the conservative ideas present in society. But could 
they do this convincingly? There was hardly any societal feedback. Their activi-
ties were performed behind closed doors, without the publication of parliamentary 
proceedings. The natural habitat of most of the group was the high, old nobility – 
people who considered themselves superior to all others classes and led isolated 
lives far removed from other social groups, with their own values, moral stand-
ards, and customs. Had they been elected, they would have had to rely mainly on 
the support of the knighthoods. Those who had held official positions would also 
have belonged to the small privileged administrative elite, closely related and 
subservient to the king’s authority.
Inasmuch as that he picked the members of the Senate, the king considered the 
Senate as one of the places within the political system where he could occupy cen-
tre stage without granting too much power to Parliament. The people’s assembly 
was generally far from rebellious, which meant that the Senate was often pleased 
to lend a helping hand to the king. The king was seldom disappointed, and servil-
ity was the most common attitude. In addition to its mandatory tasks, the Senate 
56 Els Witte
had very few options to actively participate in government. Though designated 
for life, which provided for a certain degree of independence, the lack of power 
to propose legislation and check and challenge the actions of the government 
severely restricted their sphere of influence.
Some members of the Senate were also influenced by early liberal ideas and 
the desire for political renewal. With the help of the constitutional freedoms, they 
too wished to exempt church and education from government control. Less power 
to the government, more checks on the opaque financial policy, and members 
of Parliament who would have more to say if ministers were made accounta-
ble to them – these ideas gradually started to seep through. These were political 
demands that the king would not take into account – demands that gave rise to 
a power crisis and also caused the split between North and South in 1830. The 
change of elites that followed signalled the end of the mandates of almost all 
Southern members of the Senate.
Their successors operated in a more modern model. The Senate had been 
the target of considerable criticism in 1830, and the change was now obvious. 
The basic principle, however, remained the same. Conservative forces had to 
have their say in the face of advancing liberalism that was clearly growing in 
bourgeois and middle class circles, but the link with conservative society was 
now stronger. The nobility no longer monopolised the makeup of the political 
body – there was now room for the upper stratum of bourgeois society. Members 
of the Senate now received their mandates from the voters and had to submit to 
re-elections. The public nature of the proceedings ensured that the voters were 
kept informed of the actions of the Senate. The primacy of the Chamber of Rep-
resentatives was reduced. Legislation could now also be proposed by the Senate, 
and the principle of ministerial accountability also applied to this chamber. Even 
though Leopold I tried to use his connections with members of the Chamber of 
Representatives and Senate to exercise more influence than was allowed by the 
constitution; personal relationships were still important; and members of the 
Senate remained more docile than members of the chamber of representatives, 
the Senate was no longer an instrument that the king and the government could 
use as they pleased.
Members of the Senate were able to carry out their functions without hav-
ing to face inextricable political crises until the end of the nineteenth century. 
The Senate was apparently well adapted to the conservative section of bourgeois 
democracy. When the latter expanded under pressure from democratic forces, the 
composition of the Senate changed. In line with opinions regarding the exclusion 
of women from the political system, however, the Senate continued to be the 
male stronghold it had been throughout the nineteenth century. Not until after the 
Second World War would the first women take their seats in Senate. It was no dif-
ferent for Dutch-speaking senators. All through the nineteenth century and still at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, only French was spoken in the Senate, and 
this would only change under pressure from the Flemish movement.
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Note
1  Members oth the old aristocracy of the 16th century and before: C.A.A. prince de Gavre, 
P.J.M.G. marquise de Trazegnies, J.F.A. viscount de Preud’homme d’Hailly de Nieup-
ort, G.G.M. count de Marnix, M.F.H. count de Liedekerke Beaufort, T.H. count de Ber-
laimont, P. count de Lens de Lichtervelde, P.J.M. count d’Arschot Schoonhoven, C.A.L. 
count van der Burch, H. count du Chastel. From the Spanish period: M.L.count van der 
Noot marquise d’Assche, C.count de Renesse Breidbach, C.C. viscount de Vaerne-
wijkck d’Angest, M.F. baron Goubau d’Hovorst, C.F. baron de Stockhem de Heer, 
M.A.B. count de Bethune d’Hesdigneul, F.L.N. count de Spanghen, C.I.P. count de 
Thiennes de Lombise, C.C.M. count de Thiennes de Leinbourg et de Rumbeke, J.B. 
count d’Hane de Steenhuyse, F.H.J. baron d’Anethan, J. della Faille de Leverghem. 
From the Austrian period: J.G. count de Borchgrave d’Altena, C.A.E. count van der 
Meere de Cruyshoutem, A.E. count d’Hemricourt de Jemeppes, G.A. baron de Feltz, J.J. 
baron de Vinck de Wuest Wesel, J.M.G. knight de Moreau de Bioul. F.J. de Riquet prince 
de Chimay and count de Caraman, F.A. prince de Méan, L.F.G. marquise de Harchies de 
Vlaemertinghe, I.C. count de Carnin de Staden all had French aristocratic origins. King 
William I gave C.R. de Néverlée de la Fortelle and C.J.F. de Keverberg d’Aldengoor the 
title of baron in 1816.
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The Netherlands before and after 1830
(Bert Brouwenstijn, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Introduction
The Danish constitution of 5 June 1849 introduced the bicameral Parliament. 
Unlike most other smaller constitutional monarchies at the time, the electorate 
of the Senate in Denmark, or the upper chamber, became as inclusive as that of 
the lower chamber, allowing 70 per cent of the male population over 30 to vote. 
This situation persisted until the Senate became more aristocratic after the consti-
tutional revision in 1866. In the Constituent Assembly of 1848–1849, the question 
of whether to introduce a bi- or unicameral system and the criteria for suffrage and 
eligibility raised the most discussion. The introduction of bicameralism became a 
compromise among various factions of the left, centre and right.
This chapter takes up two discussions within the theoretical approach of ‘his-
torical institutionalism’ in political science and sociology. First, it argues that 
‘timing’ may have mattered greatly in the sense that initial power structures cre-
ated a ‘path dependency’ and that this may have affected what happened in 1848 
(Pierson & Skocpol 2002). Second, the chapter takes up the argument suggested 
by Kaspersen (2004), that the sudden and major change from absolutism to a 
system with relatively broad representation in Denmark in 1848 was for its time 
an unintended consequence of warfare. At the time of the abolition of absolut-
ism, Denmark fought an army consisting of forces from the German Confedera-
tion and German-oriented inhabitants of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, 
which belonged to the Danish conglomerate state. The impact of the war will be 
demonstrated in the second section, when this chapter presents and analyses the 
discussions in the Constituent Assembly and highlights the time pressure faced 
by the Assembly because of the ongoing war. Conservatives, inspired by interna-
tional developments, were in favour of a bicameral system with limited suffrage 
and a senate that was intended to function as a delaying ‘moderate force’ (Hjelholt 
1949, p. 105). However, the principles of democracy and nationalism, ignited by 
the war, gave weight to the liberal demands for a unicameral system in Denmark. 
As a result, the third and final section of this chapter concludes that the Danish 
liberal Senate was a wartime compromise between an international trend of sen-
ates functioning as chambres de réflexion and revolutionary democratic principles 
that allowed for universal suffrage in both chambers.
4  A liberal senate
The Danish Landsting of 1849
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This chapter mainly utilises secondary literature written by historians who cov-
ered the Constitutuent Assembly quite extensively. They had access to the pro-
cedures employed by the Assembly, state council and government. Furthermore, 
this chapter makes use of materials – which have been left to the Danish National 
Archive – from the constitutional committee, which was in charge of designing a 
proposal for a new constitution. The studies of the 1849 constitution by politician 
and historian Niels Neergaard (1854–1936, MP from 1887 to 1890 and 1892 to 
1932; PM from 1908 to 1809), his contemporaries and the jubilee publications 
from 1949 and 1999 were important sources for this chapter on the Danish liberal 
Senate (Neergaard 1892; Hjelholt 1949; Møller 1949; Thorsen 1953; Bjørn 1999; 
Knudsen 2001; Bjørn 2003).
Historical background of the Danish monarchy  
and the events of 1848
The Danish monarchy of 1848 consisted of four parts: the Danish Kingdom and 
the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg, all of which had the king of 
Denmark as their head. Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland also belonged 
to the Kingdom of Denmark. Attached to the Kingdom of Norway, they became 
part of the Danish-Norwegian Union from 1380 to 1814. The Treaty of Kiel, 
1814, then transferred them to Denmark rather than to the Swedish-Norwegian 
Union (1814–1905). The Kingdom also possessed colonies in the West Indies and 
on the Gold Coast. The Kingdom of Denmark traces its history back to at least 
the tenth century. Holstein and Lauenburg were completely German-speaking 
areas, and both were members of the German Confederation established after 
the Treaty of Vienna, 1815. Schleswig was originally a Danish fiefdom, but for 
centuries it had had German as its administrative language, just like Holstein. In 
the early nineteenth century, Danish was the language spoken by the people and 
the language used in church in the Northern part; German, in the Southern part 
(Bijleveld 2008).
As in other parts of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, nationalist and liberal 
sentiments inside the monarchy strengthened after 1815 and during the 1830s and 
1840s in particular. Schleswig was the apple of discord. Both sides in the conflict 
rejected a division, wanting all of Schleswig. The goal of the Danish nationalists 
was a united Danish national state, including all of Schleswig, under a free con-
stitution. The German-minded nationalists in Schleswig and Holstein wanted a 
joint Schleswig-Holstein under a free constitution, with Schleswig admitted into 
the German Confederation (Friisberg 1974). Furthermore, they pointed at a dec-
laration dating from 1460 – the Ribe letter – issued by King Christian I of Den-
mark, in which he promised the nobility of Holstein to never separate Schleswig 
and Holstein. To complicate these matters further, it became likely during the 
1840s that the male line of the Danish Oldenburg dynasty, which had reigned 
since 1448, would end since the crown prince was twice divorced and childless. 
It was not clear whether the same succession rights of the Duchies also applied to 
the Kingdom.
62 Flemming Juul Christiansen
By the beginning of 1848, the Danish monarchy was still absolutist, as it had 
been since 1660. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Denmark was a state 
run largely by a bureaucracy based on the rule of law and with civil servants 
largely appointed by merit. Nevertheless, all authority originated from the powers 
of the king. The liberal sentiments of the time desired a constitution to limit the 
power of the king and to guarantee the rights and representation of the citizens. 
King Frederik VI (1768–1839; reg. 1784–1839, crown prince regent until 1808) 
had passed liberal reforms in his youth that freed the peasantry from adscription. 
Yet in the later years of his long rule, he and the civil servants around him had 
become resistant to change.
Despite the king’s reluctance towards reforms, the liberals’ demands were met 
to a certain extent with the 1833 installation of ‘consultative provincial assemblies 
of estates’ for the different parts of the monarchy: two for the Danish Kingdom, 
one for Schleswig and one for Holstein and Lauenburg. These estates could only 
give advice to the King. Their electorate was about 2.8 per cent of adult males 
(Engelstoft & Wendt 1934). Intended to put a brake on liberal demands, the estates 
turned out to stimulate political debate and contributed to political involvement of 
many citizens across the country. The king and his main advisors were primarily 
concerned that more freedom would engender nationalism and endanger the unity 
of the remaining parts of the monarchy. After losing Norway in 1814, the govern-
ment was primarily concerned with keeping the conglomerate state intact.
With the death of Frederik VI in 1839, the liberals had high expectations for 
his cousin, Christian VIII (1784–1848, ruling from 1839), who in his youth had 
ruled as the constitutional king of Norway for a few months in 1814 and was 
generally considered a progressive figure. Yet the new king kept many of his pre-
decessor’s advisers and refused to give the people a free constitution. Meanwhile, 
antagonism grew in Schleswig. In 1840, Christian VIII ordered Danish to be the 
language of administration in those parts of Schleswig where it was already used 
in schools and churches. He also declared that the same succession rights of the 
Kingdom applied to the Duchies (where women could inherit the throne in the 
absence of any direct male line from Frederik III), hoping to retain the monarchy 
for his dynastic successors. German nationalists contested this, arguing for the 
right of succession in the Duchies to belong to a pure male line going back all the 
way to Christian I, hoping for a successor who would be more sympathetic to their 
cause than the king of Denmark. When Christian VIII suddenly fell ill and died on 
20 January 1848, he advised, from his deathbed, his politically inexperienced son, 
Frederik VII (1808–1863, ruling from 1848), to establish a free constitution and 
to find new advisers (Bjørn 1999).
Soon, on 28 January, the king publicly announced his intention to give up 
absolute rule. He invited representatives from the estates of the Kingdom and 
the Duchies to discuss a possible constitution with him, and it soon looked as 
if a compromise was within reach (Bjørn 1999). Subsequently, external events 
completely took over this process. The 1848 February Revolution in Paris ignited 
liberal and national sentiments across Europe, not only in Vienna and Berlin – the 
main cities of the German Confederation – but also in Copenhagen (Denmark) and 
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Kiel (Holstein). There, citizens met and made proclamations. On 18 March 1848, 
a delegation from Kiel headed to Copenhagen in order to prevent the Danish lib-
erals from having their demands realised. Upon their arrival, they were informed 
that the king had dismissed the government (Friisberg 1974). A new government 
was formed with representatives from all of the dominant political camps: con-
servatives, national liberals and ‘friends of the peasants’ (Bondevennerne). The 
king declared he would no longer rule as an absolute monarch; instead, he would 
act on the advice of his new ministers, which predominantly supported the nation-
alist Danish cause (Bjørn 1999).
The response of the new government to the delegation from Kiel was to 
acknowledge the demand for a free constitution for Holstein only. The Duchy of 
Schleswig was to be closely connected to or even incorporated into the Danish 
Kingdom. When news about the new government in Copenhagen reached the 
Duchies, a rebellion broke out in Holstein and parts of Schleswig. The Danish 
Kingdom soon mobilised an army based on conscription, and the First Schleswig 
War (1848–1851) followed.
Decision to elect a Constituent Assembly
The new government in Copenhagen promised the people a new constitution. 
Since the king still formally held absolute power, it would have been possible to 
issue a constitution in his name. The government, however, wanted to anchor the 
new freedoms in ‘the people’ more than in the ‘grace’ of the king (Møller 1949, 
p. 68). Therefore, it opted to have a Constituent Assembly design a constitution 
for the king and the government to ratify. Next, the government had to decide on 
the electorate of the Constituent Assembly. In 1848, the minister of education and 
church affairs (1848), Ditlev Gothard Monrad (1811–1887) was most influential, 
arguing in favour of extended suffrage, thus avoiding the division of the nation 
into voters and non-voters (Møller 1949). His view prevailed, and the king agreed 
to grant the right to vote to all adult men above 30, with certain disqualifying 
exceptions, such as the non-possession of a household – i.e. servants, prisoners or 
disempowered individuals. These provisions would allow approximately 70 per 
cent of men above the age of 30 to vote. About one-third of the voters did cast a 
vote for the Constitutional Assembly (Neergaard 1892). Men above 25 were eli-
gible for election. The conservative minister of the navy (1848–1850), Christian 
Christoffer Zahrtmann (1793–1853), argued that ‘the intelligent and conservative’ 
should be allotted a considerable share (Thorsen 1967). The government united 
on the compromise that the king – now acting on the advice of the government – 
was to appoint one-quarter of the Assembly to compensate for the effect of the 
extended suffrage (Bjørn 1999). The appointments by the king should ‘calm and 
dampen [. . .] overly hasty decisions resulting from general suffrage’ (Neergaard 
1892). Although the Constituent Assembly became unicameral, similar arguments 
later became important for the establishment of the Senate in Denmark.
The proposal of the government as to elections for the Constituent Assembly 
received the support of the two consultative provincial estate assemblies within 
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the Kingdom. This was the time of the ‘spirit of 48’, in which a patriotic and 
democratic mood of equality prevailed (Bjørn 1999; Neergaard 1892). The con-
notation of the term ‘democracy’ changed from negative to positive at this point 
(Nygaard 2011). As soldiers and the common man had shown so much courage 
on the battlefield, opposition against a broader franchise disappeared (Neergaard 
1892). Rather, there was some opposition towards the appointments to be made 
by the king since they were believed to demonstrate a lack of confidence in the 
will of the common people (Neergaard 1892). The electoral law came into force in 
July 1848, and the elections took place on 5 October 1848 in 114 single-member 
districts, each contributing about 12,000 voters (Engelstoft 1949).
The factions in the Constituent Assembly
The candidates for the Assembly did not represent political parties in the mod-
ern sense of the word (Thorsen 1953). Historians do, however, identify three 
broader factions among the candidates, as they do later within the Constituent 
Assembly and subsequently in Parliament – conservatives, national liberals and 
‘friends of the peasants’, which were at the time already labelled as right, centre 
and left. The conservatives favoured a bicameral system with a moderating senate 
appointed either by the king or through very limited suffrage. The conservatives 
found their supporters among civil servants and urban citizens, in particular of the 
older generation, and from large estate owners and the aristocracy (Høgh 1972). 
The national liberals supported a liberal constitution with guaranteed freedoms 
but were divided over the degree of the extension of suffrage and whether to 
have two chambers or one. This party was largely inspired by national and liberal 
movements elsewhere in Europe at the time (Salvadori 1972). It was supported 
by intellectual urban elites and citizens – the younger generation in particular. 
This movement was dominated by a group of men born around 1810, several of 
whom went on to obtain important positions in Parliament and in government and 
as civil servants and who strongly affected Danish politics until 1864. During the 
1840s, they had advocated the reforms and nationalist policies that prevailed after 
the governmental shift in 1848.
Established only in 1846, the Society for the Friends of the Peasants had 
amassed almost 10,000 members by the summer of 1848 (Neergaard 1892). The 
Danish peasantry, which made up by far the largest part of the population, had 
made great advances since major reforms at the end of the eighteenth century by 
gradually replacing sharecropping and introducing better education. A peasant- 
oriented national ideology arose around a number of figures, in particular N.F.S. 
Grundtvig (1783–1872), a Lutheran pastor, thinker and author who called for 
a political – national, democratic and religious – awakening among the peas-
antry (Korsgaard 2014). Politically, the ‘friends of the peasants’ were in favour 
of extended voting rights and a unicameral system with no appointment of 
representatives by the king. It had its strongest support in the peasantry, but 
some of its candidates were academics. The older and the younger generations 
of political actors were divided between Danish nationalists (national liberals 
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and a few conservatives and ‘friends of the peasants’, as well as the king, Fred-
erik VII) and anti-nationalists (most conservatives and ‘fiends of the peasants’) 
(Vammen 2011).
During the electoral campaign in the summer of 1848, the question of the 
extension of suffrage was most important, with the question of a uni- or bicam-
eral system receiving much less attention (Neergaard 1892). The political tenden-
cies of the 114 elected and thirty-eight appointed members of the Constituent 
Assembly have been assessed in various different ways since they did not vote 
consistently across matters (Neergaard 1892; Jensen 1915; Elberling 1949; Olsen 
1972). According to Neergaard, thirty-three right-wing members (conservatives), 
thirty-two centrists (national liberals) and forty-four left-wingers (‘friends of the 
peasants’) were elected. The king appointed five members to represent Iceland 
and one to represent the Faroe Islands (Neergaard 1892; Bjørn 1999). After the 
appointments by the king, the Assembly developed a slightly more conservative 
bent, with the numbers changing to fifty-four, forty-three and forty-seven respec-
tively. Roughly speaking, however, each political tendency accounted for one-
third of the members. Of the elected members, fifty-seven were civil servants, 
thirty-eight were peasants, seventeen were trade and craftsmen, fifteen came from 
larger estates and the rest came from other trades (Bjørn 1999). Compared with 
the population at large, the civil servants, who had played the dominant role in 
the government during the final decades of absolutism, were still clearly over-
represented but now had to share power. Despite the underrepresentation of the 
peasants, they were now much better represented than before.
At the opening meeting of the Constituent Assembly on 23 October 1848, the 
government presented its proposal for a constitution (reprinted by Bjørn 1999). 
The proposal suggested two chambers, both directly elected by ‘the people’. The 
suffrage for both chambers would include anyone above the age of 30 under the 
same rules that had applied to the Constituent Assembly election. The Senate 
(Landsting) would comprise one-fourth of the members of the lower chamber 
(Folketing). However, to be eligible for the Senate, one had to be at least 40. The 
proposed minimum age for members of the lower chamber was 25, which was 
below the voting age. Members of the Senate would not receive an allowance, 
unlike the members of the lower chamber. The members of the Senate were to be 
elected for eight years, and every fourth year, half of them would run for election 
again. The members of the lower chamber would be elected for a term of four 
years.
This proposal was issued by a committee consisting of three ministers. The 
government had discussed the draft during several meetings. Monrad – who 
came to write the draft in cooperation with Orla Lehmann (1810–1870; minister 
without portfolio 1848) – had studied the Belgian constitution of 1831 and the 
Norwegian constitution of 1814 and reused formulations found in them (Møller 
1949). Belgium had a bicameral parliament and required that voters pay a certain 
amount of taxes and another, higher amount to be eligible for election (cf. Witte, 
this volume). Norway elected a unicameral parliament that divided itself into two 
chambers afterwards (cf. Smith, E., this volume). From its first draft of 26 June, 
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the preparatory cabinet committee worked with a bicameral system. It argued 
that a senate could become ‘a regulator to prevent overly hasty action’, i.e. it 
should become a chambre de réflexion. In the internal proceedings from the draft-
ing committee, we see that Monrad had argued for a very low tax requirement. 
Nevertheless, he and other ministers were also concerned about ‘the danger of 
communism’ (Møller 1949, pp. 59–63; Thorsen 1967, p. 81; cf. Nygaard 2011).
There was internal disagreement between the ministers in the cabinet as to 
whether Denmark should have one or two chambers and whether they should 
be subject to dissolution or not. A. F. Tscherning (1795–1874, minister of war 
1848), the most left-leaning member of the government, did not think a senate 
would make much of a difference. However, he was opposed by a number of more 
conservative ministers. The head of government, Adam Wilhelm Moltke (1785–
1864, prime minister 1848–1852), was concerned that the moderating effect of the 
proposed senate would be weakened, and he later argued for a lower chamber of 
‘personalities’ and a senate of ‘property’ (Møller 1949, p. 78). It culminated in a 
vote in the state council, with Monrad’s point of view prevailing. As summarised 
by Møller (1949, p. 80), his idea was for both ‘chambers to originate directly 
from the people but with different characters, in all aspects equal, but also equally 
subject to dissolution’.
The constitutional proposal of the government, including a rather liberal sen-
ate, formed the foundation for the negotiations about the constitution that began 
within the Constituent Assembly from October 1848 to May 1849. The European 
context for the work changed during that period. While revolutionary euphoria 
characterised the early months of 1848, reactionary forces had suppressed the rev-
olutions in Vienna and Berlin by the end of the year. In Copenhagen, the ‘March 
ministry’ broke down over the issue of how to handle Schleswig. In November, 
a new government, still headed by Moltke, featured more conservatives and still 
included several national liberals – but no one from the left. In August 1848, the 
war over Schleswig came to a truce, and peace negotiations followed in London. 
By the end of February, negotiations in London broke down and war resumed in 
April 1849.
These events did not seem to have profoundly affected the negotiations con-
cerning the constitution, but they did turn time into a factor. Because of the gener-
ally more anti-revolutionary mood, conservatives believed that as time passed by, 
their cause would benefit. A peace deal involving foreign powers, in particular, 
would restrain the calls for democracy. At an early stage, they proposed to aban-
don the work of the Assembly, arguing to halt negotiations concerning a constitu-
tion as long as the Schleswig question could not be settled due to the war, but this 
proposal was defeated (forty-seven in favour, one hundred against). Over the next 
six months, the Constituent Assembly debated the question of one or two cham-
bers several times, voting on amendments to the proposed constitution regarding 
the issue of bicameralism. The issue became closely connected with the issue of 
extended suffrage, which meant that most members of the Assembly now saw it 
as the most important question. The debate divided the three main factions, with 
the left supporting unicameralism and extended suffrage and the right supporting 
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bicameralism with limited suffrage, at least for the Senate, or alternatively one 
chamber with limited suffrage. The centrists largely supported the proposal of the 
government, but some were open to restricted voting rights and eligibility out of 
concern for the level of public education, which was perceived to be insufficient, 
especially among the peasantry (Jørgensen 1968).
The deliberations in the Assembly proceeded as follows. In October 1848, 
the Assembly divided itself by lot into five groups that, in December 1848, each 
elected two members to a ‘Constitutional Committee’. Together with seven mem-
bers elected by the Assembly at large, the Committee came to consist of seventeen 
members. This procedure benefitted centrist members, and ultimately it consisted 
of nine centrists, four conservatives and four left wing members. The Committee 
worked until the end of February without reaching an agreement. It ended up with 
six different minority reports on its composition, i.e. voting rights and eligibility – 
as well as several proposals on whether to have a senate or not. (Engelstoft 1949; 
Bjørn 1999). These reports reflected positions from the left of the political spec-
trum to the right. The largest minority supported the proposal of the government. 
Yet the result that passed on 25 May 1849 was influenced by ideas in two of the 
other minority reports about more conservative eligibility criteria for the Senate.
Following the presentation of the six minority reports, debates, negotiations 
and coalition-building emerged within the Constituent Assembly. Again, the 
issue of bicameralism was linked to the issue of suffrage. The conservative fac-
tion decided, for tactical reasons, to support a unicameral solution. If this pro-
posal passed with support from the left, the idea was that the government and 
the centrists would have to delay their work on the constitution for some time, at 
least until there was a peace settlement. Meanwhile, two centrist representatives – 
Mads Pagh Bruun (1809–1884) and Christian Magdalus Jespersen (1809–1873), 
both members of the Constituent Assembly – proposed an amendment suggesting 
an indirectly elected senate (voters selecting electors in broad constituencies who 
then elected the senate members). Over time, the Senate would be elected by the 
municipalities. Until then, the franchise would be similar to the lower chamber 
but with high eligibility requirements: an income of 1,200 Rigsbankdaler or a tax 
payment of 200 Rigsbankdaler annually and an age requirement of 40.
The new minister of culture and education, Johan Nicolai Madvig (1804–1886, 
minister 1848–1851), a centrist with conservative leanings, wanted more ‘con-
servative guarantees’ than those that were offered in the government’s original 
proposal and urged the conservatives to give up their unicameral proposal. A vote 
was taken: twenty-eight in favour of one chamber, 112 against. Next, there was a 
vote on the Bruun and Jespersen amendment, which passed by a narrow margin 
of sixty-eight votes (conservatives and some centrists) to sixty-six (other centrists 
and left-wing members). With such divided support in the Constituent Assembly, 
the government declared that it would not recommend that the king ratify the con-
stitution. Through Madvig, it stated that such a narrow majority could be ‘coinci-
dental’ and a result of the ‘moods of the moment’ and that there might be ‘strength’ 
and ‘insight’ in such a large minority. This gave the conservatives new hopes 
to delay and win time. Because of the pressure, the left-leaning representatives 
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changed their mind and decided to support the Bruun-Rasmussen amendment, 
making it clear that a broad majority for a new constitution was within reach. In a 
new vote, the amendment passed 127 to thirteen, with broad support from mem-
bers of all three political leanings.
With regard to indirect election and eligibility criteria, the amendment that 
passed was more conservative than the government’s original proposal and more 
in line with the new centrist-conservative government. The outcome was that an 
estimated 4 per cent of the electorate could be elected to the Senate (Nygaard 
2017), but extended suffrage remained in place for the Senate without tax require-
ments. The final proposal for a new constitution came to a vote on 25 May 1849 
and passed with 119 votes against four. On 3 June, the government unanimously 
recommended the proposal to the king, who signed it 5 June 1849. This date is 
now constitution Day in Denmark.
What followed? The end of the war and its  
effect on the Constitution
After the great power of Russia compelled the forces of the German Confedera-
tion to retreat, Denmark defeated the Schleswig-Holstein separatists, which ended 
the First Schleswig War in 1851. A peace treaty was hard to reach because of 
incompatible demands on both sides. Furthermore, the European great powers 
insisted on the unity of the Danish monarchy, secured in a constitutional union 
between the Kingdom and the three Duchies. This required the settlement of the 
question concerning the succession of the Danish king. Russia, in particular, was 
not satisfied with the Danish democratic ‘experiment’. During the peace negotia-
tions in London in 1852, Prince Christian of Glücksburg (later King Christian 
IX 1818–1906, ruling from 1863) was elected successor. Furthermore, there was 
an explicit ban against the incorporation of Schleswig into the Danish Kingdom 
and the obligation to design a constitution for the conglomerate Kingdom. These 
decisions, laid down in the London Protocol of 1852, were labelled in Denmark as 
‘the European necessity’, and conservative governments ruling until 1854 aimed 
to follow the decisions but met with resistance from the national liberals.
The London Protocol aimed at solving the dynastic claims of all parties but 
offered no solution to the nationalist sentiments that had caused the conflict. There-
fore, none of the parties involved were satisfied with the peace treaty. A new ‘joint 
constitution’ came into effect in 1855 for matters of the conglomerate Kingdom – 
defence, monarchy, foreign affairs – leaving the constitution of June 1849 intact 
for interior matters. The new constitution operated with a ‘Council of the Realm’ 
elected on terms much more favourable to the conservatives (of the eighty mem-
bers, twenty were appointed by the king, thirty were elected by estates and thirty 
were elected by the same electorate as that which elected the lower chamber and 
the Senate) – with an early version of proportional representation. It was a uni-
cameral body with representatives from both the Kingdom and the Duchies. It was 
boycotted by German-speaking representatives, however, and in 1857 the German 
Confederation decided that it did not live up to the London Protocol (Bjørn 2003). 
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Vammen (2011) argues that the state became ‘empty’ during those years, since 
the dominant political faction of the national liberals was unwilling to adopt the 
policy required by the international powers in the peace treaty of 1852.
The German nationalists resented pro-Danish language policies in Schleswig 
put in place by the national liberal governments in power from 1854 until 1864. In 
1863, the government saw an opportunity to pass a constitution that covered only 
the joint areas of concern in the Danish Kingdom and the Duchy of Schleswig. 
This constitution was based on a bicameral system with a senate that had about 
one-fifth of its members appointed by the king, while all other members were 
elected according to the 1849 constitution. As such, this was a rather liberal sen-
ate, and generally speaking, the joint constitution was also more liberal than its 
1855 counterpart. This constitution passed in the end of 1863 and awaited only the 
signature of the king, who suddenly fell ill and died.
Unlike his predecessor, the new king, Christian IX, was a staunch supporter of 
a united Kingdom, yet he gave into the pressure from the government to sign the 
new constitution for Denmark and Schleswig. The incorporation of Schleswig 
into a constitution together with the Kingdom of Denmark was a blatant violation 
of the London Protocol of 1852, providing Austria and Prussia with a casus belli. 
They invaded the Duchies and much of Jutland in 1864 and defeated the Danish 
army. The peace between Denmark, Prussia and Austria signed in Vienna in 1864 
saw the Danish Kingdom lose all the Duchies. This left Denmark as a small coun-
try with two constitutions: the one from 1849 for interior matters and the one from 
1863 for those matters that concerned the Kingdom as a whole. It also had four 
Chambers, two for each structure. In 1866, a new constitution replaced this sys-
tem. The 1864 defeat was blamed heavily on the national liberals and democratic 
rule. Negotiations resulted in a new constitution with a largely unchanged lower 
house but a profoundly more conservative Senate. Again, the Senate had fallen 
victim to the need to reach a compromise.
Discussion
The liberal Senate (1848–1866) was the result of a compromise. The govern-
ment and the Constituent Assembly believed that ‘an honest senate’ should be a 
moderating force (Hjelholt 1949, p. 105). Did the Senate live up to these inten-
tions? Testimony from members of the two new Chambers shows that the lower 
chamber soon became the more important since this was where the government 
usually introduced bills, and the meetings of the Senate were fewer and shorter 
(Hjelholt 1949). Peter Christian Kierkegaard (1805–1888, member of the Senate 
1849–1853 and brother of the famous philosopher Søren Kierkegaard) stated that 
the Senate only occasionally had a moderating influence and that the debates there 
were less cheerful (Hjelholt 1949). The approximate size of the party factions in 
the lower chamber and the Senate 1849–1866 is presented in Table 4.1. Not all 
members are easy to allocate to particular party factions, so the numbers should be 
read with much caution. Nevertheless, they do indicate that the Senate had a more 
conservative bent – an observation that has also been made in qualitative terms 
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Table 4.1 Approximate party positions in the Danish Parliament, 1849–1866
Lower House Left Centre Right Others
1849 45 42 8 6
1852 40 47 9 5
1855 54 23 21 3
1858 15 + 41 = 56 20 16 9
1861 34 46 5 9
1864 39 40 11 11
1865 5 + 17 + 20 = 42 20 + 20 = 40 4 5
1866, June 15 + 13 + 30 = 58 20 + 10 = 30 13 0
Source: 101 members in total (three elections in 1853 and 1854 omitted)
by Hjelholt (1949). The numbers also demonstrate that the left grew stronger over 
time, most likely as a consequence of higher turnout. This was due primarily to 
the peasantry, who were initially more likely to vote for the lower chamber but 
later started voting for the Senate too.
The Danish constitution of 1849 introduced some democratic and many liberal 
components, including broad, almost general suffrage for men above the age of 
30 for both houses. This analysis shows that the constitution was the result of a 
compromise between the main factions of the left, centre and right of the political 
spectrum, which represented different attitudes towards democracy, ranging from 
support to moderate support to criticism. A liberal senate made sense – the centre 
and the left supported extended suffrage, and the centre and the right supported 
bicameralism, the former wanting a moderating and delaying body and the latter 
preferring a system with a narrower electorate. Even when the external condi-
tions changed throughout the course of 1848, with the major European powers 
moving away from national revolution and democracy, the Constituent Assembly 
remained in place and finished its task of making a new constitution that was still 
inspired by the revolutionary moods of 1848. On the one hand, these external 
changes encouraged the conservatives to attempt various delaying tactics. Yet it 
also spurred the left to accept a compromise that moved the government’s origi-
nal proposal in a slightly more conservative direction. Otherwise, the renewed 
reaction in Europe would mean that there would most likely not have been a new 
Senate Left Centre Right Others
1849 13 13 26
1853 14 11 27
1855 13 15 23 1
1859 20 14 17 1
1863 23 14 14 1
1866, May 21 11 19 1
Source: Fifty-two members in total
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constitution for quite some time to come (Neergaard 1892). The external condi-
tions meant that the right and the left operated under different time horizons, and 
this difference helped them strike a compromise.
The composition of the Constituent Assembly was not exogenous to the pro-
cess. It was crucial for the process and the outcome that the Constituent Assembly 
was elected by a relatively broad electorate while being supplemented with royal 
appointments, and the left managed to get a significant number of members elected 
who supported a greater degree of democracy. One wonders why the government 
opted for such extended suffrage in the first place. The analysis here points to the 
strong perception that, despite a revolutionary mood throughout Europe that led 
to uprisings in Paris and Kiel and a diffuse fear of ‘communism’, the Danes had 
shown that their national character was of a moderate nature. With conscription 
in place to help the country fight a war for the nationalist cause, it became harder 
to deny the people the right to vote. To that extent, this chapter confirms the argu-
ment put forward by Lars Bo Kaspersen (2004), but this contribution also high-
lights another dimension. The acceptance of extended suffrage depended on the 
introduction of a senate, which was primarily the result of a compromise between 
the three factions within the Constituent Assembly. Broader changes in society, 
such as the emancipation of the bourgeoisie, the mobilisation of the farmers and 
the increasing strength of reactionary forces in Europe, played significant roles as 
well (cf. Vammen 2011).
The constitutional process of 1848–1849 came too late to solve the conflict 
between Danish and German nationalists inside the Kingdom. The constitution 
covered only the Kingdom proper and did not consider having a senate for the 
Kingdom as a whole by giving the Duchies and/or the German-speaking minority 
a place in the Senate. Such a proposal would have had the support of most con-
servatives, who defended the interests of the Kingdom as a whole. The events of 
March 1848 meant the end of such a senate and postponed a solution until after 
a peace settlement. As we have seen, no such solution was ever accepted by both 
Danish and German speakers between 1852 and the next war, in 1864. Such a pol-
icy became more typical for the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries than for 
the nineteenth century – in line with the government’s current attempts to unify 
the Danish regions instead of leaving room for regionalism (cf. Frandsen 2013).
Conclusion
Extended suffrage gave the left, which represented the peasants, a chance to elect 
a high number of representatives to the Constituent Assembly, where this group 
managed to act as a disciplined unit with a clear idea about its goals. Without prior 
organisation in the Society for the Friends of the Peasants, the left would, most 
likely, not have become such a strong force in the Constituent Assembly. Although 
its leaders did not play as active a role in the negotiations as the national liber-
als and conservatives, they were able to differentiate between their primary aim, 
general suffrage, and their secondary aim, unicameralism. They did not acquiesce 
when the conservatives offered unicameralism, knowing that it could come at the 
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expense of extended voting rights. In the end, they delivered enough votes for the 
compromise to gain a broad majority and persuade the government to recommend 
the new constitution to the king.
Viewed from a North Atlantic perspective, the 1848–1849 crisis of the Danish 
realm made it possible for groups that normally would have been excluded to 
participate in political deliberations, resulting in a liberal constitution in which the 
principle of extended suffrage and the presence of a senate functioned as the main 
bargaining chips. The establishment of the Danish Senate was a result of a com-
promise and was intended to function as a counterweight to extended suffrage. 
Nevertheless, compared with the senates in the North Atlantic region that were 
established somewhat earlier (e.g. in Belgium) or later in the 1860s (e.g. Sweden, 
Canada and Denmark), it was still relatively liberal. The compromise reflected the 
powers of its time. In that sense, Monrad was right when he responded to fellow 
minister Tscherning in a state council meeting on April 6, 1848: ‘one should [. . .] 
recall that the constitution of a realm depends on the stars under which it is born’ 
(Møller 1949, p. 67).
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Denmark, including the Duchies of Schleswig  
and Holstein
(Bert Brouwenstijn, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Setting
Originally, Canada was a colony of France; after 1763 and the Treaty of Paris, 
it was a colony of the United Kingdom, within whose borders lived two Euro-
pean peoples and a large indigenous population. Those demographic realities are 
important to remember in any study of a senate in Canada – whether in the past 
or today. Equally important to remember is that, only a decade after the Conquest, 
the majority of North America’s English population formed their own separate 
country, the United States. In 2017, on the occasion of Canada’s 150th birthday 
and referring to the Conquest, the New York Times described modern Canada as 
coming ‘pre-broken’ (Marche 2017). Here, the author of the article maintained, 
was why there is even today a strong disposition in the country to accommodate 
difference.
Canada is a federation, created in 1867 and today comprising ten provinces and 
three territories. Of the ten provinces, only five have ever had unelected legisla-
tive councils (in addition to people’s assemblies) either when they were colonies 
before 1867 or as provinces thereafter. All but two provinces abolished these bod-
ies before 1900 – the last was Quebec, in 1968 (Kitchin 1974).
Canada is a constitutional monarchy whose sovereign is the sovereign of the 
United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the Canadian Crown is a separate entity from 
the Crown in the United Kingdom. Indeed, an amendment to the constitution of 
Canada ‘in relation to [. . .] the office of the Queen, the governor general and the 
lieutenant governor of a province [who represents the Queen in the province]’ 
requires unanimous consent of both houses of the Canadian Parliament and the 
peoples’ assembly of each of the country’s ten provinces (Constitution Act, 1982).
The Crown is inextricably linked to Canada. For instance, senators are not 
elected but rather appointed by the Crown on the advice of the prime minister. 
Recently, this provision allowed for a total transformation in the existing system: 
the present prime minister has delegated the selection of nominees to an inde-
pendent advisory panel. It is those nominees whom he now recommends to the 
governor general for appointment. No law or constitutional amendment was used 
to achieve this end (since the prime minister holds a monopoly on advice to the 
Crown), although this change has arguably produced the greatest transformation 
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in the composition and working of Canada’s parliamentary institutions since 
1867. Rather, it was the presence of the Crown and the provision for the Crown’s 
appointment of senators (on advice) which made it possible.
Canada has a written constitution, the Constitution Act, 1867, but the terms 
of that document refer almost exclusively to matters of federalism. While the 
Act provides for an elected chamber, the House of Commons, understandings 
about parliamentary government as they relate to that House – for example, 
‘open discussion, freedom of association, and vigorously contested elections’ 
(what might be called the British Tradition) – are left unspecified and depend 
upon constitutional custom and convention, many of which are older than Can-
ada itself (Sharman 1990). As an important aside, it need be said that Canadi-
ans are tolerant of constitutional ambiguity. In fact, it is due to this disposition 
that the country’s political institutions work better in practice than in theory 
(Smith 2017).
The 1867 Act also provides for the non-elected Senate, and it is essential to 
be clear as to its cardinal characteristics – (1) appointment by the Crown (at one 
time for life, but since 1965 until age 75) and (2) a fixed number of senators 
(twenty-four) for each of the four regions, two comprising single provinces and 
two comprising either three or four provinces each. Additional senators have 
been added – six to Newfoundland and Labrador when it entered as a province 
in 1949 and later one each to the three northern territories – for a total 105 sena-
tors. In terms of numbers, the Senate plays a sanctuary role for the less popu-
lous provinces, a role recognised through a constitutional amendment in 1915 
which guarantees that no province will have fewer members of Parliament than 
it has senators (Constitution Act, 1915). Unlike the House of Lords in Great Brit-
ain, there is no possibility of adding additional members, except for a temporary 
expansion limited to a maximum of eight (Constitution Act, 1867, p. 26), and this 
has happened only once, in 1990, when the government was determined to see a 
controversial tax measure passed. Note, therefore, that the Senate, more than the 
House of Commons, is purpose-built; for that reason, it, more than any other insti-
tution, provides the basis for a ‘theory’ of Canada’s federation (senatorial regions, 
it could be argued, constitute a rare institutional affirmation of federalism). It 
might be for this reason that, historically, reforms to the Senate have usually pro-
posed as their rationale an improvement to the federal system. Notwithstanding 
the provision of s.23 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which requires that appointees 
(men, until 1930) hold real property worth at least 4,000 dollars in the province 
for which they are appointed, it is important to emphasise that the object of this 
requirement was to help guarantee that appointees would be more financially (and 
thus, politically) independent than members of the House of Commons. Admit-
tedly, this provision also protected the interests of property holders more gener-
ally. Nonetheless, the Senate has never been an elitist body whose composition is 
determined by divisions of birth or class. Therefore, recent changes in the selec-
tion process signal no change in social, as opposed to partisan political, values. 
In Canada, deference has invariably been paid to electoral power, that is to votes 
rather than to social status.
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Background
In Anglo-American political systems great weight is given to precedent, a fea-
ture that contributes to the sense of constitutional ambiguity noted earlier, since 
precedent is subject to interpretation. Thus, initial outcomes may be strongly self- 
reinforcing and hard to reverse; another way of making this point is to say that 
‘forsaken alternatives become increasingly unreachable with the passage of time’. 
This, Paul Pierson (2004), the American political scientist and author, has argued, is 
an example of the effect of time on politics. Two examples may be cited to illustrate 
this generalisation. First, the fixed number of members per region in the Senate had 
its origin in the fixed numbers assigned to the Legislative Council (that is, the Colo-
nial Senate) in the period of United Canada that preceded confederation. A fixed 
number of members also helped protect the Francophone and Roman Catholic pop-
ulation, which was in relative decline, or threatened decline, as English immigra-
tion increased. A second example would be that political obstruction by the Senate 
has always been and remains rare. For this reason the original structure continues to 
entrench itself. Except for the governments of Pierre Trudeau in 1980 and Stephen 
Harper a quarter-century later, there has never been an attempt made by a govern-
ment to change the structure of the Senate. Such Senate reform proposals as there 
have been, for instance to make the chamber elected, effective and equal (in terms 
of numbers per province), were non-public in origin, coming from interest groups, 
in this particular case the Canada West Foundation, Alberta. Third, political parties 
in Parliament who oppose federal government trade and economic policies have 
their roots in western Canada, beginning in the period of the First World War; the 
Canada West Foundation was associated with the populist but conservative Reform 
Party, which originated in Alberta in the last decade of the twentieth century.
Again, in Pierson’s (2004, p. 13) words, ‘The fact that something happens 
slowly, however, does not make it unimportant’ – witness the emerging awareness 
of bicameralism as a feature of Canada’s Parliament today, in large part because 
of the Supreme Court’s 2014 opinion and the government’s appointment of an 
independent advisory committee to select potential nominees. Canadian experi-
ence and especially the ever-shifting makeup of its population in consequence of 
immigration from Asia, Europe and South America have shaped the Senate over 
time. One might say that as Canada changes, so too must the Senate. As will be 
argued later, demographic and sociocultural change and a decline in traditional 
party allegiances among voters are combining to make the Senate today a plat-
form for the voice of democracy as much as it has historically been an instrument 
of federalism. It could be said that bicameralism is as vital to the realisation of the 
constitutional objective set down in 1867 in the preamble to s.91 of the Constitu-
tion Act – ‘the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada’ – as the division 
of powers is to maintaining the federation. Indeed, in 2018, there is no question 
but that the role of the Senate in Canada’s bicameral Parliament, and more par-
ticularly its relationship to the House of Commons, where under the principle of 
responsible government the government must command the support of a majority 
of elected MPs, is recognised to be of paramount importance.
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It is not possible to speak of Canada’s Senate without speaking of the House 
of Lords and the United States Senate (at that time), two non-elected chambers 
which the Fathers of Confederation (the name given Canada’s founding fathers) 
knew well but rejected, with long-term consequences for the politics of the fed-
eration. Even today, critics of the Senate will sometimes refer to the chamber as 
Canada’s ‘House of Lords,’ though there never was any factual basis for the anal-
ogy. Canada is a federation, the United Kingdom is not, and more than that, the 
creation of the Senate was an absolute condition made by the colonies that later 
became the provinces of Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia for enter-
ing into the Confederation. From their perspective, it was one important way 
of achieving a balance alongside Ontario’s much larger population than that of 
the combined eastern provinces. In the words of a pre-eminent ‘Father,’ George 
Brown, ‘On no other condition would we have advanced a step’ (Parliamentary 
Debates 1951, p. 88). That said, the Westminster model, of which Canada was 
the first self-governing colony in the Empire to emulate, exercised a very strong 
influence on colonial and later Canadians. One reason often overlooked is the 
paramountcy of the Crown, which at the time of Canada’s creation was identified 
with Queen Victoria, then at the zenith of her reign, having become Empress of 
India a decade earlier. Crown, Senate and Commons on the western side of the 
Atlantic could (and were) easily, if mistakenly, interpreted as mirror images of 
Crown, Lords and Commons on the eastern side.
The other obvious example of which the architects of Confederation were aware 
but whose details they refused to copy was that of the United States Senate. The 
United States was a large federation, as Canada needed to be if the British North 
American colonies were to be united. Yet the structure of the Senate of the U.S. 
Congress, as set down in 1787, found little favour north of the forty-ninth parallel. 
The selection by provincial legislatures of delegates from among their numbers 
to sit at the centre, as was done by state legislatures in the United States until the 
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, violated the common sense of 
Parliament as the supreme legislative power (as in the United Kingdom) and the 
belief British North Americans held that the creation of a national parliament of 
two chambers marked an important step towards constitutional maturity. Accord-
ing to J. C. Bourinot (1837–1902), journalist and later clerk first of the Senate 
and then of the Commons, one justification for an upper chamber was this desire 
for national status in Canada’s dealings with other countries, particularly with 
the United States. At least until the middle of the twentieth century, when New 
Zealand (1950), Denmark (1953) and Sweden (1970) moved from bicameral to 
unicameral legislatures, a two-house parliament was considered one of the signs 
of national maturity. By contrast, in 1895, Bourinot (1895, pp. 19–20) wrote:
Unicameral bodies fall into three or four main groups: the parliaments of minor 
states of southeastern Europe, Servia, Bulgaria and Greece; the congresses of 
the states of Central America, Nicaragua excepted, compose another group; 
the Landtags of the Austrian crown lands are one-chambered, and so are nearly 
all of the diets of the minor German states, excepting those of the free cities.
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The ambitions of Canadian politicians for national autonomy aimed higher than 
that, if only because they were embarking on a unique enterprise – the creation 
of what in time would be referred to as a bilingual and bicultural federation of 
continental scale.
The architects of the Canadian federation may have rejected some of the details 
of the American precursor, but they retained the principle of a distribution of pow-
ers between two levels of jurisdiction. Where the difference lay in Canada was in 
the presence of a common Crown at both levels of jurisdiction. In one sense, Can-
ada is a monarchy because there is neither now nor at any time previous repub-
lican sentiment of any strength. The exception to that generalisation might be in 
Lower Canada in the 1830s, before the grant by Great Britain of the principle of 
responsible government and before in consequence the French-speaking majority 
could make its voice heard. But once that principle was acknowledged after the 
rebellions of 1837, particularly in what is today Quebec, no organised movement 
of any influence to introduce republican institutions reappeared, despite both the 
fact that Canada lay to the north of an undefended border with one of the largest 
and most vigorous republics in the world and the intermingling of the agrarian 
populations of the two countries (Coats & MacLean 1943; Hansen 1940). That 
Canada should have developed its parliamentary and federal institutions with so 
little influence from its powerful neighbour is a subject that deserves more inves-
tigation than it has received (Smith 1999). One factor that has been given insuf-
ficient attention in this regard is the anti-republican or, perhaps more accurately, 
pro-clerical sentiment evident in Quebec for decades after the French Revolution. 
During the American War of Independence, troops supporting the revolutionary 
cause, which included the separation of church and state, invaded Quebec, they 
were not welcome in Montreal and other communities for this reason as much 
as – or more than – their belligerent behaviour.
Canadians do not think of boundaries with other countries, because except 
for the United States, there are no boundaries. In that respect, Canada might 
be seen as an island bounded in three directions by oceans and to the south 
by the United States. And much of the landmass of Canada, particularly the 
vast area that embraces Hudson Bay, is occupied by the pre-Cambrian (or Lau-
rentian) Shield, comprising rock, lakes and trees. The population of this part 
of the country is mainly indigenous. Indeed, the vast majority of the country’s 
non-indigenous population lives within three hundred miles of the US border. 
Canada remains, as it has for centuries since the arrival of European settlers, a 
country characterised by east-west linear activity, be it in the form of railways, 
highways, television broadcasting, economic and recreational organisations and 
much more. This is how bureaucracy, political parties and the cabinet are organ-
ised. More to the point of this essay, this is how the Senate is organised: northern 
senators from Nunavut, the North-West Territories and Yukon were appointed 
only in 1975. All of which is to say that as imposing as geography is on Cana-
dian life (Canadians live in five different time zones), it tends not to be given the 
close attention it warrants when the subject is politics, either as an organisation 
or as an activity.
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By contrast, however, perhaps too much attention is given to time – in the 
sense of history – especially when the discussion has as its subject comparisons 
between Europe and Canada. While there is no doubt that the former may have 
longer settled histories (placing to one side the early habitation of indigenous 
populations in North America), that should not obscure the persistence of Can-
ada’s constitutional arrangements – federalism for 151 years and institutions of 
responsible government for an additional twenty-five years. While it is true that 
the franchise expanded in the post-Confederation years, aside from that there is 
a sense of a continuous present about its political structures – and this despite 
massive demographic growth (in the past fifty years the country’s population has 
almost doubled; currently, it stands at 37 million people). A summary of the most 
notable changes would be rural settlement of the western part of the country in 
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, a striking rural-to-urban move-
ment in population beginning in the latter part of the twentieth century and a 
significant broadening in demographic heterogeneity among immigrants in recent 
decades. The Crown, the House of Commons (whose members are elected under 
a single-member, simple plurality voting system) and the Senate, except for the 
very recent alteration in the manner of the selection of senators, remain as they 
were at the beginning. Compare that persistence with the striking constitutional 
changes that characterise Ireland and which are described by the authors of papers 
on that country in this book. Equally noteworthy is the absence in Canada of civil 
unrest or political strife. The one exception would be the secessionist movement 
in Quebec a quarter-century ago, yet that too has declined without, significantly, 
constitutional or institutional reforms.
The continuity of Canadian politics deserves more study than it has received. 
One part of the explanation lies in the fact that Canada has presented itself to the 
world – and to its own citizens – in company with international associations, for 
instance, the British Empire, the League of Nations and the United Nations. It is in 
those contexts that Canada and its citizens established in their own minds a strong 
sense of place. At the same time, it has been said that as English and French are 
the country’s two official languages, ‘Canada is well equipped to communicate 
with the world and to assert its presence’ (Report of the Royal Commission 1967). 
This is a point too easily forgotten in an anti-colonial age: for most of her history 
Canada was more than a colony – she was part of ‘a world-encircling empire’ that 
included not only the Commonwealth but also the Francophonie. With regard 
to the Empire, she thought not about separation but about using her prestige to 
gain greater weight and strength within it and its Commonwealth successor (Frye 
1976, p. 59). And that sense of place depended upon familiar rather than revolu-
tionary relationships. Although Canada evolved a separate (from Great Britain) 
set of diplomatic ties, category of citizenship and international obligations, each 
nonetheless possessed a discernible common DNA: British history, institutions 
and political values. At the same time, from 1774 and the Quebec Act onwards, 
the Crown acknowledged and accommodated the Roman Catholic religion, the 
French language and French civil law. For these reasons, Canada, though not 
unique, today presents the image of a strongly international country, and there 
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is no doubt that the structure of the Senate, which grants equality of seats among 
senatorial divisions regardless of their population disparities, contributes to this 
bilingual and bicultural feature.
Interpretation
What I have said up to this point is pretty much standard script when talking 
about the constitution in Canada. If it diverges from what is usually said, it does 
so in the sense that it emphasises the transformation the Senate is experiencing 
because of the change in its appointment procedure. To repeat, where once nomi-
nees for the Senate were almost exclusively partisan in their selection, since 2015 
partisanship as a criterion has virtually disappeared. As of October 2018, of the 
forty-three Senators appointed under the new procedure, none can be described as 
a visible partisan. There are three implications of this change: first, there will be 
a growth and strengthening in public attitudes towards bicameralism, with impor-
tant consequences for public attitudes towards government generally and towards 
the Commons, cabinet, political parties and opposition specifically. Second, there 
is going to be a confounding of what the sense of the constitution is: the princi-
ple of responsible government may continue in its historic location, the House 
of Commons, but no longer will that, in itself, be an exhaustive explanation of 
Canadian government. Third, there will be re-examination of the criteria used to 
evaluate the quality of Canada’s institutions and political processes. Neither the 
language nor criteria that have so long dominated political discourse in Canada 
are applicable to the situation of the new, emerging Senate.
Not only are Canadians confronting a form of parliamentary institutions dif-
ferent from what they have witnessed before but they are also limited in their 
response to the change by being constrained to interpret events using concepts and 
a political vocabulary retrieved from the past. Where, for instance, in a chamber 
without parties is ‘the opposition’? It should be said that what is happening in 
Canada has its critics – but from a comparatively narrow perspective, that of non-
elected senators challenging the principle of responsible government, which rests 
on control of the popularly elected House of Commons. See, for example, news-
paper articles by Andrew Coyne (2008), ‘Supreme Court Ensures Our Widely 
Reviled Patronage House (The Senate) Will Stay Forever’ and ‘ Exactly Why 
Do We Need a Senate?’, and by Konrad Yakabuski (2018), ‘Senators Should be 
Elected – or Eliminated’. That this opinion should be so prominent despite the fact 
that the Fathers of Confederation could hardly have been more explicit in their 
rejection of an upper elected chamber, specifically on the grounds that a legisla-
tive body so constituted would rival the House of Commons, requires close study. 
The Supreme Court itself observed in 1980 that ‘a primary purpose of the crea-
tion of the Senate [. . .] was to afford protection to the various sectional interests 
in Canada in relation to the enactment of legislation (emphasis added)’. In 2014, 
the Court once again said much the same thing in its discussion of the Senate as 
‘a complementary chamber of sober second thought’ (Reference re Legislative 
Authority [1980]; Reference re Senate Reform 2014; cf. Harder 2018).
82 David E. Smith
Where is there a crisis or difficulty when the Senate seems poised (1) to play a 
far more public role in the political life of the country than ever before and at the 
same time (2) to be acquiring new-found legitimacy in the eyes of Canadian citi-
zens? Yet the more I thought about the question, the more I came to see that there 
may indeed be an emerging crisis – arising not from lack of legitimacy but, para-
doxically, from the onset of legitimacy itself! More than that, this unprecedented 
challenge carries with it a concomitant query: what does a reinvigorated Senate 
say about the Crown in Canada? For the subjects are related, although the Cana-
dian public has historically identified the appointed House as a partisan political 
body. Even those who understand that senators are appointed by the Crown (that 
is, by the governor general) see this as form without substance. Yet the Senate 
and the Crown are two parts of the three-part Parliament and, unlike the House 
of Commons, they share some important similarities, the most important among 
which is their role as deferential bodies – the Senate to the Commons and the 
governor general to the government drawn from the Commons. If the Senate, to 
its critics, is trespassing on the terrain of the Commons as the historic home of 
responsibility, there is at the present time, although less publicly discussed, con-
cern in other quarters about clarifying, even codifying, the conventions of consti-
tutional monarchy as they relate to the Crown’s reserve power (Evatt & Forsey 
1990; Forsey 1968; Twomey 2018).
Thus, while in their relationship to government and the Commons the Crown 
and the Senate may share a convention of restraint, both stand as potential limita-
tions on the exercise of popular power. More than that, the Senate depends upon 
the Crown for its legitimacy, as the Fathers of Confederation intended when they 
rejected every proposal that the Senate should be elected, a rationale the Supreme 
Court of Canada confirmed in its advisory opinion in 2014: ‘Introducing a process 
of consultative elections’, said the Court, ‘would change our constitution’s archi-
tecture, by endowing Senators with a popular mandate which is inconsistent with 
the Senate’s fundamental nature and role as a complementary chamber of sober 
second thought’ (Reference re Senate Reform 2014, p. 708).
Public attitudes towards the Crown in Canada tend to be narrow, usually 
associating it with monarchy and more specifically the person of the sovereign. 
The small minority of Canadians who object to the Crown do so because of its 
form – that of being British – and not because they advocate a transformation to 
a republic. Canadians see but do not understand the Crown: one might label this 
an ‘external approach to things (relying on the evidence of the eye rather than the 
more emotional organs of sense)’ (Allen 1958). Yet Canada’s relationship to the 
Crown has contributed strongly to the development of the country’s autonomy 
in its dealings with other countries and with the United Kingdom. The story of 
Canadian treaties, diplomatic representation abroad or separate Canadian citizen-
ship is founded on a concept of a separate Canadian identity rooted in a distinct 
Canadian Crown. Similarly, the Crown and the Senate are more intimate in their 
relationship – recall that senators are creatures of the Crown’s representative – 
than is generally acknowledged. In light of the existing constitutional arrange-
ment, it is necessary to ask, what would happen to the Senate if the Crown were 
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to be abolished? The two parts of Parliament could hardly be more closely linked. 
More than that, the complementary role that the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
2014, saw the Senate’s role in the legislative process – that of completing the pro-
cess, so to speak, and providing ‘a “check” on the excesses of a winner-take-all 
majority rule’ (by which MPs are elected) – is a scrutinising function the Crown 
depends upon before it grants royal assent to bills (Harder 2018, p. 11). Thus, if 
the Crown’s place elevates the Senate, it may equally be said that the Senate’s role 
as a chamber of sober second thought is vital to maintaining the integrity of the 
legislative process, of which the Crown is the acknowledged guardian. That does 
not mean that the opinion of the Senate necessarily determines the outcome of a 
question. What is more likely to happen, in light of the primacy of the principle of 
responsible government, is the position advanced by Senator Tony Dean during 
the vigorous debate in 2018 on legislation to legalise cannabis: ‘This is an election- 
platform commitment, it is a major government bill. I think, at the end of the day, 
the Senate [must] recognise the primacy of the elected body’ (LeBlanc 2018).
The achievement of universal male suffrage had no effect on the Senate both 
because federalism was the key consideration at its creation and because it was 
never understood to be primarily a societal bulwark. In fact, the Senate has been 
an important forum for minorities underrepresented in the Commons: women, 
indigenous peoples and French Canadians in provinces where they are not an 
electoral majority (cf. Cardinal, this volume). In one respect, the Senate might be 
considered static, since its numbers never change; by contrast, the House of Com-
mons increases in size as a result of the Canadian formula for electoral redistribu-
tion. Indeed, in the last century the Commons has increased in numbers almost by 
the size, in number, of the Senate. In 2018, the Fathers of Confederation would 
recognise the Senate they designed but not the House of Commons, whose mem-
bership far exceeds its original number. Therefore, small provinces value their 
representation in the appointed Senate. Another factor in explaining growing pub-
lic interest in and sympathy for an unelected chamber is the growing unpopular-
ity of partisan politics and of party discipline in particular, as manifested in the 
work of the House of Commons. One reason for this development is a heightened 
belief in the need for real and perceived fairness, with a resulting transformation 
in the sense of what rules should look like. In the words of Australian scholar 
Judith Brett (2001), ‘For those experienced with the modern informal meeting and 
its consensual style of reaching a decision, parliamentary procedure is no longer 
seen as enabling but as precluding cooperative action’. A reciprocal relationship 
appears to be emerging between senators and the public, one that is essentially 
different from that which happens between MP, as representative, and constituent, 
as represented.
Paradoxically, the Senate itself is being redefined as a new democratic instru-
ment at the same time as the Commons, particularly the government in the Com-
mons, is being forced, as a result of the Senate’s activities, to address criticism of 
its activities more than ever before. Although the committee work of the Senate 
is regularly lauded by media, academics and the public, the scope of that activity 
and the sense of citizen access to its proceedings deserve closer study than may 
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be given here. Indicative of its volume, however, are data in the annual Senate 
Report on Activities for the period between both 2008 and 2009 and 2012 and 
2013, which reveal that over 2,300 committee meetings have taken place with 
more than 6,000 witnesses in attendance, which produced roughly 500 committee 
reports ( Senate of Canada s.d.).
As evidence of the dynamic of bicameralism, the primacy of one chamber 
appears to be in potential decline while the other appears to be on the rise. Thus, 
while critics of a non-partisan Senate might profess to see it imperilling the prin-
ciple of responsible government, defenders of the new order might claim that it is 
saving democracy. If there is substance to those positions, here is where today’s 
‘crisis’ of Canada’s Senate may reside, for it is challenging assumptions of gov-
erning that predate the Confederation. At this point, it is worth recalling that 
Canada has never had legislation such as the Parliament Act, 1911 of the United 
Kingdom, which reduced the House of Lords’ power in the passage of legislation 
to that of a suspensive veto, which is to say that the Lords may delay but cannot 
defeat legislation. With that result, said American political scientist William Riker 
(1992), the Parliament at Westminster had become, in constitutional reality, ‘a 
unicameral legislature’. That Canadians have never been induced to follow the 
example of ‘the mother country’ in this regard may be interpreted in different 
ways, but in the present context, it confirms widespread support for the original 
Senate and its powers, as set down in the Constitution Act, 1867.
Although perhaps not an inundation, there is more media coverage of the Sen-
ate today and the tone and analysis of that examination is far more probing than 
previously. Such attention is to be preferred to the suffocation of business in the 
House of Commons by party discipline. More than that, there is an educative 
value to be gained from the controversy that may arise between the two houses: 
government is forced in its response to criticism from senators to take a posi-
tion, with the result that the process of governing is becoming more public than 
ever before. Compare that outcome to the findings of a study about constrictive 
party discipline based on interviews with MPs in 2004 and in 2011, conducted by 
the Samara Centre for Democracy (Curry 2018). Today, even when government 
refuses to compromise, it is still more accountable than before because it has to 
explain – publicly – its decision again (and again) (Wherry 2018). One of the 
great benefits to accrue from the appearance of truly functioning bicameralism is 
a more informed citizenry. A significant consequence of the arrival of a more criti-
cal Senate (and with it energised bicameralism) is that the primacy of the House of 
Commons – in truth, government dominance of the Commons (and Parliament) – 
is being reduced.
It is difficult in 2018 to make an absolute judgment as to whether this develop-
ment is good or bad for the future of Canadian politics. Certainly, it is possible 
to find critics: Ian Brodie (2018, pp. 11–12), Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 
(2006–2015) former chief of staff, has written that ‘a Senate without partisans 
is a dangerous innovation’. On the other hand, Hugh Segal (2018) – Principal of 
Massey College, University of Toronto, a former Conservative senator (2005–
2014) and former chief of staff to another Conservative prime minister, Brian 
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Mulroney – has argued that ‘we can’t return to a Senate ruled by partisan poli-
tics’. Perspective is required to make an informed judgment on this matter, and 
that requires time. In the interval and equally central to the discussion, are two 
additional questions: ‘why, after almost a century and a half of stability, is this 
happening?’ and ‘why now?’ First, there has been more than a decade of talk – but 
no action – by Conservatives on Senate reform, particularly to make the body 
elected. When the government of Stephen Harper finally acquiesced to pressure 
from within and outside Parliament to seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme 
Court of Canada as to whether his government’s proposal to introduce a system 
of indirect election of senators (that is, elected within each province) was consti-
tutional, the Court responded in 2014 that such a change would constitute a fun-
damental alteration to the terms of Confederation and therefore require amending 
the formula of the constitution – after which, talk of Senate reform abated. In real-
ity, as we have seen, it was replaced by action on the part of the opposition Liberal 
party, first as opposition and then, after 2015, as government.
It would be an exaggeration to say, in light of this brief history, that political 
parties are in decline. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that recent and rather 
dramatic changes in parliamentary practice have not promoted the reputation of 
the Senate among those Canadians who express cynicism about political parties, 
because parties often seem unable to achieve what people want. The Senate was 
designed to provide balance in an otherwise unbalanced federation, which is one 
reason the Court in its opinion described it as a ‘foundational political institution’. 
Now, freed of the partisan chains that linked them for a century and a half to the 
House of Commons and which denied their playing the compensatory role the 
architects of the constitution intended, senators are poised to undertake a new 
role as an ally of the people. Whether this is a crisis for the Senate may be open 
to debate, but that there will be contradictory understandings about the role of the 
non-partisan Senate in the future is unquestionable.
Conclusion
Historically, the reputation of the Senate of Canada among Canadians has not been 
particularly favourable. It was viewed as a partisan preserve whose members were 
scarcely less disciplined by party whips than were members of the House of Com-
mons. Yet it is rather difficult to accept that negative assessment, if only because 
without the Senate of Canada there would have been no Canada and because for 
more than a century and a half it has brought a balance to opinion in Parliament 
that the Commons, whose composition has been based on elections, often felt free 
to ignore. If there is one undisputed characteristic of Canada, it is that the country 
is stable; if there is one institution more than any other that contributes to that 
condition, it is the Senate. What kind of marks can be given to the initiative now 
underway – where senators are accountable to no one but themselves? While the 
period under review may be short, there is no question that the Senate today is 
improving legislation, yet at the same time it is not thwarting government. Rather 
than limiting popular power, the Senate is promoting it.
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6  Constitutional conservatism, 
anti-democratic ideology, 
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Before Canada emerged as a nation-state in 1867, the former British North Amer-
ica consisted of a series of independent colonies each with its own bicameral leg-
islature. These legislatures consisted of a lower house, or Legislative Assembly, 
elected by ‘the people’ and an upper house, or Legislative Council, appointed by 
its lieutenant governor. Much like their equivalents in Belgium and the Nether-
lands, these Legislative Councils originally served to curb democratic excess and 
defend landed interests, roles they filled through 1848 and the advent of respon-
sible government. In Canada, responsible government refers to a parliamentary 
system where the governor’s Executive Council (better known today as the prime 
minister and his cabinet) both sits within Parliament and finds itself responsible 
to the parliamentary majority. Under the responsible regime, colonial premiers – 
as leaders of both the Executive Councils and their own political parties – now 
instructed governors directly as to who should receive appointments to the upper 
houses. As a result, Legislative Councillors became responsible solely to the polit-
ical party leaders who appointed them to their positions. For those who preferred 
the former colonial constitutions, constitutional government had become party 
government, and narrow party interests had replaced collective group interests. 
In the many-fronted battle for (and against) popular sovereignty – a battle that 
crossed social, cultural, economic, and more straightforwardly political lines – 
another check had seemingly fallen as the push toward democratization increased.
In 1849, the year following responsible government, calls rang out anew for 
elective Legislative Councils. By 1859, the assemblies of the colonies of Canada 
(now the provinces of Ontario and Quebec), New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and 
Prince Edward Island had all endorsed the idea in principle. While only Canada 
and Prince Edward Island would actually make their upper houses elected, the 
pursuit of the elective principle across British North America generally unfolded 
around the same ideological positions. Self-declared radicals and republicans, at 
one extreme, wanted elective institutions spread as widely as possible. Uncom-
promising Tories at the other scoffed at anything that did not mirror the British 
House of Lords. Between these two poles lay the true contest over the colonial 
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upper houses. As reformers defended the responsible system they had so recently 
won, a new conservatism, I argue, formed in the wake of responsible government: 
one that still favoured the old mixed constitution of Crown, Lords, and Commons 
but looked to direct election to restore its former essence. These conservatives 
in particular pressed for elective Legislative Councils – accompanied by strict 
property qualifications for electors or candidates – in hopes of restoring political 
legitimacy to their upper houses, siphoning power from the people’s assemblies 
and ultimately undercutting responsible government itself. Much like the Dutch, 
Swedish, and Danish conservatives seen elsewhere in this volume, British North 
American conservatives had thus looked to stifle the spread of democracy through 
elective institutions normally associated with democracy itself.
Historiography
Within Canadian historiography, discussions of British North America’s elective 
Legislative Councils trace back to the earliest days of Canadian history as a profes-
sion. These early histories reflect institutional studies in their purest sense, where 
analyses took place within narrow provincial frameworks and ideas of expedi-
ency and partisanship dominated explanations for change (Harvey 1922; Mackay 
1963; McArthur 1930; Hart 1960; Beck 1957; MacNutt 1960). Since the turn of 
the twenty-first century, provincial emphases have changed little when it comes to 
British North America’s upper houses, and only the Canadian Legislative Council 
has received any recent attention. Even so, intellectual historians and political sci-
entists, such as Jeffrey McNairn and David E. Smith, have done much to revitalise 
the subject through a deeper understanding of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
political thought. Both authors, writing concurrently, have claimed very much the 
same thing: that a dialectic between republicanism and conservatism gave rise to 
the Province of Canada’s elected Legislative Council during the 1850s.
Within the British North American context, historians have tended to most 
closely associate republicanism with the Canadian Rebellions of 1837 and 1838. 
In response to perceived oligarchic rule, French-speaking Lower Canadians in 
particular turned to republican ideas of popular sovereignty to empower them-
selves as a provincial majority (Ducharme 2014b). As part of their famed Ninety-
Two Resolutions of 1834, these so-called patriotes repeatedly demanded an 
elective Legislative Council so they might fully realise republican rule (Lower 
Canada 1834). The Imperial government’s rejection of these Resolutions in 1837 
ultimately led to open rebellion that autumn (Ducharme 2014b). Canadian con-
servatives, in their active support of the Imperial government, vehemently disas-
sociated themselves from the patriote cause. Yet Canadian conservatives would 
also come to pursue an elective upper house less than twenty years later.
Acknowledging this situation, McNairn and Smith argue that these conserva-
tives had a different example in mind when they pursued the elective principle: 
that of the republican United States. McNairn, for his part, emphasises the tem-
plate offered by American Federalist thought. Responding to post-revolutionary 
political instability, the Federalists crafted an American federal constitution in 
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1787 that established separations of powers resting ‘squarely on popular sov-
ereignty, but that still encapsulated the benefits of the three classical forms of 
government [King, Lords, and Commons]’ (McNairn 1996, p. 508). McNairn 
concludes that these conservative checks upon democratic excess served as a 
model for Canadian reformulations of the Legislative Council (McNairn 2000). 
While Smith ultimately agrees with McNairn in principle, he questions some of 
the details. The American Senate, as established by the federal constitution, would 
not operate electively until 1913. With this in mind, Smith argues that American 
state constitutions provided Canadian conservatives with working models for suc-
cessfully balanced separations of powers. Just as elected state senates served as 
important and respected checks within state legislatures, an elective Legislative 
Council could fill the same role for Canada. Through this decision, Smith con-
cludes that ‘Canadians came closer than at any time in their history to facing the 
republican option’ (Smith 1999, pp. 87–89).
While this chapter does not seek to contradict McNairn or Smith on these general 
points, it does take a closer look at the elective bodies that British North American 
conservatives hoped to establish. By 1855, all but three American states had elimi-
nated the property qualifications on their state franchises (Keyssar 2000). These 
state franchises – grounded in republican ideals of white male equality and popular 
sovereignty – governed all state elections, including those for state senators (Scalia 
1999). While British North American conservatives may have pursued the elec-
tive principle, they fundamentally resisted any broader application of republican 
government. Anything that approached universal manhood suffrage was viewed 
as anathema for the elective Legislative Councils. If British North America’s 
lower houses served the people, its upper houses, according to these conservatives, 
needed to return to their original purpose and serve landed interests. The elective 
principle and restrictive property qualifications – for electors, candidates, or both – 
offered British North American conservatives a means to achieve this goal and 
restore the constitutions that responsible government had so recently unbalanced.
Responsible government and the elective principle
With this background in place, the story of British North America’s elective 
Legislative Councils begins in earnest on 25 April 1849. The Canadian gover-
nor general, Lord Elgin, had just signed the so-called Rebellion Losses Bill into 
law, and in response, an angry Tory mob torched the market building that housed 
Canada’s Parliament. Throughout the 1840s, Canadian conservatives had warned 
Elgin that responsible government would open the door to destructive legislation 
based upon selfish party interests (Fuimus 1847). To conservative eyes, Canada’s 
Reform government had just endorsed the most unjust and self-serving party 
legislation imaginable. In the name of provincial reconciliation, the Rebellion 
Losses Bill compensated anyone who had lost property during the Lower Cana-
dian Rebellions of 1837 and 1838, including those who had taken up arms against 
the Crown (Province of Canada 1849; cf. Careless 1967). Most of those who sup-
ported the uprisings now sided with the Reform cause. The Reform government 
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had to stack the upper house with multiple new members just to get the legislation 
to pass (British American League 1849a). For conservatives, the Rebellion Losses 
Bill had proven that the constitutional checks formerly offered by the Legisla-
tive Council no longer applied under responsible government. The Parliament 
building, now burning in the darkness, served as direct evidence of what might 
continue to happen without those former checks restored.
Canada’s Rebellion Losses controversy offered the initial push for British 
North American conservatives towards elected Legislative Councils. As one his-
torian notes, Canadian conservatives of all stripes responded to the legislation ‘by 
organising Constitutional Societies to promote conservative policy’ (Way 1995, 
p. 20). The largest of these societies, the British American League, formed in the 
days preceding Lord Elgin’s fateful trip to Parliament. The League’s purpose was 
twofold: first, to determine whether Canada should break its imperial connection 
to Great Britain; and second, to figure out how to restore political legitimacy to 
the province’s Legislative Council (Allin 1915). On the first point, League mem-
bers agreed: Canada would remain loyal. On the second point, opinions were 
much more divided. Some delegates, on the one hand, viewed it as ‘essential to 
the interests and liberties of the people [. . .] that the Legislative Council should be 
elected’. For them, an elected upper house, when combined with strict qualifica-
tions for either candidates or voters, ‘would be virtually and in fact a much more 
conservative body than we have at present’ (British American League 1849a, 
pp. 7–8; British American League 1849b, app.xxv). Older Tories, on the other 
hand, balked at any mention of reform whatsoever and worked to preserve existing 
constitutional arrangements. The question ultimately proved so contentious that 
the League’s general convention refused to discuss it further and instead referred 
it to the League’s local branches (British American League 1849b). Answers 
trickled in soon enough. By January 1850, the majority of League associations 
had voted in favour of an elective upper house (Toronto Independent 1850).
The British American League never held another general convention to ratify 
these local results. The question of elective Legislative Councils had laid bare the 
ideological divisions between its two schools of conservatives. Although a majority 
of branches had endorsed the elective principle, the League’s sizeable Tory compo-
nent refused to accept the outcome. A letter from J. W. Gamble to the members of 
the Yorkville (Toronto) branch reveals the extent of those divisions. Gamble, a lead-
ing Leaguer from the Toronto area, supported the elective principle wholeheartedly. 
The Yorkville branch had not only disagreed with Gamble’s position but had done 
so publicly, personally, and confrontationally. In Gamble’s own words:
It is with much concern that I have read [. . .] a resolution passed by you in 
reference to my views on the question of elective institutions. [. . .] [P]ass-
ing over the direct personal allusion to myself, [. . .] I submit whether any 
advantage to be derived from parading before the public merely conflicting 
opinions of members of an association, whose utility depends upon its una-
nimity, and whose measures, to carry weight with them, must be based upon 
some show of reason and sound sense, is not more than doubtful.
(Gamble 1850)
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Older Tories used such direct tactics alongside their broader colonial influence to 
forestall any further assemblies (Allin 1915). Without a mandate, the League’s 
executive formally pursued the subject no further. Its public address of May 1850 
made no mention of the Legislative Council whatsoever (Toronto British Colonist 
1850).
The League’s public silence, however, did not prevent its message from finding 
a wider audience. As part of its efforts to promote conservative policy, the British 
American League made repeated entreaties to potential sympathisers across Brit-
ish North America’s Maritime colonies. League delegates, for instance, met with 
John Robertson and Charles Simonds of the New Brunswick Colonial Association 
in October 1849 (MacNutt 1960). These two groups agreed to meet again in Hali-
fax to discuss, among other things, Legislative Councils and a broader union of the 
colonies. Persuaded by their Canadian counterparts, the New Brunswick Colonial 
Association would soon enough promote the elective principle for their own upper 
house as well (Toronto North American 1850). League delegates, moreover, sent 
out personal letters to ‘prominent and influential citizens in Halifax’ and circu-
lated pamphlets within Maritime urban centres (Toronto Independent 1849). They 
also ensured to keep the Maritime press well informed. Newspapers throughout 
the eastern colonies highlighted the League, its conventions, and the arguments 
of its delegates. Maritime editors kept a keen eye on the idea of an elective upper 
house, whether they supported it or not (Fredericton Head Quarters 1849, 1850; 
Halifax British Colonist 1849a, 1849b, 1850a, 1850b).
Despite these apparent successes elsewhere, the British American League would 
not survive into 1851. The elective principle had torn it into two warring camps. 
The League’s broader reaction against responsible government and its rejuvenated 
brand of conservatism had nonetheless travelled across British North America. 
These ideas, including elective Legislative Councils, would soon worm their way 
into colonial legislatures. From there, they would take on lives of their own.
Conservative legislation and the elective principle
In this regard, conservatives from Nova Scotia picked up the torch first. Respon-
sible government, according to Nova Scotia’s leading conservative, J. W. John-
ston, had ‘placed the Local affairs of the Province in the hands of the Executive 
Council unrestrained by any control on the part of the Lieutenant Governor or 
the Imperial Government’ (Johnston 1850, p. 5). Executive oligarchy and party 
interests now reigned supreme. The ‘Canadian Rebellion Reward Bill’, as John-
ston called it, had proven that the upper branches of government could no longer 
curtail unjust legislation under the responsible system. In Nova Scotia as well, 
Johnston saw the province’s new Reform government acting in ways that sowed 
the same discordant seeds. Despite imperial policy, the new executive had dis-
missed one hundred Nova Scotian magistrates without cause or explanation, only 
to appoint 250 replacements. Reformers now sat on county benches across the 
province with friendship serving as their primary qualification (Johnston 1850, 
pp. 6–8; cf. Halifax British Colonist 1849c). Nova Scotia’s new Reform executive 
had thus revealed an apparent willingness to exploit responsible government even 
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at the expense of local justice. Propelled by these concerns – alongside Prime 
Minister Lord John Russell’s recent acceptance of an elective upper house for the 
Cape Colony in South Africa – Johnston read a series of sweeping resolutions to 
Nova Scotia’s House of Assembly, headlined by ‘the Election of the Legislative 
Council by the people’ (Johnston 1850, p. 5; cf. Wight 1947, pp. 71–72). Johnston 
argued that only an elective upper house would break executive dependency and 
‘weaken those influences that result in merely party adhesions’ (Johnston 1850, 
p. 5; cf. Nova Scotia 1850, pp. 565, 569). Johnston’s conservative resolution 
for an elective Legislative Council signalled the first of its kind in British North 
America’s history.
Johnston, in the end, failed in this initial resolution. A similar motion failed 
within Nova Scotia’s upper house as well (Halifax British Colonist 1850c, 1850d, 
1850e, 1850f). The province’s Reform majority, having just secured responsi-
ble government, aligned against any constitutional change that might jeopard-
ise its continued survival (Nova Scotia 1850, pp. 602–605). Even so, the idea 
of elective Legislative Councils gathered steam within British North American 
conservative circles. By March of 1850, Prince Edward Island conservatives had 
also given notice ‘to render the Legislative Council ELECTIVE’ based upon the 
belief that only an elected upper house would be ‘truly “responsible” and useful 
to the public’ (Charlottetown Islander 1850). Unfortunately for these conserva-
tives, their motion died when the legislative session ended. From May to August 
of the same year, the Canadian Legislative Assembly also heard a total of four 
conservative motions for an elective upper house based upon similar arguments 
(Province of Canada 1850, pp. 17–18, 40, 91–94, 245). These motions also failed 
as well when Canada’s Reform majority sided against them as threats to respon-
sible government.
In New Brunswick, however, a conservative coalition government held power. 
Much like their compatriots elsewhere in British North America, New Brunswick 
conservatives also believed that
[t]he extension of the principle of self-government has so increased the 
power of the House of Assembly over the Legislative Council [. . .] that the 
Legislative Council does not now retain the constitutional check which that 
Branch is called upon to exercise according to the theory of our mixed form 
of Government.
Seizing on the Imperial government’s promise to the Cape Colony, these conserv-
atives formally proposed an elective Legislative Council for New Brunswick so 
‘as to secure a more perfect constitutional balance [. . .] than any other attainable 
in the present state of Colonial Society’ (New Brunswick 1850, pp. 348–349). The 
proposal received the Assembly’s formal approval in April of 1850 and the colo-
nial secretary’s attention the following November. After some delay, New Brun-
swick obtained its reply in mid-February of 1851. The Imperial Government had 
no objection to an elected Legislative Council so long as it came with restrictive 
property qualifications attached for either electors or candidates (New Brunswick 
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1851a, p. 42). Such a decision had far-reaching implications. Not only had New 
Brunswickers obtained permission for an elective upper house but British North 
America’s opponents to responsible government had also received the precedent 
they needed. If these conservatives wanted to restore legitimacy and power to 
their Legislative Councils, the Colonial Office accepted the elective principle so 
long as restrictive qualifications arrived alongside.
While New Brunswickers had obtained permission for an elective Legisla-
tive Council first, their pursuit of the principle ultimately went no further. When 
confronted with elective legislation tabled within New Brunswick’s upper house 
in February of 1851, the province’s Legislative Councillors themselves saw no 
reason as to why they should stoop to running for their offices (New Brunswick 
1851b, pp. 62, 119). The majority of these Councillors believed that the Legisla-
tive Council had
hitherto performed its function with every consideration of the public inter-
est; and while preventing on the one hand improvident expenditure, hasty 
and imprudent legislation, it has on the other carefully avoided all captious or 
factious opposition to any well digested measure.
Because New Brunswick’s Legislative Councillors reportedly continued to per-
form their customary duties, these same Councillors concluded that ‘the Country 
is not prepared for, nor favourable to, such an organic change in the constitution of 
this Province’ (New Brunswick 1851b, pp. 164–165). As a result of this intransi-
gence, New Brunswick would retain an appointed Legislative Council for as long 
as it kept an upper chamber (Campbell 2007).
Nova Scotia, on the other hand, would come much closer to making its Legisla-
tive Council elected. Beginning in 1852, Nova Scotia’s conservative legislators 
pushed elective legislation by adapting the language of democratic reform to a 
conservative’s view of the British mixed constitution. According to J. W. John-
ston, the elective principle was ‘a step in advance’ not only because it gave Nova 
Scotians ‘the power of choosing their own law-givers’ but also because it ‘[gave] 
to our constitution that stability without which any constitution is worth but little’ 
(Halifax British Colonist 1852a, 1852b). Stability, here, would come through con-
stitutional balance, and constitutional balance, in turn, would come through prop-
erty. The House of Assembly had just replaced its property-based franchise with 
a ratepayers’ franchise the previous year (Nova Scotia 1851). The latter’s inclu-
siveness meant that the province’s lower house now spoke for the people more 
than ever before. An elective Legislative Council, according to conservatives 
like Johnston, needed clear property qualifications to ensure the people’s voice 
did not overwhelm any further those of property and wealth. Johnston’s own sug-
gestions looked to put these beliefs into practice. According to Johnston’s original 
formulation, voters at Legislative Council elections would have had to possess 
real estate worth at least £100 and have it registered at least six months prior 
to an election. Candidates, conversely, would have needed to possess ten times 
that amount of real property – at least £1,000 worth – and have held the status of 
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British subject for at least thirty years. While Johnston eventually reduced these 
qualifications, he still ensured to foreground real property so ‘as to preclude cavil 
or opposition from any, no matter how conservative in principle’ (Halifax British 
Colonist 1852a). It would take some time, but these resolutions eventually came 
to vote in 1858 once Johnston and his Conservative party formed government.
Because of the Conservative strategy, the province’s Liberal opposition had 
tremendous difficulty coordinating its response. On the one hand, some viewed 
the legislation as radical insofar as they believed it ‘the duty of the Crown officers 
to preserve the form of government [. . .] and not to impose on us such a ridicu-
lous hybrid, mongrel sort of constitution’ (Nova Scotia 1858, p. 105). Conversely, 
other Liberals viewed an elective Legislative Council as intrinsically, even dan-
gerously, conservative because it would ‘strike a fatal blow at the [responsible] 
system of government’ by eventually ‘denud[ing] [the House of Assembly] of all 
real practical power’. More specifically, they worried that Johnston’s proposed 
‘superior franchise’ for Legislative Council elections would ‘strike a death blow 
to the power of [the lower house]’ in terms of its control over public spending 
(Nova Scotia 1858, pp. 107–108). These Liberals feared that a newly reinvigor-
ated upper house – governed by higher franchise and candidacy qualifications – 
could legitimately claim to represent the property and wealth of Nova Scotia. 
An elected legislative body that represented a province’s wealth theoretically had 
greater claim to dictate how government spent that wealth. Control over revenues 
could then conceivably shift from the lower house to the upper, thereby stripping 
the Assembly of its greatest privilege and taking the power of the purse from the 
people’s hands. Although it may have appeared as radical, Johnston’s game was 
about as conservative as it got. In the end, Nova Scotia’s elective Legislative 
Council legislation deadlocked the Assembly, twenty-six to twenty-six. Johnston, 
as Conservative party leader, refused to pursue the legislation without a clear 
majority (Halifax British Colonist 1858). Soon enough, the Conservative fell 
from office, and Johnston retired from legislative politics. Nova Scotia’s window 
for an elected upper house had ultimately closed for good.
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia would never have elective Legislative Coun-
cils despite the precedents they had set. Conservative arguments for constitutional 
balance and legislative legitimacy could not sway enough people to pursue further 
changes to responsible government. Those same arguments, however, had dif-
ferent effects in the Province of Canada and Prince Edward Island. In Canada, 
radical demands for widespread elective institutions had merged with a grow-
ing conservative acceptance of elective upper houses by the early 1850s. While 
these radicals had proposed qualifications actually lower than those for the Leg-
islative Assembly, Canada’s conservatives had something else in mind. As con-
servatives gained further power within the Assembly between 1852 and 1856, 
candidacy qualifications proposed for elected Legislative Councillors swelled 
from mere residency to £1,000 worth of unencumbered real property to £2,000 
worth of unencumbered real property (Province of Canada 1852b, p. 197; Prov-
ince of Canada 1853, p. 924; Province of Canada 1856b, p. 212). Even wealthy 
professionals in Canada’s largest cities may not have held estates so large. Indeed, 
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George-Étienne Cartier – one of Montreal’s most prominent lawyers and attorney 
general for Canada East from 1858 to 1862 – had paid only £1,600 for his well-
appointed three-storey residence in downtown Montreal (Young 1981).
As these qualifications increased, Canada West’s leading reformer, George 
Brown, looked on in horror. Just like reformers in Nova Scotia, Brown railed 
against an elected Legislative Council because, in his own words:
It is a Tory measure [. . .] and will be resisted by every man who truly favours 
the cause of progression. [. . .] In this country it emanated from the Tory 
league, and in Nova Scotia it was submitted to Parliament by the Tory Attor-
ney General, Mr. Johnston, and resisted by the progressive party on the ground 
that it was destructive to responsible government, that bane of Toryism.
(Province of Canada 1852a, pp. 1105–1107)
Brown continued his attack outside Parliament through his newspaper, the Toronto 
Globe. Simultaneously enraged and mystified, he asked his readers:
would this second elective chamber destroy Responsible Government? Of 
course it would. [. . .] We can understand the heat of the Tories, – we cannot 
understand the haste of Reformers to pull down a Constitution which gives 
them full and direct power. After fighting thirty years to obtain a position, and 
finding it to realize all our expectations – shall we fling it away without one 
solid complaint, to run after a theory?
(Toronto Globe 1852)
As he reflected on these questions, Brown ultimately arrived at the conclusion 
that ‘[i]nstead of advancing in liberal opinions we are going back – instead of 
the control of the public will being more direct it is more remote’ (Toronto Globe 
1853). Despite Brown’s warnings against further constitutional change, Cana-
dian radicals united with the province’s Conservatives in 1856 to establish Brit-
ish North America’s first elective Legislative Council. The legislation required 
future Councillors to possess in fee simple the aforementioned £2,000 worth of 
real property (Province of Canada 1856a). As Canada’s wealthiest inhabitants 
took their seats within the Legislative Council, they found themselves well placed 
to defend the interests of accumulated wealth. The people already had their house; 
the province’s landed interests could once again claim theirs.
With the Canadian precedent emerging before them, Prince Edward Island’s 
conservatives now made their final push for an elective Legislative Council as 
well. By 1859, Island voters had returned their Conservative party to power. In 
the meantime, public meetings across the Island demanded an elective Legislative 
Council to better realise ‘true’ responsible government (Charlottetown Islander 
1858). By 1861, Island Conservatives had engineered enough support in both leg-
islative houses to get elective legislation passed (Charlottetown Examiner 1860a, 
1860b, 1860c). The legislation’s final form, however, emerged at the behest of the 
new colonial secretary, the duke of Newcastle. Instead of property qualifications 
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for candidates, Newcastle preferred property qualifications for electors, which the 
government ultimately pegged at £100 of real property (Prince Edward Island 
1862). Unlike in the Province of Canada, where property qualifications remained 
the basis for electoral enfranchisement, Prince Edward Island had linked its fran-
chise to the performance of statute labour in 1853 (something Island men had 
to perform anyway) (Prince Edward Island 1853; Grittner 2012). Such a fran-
chise had pushed colonial governance even further towards male participatory 
democracy. An elective Legislative Council, elected solely by property holders, 
promised to roll back this democratic advance and give Island proprietors a much 
stronger political voice (Charlottetown Islander 1863). Through the elective prin-
ciple, the Island’s landed elite had thus wrested back its house. As Legislative 
Councillors returned to their traditional position as propertied mediators between 
the people and the Crown, the question soon became, how would they use that 
position once they took their seats?
Elective legislative councils in principle and in practice
Canada’s leading nineteenth-century conservative and first prime minister, John 
A. Macdonald, once pronounced that upper houses needed to represent property 
because ‘[t]he rights of minority must be protected, and the rich are always fewer in 
number than the poor’ (Browne 2009, p. 98). Colonial conservatives like Macdon-
ald had turned to elective Legislative Councils following responsible government 
in an attempt to put this idea into practice and limit democratic influence across 
British North America. Through the political legitimacy offered by direct election, 
British North America’s upper houses could have conceivably gained the ability 
to not only stand up to the people’s assemblies but also usurp their power (thereby 
undercutting responsible government itself). Yet these goals ultimately proved eas-
ier conceived than accomplished within the British North American setting. In the 
Province of Canada, the £2,000 candidacy qualification had drastically limited the 
pool of potential Councillors because few inhabitants possessed so much property 
in fee simple. While some constituencies held spirited elections, a full two-thirds 
of Council seats went uncontested by 1864 (Emery 2012; Hart 1960). The most tal-
ented candidates wanted to sit in the Legislative Assembly anyway, alongside their 
party leaders (Ajzenstat 2003). Canada’s elective Legislative Council soon became 
a halfway house for those who lost their seats in the Assembly. Only ‘[o]ld men, 
dead politically or nearly dead physically’ sat there by choice (in Shirley Cark-
ner Hart’s colourful words) (Hart 1960, p. 207). In 1859, the Legislative Council 
showed a glimmer of independence when, as a ‘co-ordinate and co-equal branch’, 
it refused to pass the annual supply bill that granted public spending (Province 
of Canada 1859, pp. 421, 438). Such defiance proved fleeting, and supply passed 
mere days later after some absentees returned and voted along party lines (Prov-
ince of Canada 1859, p. 468). Canada’s Legislative Council would never try any-
thing like it again (Province of Canada 1865, p. 117). Its members, collectively, 
had neither the ambition nor the acumen to truly stand up to the people’s house.
The elective principle similarly failed to rejuvenate the Legislative Coun-
cil on Prince Edward Island. While some premiers had attempted to lead 
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government from the elected upper house, they quickly found themselves over-
shadowed as colonial finances remained firmly entrenched within the people’s 
assembly. Soon enough, Islanders of all political stripes began to demand the 
upper chamber’s total abolition. Some saw it as a ‘useless institution’ filled 
with ‘rich noodles’ (Charlottetown Examiner 1878a). Others viewed it as ‘effete 
and expensive’, wasting $7,000 per year (Charlottetown Examiner 1878b). Per-
haps most important of all, conservatives who had supported the elective prin-
ciple now derided the Legislative Council as neglectful of its duties. ‘These 
Councillors were put in by the property-holders to look specially after their 
rights of property, and guard against hasty, oppressive or unjust legislation’, 
one conservative editor declared in 1878. ‘Every one of them [. . .] grossly 
violated the sacred trust reposed in them by carelessly and hastily “piling on the 
agony” upon the wronged country’ by passing unpopular legislation in the form 
of direct taxes (Charlottetown Presbyterian and Evangelical Protestant Union 
1878). The supposedly conservative body had proven far less conservative and 
far more partisan than hoped. It did not help that judges had interpreted Prince 
Edward Island’s Legislative Council franchise incredibly broadly. Besides free-
holders and leaseholders, squatters also voted at Legislative Council elections 
so long as they squatted on £100 (or $325) worth of land (Public Archives and 
Record Office of Prince Edward Island 1877–8). Such electors certainly did not 
represent the Island’s landholding elite.
Prince Edward Island’s elective Legislative Council would limp on through 
to 1893. Islanders ultimately recognised that they had too much government for 
such a small province and amalgamated their two houses into one (Harvey 1922; 
Kennedy 1997). By then, Canada’s elective Legislative Council was long dead. 
The new provinces of Quebec and Ontario had rejected the elective principle 
at Confederation in 1867. Quebec returned to an appointed upper house, while 
Ontario abolished its upper house altogether. The new Dominion of Canada, with 
its capital in Ottawa, would also resort to an appointed Senate upon its creation 
in 1867. The elective principle had clearly disappointed its previous adherents 
(Ajzenstat 2003). It had not rebalanced the British North American constitutions, 
as promised; it had not waged war for landed interests; and it had not undercut 
responsible government. By the time legislators debated Canadian Confederation 
in 1864 and 1865, even John A. Macdonald showed little enthusiasm for the elec-
tive principle (Province of Canada 1865, p. 35). Conservatives like Macdonald 
had come to realise that it was easier to work within the responsible system – and 
to manipulate it – than to attack it directly through elective institutions (Ducharme 
2014a). A weakened upper house, reliant upon government appointments, served 
shifting strategies in this regard.
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Eastern Northern America (Canada), c. 1840
(Bert Brouwenstijn, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Introduction
The Belgian Revolution of 1830 is often depicted as a conservative or ‘stolen’ 
revolution (Verschaffel & Rietbergen 2006). Triggered by social, ideological and 
religious revolt against an autocratic monarch, it employed the language of popular 
sovereignty in its first phase. During the constitutional debates, however – so the 
traditional storyline goes – the vested and new élites took power and replaced the 
language of popular sovereignty with that of national sovereignty and patriotism. 
According to this latter discourse, it was not the actual Belgian people who had 
taken power during the revolution but the Belgian nation – being a metaphysical 
entity encompassing past, present and future generations. Such a trans-historical 
nation could by definition not rule itself and therefore had to be represented by its 
élites. Hence, still according to that same narrative, conservative elements, such 
as censitary suffrage and bicameralism, had to be introduced in the institutional 
architecture of the new state. They would help to defend the age-old and vener-
able ‘nation’ against the short-sighted and self-interested ‘people’.
Recently, scholars have unmasked this traditional view as a postwar invention. 
Based on the ideas of the interwar French constitutionalist Raymond Carré de 
Malberg, it is supposed to have been generalised by his Ghent colleague André 
Mast in the wake of the 1950 referendum about the fate of Leopold III. By pre-
senting national instead of popular sovereignty as the foundation of the Belgian 
state, he tried to delegitimise referendums as a political tool. In reality, as scholars 
such as Raf Geenens and Stefan Sottiaux argue, the founding fathers of the Bel-
gian state hardly made a distinction between ‘the nation’ and ‘the people’. Hence, 
even if they wrote in the constitution that ‘all powers emanate from the nation’, 
they did not exclude popular sovereignty (Geenens & Sottiaux 2015; Clement & 
Van de Putte 2018). Democratic values were not, according to these scholars, 
hijacked for conservative purposes. Much rather, they present the Belgian consti-
tution of 1831 as a hybrid compromise between several ideologies that were not 
as distinct from one another as they would later be imagined to be.
My own research has revealed that ‘popular sovereignty’ was a central concept 
in the discourse of members of the nineteenth-century Belgian House of Repre-
sentatives. Liberals and conservatives alike stressed that they acted in the name 
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of the people in Parliament, and a common reproach in parliamentary discussions 
was that the opponent had ‘betrayed popular sovereignty’. The difference with 
Dutch parliamentary culture, where the notion of popular sovereignty was viewed 
as a haunting spectre rather than an ideal to be strived for throughout the nine-
teenth century, turned out to be considerable (Beyen & Te Velde 2016).
Even if the founding fathers had the intention of keeping the threatening notion 
of ‘popular sovereignty’ at bay, they do not seem to have been successful. At least, 
such was the case in the House of Representatives. Was the situation different 
when we look at the Senate? At first glance, there are reasons to expect that it was. 
When looking at the institutional architecture of this upper chamber, it appears as 
an aristocratic antithesis of the (relatively) democratic House of Representatives. 
To be sure, the Senate was never meant to be a house for hereditary aristocrats 
alone; rather, it was supposed to represent aristocracy in the ancient Greek sense 
of the word, i.e. ‘the rule of the best’. As the defenders of the vested interests of 
the countryside, however, noblemen were readily counted among these ‘aristo-
crats’ in the broader sense of the word.
The difference between the two chambers was found first of all in the condi-
tions of eligibility. While in the House of Representatives these conditions were 
limited to sex (male) and age (25 years or older), the age threshold was higher (40) 
for election to the Senate, and candidates had to pay at least 1,000 florins (or 2,116 
francs) in taxes. The constitution also stipulated a minimum rate of one candidate 
for every 6,000 inhabitants. In provinces where this minimum was not reached, 
those who paid the highest taxes below 1,000 florins would be added to the list of 
eligible candidates. In the lived reality of nineteenth-century Belgium, it turned 
out that candidates from the less wealthy strata often had to be added to the list. 
Even so, this stipulation contributed to a considerable (albeit slowly decreasing) 
over-representation of noblemen in the Belgian Senate throughout the nineteenth 
century (Stengers 2017; Stengers 1975).
On the other hand, the compromise of 1831 also introduced a ‘democratic’ 
element in the composition of the Belgian Senate. If its members by definition 
belonged to the highest strata of society, its electorate was exactly the same as that 
of the House of Representatives. In order to receive a vote, one had ‘only’ to be a 
man 25 years or older and pay 100 francs or more in taxes. Seen from the perspec-
tive of suffrage, the Belgian Senate undoubtedly was one of the most democratic 
upper chambers of its era.
This duality of the Senate’s composition raises interesting questions with regard 
to the political language it engendered. Was it primarily an ‘aristocratic’ – and 
therefore conservative – language or did it leave room for democratic aspects? 
Where did the Belgian senators situate the source of sovereignty, if they did so 
at all – in the monarch, in a metahistorical ‘nation’, in the actual ‘people’, or in a 
mixture of all these sources?
Attempts to answer these questions in generalising ways are hampered by the 
fact that the Belgian Senate’s proceedings have not been digitised in a search-
able way, as has been done for the House of Representatives. Hence, quantita-
tive and longitudinal assessments of the occurrence of terms such as ‘(popular) 
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sovereignty’ are very hard to make. Therefore, I focus on specific debates, occur-
ring in two periods of intense democratisation (1848 and 1893). Even then, I do 
not analyse the entire debates but opt for a microhistorical and hermeneutical 
analysis of specific passages. More specifically, I single out passages in which 
senators reflected on the identity and the role of their institution in the constitu-
tional architecture in Belgium. Although I pay attention both to frequently recur-
ring tropes and interventions that go against the grain, most will belong to the 
latter category. Rather than trying to reconstruct ‘the’ political language of the 
nineteenth-century Belgian Senate, I want to explore its limits: which discursive 
positions could be taken without being ostracised by the other members of the 
assembly? By quoting extensively from the proceedings, I try to bring the hitherto 
underexplored language of the Senate back to life in its richness and complexity.
1848: the voice of the people in the Senate
The revolutionary wave that travelled through large parts of Europe in 1848 left 
Belgium relatively untouched. This relative stability is most often explained by 
the fact that the Belgian government took some democratising measures (cf. 
Luykx 1977; Reynebeau 2003). The most important of these was the lowering 
of the franchise to its constitutional minimum of 20 florins (or 42 francs). By 
doing so, the government tried to prevent revolutionary movements in favour of 
greater democracy. Hence, even if this measure widened the electorate of both the 
House and the Senate considerably, it was more inspired by a form of ‘preven-
tative conservatism’ than by a spirit of democracy (Girvin 1994). It should not 
come as a surprise, then, that the aristocratic Senate supported the measure with 
a large majority of twenty-six to seven (Luykx 1977). Moreover, in the discourse 
surrounding this electoral reform, senators tended to stress that it gave them the 
opportunity to play the moderating role that the constitution had assigned to their 
institution. The president of the Senate, the Tournai liberal Augustin Dumon-
Dumortier, did so in a very elaborate way after the reform had been accepted. It is 
worthwhile to quote him extensively, since his words expressed feelings that seem 
to have been common among the senators at that time:
The Senate, sirs, does not have the most brilliant role to play in the legisla-
ture. But it does have a role, and a very important one at that. One starts to 
recognise that, and soon it will be recognised everywhere, in all the consti-
tutional countries where there is no moderating power, one will see that the 
governments will be at pains to sit down and move forward. We will always 
play our role of moderating and pacifying power with the same devotion. 
If the government and the other chamber have taken the initiative for great 
measures that have saved the country and that have made it pass the crisis 
that agitates all of Europe, one will never forget that we have taken part 
very actively in those measures by voting on them with a patriotic enthu-
siasm, that patriotism will never fail from the Senate’s part. L’Union fait 
la Force [the official motto of Belgium]; we will stay united, we will stay 
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strong, and we will defend the country’s interests as we have done always 
since the day we were created.
(Sénat de Belgique 1848, 27 June, p. 4)
Defending electoral reform was therefore wrapped not in the language of democ-
racy but in that of patriotism and moderation. Should these terms simply be 
viewed as euphemisms for a defence of the monarchy and the aristocracy against 
the masses? The ensuing discussions about the address of the Senate as a reply 
to the throne speech made clear that they cannot simply be dismissed as such. In 
this address, as it was drafted by a special commission, paternalistic language was 
used about the need ‘to search the necessary means to improve and to elevate the 
condition of the labour class’. It was stressed that this result could be reached not 
with the help of ‘dangerous utopias’ but only ‘by moralising the working popula-
tion, [. . .] by uplifting trade and industry, [. . .] by applying the arms that do not 
find an occupation to the improvement of the uncultivated lands’. ‘The good prac-
tical sense and the feelings of philanthropy [sentiments de philanthropie] of our 
co-citizens’, the address continued, ‘will help the government to find the means to 
procure this interesting part of our population with the moral and material well-
being that is the object of our studies’ (Sénat de Belgique 1848, 28 June, p. 7). If 
some kind of social policy was advocated in the address, it did not seem to give a 
voice, let alone agency, to the people.
In the discussion about the commission’s draft, however, a more active political 
role was assigned to the people. That was especially the case in the interventions 
by Alexandre de Royer de Woldre (also known as De Royer de Dour, 1795–1852), 
a baron from the Walloon city of Mons who had sat in the Senate since 1844, serv-
ing as its secretary between 1848 and 1850, and who leaned towards the liberal 
party. As a member of the commission that had drafted the address, he had inserted 
a passage pleading for a rationalisation of the civic guard, which would facilitate 
a reduction of expenses for the army. Since other members of the commission 
considered this an attack on the army – and, hence, indirectly on the king – the 
passage was removed from the draft that was presented to the plenary session. 
Not only did De Royer de Woldre protest vehemently against this removal but 
he also pleaded for the insertion of an amendment aiming at a ‘social revision’ of 
the functionaries’ pensions as they were prescribed by a law of 1844. According 
to De Royer de Woldre, these pensions were an excessively heavy burden on the 
treasury, at the expense of the taxpayers.
Interestingly, this aristocrat justified his amendment by references to his voters 
and to ‘the people’ in general. Being a liberal, he expressed ‘the most perfect con-
fidence in the [Liberal] Cabinet’ and especially in the minister of the Interior, but 
he immediately added that ‘there is something more pressing than the intentions 
of the Cabinet, it is the voice of the people that has stigmatised this retirement 
pension law and that imperatively requires its revision’. This reference to ‘the 
voice of the people’ (la voix du peuple) in order to legitimise his own political 
behaviour was clearly taken from the language of popular sovereignty – a lan-
guage De Royer de Woldre may have learnt while serving in Napoléon’s armies 
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in 1813–1814 (cf. Mathieu 1910). Nonetheless, he used the terms ‘people’ and 
‘nation’ synonymously, which became clear when he further dissected this ‘voice 
of the people’:
That cry is unanimous in the nation. It has not been produced in the cham-
bers, but it is unanimous in the country and I have to declare it, I have behind 
me 1500 voters who have sent me to this House in order to require the sup-
pression of this law, and who will approve of my words.
(Sénat de Belgique 1848, 28 June, p. 11)
This passage not only discursively interweaves ‘the people’, ‘the nation’ and 
‘the voters’ into one homogeneous entity but also creates a dichotomy between 
this entity and ‘the chambers’. As such, it contains the seeds of what would later 
become known as the language of populism. De Royer de Woldre seems to have 
understood that it was somehow unacceptable for an aristocrat to use such lan-
guage in an aristocratic assembly. He was eager to add on 28 June 1848 that he had 
‘not accepted an imperative mandate’ and that he ‘would not have accepted it if 
it had been offered to me’. In doing so, he took his distance from the Rousseauist 
notion that members of an assembly should be accountable at each moment to 
their constituents and defended the autonomy of the representative. In spite of this 
autonomy, listening to the people/the nation was, he believed, the representative’s 
primary task:
I have understood the wish of the nation, I have understood the hardship 
under which the nation has sighed for some time, and it is necessary that this 
hardship disappears, it is necessary that this enormous expense that the peo-
ple supports is alleviated.
The representative’s autonomy, therefore, should be defended more against the 
throne and the cabinet than against ‘the people’. Precisely that autonomous position 
vis-à-vis the king should be the point of departure for any address to the throne:
if we can only insert in the address the paraphrase of the throne speech, then 
we should not discuss at all – we should limit ourselves to returning phrases 
and bringing them under the eyes of the throne. An address, however, is 
something else – it is the expression of the people, the expression of the 
country that mounts to the Throne, and if you can neither talk of the army nor 
of taxes, then to what is your address reduced?
If De Royer de Woldre persisted on 28 June 1848 ‘in demanding the maintenance in 
the address of the paragraph proposed by the commission’, it was due to his desire
to maintain for the Senate the right to say to the Crown (while observing the 
rules from which an assembly of this high stature should never deviate) what 
the people want; what the intimate thought of this assembly is.
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Undoubtedly, De Royer de Woldre’s insistence on the need to listen to the voice 
of the people was rather exceptional. Nonetheless, his position was defended by 
another Walloon aristocrat in the Senate, Camille baron de Tornaco from Huy 
(near Liege, 1807–1880). Like De Royer de Woldre, who was twelve years older, 
De Tornaco sided with the liberals. And like De Royer de Woldre, he stressed that 
he did not want to act against the king or the cabinet when he tried to maintain or 
insert certain passages in the address to the throne. On the contrary, he claimed 
on 29 June 1848:
We have fulfilled a duty, that I will continue to fulfil very strictly towards the 
Cabinet. When one wants to preserve a king, one has to tell him the truth. 
When one wants to preserve a Cabinet, one owes it the truth, too.
This duty resided precisely in ‘observing facts’ and in ‘reminding the power [le 
pouvoir] of the situation of the country’. In this respect, he found the executive in 
dire need of assistance:
The bit of experience that I have amassed with these matters since the vot-
ers sent me to parliament, has proven to me that ministers often tend to have 
certain illusions with regard to the situation of the taxpayers; each year, we 
have seen an increase of the expenses, in spite of the incessant protests by the 
members of parliament, in spite of – and I remind you of this in honour of the 
Senate – the wishes expressed each year in this hall.
(Sénat de Belgique 1848, 29 June, p. 16)
With words like these, De Tornaco seemed to follow De Royer de Woldre in his 
aristocratic populism: both legislative chambers had to make the voice of the peo-
ple heard towards the king and the cabinet. The difference between both seemed 
to reside primarily in their assessment of the degree to which Parliament lived up 
to this task. De Royer de Woldre was rather negative about it: he believed that 
Parliament, as it actually operated (except for himself), sided with the authorities 
rather than the people. De Tornaco, for his part, did not see such a gap between the 
theory and the practice of parliamentary politics.
Even if De Royer de Woldre and De Tornaco were unable to alter the text of the 
address, their references to the voice of the people seem not to have aroused indig-
nation. Far from being dominant, the language of democracy was accepted in the 
Senate – even if the word democracy was probably never used in a positive way.
1893: searching for legitimacy with the people
In the second half of the 1880s, social tensions in Belgian society resulted in 
large protest movements. The driving force behind them was the young but bur-
geoning socialist party (the ‘Belgian Labourers’ Party’). Apart from social laws, 
this party also claimed to advocate political democratisation. In 1893, a political 
majority in the House of Representatives changed the constitution in such a way 
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that a complicated, qualified form of universal male suffrage could indeed be 
introduced. All adult men received a vote for the legislative election; a second one 
was allotted to men who paid certain amounts of taxes. A third vote would even 
be given to people who possessed a university degree or a certificate of higher 
secondary education or who occupied professional positions that required such a 
form of schooling (Luykx 1977).
Unlike that of 1848, the 1893 reform also implied a fundamental transforma-
tion of the Senate. On the one hand, the electorate was no longer identical to that 
of the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the eligibility conditions for 
the senators were slightly lowered. In a complex set of electoral rules, two kinds 
of senators were created. The first group of senators, who amounted to slightly 
more than half of the Senate, were directly elected by the same plural system of 
universal male suffrage as the one applied to the House of Representatives (except 
that the voters had to be 30 years old instead of 25). For this category, the censi-
tary eligibility conditions were lowered from 2,116 to 1,200 francs in taxes, and 
the minimum eligibility rate was lowered from 1/6,000 to 1/5,000 of the popula-
tion. For the second group of senators, each provincial council assigned, without 
any eligibility conditions, two to four senators. This measure was not primarily 
introduced to strengthen the representation of regional interests in the Senate. 
Instead, it aimed at counterbalancing the democratisation of the eligibility condi-
tions with a form of indirect election (as it existed in the Netherlands and France).
Although these measures did contribute to a certain degree of democratisation 
of the Senate’s composition (the rate of noblemen decreasing from 51 per cent in 
1892 to 45 per cent in 1894), it also enlarged the difference with the House of Rep-
resentatives, where, after 1893, even members of the lower middle classes made 
their entrance (Libon & Nandrin 2017). Unavoidably, this duality was reflected in 
the self-representation and self-assessment of the senators. On the one hand, there 
was a certain pride in the fact that the Senate had once again played its moderating 
role by contributing to this solution. According to Charles de Coninck de Mer-
ckem (1836–1896), a Catholic West-Flemish politician who had recently become 
a baron, the upper chamber had ‘proved, once again, its utility, the necessity of its 
existence by looking for and finding a satisfactory solution for the complex and 
difficult question of the revision of the constitution’. Since the Senate had taken 
‘a remarkable part in these debates’, he expressed the hope ‘that from now on its 
use and its existence will not be subjected to doubt anymore’ (Sénat de Belgique 
1893, 2 Sept., p. 664).
Unlike in 1848, the word ‘democracy’ was used positively (if only rarely) in 
these acts of self-glorification. The president of the Senate, Henri t’Kint de Rood-
enbeke de Naeyer (1817–1900), the Catholic baron of the East-Flemish town of 
Eeclo (Terlinden 1930), looked back at the passing of the constitutional reform in 
the following terms:
May God protect our dear Fatherland! May it, under the roof of stable insti-
tutions and under the aegis of a national Dynasty that justly becomes more 
popular every day, offer to the world the example of a nation that is able to 
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govern itself, by reconciling the preservation of order and peace with the wise 
and well-reflected deployment of democracy!
(Sénat de Belgique 1893, 17 Oct., p. 2)
Implicitly, t’Kint de Roodenbeke de Naeyer associated the Senate with ‘the pres-
ervation of order and peace’, leaving ‘the well-reflected deployment of democ-
racy’ to the House of Representatives. He did not, however, present the Senate as 
a bulwark against democracy.
If this self-complacent assessment of the Senate’s role dominated after the vote 
of the constitutional reform, some of the senators during the debates had pleaded 
for more radical transformations of their own institution. The liberal Théophile 
Finet (1837–1910), representing the city of Arlon in the south of the Belgian 
Ardennes, was afraid that the maintenance of censitary eligibility qualifications 
would fatally diminish the legitimacy of the Senate in the eyes of the Belgian 
population:
But look in which situation the Senate of censitaries will find itself if a con-
flict with the Chamber arises, and particularly if a question of either taxes, or 
military substitution, or heritage, or questions directly or indirectly related to 
individual fortune are at stake. The Senate may be perfectly right in the facts, 
but the electoral mass, composed of proletarians, will tell it’s wrong.
It will say: these are the rich ones, the censitaries, they do not want what 
the popular Chamber wants. And public opinion will say the Senate is wrong 
only because it will be composed of censitaries, and that will be the cause of 
its weakness.
[. . .]
Obviously, a censitary generally is conservative. But being rich does not 
suffice to exert prestige on public opinion, and what the Senate needs is a 
moral prestige that will make the country accept its decisions.
(Sénat de Belgique 1893, 2 Sept., p. 644)
In order to strengthen his case against the censitary qualifications, Finet stressed 
that these had been ‘excluded from all the Senates that have a more or less demo-
cratic character: it exists neither in France, nor in the United States, nor in Swit-
zerland’. By presenting these countries as models, he implied that he considered 
democracy as a model for Belgium too. If the role of the Senate was to play a 
moderating role in this democracy, it could only do so if it was democratically 
legitimised. Unsurprisingly, this argument was used by a non-aristocratic senator, 
who, as a son of a labourer, had become an internationally active industrialist (cf. 
Syndicat d’Initiative de Jambes 2019).
Another industrialist-senator of non-noble descent, Finet’s Liberal colleague 
from Charleroi (Hainaut), Emile Van den Dooren (1826–1909), made the same 
diagnosis but was even more pessimistic about the consequences of the Senate’s 
choice not to promote a more radical transformation. In order to show that it had 
been ‘a great mistake not to have increased to a very large degree the number 
114 Marnix Beyen
of eligibles to the Senate’, he referred to the fact that his own constituency had 
only thirty-five eligible candidates for a population of 333,000 inhabitants. ‘Main-
taining such a privilege’, he added, ‘equals preparing the disappearance of the 
Senate’. Without mentioning the author (which was probably not necessary in a 
highly literate company such as the Senate), he referred to a fable of De La Fon-
taine to depict the consequences of this conservative decision: ‘We have invited 
the people to a feast, but we serve it universal suffrage “in a narrow-necked ves-
sel”. It will only be able to enjoy it by overthrowing it and breaking it’ (Sénat de 
Belgique 1893, 2 Sept., p. 644). In other words, the constitutional reform did not 
contain, according to Van den Dooren, a sufficient degree of democracy to prevent 
a revolution from taking place. Precisely because he did not want to contribute to 
such a state of affairs, he abstained from the vote.
Conclusion
It is impossible to say whether Belgian political history would have followed a 
different course if no Senate had been created. The dominant line of discourse 
within the nineteenth-century Senate was that it had played its constitutional role 
in an exemplary way. More precisely, there was a strong belief that the upper 
chamber had made an important contribution to the smooth adaptation of parlia-
mentary institutions to the democratisation of society and hence to the success 
story of the Belgian state. Especially in times of accelerating democratisation, the 
Senate was needed to maintain law and order – such was the general view.
In this discourse, the Senate presented itself as a corrective against the ‘rule of 
the mob’ and not as the antithesis of democracy. Even if the word ‘democracy’ 
was seldom used in a positive way until the last decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, it was not unusual for senators to situate ultimate sovereignty in ‘the peo-
ple’ rather than in the monarch or in transcendent forces. The Senate was all but 
immune to the language of popular sovereignty that prevailed in the Chamber of 
Representatives. This can at least partly be explained by the fact that, by the end 
of the century, a considerable portion of senators had been members of that latter 
house before they were elected to the Senate (Libon & Nandrin 2017).
The language of some senators could even be stamped as ‘populist’ in the sense 
that they defended the primacy of the people against the elites, the aristocracy and 
the king. The framing of this language, however, seems to have changed through-
out the period. During the revolutionary wave of 1848, listening to ‘the voice of the 
people’ (a notion that was used in abstract and homogenising ways) was presented 
as a duty of the senators, in order to resist the royal prerogatives. It remains to be 
investigated whether this language was used primarily by those senators who had 
come to maturity during the French revolutionary and/or the Napoléonic period.
Forty-five years later, during the debates about the constitutional reform of 
1893, this voice of the people seemed to have grown so loud that listening to 
it had become less of a duty than a necessity. By insufficiently democratising 
itself (by actually opening its doors to ‘the people’ – the demos), some senators 
of non-noble descent asserted that the Senate would threaten its own existence 
in a democratic world. In doing so, it would betray its own conservative duty of 
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maintaining and defending the traditional structures of society. Democratising 
itself was cast as a conservative duty in this discourse; conservatism, as a duty 
of the elites to the sovereign people. Combining these two duties was consid-
ered to be at the heart of the Senate’s mission. In its self-perception, it remained 
deeply aristocratic and conservative, in the sense that it had to guarantee the 
‘rule (kratos in ancient Greek) of the best citizens (aristoi in ancient Greek)’ in 
order to safeguard (conservare in Latin) the traditional structures of society. This 
function could only be exerted, however, at the grace of the sovereign people 
(populus in Latin). A refusal to listen to the voice of the latter would provoke 
revolution and ultimately the fall of the elites. Only populism and democracy, 
so it seemed, could save aristocratic conservatism in nineteenth-century Belgian 
political culture.
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Introduction
Finland underwent radical and abrupt parliamentary reform in the aftermath of 
the Russian Revolution of 1905. Europe’s last four-estate system of representa-
tion was transformed directly into a unicameral parliament elected by universal 
and equal male and female suffrage in 1906. The decision to adopt a unicameral 
parliament was a dramatic departure from Finland’s bicameral model parliaments, 
such as the Swedish Riksdag, which had dominated Finnish reform plans in the 
nineteenth century.
This chapter examines how and why Finnish reformers abandoned the bicam-
eral model prevalent in European and North American discussions. Was the uni-
cameral parliament merely a hasty improvisation resulting from the unexpected 
crisis of the Russian Revolution or a carefully prepared compromise? In order to 
understand the reform and its background, I examine how bicameral parliaments 
and their upper chambers were viewed in Finland based on the experiences and 
inspiration of other countries. What role did national and transnational political 
traditions, contexts and ideologies play? How did the Finnish reformers under-
stand Finland’s position as part of wider Nordic, European and North Atlantic 
parliamentary developments?
The chapter highlights, perhaps paradoxically, the central role of foreign exam-
ples, models and discussions in the efforts to create a national parliamentary tradi-
tion. Whilst Finland was part of transnational parliamentary publicity (Pekonen 
2017b) and eager to learn from other countries, political reformers emphasised the 
need to apply foreign lessons to domestic circumstances. Finnish reform plans, 
prepared and debated for decades, were eventually realised and partly revised as 
a result of shifts in international politics.
Finland’s constitutional status and national representation  
as part of the Russian Empire
Finland was annexed to the Russian Empire as a result of the Napoleonic Wars 
in 1809. Until then, Finland had been part of Sweden for over 500 years and 
constituted a sparsely populated area that made up approximately one-third of 
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the Kingdom. After the annexation, Finland became a relatively small north-western 
grand duchy of the Russian Empire, with the tsar as grand duke and its own 
national representative assembly. Tsar Alexander I summoned the Finnish estates 
(the nobility, the clergy, the burghers and the peasants) to the Diet of Porvoo in 
1809, where he promised to uphold the constitutional laws, rights and privileges 
in Finland. From this event on, ‘the Finnish constitution’ became a question of 
varying dispute, especially between Finnish and Russian political and admin-
istrative elites. During the nineteenth century, Finnish political actors began to 
highlight the events at Porvoo as a state treaty, the founding moment of Finnish 
autonomy within the Russian Empire. Finnish politicians and scholars viewed the 
Swedish Instrument of Government of 1772 and the Union and Security Act of 
1789 as Finnish constitutions, despite the fact that the emperor never officially 
validated them.
Until Finland’s independence in 1917, the Finnish constitution was de facto: it 
seemed to exist and remain in force as long as it was respected and not challenged 
by the Finns and the Russians. One reason for this was the leeway it offered for 
both Finnish and Russian actors. On one hand, the Gustavian constitutions gave 
the monarch (the emperor) sufficiently vast powers. The task of the Diet of Fin-
land was formally limited to examining and approving or rejecting proposals of 
the emperor. The proposals were prepared by Finland’s domestic (kotimainen) 
government, which answered only to the emperor – not to the Diet. The domestic 
government was called ‘the Senate’, but it did not function as an upper chamber. 
On the other hand, the Finnish estates were able to expand their rights. Emperor 
Alexander II reconvened the estates in 1863 after a more than fifty-year hiatus, 
and after this the Diet met regularly, mostly in intervals of first five and then three 
years, until the Parliamentary Reform of 1906. Although the emperor had the 
right to reject any decision of the Diet, he mostly respected the Diet’s decisions 
and took many of its petitions into account by transforming them into govern-
ment proposals and reintroducing them to the estates. The emperor authorised the 
Diet Act of 1869, the first Finnish constitutional law, which, among other things, 
manifested the principle of the representation of the Finnish people. The Diet was 
the centre of Finnish public and political life from the 1860s onwards. Each deci-
sion the Diet made according to the (de facto) constitutions was an irreversible 
move towards strengthening Finland’s special status within the Empire. Thus, the 
Diet was invaluable in strengthening the Finnish polity and protecting its interests 
(Engman 2017; Krusius-Ahrenberg 1981).
Alexander II introduced a reform program for Finland after Russia’s defeat 
in the Crimean War. The final decision to convene the Diet was a result of the 
bloody January Uprising in Poland in 1863. As part of a series of concessions 
aimed at calming the situation within the Empire, Alexander II rewarded Finland 
with a Diet, which convened on 15 September 1863. Despite the enthusiasm for 
the reconvened Diet, Finnish political actors acknowledged the four-estate sys-
tem as outdated and expressed hopes for a bicameral parliament. As in several 
other countries in the North Atlantic, suggestions were made for either reform or 
the establishment of a bicameral system. Encouraged by discussions in the press, 
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estate members petitioned to introduce a bicameral parliament with ministerial 
responsibility as early as 1863–1864. Finnish political actors argued that estate 
representation was ‘unfitting and in contradiction to the demands of the time’ 
and ‘outdated in comparison to civilised and constitutional European countries’. 
The Diet, with its division of four mainly separate estates, was considered time-
consuming, inefficient and undemocratic (cf. Pekonen 2017a).
Bicameralism – but of what kind?
Finland’s position as part of the Russian Empire set the limits for parliamentary 
reform. Despite this, political groups discussed and debated the direction of Finn-
ish parliamentary life with reference to a variety of foreign examples and develop-
ments. The discussions were considered preparations for the inevitable yet distant 
reforms. Finnish actors across the political spectrum argued that Finland, as a late-
comer, could benefit from the experiences of other countries and, when possible, 
should update its existing system according to the demands of the time. This tran-
sition from the old forms and practices of estate representation towards modern 
Western parliaments was an active process of imitation and application, explained 
in Finland, for instance, through reference to ‘the ABCs of parliamentary life’ 
and ‘rudiments of parliamentary work’. Despite Finland’s remote location on the 
north-eastern edge of Europe, it was in no sense excluded from European and 
North American discussions. The press was an important means for the Finn-
ish political protagonists, public servants and scholars to study foreign examples 
and plan future reforms (Pekonen 2014; Pekonen 2017b). Finnish arguments for 
bicameralism reflected and repeated ideas from foreign discussions.
The main principled arguments for bicameralism, which were repeated in the 
following decades, were expressed in Finnish public debate in the 1860s. The 
press highlighted that all prominent European parliaments were bicameral, and 
very few had changed their bicameral systems to something else. There was, in 
contrast, little experience with regard to unicameral assemblies. The liberal and 
nationalist political elite had a complex attitude towards the people. On the one 
hand, they were concerned about the political and social backwardness of the 
country and its people’s low level of education. On the other hand, they argued 
that the highest principle of representative government was that state affairs 
should be based, in theory, at least, on ‘the public opinion’ or ‘the will of the 
people’s majority’. Consequently, the elite were convinced that Finland needed 
a bicameral parliament whose democratically elected lower chamber would be 
combined with an experienced, educated and intellectual upper chamber which 
could restrain immature expressions of the public opinion. The true public opin-
ion and will of the people required time, discussion and exchange of arguments to 
shape, develop and mature (e.g. Helsingfors Dagblad 1863a). The question, then, 
remained how those who sat in the two chambers should be selected and how their 
relationship should be organised.
In search of foreign inspiration, Finnish political protagonists and scholars rec-
ognised two main forms of upper chamber. The first was based on the existence 
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of a strong aristocratic element which served as a ‘natural’ foundation for division 
between the chambers (e.g. Helsingfors Dagblad 1863b). Britain was highlighted 
as a prominent example of this form of bicameralism. In the second form, the 
upper chamber was created by electoral arrangements or by regional assemblies 
choosing the members, as was the case in countries such as Sweden, Denmark and 
the United States. It was the second form of bicameralism that raised most interest 
in Finland, as the country arguably lacked a strong aristocracy.
In the late nineteenth century, most members of the political elite saw the 
bicameral model as the best option for reform, but there was no consensus on 
how the system should be organised. Bicameral parliaments abroad were typically 
results of a long historical development or created as a compromise solution to 
a crisis. In nineteenth-century Finland, there was no opportunity for a thorough 
reform and thus no urgent need to agree and compromise. Thus, political groups 
settled for presenting proposals, criticising those of their opponents and discuss-
ing international examples.
In the 1860s, future Finnish reform prospects were discussed indirectly through 
and in connection with foreign debates. Because of its shared constitutional tradi-
tion and close political, cultural and economic links, Sweden was the closest and 
most frequently discussed example. The Swedish parliamentary reform of 1866 
(cf. Nilsson, this volume; Nergelius, this volume) coincided with the formula-
tion of the Finnish Diet Act of 1869 and a failed attempt to create and codify a 
constitution act for Finland, which would have decreased the prerogatives of the 
emperor. The Swedish Riksdag Act of 1810 and its later revisions were used as the 
main model for the Diet Act.
Louis de Geer had been the father of the Swedish reform, and his ideas and 
arguments inspired the Swedish-speaking liberals in Finland, who were loosely 
organised around the newspaper Helsingfors Dagblad. They argued that when 
the time was right, the Finnish reform could be based on Swedish bicameralism 
and correct its mistakes. The Finnish liberals had doubts whether the Swedish 
upper chamber could offer a sufficient hindrance to an immature public opin-
ion. Leading Finnish liberals were strongly indebted to the British culture and 
practices of parliamentary debate and liberal authors such as John Stuart Mill. 
So it should refer to British culture (of parliamentary debate) and practices of 
parliamentary debate. These liberals argued that, regardless of the nature of 
the parliamentary system, a well-designed deliberative procedure was a neces-
sity for securing a thorough examination of matters and making high-quality, 
legitimate decisions. According to the liberals, a representative assembly could 
only speak and decide in the name of the people after a thorough debate. Parlia-
mentary rules should be used to force different opinions and arguments to clash 
and test each other’s strengths and weaknesses in an open debate in multiple 
plenary readings. In no other way could a question be sufficiently examined 
from different sides. The priority of debate was an overriding principle in the 
political thought of the Finnish liberals. They argued, for example, that the 
upper chamber in a bicameral parliament should not be given a definite veto in 
decision-making. Instead, procedures should be in place in the lower chamber 
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to guarantee a thorough debate and careful examination (Pekonen 2014, 2017a). 
Such approaches to parliaments and parliamentary debate were typical among 
liberals across Europe (Ihalainen, Ilie & Palonen 2016).
In the early 1870s, the pro-Finnish language Fennoman nationalists, in contrast, 
argued that the Swedish reform had led to plotting, dispute and conflicts. Their 
main organ, the newspaper Uusi Suometar (1872), stated that many Swedes, in 
fact, complained that their reform had been implemented too early. The analy-
sis of the Swedish case reflects a Fennoman nationalist aversion to the liberals’ 
idea of debate as the essential characteristic of representative politics. Mainstream 
Fennoman nationalists were opposed to all factions and political parties that had 
the potential to divide the people and disturb the Fennoman idea of ‘one language, 
one people’. The Fennomans found their opponents in the Swedish-speaking 
ascendant bourgeoisie and aristocracy, who, according to the Fennomans, held 
on to their privileges and obstructed reforms that were crucial to the development 
of the people’s Finnish-speaking majority. The dispute between the Finnish and 
the Swedish languages dominated Finland’s political life until the end of the nine-
teenth century. The Fennoman views on the Swedish reform and conflict reflected 
a tradition that would eventually play a central role in the rejection of bicameral-
ism in Finland.
The question of bicameralism reappeared in Finnish public debate during a 
short wave of reform optimism in the 1880s. This sense of optimism was triggered 
by European reform debates and the emperor’s decisions to grant the estates the 
right of motion and to convene the Diet every three years. The situation in Norway, 
for instance, motivated the Finns to try to introduce characteristics of parliamen-
tary government and democratise the estate elections. All major political groups 
presented their reform plans. The nationalist Fennoman movement had started to 
split into factions, and the so-called Valvoja group, a liberal and internationally 
oriented faction of the Fennomans, was the most vocal advocate of bicameralism. 
Their model was based on Sweden, which ‘shared a common past and somewhat 
similar social conditions’ with Finland (Danielson 1881, p. 463). According to the 
Valvoja group, time was not ripe for thorough reform, but bicameralism could be 
introduced gradually by preserving the best aspects of the existing system.
The Valvoja group argued that the Swedish reformers had expected too much 
from the people and that the reform of 1866 had resulted in the one-sided rule of 
the peasantry and its Lantmanna Party. According to Valvoja, Swedish constitu-
tions were not a sufficiently powerful bulwark against the dominance of a particu-
lar class. The ‘purse of the state’ was open only to the peasantry, and ‘estate spirit’ 
and ‘estate envy’ were still alive and kicking. Two prominent Valvoja members, 
professor of history J. R. Danielson and professor of philosophy Th. Rein, argued 
that, in order to avoid such mistakes in Finland, the two chambers should be given 
distinctly different characters. The lower chamber should represent the prevailing 
opinions of the moment, while the upper chamber was to represent more serious, 
intergenerational opinions and stable interests. The representatives of the upper 
chamber should thus have longer mandates than those of the lower chamber; the 
members of the upper chamber should be replaced gradually, while those of the 
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lower chamber were to be replaced all at once. According to Danielson and Rein, 
the two lower estates of the peasants and the burghers should be united into a 
democratic lower chamber, while the two higher estates of the nobility and the 
clergy would form an aristocratic upper chamber. Towns should be given rela-
tively stronger representation in the lower chamber than the countryside, as cities 
were more civilised and politically active. Provincial assemblies would elect one-
third of the upper chamber, and the nobility and the clergy would each elect one-
third. After these revisions, both chambers could be given equal decision-making 
powers, and a joint vote of both chambers could be held in case of disagreement 
(Danielson 1881; Rein 1885).
Bicameralism was challenged in the 1880s mainly because of the situation in 
Denmark, where the opposition between two chambers had resulted in a total 
standstill of decision-making on budget and tax issues (cf. Skjæveland, this vol-
ume). As a result, the government dictated budgets. The Finnish liberals described 
the Danish situation as a crisis which had pushed the country to the verge of a 
coup d’état or a revolution. The Valvoja group found the Danish situation worry-
ing and described it as ‘contempt of the constitution’ (Rein 1885, p. 431).
The main question with regard to the Danish case was how to overcome the 
deadlock between two chambers. Finnish discussants took the side of the lower 
chamber. The Valvoja group presented two options: either the lower chamber 
should have authority concerning budget and tax issues or it should be repre-
sented by more members in the joint votes of the two chambers. According to the 
group, the upper chamber should be given the right to ‘give the people the chance 
to reflect and deliberate’ but ‘not to block its seriously considered will for good’ 
(Rein 1885, p. 431).
The Finnish liberals argued that the Danish form of bicameralism was ‘a severe 
mistake’ and ‘contrary to the principles of constitutionalism’ as it did not give the 
lower chamber a lawful possibility to break the stubborn opposition of the upper 
chamber. As a solution, they argued, it would be wise to follow the example of 
Britain, where the rights of the House of Lords had been limited in matters of 
budget and taxation. In Britain, the House of Commons could influence the major-
ity of the Lords by forcing the government to introduce new members. Thus, 
instead of a definite veto, the upper chamber had only moderating power and a 
suspensive veto (Helsingfors Dagblad 1885a, 1885b).
The rise of the unicameral model
The bicameral model was discussed in the Diet, local election and press debates 
and social movements and associations, for example in the meetings of the tem-
perance movement (cf. Waasan Lehti 1887). The inevitability of a bicameral par-
liament was taken into account even when planning a new house for the Finnish 
estates in the 1880s. It was argued that the building should be equipped with 
facilities for the meetings of a future bicameral assembly (Helsingfors Dagblad 
1882, 1883). Nonetheless, the consensus on the bicameral model became increas-
ingly challenged towards the end of the nineteenth century.
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A ‘crisis of parliamentary politics’ or ‘crisis of parliamentarism’ spread across 
Europe in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Increased pressure to open 
up parliaments to new groups and public scrutiny resulted in the (gradual) democ-
ratisation of suffrage and candidacy. Democratisation brought new groups to 
parliaments. The newcomers criticised parliaments as debating clubs of the elite 
and argued that parliament’s slow and multiphase proceedings were intended to 
obstruct democratic progress and reforms necessary for the people. Parliaments 
were considered unable to keep up with the pace of progress (Vieira 2015). They 
became arenas for new controversy and heated disputes. National assemblies 
were challenged by scarcity of time resulting from growing agendas and longer 
speeches. Obstruction campaigns by nationalist and socialist minorities spread 
across Europe, inspired by the Irish obstruction in the British House of Com-
mons in the late 1870s and early 1880s (Te Velde 2013). ‘The whole future of 
parliamentarism’ was at stake (Jellinek 1904). The crisis of parliaments was partly 
viewed as a crisis of bicameralism.
The challenges faced by bicameralism resulted in arguments stating that it was, 
in fact, safer either to keep the Finnish four-estate system or to upgrade it rather 
than adopting a bicameral parliament. For example, the Swedish-language news-
paper Nya Pressen, suspicious of democratic reforms aimed against the aristoc-
racy, argued that the ‘reform fanatics’ were unable to offer a good alternative for 
the old system, which had stood the test of time (Nya Pressen 1885). Actors with 
gradual reform plans argued that ‘it is better to fix a poorly built hut than to move 
to an unknown, foreign palace’ and that ‘a reasonable man would rather renovate 
an old, sturdy house than tear it down to construct a new palace for mere amuse-
ment’ (Numminen 1950; Uusi Suometar 1899).
Moreover, precautionary tales from abroad led to increased support of the uni-
cameral model, which had, up to the 1880s, been considered the risky, revolution-
ary counterpart of bicameralism. The problems in Denmark resonated especially 
strongly with the Finns, whose Diet decision-making was often paralysed by a 
deadlock between two estates against two. The Diet decisions required a majority 
of three estates on regular matters. Two estates, the peasants and the clergy, had 
pro-Finnish Fennoman nationalist majorities, while the Nobility and the Burghers 
were in the hands of pro-Swedish members. The Fennomans argued that Fin-
land was small, developing and still weak, and therefore could not afford to halt 
national progress by having two chambers fighting against each other. Finland 
needed more unity and harmony, while bicameral parliaments produced conflicts 
and politics.
The Fennoman nationalists started to move towards more radical democratic 
ideals from the early 1880s on. While the old generation of the Fennomans spoke 
in favour of the abstract ‘public opinion’ and ‘will of the people’, these rhetor-
ical figures did not materialise in serious demands for extended suffrage until 
the 1880s. The Fennomans aimed their political rhetoric at the people’s peasant 
majority. Their main organ, Uusi Suometar criticised Valvoja’s reform proposals 
for favouring urban areas at the cost of the countryside. The Fennomans attacked 
the old privileges of the Swedish-speaking nobility. According to the Fennomans, 
Rejecting the upper chamber 123
the nobility’s representational rights were based neither on trust, ingenuity, edu-
cation nor earned social status, but on an inherited ‘fancy family name and a jin-
gling coat of arms’. The Fennomans argued that the Nobility should give away its 
privileges and the three other estates should form a unicameral assembly. While 
earlier proposals were based on the use of electors among the lower echelons of 
society, and the number of tax units as criteria for suffrage rights, the Fennomans 
now claimed that direct elections, the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ and uni-
cameralism were standards of the day. If implemented, they would increase the 
people’s interest in striving for common national goals (Uusi Suometar 1881a, 
1881b, 1884a).
In the 1880s, a new radical young Fennoman generation drew on empirical nat-
uralism, individualism and moral relativism and stressed the need for a wide appli-
cation of European democratic influences. The young students put faith in the idea 
of progress that emanated from the doctrine of evolution and the developments 
and explanations of natural sciences. Often combining nationalist Fennoman ide-
ology with socialism, they spoke openly in support of radical democratic reform 
and argued that the spirit of the time had abandoned bicameralism. The power of 
landowners, aristocracy and capital had been replaced by humanism, civilisation 
and equality; representation based on class was replaced by representation of the 
people (Aamulehti 1882b, 1882c).
Unicameralism was now supported with the argument that it gave the most 
direct and undistorted expression of the will of the people’s majority. It promoted 
national awareness and spirit, and strengthened Finland’s autonomy and repre-
sentation of the people. Unicameralism saved time and made decision-making 
more efficient (Uusi Suometar 1884a, 1884b). Upper chambers such as the British 
House of Lords and the Danish Landsting represented ‘reaction’ and ‘conserva-
tism’ and ‘obstructed progress’, while democratic lower chambers were assem-
blies of freedom, democracy and the people. Upper chambers were becoming 
useless and obsolete (Savo 1887; Päivälehti 1896).
The revolutionary context of the Parliamentary Reform of 1906
The breakthrough of the unicameral model took place in the context of the Rus-
sian Revolution of 1905. In the 1890s, Russian constraints and the so-called Feb-
ruary Manifesto published by Russian Emperor Nicholas II in 1899 shifted the 
political focus from the Finnish-Swedish language question to Finnish-Russian 
relations. The manifesto ruled that Russian authorities could bypass the Finn-
ish Diet when revising Finnish constitutional laws. Other aims of the manifesto 
included, for example, the merging of the Finnish and Russian militaries. The so-
called Constitutionalists, consisting of the more liberal faction of the Fennomans 
(Young Finns) and the Swedish Party, argued that passive resistance was the best 
way to end Russian ‘oppression’. The Constitutionalists drew on legalism and 
argued that while the Emperor was an autocrat in Russia, he was a grand duke 
of Finland, which meant he was obliged to respect the Finnish constitution. The 
Constitutionalists argued that the ‘illegal’ decrees imposed by the Emperor should 
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not be obeyed but passively resisted. The conservative faction of the Fennoman 
nationalists (Old Finns), in contrast, supported appeasement in relation to the 
Empire and argued that Finnish interests would be best secured in the long run by 
submitting to most Russian demands.
Another political division became pivotal in the Parliamentary Reform of 1906. 
The Finnish labour movement, whose members lacked representation in the Diets, 
challenged the old political elite by actively invoking ‘the will of the majority of 
the people’, consisting of the workers and the poor. The Social Democratic Party 
of Finland was established in 1903 when the Finnish Labour Party (est. 1899) 
changed its name and proclaimed to be part of the international social democratic 
movement. The party’s programme of 1903 was an almost direct translation of the 
Hainfelder Programm of Austria’s Social Democratic Party (1888–1889) written 
by Victor Adler and approved by Karl Kautsky. While the rise of the labour move-
ment and socialism were traditionally linked to industrial workers in urban areas, 
in Finland they spread swiftly to the countryside and among the poor landless 
peasantry. The rise of the Social Democratic Party challenged the position of the 
Fennoman nationalists as the sole and rightful representatives of the (common) 
Finnish people. The rise of socialism turned many of the Fennomans back to being 
supporters of more moderate reform and a calm and considerate upper chamber.
The Parliamentary Reform of 1906, as were all momentous reforms in early 
Finnish parliamentary life, was a result of shifts in Russian and international poli-
tics. During the Russian Revolution of 1905, demands for democratic reform were 
presented in the Empire, including the Baltic states and Poland. At the end of 
October 1905, the revolutionary spirit spread to Finland, where it manifested itself 
as a general strike. Collective action culminated in two main demands: the rever-
sal of Russian attempts to integrate Finland into the Empire and the reform of 
Finland’s outdated political system. All political groups shared these objectives. 
The Social Democratic Party (SDP), which had been a relatively modest force 
until the revolution, took the lead in the Finnish mobilisation and became a major 
political movement. The number of paying members of the SDP rose from 16,000 
in early 1905 to 107,000 in October 1906 (Alapuro 2006). The party advocated 
its main concrete objective, the introduction of a unicameral assembly based on 
universal and equal suffrage for both men and women, with unprecedented force.
As a response to the revolutionary situation in Russia and pressure from the 
large-scale protests, Emperor Nicholas II signed a new manifesto on 4 Novem-
ber 1905, in which he reversed the February Manifesto of 1899 and gave Finland’s 
domestic government the task of preparing a proposal for parliamentary reform. 
The manifesto laid down that the reform should be based on the ‘demands of the 
time’ and apply the principles of universal and equal suffrage. The manifesto did 
not say anything about the number of chambers. The publication of the manifesto 
was followed by intense public debate, in which political groups presented their 
proposals in reference to foreign examples and experiences. Newspapers pub-
lished extensive presentations on foreign parliaments and constitutions. Public 
lectures were held and books were printed on the topic in order to influence and 
frame the Finnish reform.
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Finland’s domestic government appointed a reform committee to prepare pro-
posals for a new parliament act and a new electoral act. The Committee consisted 
of 14 members representing the main political groups of the Swedish Party, the 
Social Democratic Party, and the Fennomans, divided into the conservative Old 
Finns and the more liberal Constitutionalist Young Finns. The committee had 
thorough knowledge of foreign parliaments and constitutions and experience in 
Diet work, ten of its members having been members of the estates. The commit-
tee members included, for example, the former Valvoja group members Th. Rein 
and J.R. Danielson, who had been active in the debates on bicameralism. The 
committee was in session for less than three months, from 8 December 1905 to 28 
February 1906. The Emperor ratified the parliament act and the electoral act after 
hearing the Diet as well as Russian and Finnish authorities.
The parliamentary reform committee of 1905–1906 started its discussions on 
general principles and agreed that universal and equal suffrage, which had already 
been mentioned in the November Manifesto, would be implemented. Despite the 
fact that suffrage reform had been discussed for decades in Finland (Alapuro 
2006), the democratisation of voting rights was dramatic and left its mark on the 
organisation of Parliament and its procedures.
The rejection of bicameralism
Unifying the people
The number of chambers was a heated topic in the parliamentary reform com-
mittee, and the Finnish reformers ultimately had several reasons for abandoning 
the bicameral. Firstly, it can be argued that the timing and political context of 
the reform played a crucial role in how Parliament would be organised. Non-
socialist groups, who had earlier been satisfied with more moderate changes, 
such as a bicameral assembly and equal but not universal suffrage, eventually 
consented to the Social Democrats’ demands for radical reform. In the unsta-
ble and revolutionary political situation, the non-socialist parties felt that only a 
unicameral parliament could efficiently calm civic unrest and unify the Finnish 
people in a critical, historical moment. There was a general consensus that the 
unique window of opportunity created by the revolutionary situation should be 
used effectively. The political elite feared that the long-awaited reform might not 
be passed at all if the nation seemed too divided or too much time was spent on 
disputations.
While the fear of political conflict and division had first been focused on the 
paralysis of intra-parliamentary decision-making, democratisation shed light on a 
wider extra-parliamentary context. The Fennoman leaders highlighted the impor-
tance of compromise during the general strike of 1905. Their rhetoric focused on 
restraining disagreement and conflict and stressing the need for national unity. 
Young Finn leader K. J. Ståhlberg argued that Finland’s most important task at 
hand was to ‘deepen and strengthen the internal harmony of the people’. Only 
through harmony could the Finnish people seize the moment. Ståhlberg argued 
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that all elements of the population should be included in striving for common 
national goals (Ståhlberg 1905, pp. 706–708).
In the reform committee, Old Finn leader J. R. Danielson argued that the exclu-
sion of the intelligentsia from the chamber would only separate it from the people 
and create conflicts. Old Finn Juho Torppa argued that the problem of reaching 
consensus in the Diets was often the result of an inability to understand each other 
rather than irreconcilable views on common goals. Thus, ‘common understand-
ing’ and ‘full integration of different opinions’ could be reached only in a unicam-
eral parliament. Old Finn J. K. Paasikivi argued that a unicameral parliament was 
‘the best way to unify the people’ (Eduskunnanuudistamiskomitean pöytäkirjat 
1906). The participation of the people in a single chamber would strengthen pat-
riotism and encourage Finns to strive for common goals.
These views stood, of course, in strong contrast to the typical criticism of unicam-
eralism. The advocates of bicameralism had linked unicameralism to heated disputes, 
revolutions and chaos. In November 1905, for example, the anti-socialist Fennoman 
newspaper Suomen Kansa argued that the adoption of a unicameral system had 
resulted in a tyrannical government during the French Revolution. When a bicameral 
parliament was finally adopted, ‘the people was already torn’ and had ‘gone wild’, 
which resulted in the new despotism of Napoleon (Suomen Kansa 1905).
Defenders of unicameralism rejected such criticism by referring to the ‘calm’, 
‘stable’ and ‘considerate’ Finnish national character, which helped the Finns avoid 
radicalism and resist the temptations of demagogues. Finnish actors mainly linked 
this character to people who lived in the countryside, which was the case for the 
majority of the Finnish population (Aamulehti 1882a, 1882b; Koitar 1905; Turun 
Sanomat 1905).
Strengthening national representation: Parliament as  
‘the people in miniature’
Unicameralism corresponded with the ideal of national representation for Finnish 
nationalists. According to the Fennomans, parliament should be ‘the people in 
miniature’ and offer ‘a picture of the Finnish people as a whole’. It was argued that 
this could be made possible through proportional representation of different areas 
of the country and different classes of the population in one chamber.
The ideal surfaced in the Fennoman thought in the early Diets. In 1871, for 
instance, nationalist leader Yrjö Koskinen cited Mirabeau’s speech in the French 
National Constituent Assembly in 1789: ‘Like a map portrays mountains, dales, 
lakes and rivers, forests and plains, towns and villages, the representative assem-
bly should present a miniature picture of all parts of the people as a unified whole’ 
(Uusi Suometar 1871). The idea of representation of all parts of the people sup-
ported the Fennoman aim of speaking in the name of the people and gaining a 
majority in the representative assembly.
This conception of representation became a central argument for justifying 
the combination of universal suffrage, unicameral parliament and proportional 
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representation in the reform of 1906. The Fennomans believed that an internally 
harmonious assembly of all parts of the people would ensure the legitimacy of 
the Parliament and strengthen national representation both within Finland and in 
relation to Russia. Such a parliament would best be able to speak and decide in the 
name of the Finnish people.
The surrogates for an upper chamber and the powerless Parliament
Against the backdrop of democratisation and the rise of socialism, a central ques-
tion for the non-socialist parties was how to secure ‘thorough, considerate and 
calm discussion and reflection’ against ‘immature’, ‘inconsistent’ and ‘hasty deci-
sions’ made by ‘the uneducated masses’ and ‘occasional majorities’. The aris-
tocratic elite studied procedural and electoral ways to avoid ‘the tyranny of the 
majority’.
The Social Democrats were unconditional in their demands for a unicameral 
parliament. Inspired by revolutionary spirit, the party demanded that, instead of 
leaving the reform in the hands of the ‘oligarchic class representation’ in the Diet, 
which would opt for a bicameral parliament, the question should be decided by 
a democratically elected, unicameral ‘national (constituent) assembly’ (Työmies 
1905a). Both the Russian authorities and the non-socialist parties rejected such an 
approach. The non-socialists underlined that the reform should be implemented 
constitutionally – a legislative national assembly would be a revolutionary option. 
The socialist press used fierce rhetoric and implied its readiness to use violence 
if ‘the traitors’ were to introduce a bicameral parliament in which the elite sat 
unequally in a different chamber (Työmies 1905b).
The Old Finns were the first to consent to the demand for a unicameral parlia-
ment. They had lost support because of their appeasement policy and were looking 
to siphon some support from the SDP supporters, especially in the countryside. 
The socialists were frustrated with the Young Finns’ indecision. Some prominent 
Young Finns, who had been allies of the socialists in the passive resistance, sup-
ported a bicameral assembly. In mid-November 1905, for instance, Young Finn 
Eero Erkko, who had recently returned from exile in the United States, suggested 
that Finland should model its parliament after the US Congress. Erkko argued that 
the Finnish workers opposed European upper chambers as hosts of capital and 
class interests, but in his eyes, both chambers of the US Congress were democrati-
cally elected and represented the people. According to Erkko, there were differ-
ences of neither class nor ideology between the House of Representatives and the 
Senate. Instead, they were based on differently sized electoral districts, different 
age requirements and mandates of a different length. Instead of general elections, 
US Senate members were ‘elected indirectly’ by the state legislators. Erkko tried 
to sell the idea of a bicameral assembly to the supporters of universal and equal 
suffrage (Helsingin Sanomat 1905).
Finally, the Young Finns also faltered in the face of public pressure and 
assented to unicameralism. It is notable that the non-socialist parties, the Young 
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Finns, the Old Finns and the Swedish Party, abandoned bicameralism, as they 
understood that there were other means to restrain the potentially negative side-
effects of democratisation. The Young Finns argued that as much as democratic 
aspects could be incorporated into a bicameral assembly like the US Congress, a 
unicameral parliament could also be equipped with precautions against haste and 
disregard. The party argued that procedure should be used to protect the rights 
of the minority and to make sure that ‘sudden winds in the public opinion could 
not harm the steady work of the State’. Norway became the main model for such 
plans (Louhi 1905a, 1905b, 1905c; Turun Sanomat 1905).
In contrast to bicameral assemblies, the models for a unicameral assembly 
were few and far between. Germany, Greece, Bulgaria and Norway were the 
main unicameral examples discussed. Norway (cf. Smith, E., this volume) was 
considered the most suitable model for Finland because of its somewhat simi-
lar social and political conditions. The qualified unicameralism of the Norwe-
gian Storting, which had already been presented in the Finnish discussions in 
the 1880s, became a central model in the parliamentary reform committee after 
bicameralism was rejected. At first, non-socialist committee members sought to 
replace the separate upper chamber by electing part of the single chamber in a 
different manner. As the proposals were turned down as a form of bicameralism, 
the next effort was to divide the chamber into so-called ‘sections’ inspired by the 
Norwegian Storting. Young Finn E. N. Setälä proposed that the smaller section 
would comprise one-third and the larger two-thirds of the members. The two sec-
tions would deliberate separately, and in case of disagreement the sections would 
negotiate in a committee. If this were unsuccessful, a final decision would require 
a qualified majority of two-thirds in a joint vote of the two chambers. In contrast 
to Norway, where the Storting elected one-fourth of its members to the Lagting, 
Setälä’s proposal aimed to give the upper section (one-third of the MPs) more 
power in legislation.
Some Finns criticised the Lagting for being ‘a mere committee’ or ‘a mere 
echo’ of the majority of the Odelsting (cf. Rein 1885). Further proposals on the 
sections were made. It was, for example, argued that the smaller section should 
consist of older and more experienced members so that it would be ‘calmer’, 
‘more serious’ and protective of the role of the educated intellectuals. The larger 
section would be younger, ‘more lively’ and ‘progressive’. According to one pro-
posal, electoral success should be the leading criterion for one-third of the smaller 
section, as this would encourage parties to choose good, merited and experienced 
candidates (Eduskunnanuudistamiskomitean pöytäkirjat 1906; Mylly 2006).
Social Democrats and Old Finns eventually abandoned the sections, which 
were replaced with the so-called Grand Committee. Based on the proposal by 
Swedish Party representative Felix Heikel, the unicameral Parliament was given 
a sixty-member Grand Committee, which discussed every bill after a referral dis-
cussion, standing committee examination and the first plenary reading. The Grand 
Committee would draw up a report for the second plenary reading. If the report 
was not passed as such in the second plenary, it was sent back to the Grand Com-
mittee with amendments. At this point, the Grand Committee re-examined the 
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question and even had the right to send the bill back to the standing committee. 
In addition to blocking hasty decisions, the Grand Committee was designed to 
increase the influence of intelligent, experienced members. The members of the 
Grand Committee (as well as those of other committees) were elected proportion-
ally and indirectly by the MPs (Mylly 2006). Committees have played a central 
role in the Finnish parliamentary work since the Diets. It is notable that the Finn-
ish word for parliamentary committees, valiokunta, signifies a group of the best 
and most capable individuals.
Finnish advocates of bicameralism and qualified unicameralism included strict 
minority provisions in their proposals on joint votes of the chambers and sections. 
These were eventually replaced with the procedure of ‘adjournment to the next 
elected parliament’ – an internationally unique product of the Finnish reform. 
According to this procedure, a minority of at least one-third of MPs (sixty-seven 
out of two hundred members) could, during the third reading of a bill, require 
that it be left in abeyance until after the next parliamentary elections. Electoral 
terms were set to three years. Constitutional revision required a qualified major-
ity of two-thirds of two consecutive parliaments or, if declared urgent, a qualified 
majority of five-sixths of one parliament (Suomen Suuriruhtinaanmaan Valti-
opäiväjärjestys 1906, §§57–60).
The possible negative side effects of democratisation were also taken into 
account when planning the electoral laws. The reform committee designed a 
system of proportional representation based on party lists which gave parties 
the power to ensure that their intelligent and experienced candidates would be 
elected. Large electoral districts were introduced in order to guarantee that enough 
capable candidates stood for election.
The procedures of the non-socialists were aimed to increase the influence of 
the educated and experienced MPs, to slow down the deliberative process and to 
force the majority into compromise. They were designed as surrogates for bicam-
eralism. The Social Democrats condemned the complex and multiphase proce-
dure and primarily criticised the Grand Committee and the minority provisions 
for leaving too many possibilities for efficient obstruction of reform. They argued 
that the bourgeoisie had made the unicameral parliament ‘a system of one-and-
a-half chambers’ and ‘a bicameral parliament in disguise’ (Kuusinen 1906a, 
pp. 99–103; 1906b, p. 246; e.g. Sosialisti 1907a, 1907b; Sosialidemokraatti 
1908).
An essential reason for the final acceptance of the unicameral model was the 
representative assembly’s lack of final decision-making power. New legislation 
required promulgation of the emperor, there was no parliamentary government 
and the emperor had the right to dissolve the unicameral Parliament (which he 
often did). Finnish reformers of 1906 argued that the Russian ruler and the strong 
government acted as a conservative bulwark against hasty and inconsiderate 
decision-making typical of unicameral parliaments. Constitutional reformers 
retained the unicameral Parliament after independence in 1917, but its powers 
were counterbalanced now with a strong presidency in a republic, adopted as a 
compromise after the plans for a monarchy failed (Ihalainen 2017). The (semi-)
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presidential system gave the president veto powers in legislation and positioned 
him or her independent of Parliament.
Concluding remarks
Crisis made its presence known in the Finnish parliamentary reform in three ways. 
Firstly, the reform was made possible by the window of opportunity created by the 
crisis of the Russian Revolution. Secondly, the crisis created an exceptional oppor-
tunity for the supporters of radical democratic reform, which, thirdly, resulted in 
the crisis of the bicameral model. Despite the dramatic nature of the reform, there 
was continuity: discussions on bi- and unicameralism were based on arguments 
that had already been made in Finland as early as the 1880s.
The delayed reform resulted in a radical democratisation. Had an opportunity 
for reform appeared earlier, Finland would have probably adopted a bicameral 
parliament with more moderate suffrage reform. This tendency of democratic and 
parliamentary reform was acknowledged in the Finnish discussions based on for-
eign experiences (Danielson 1881; Mikkeli 1905).
The role of foreign models was essential in Finland, a small and rather periph-
eral country which was still in the process of creating its own national tradition 
and practices. Finland, as a latecomer to parliamentary reform, was able to benefit 
from the experiences of other countries and apply their lessons. Finnish actors 
used foreign examples selectively to frame, contextualise and interpret domestic 
political questions and to influence the development of Finnish parliamentary life. 
Models for parliamentary practice were sought from a variety of foreign cases, but 
there was a strong desire to connect and identify with the Scandinavian countries 
and, in this way, contribute to a Nordic approach to politics.
The Finnish case illustrates that there are alternative ways to include charac-
teristics of upper chambers in unicameral parliaments. By the reform of 1906, 
Finnish reformers had gained expertise in procedure as a parliamentary tool. The 
Finns had used procedure to fight the deficiencies of the obsolete estate system in 
the Diets, when thorough reforms were impossible because of Russian opposition. 
Procedures designed to overcome the estate division played a central role in intro-
ducing forms of parliamentary deliberation and inter-estate committee negotiation 
while at the same time preserving the forms of estate representation (Pekonen 
2017a). These lessons of procedurally blurring the chamber division were further 
applied in the parliamentary reform of 1906.
The presidential powers, the strict minority provisions and the Grand Com-
mittee’s old role were dissolved gradually from the 1980s onwards, especially 
in the constitutional reform of 2000. Today, the adjournment to the next elected 
Parliament applies only in questions of the constitution, and the Grand Commit-
tee specialises in matters related to the European Union. The main work of the 
Finnish Parliament is considered to take place in committees behind closed doors, 
where disagreement can be solved more pragmatically and calmly than in plenary 
debates (Pekonen 2011).
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Introduction
In January 1867, the new Swedish Parliament, the bicameral Riksdag, was estab-
lished. This system would remain in place for more than one hundred years, until 
the introduction of the single-chamber Parliament in 1971 (elected in 1970), 
which is still in use today. During the first half of this period, the upper chamber 
(Första kammaren) was highly influential and central to the political debate. After 
the democratic breakthrough of 1917–1921, the ‘Senate’ (a term seldom used in 
Sweden) lost its role and eventually became almost insignificant. It was abolished 
without protests, strong passions or solemn ceremonies in 1970.
Discussing Sweden’s upper chamber up to the 1920s sheds some light on vari-
ous important traits of Swedish political history. After some background on how 
and why the upper chamber was established, three questions will be discussed: 1) 
In what way did the organisation of the chamber – the veto held by the chamber, 
the strict rules for eligibility and the social character of its members – affect its 
power? 2) Which role did this elitist chamber play within the state’s project of 
modernisation, contrary to the principles of laissez-faire? 3) The upper chamber 
was a product of undemocratic, graduated voting rights – how did its members 
react to calls for democratisation?
The chamber’s history after 1921 will be mentioned only briefly, in the Epi-
logue. After the democratic breakthrough of 1917–1921, Sweden’s upper cham-
ber lost its prominent place in the Swedish parliamentary system, even though the 
two chambers formally remained as equal as they had been since 1867.
Parliamentary reform in the 1860s – a background
In Sweden, reforms of the traditional four-estate Riksdag or even a total abolition 
of the old parliamentary estate system had been discussed since the coup d´état 
by a group of high-ranking officers and civil servants of 1809. During that event-
ful year, Finland was lost to the Russian tsar, and royal autocracy was replaced 
by monarchic constitutionalism, regularised in the Instrument of Government, a 
part of the constitution from 1809. The following year, a new dynasty, Bernad-
otte, was chosen, but it would take more than fifty years to reach an agreement 
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on a new parliament system built on the principle of individuality instead of the 
old corporate estate principle, which had its roots in medieval society. Intensive 
debates preceded this decision, with the critical moment taking place on 7 Decem-
ber 1865, when the House of Nobility accepted the proposal of a bicameral system 
(Nilsson 1994; cf. Metcalf 1987).
The four-estate parliament – the nobility, the clergy, the burghers and the 
peasantry – had emerged from a traditional division of society. Despite these ties 
to old traditions, social groups that were considered important to society were 
integrated into the political system to an increasing extent. Foundry owners and 
city landlords, who had not enjoyed parliamentary representation thus far, were, 
for example, allowed to sit in the estate of burghers. Through these adjustments of 
the four-estate Riksdag, nearly all well-to-do social groups were represented. The 
important role of the peasants in Swedish history was illustrated by the estate of 
the peasantry, consisting of freeholders, the wealthier class of peasants.
The bicameral Riksdag was founded during an era of liberalism in the 1850s 
and 1860s, which also saw the abolition of guilds and the establishment of free 
trade, local government, rights of inheritance for women and (partial) religious 
freedom. The leading statesman and architect of the parliamentary reform, Louis 
De Geer (1818–1896), was prime minister from 1858 to 1870 and from 1875 to 
1880, although the term ‘prime minister’ was not used before 1876. Like many of 
his aristocratic friends, he became a civil servant, even though, unlike them, he 
was initially relatively poor. His talent, wide circle of contacts and marriage to the 
wealthy Caroline Wachtmeister helped him advance his career. One should also 
mention his political companion, Johan August Gripenstedt (1813–1874), who 
successfully pushed through decisive liberal reforms as the minister of finance, 
1856–1866. Gripenstedt had continually represented his aristocratic family in the 
House of Nobility from 1840 to 1866 and was a member of the lower chamber 
between 1867 and 1873 (Nilsson 1989).
The liberals strongly supported the parliamentary reform of 1865–1866 (‘the 
representative reform’), sometimes describing it as a clear democratic victory. 
In reality, it was a compromise: it served as both a reform and a guarantee for 
maintaining the existing order. This conservation of the social system was also a 
prerequisite for De Geer. According to him, no important social group should lose 
its representation (Ekman 1966). The clergy, however, had lost much of its power, 
as only a few bishops and priests became members of the Riksdag after 1867. 
Instead, a special forum for deciding ecclesiastical issues was established, known 
as the ‘council of the church’. Half of the members were laymen; the other half, 
priests. There were also permanent members, such as bishops. The council was 
independent of Parliament and could veto proposals on church matters.
Organisation and character
Joint elections to both chambers were perhaps the most important new element 
in the Swedish Parliament. The two chambers would be different but equal. They 
had the same number of representatives in the parliamentary joint committees, 
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and each chamber could vote against – and stop – legislative proposals. The king 
could also veto decisions he disliked. Another element of the royal prerogative 
was the right to appoint the speaker and the deputy speaker in both chambers. 
Abolition of this right was a recurring demand in the lower chamber after 1867.
As a moderate – or a liberal-conservative – De Geer emphasised the importance 
of avoiding autocracy and ‘one-sided, hasty decisions’ by the lower chamber and 
safeguarding ‘the claims of education and capital’. He viewed wealth as a proof of 
individual capacity and the capability to hold an independent position against eco-
nomic and political interests. Owing primarily to heavy restrictions on eligibility, 
the upper chamber, with its 125 members, was composed of estate owners, high 
officials and financiers. The number of members increased because of population 
growth, until it was fixed at 150 in 1894 (Nilsson 1969).
Another reason for the aristocratic character of the upper chamber was the vot-
ing system. The upper chamber was elected by county councils, which were, in 
turn, elected by local councils. The local franchise was relatively extensive, com-
pared to the political franchise of the lower chamber (one-fifth of the adult male 
population). Approximately half of all adult men satisfied the minimum income 
threshold of 500 riksdaler, which was also the level of income at which one had 
to start paying taxes. This was not a coincidence, as the ruling classes considered 
that paying taxes marked the line between fully responsible citizens and the more 
unreliable poor people.
The relatively low income qualification, however, did not give the poor much 
influence. In the local elections, a graded scale was used, based on income and 
wealth, although electors had only one vote each in the second round. A very 
wealthy person could have hundreds of votes; an ordinary farmer, just one or two. 
Private companies were also allowed to vote in local elections, and towns and 
rural districts could be compared to joint stock companies. The more property 
one owned, the more votes one received. Ownership was viewed as synonymous 
with local economic interests and therefore legitimate local power (Norrlid 1970).
Theoretically, some women could also vote in local elections and, in this way, 
influence the composition of the county councils that elected the members of the 
Senate. However, very few women had property of their own because of the civil 
law that declared married women to be incapacitated. In the cities, some wid-
ows continued their deceased husbands’ businesses, but not much is known with 
regard to whether any of them actually voted.
The rules for eligibility were also highly restrictive, which is another rea-
son that only a few peasants were elected. To be eligible, one had to be at least 
35 years old and either possess real estate to a value of 80,000 riksdaler or have 
an income of 4,000 riksdaler. In 1866, these restrictions granted eligibility to the 
upper chamber to only 6,000 men. Another economic obstacle was that members 
received no salary, as opposed to members of the lower chamber. Even potential 
candidates among the well-to-do peasants needed a regular income to afford liv-
ing in Stockholm during the parliamentary sessions.
As mentioned, only slightly more than 20 per cent of the adult men were 
allowed to vote in the elections for the lower chamber. The demands on income 
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or wealth favoured freeholders but excluded tenants and the lower classes in the 
countryside. Most workers in the cities were also excluded, at least in the first 
decades. In 1867, more than 40 per cent of the members of the lower chamber 
were farmers (freeholders) and 12–13 per cent aristocratic landowners, giving the 
agrarian sector a majority, although the social and political divisions between the 
two groups could be sharp. The minority consisted of civil servants and business-
men. The last decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century have often been called the heyday of the peasantry in Swedish history 
(Sköld & Halvarson 1966).
Modernisation, state and laissez-faire
Paradoxically, in an era of industrialisation, rural forces had been strengthened 
in the new Parliament. Businessmen and middle-class representatives had played 
a decisive role in the former estate of the burghers, the estate most receptive to 
reform. In the new bicameral Parliament, the urban middle-class members were 
reduced to a minority in both chambers. Farmers largely dominated the lower 
chamber, and the aristocratic landowners and high civil servants were the back-
bone of the upper chamber.
The social gap between the two chambers soon devolved into open hostility 
between the majority of landowners, factory owners and high officials in the 
upper chamber and the freeholders and middle-class representatives in the lower 
chamber. Radical or moderate proposals for an extended franchise for the lower 
chamber and fewer votes for the wealthy in local elections, which, ultimately, 
determined the character of the upper chamber, were prevented by a majority 
in the upper chamber. On the other hand, expansion of state activity and public 
Table 9.1 Social composition of the Swedish upper chamber 1870–1910
1870 1890 1910
N % N % N %
1   Higher civil 
servants
 51 40,5  59 40,7  62 41,3
A)  Civil servants of 
trust*
 34 27,0  28 19,3  25 16,7
B)  Other civil 
servants
 17 13,5  31 21,4  37 24,6
2   Lower civil 
servants
   -    -     -    -     -
3  Free professions   1  0,8   3  2,1   6  4,0
4  Agrarian sector  46 36,5  49 33,8  42 28,0
5  Trade, industry  28 22,2  34 23,4  40 26,7
Total 126 145 150
* ‘Civil servants of trust’ were appointed directly by the king and were expected to be loyal to his 
proposals, ‘voting for the uniform’.
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administration were often vetoed by the lower chamber. The farmers were not 
laissez-faire liberals, but they adopted a suspicious attitude towards bureaucracy 
and civil servants financed by taxes on the landed property, as was traditional for 
the peasantry.
The posthumous reputation of the first part of the upper chamber’s existence 
(1867–1921) has been highly negative: it has been described as reactionary and 
an enemy of progress. Without doubt, the upper chamber defended existing power 
structures, but in technical, economic and other modernising areas, it succeeded 
in developing society, faced by an often traditional but more democratically influ-
enced lower chamber. For that purpose, modernising reforms could set aside the 
liberal principle of a passive state (Nilsson 1994). Swedish historians have mostly 
stressed the 1860s and 1870s as a period dominated by laissez-faire attitudes. 
A commonly held idea is that state interventionist policy became important only 
after the issue of tariffs had brought the protectionists to power in 1888 (Nybom & 
Torstendahl 1989; Kilander 1991).
The concept of modernisation in this chapter is mainly applied to economic and 
administrative policy and comprises rational organisation, technical development 
and emphasis on the application of scientific methods. The history of the upper 
and the lower chambers from the 1860s to the 1880s shows that there is no inevi-
table correspondence between democracy and modernisation. The senators tried 
to change society in line with what rationality, technology and science demanded, 
while preserving old political structures, laws and traditions.
During this period, an interventionist policy was initiated with regard to for-
ests, based mainly on the argument that the state should be allowed to protect 
vital national interests against exploitation, even if this meant restricting private 
ownership. As a result, several laws were introduced to guarantee the survival 
of the forests. Secondly, changes in the water laws showed that property rights 
were not sacred principles and that they could be restricted when far-reaching 
economic interests – communications and water transportation – were at stake. 
Landowners had to accept that their traditional control over waterways adjacent 
to their property was diminished for the common good. The third example is the 
National Board of Trade. After the victory of the free-trade policy in the 1850s 
and 1860s, liberals and anti-bureaucratic farmers insisted on the abolition of this 
department. When the first bicameral Riksdag met in 1867, it was thought that it 
would be just a matter of time before the National Board of Trade would be abol-
ished, but its enemies never achieved their goal. Instead, the department gradually 
adopted more modern forms of encouraging trade, communication and industry. 
The policy of detailed regulations was replaced by comprehensive responsibility 
for education, technical development, information and patents.
A group of influential members of the upper chamber played a decisive role in 
all of these debates. Although they were adherents of moderate liberalism and free 
trade policy, they emphasised the need for state support. As a result, the Swedish 
state never lost its grip on the economy during this so-called laissez-faire period. 
Instead, state activity simply took on different forms.
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Both liberals and conservatives used the state as an instrument in their attempts 
at national modernisation. From this perspective, the upper chamber, with its 
more positive attitude towards allotments and government intervention to mod-
ernise (as, for example, in the banking system, education and economic legisla-
tion) was more progressive than the lower chamber. Most of the opponents to this 
interventionist policy were not classical liberals. More conspicuous was a group 
comprising judges who based their resistance on the classical concept of the rule 
of law and farmers with their old hostility to public authorities, bureaucracy and 
taxes. In the broad field of economic policy, the upper chamber acted as an engine 
for modernisation; the lower chamber, as a brake.
The important modernising reforms initiated by members of the upper chamber 
contradict the traditional view of the party system in the chamber’s first decades 
as being rather loose, poorly organised and lacking in solidarity. Indeed, the par-
ties in the upper chamber consisted of small groups, but they were strongly organ-
ised around a network of well-established members seeking to gain support from 
the mass of unorganised and independent members. The parties were primarily 
represented in only one of the chambers, although the Farmers’ Party (Lantman-
napartiet), the strongest group in the lower chamber, had a branch in the upper 
chamber as well (Nilsson 1994).
During the first years, the lower chamber was divided between a majority of 
loyal supporters of the moderate liberal government and a conservative minority, 
many of them actively opposing the new political system. More and more, the 
closely connected issues of national defence and the tax system became the most 
significant dividing lines for different existing and newly established groups or 
parties. The question was whether the upper chamber should work to strike a com-
promise with the farmers or not. There was contact between some of the senators 
and the farmers in the lower chamber, while the small contingent of farmers in the 
upper chamber had increased at the same time.
After a compromise agreement in 1885, the debate about free trade or protec-
tionism took over as formative issue for the party system. Cooperation between 
groups in different chambers further increased because of the tariff conflict. Pro-
tectionists in both chambers formed what can be seen as an ‘early-modern’ right 
wing – in favour of tariffs, loyal to royal power, resistant to franchise reform 
and champions of military strength. Another favourite issue was hostility towards 
Norwegian radicals who were looking to abolish the personal union between the 
two countries, which had been established in 1814. This conservative and nation-
alist right-wing group controlled the upper chamber, but had supporters in the 
lower chamber as well. One can reverse all the standpoints just mentioned to get 
the political programme of their antagonists: liberals and farmers (‘the left’), who 
held a majority in the lower chamber.
This was the beginning of a new era with modern parties, which were also 
organised outside the Riksdag. Now, the upper chamber was dominated by a 
majority of pronounced nationalists, protectionists and enemies of voting reforms. 
To some extent, the period of modernisation had ended.
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The conservative fortress and democracy
When voting rights became the dominant political issue after 1900, the upper 
chamber could still use Acts of Parliament to stop every reform proposal it dis-
liked. However, developments in 1909 (extended male suffrage) and 1917–1921 
(parliamentary government, the abolition of the graded voting rights in local 
elections and women’s suffrage) established democracy. The conservative upper 
chamber had given up its resistance. The primary reasons for this acquiescence 
were the revolutionary events in Russia and Germany. Revolutionary groups and 
social unrest were also potential threats in Sweden, promoted by syndicalists and 
left-wing dissidents from the Social Democrat Party. A democratic constitution 
seemed to be necessary to ensure continued calm, which is why it was supported 
by influential industrial leaders and, at last, by the king and the Anglo-Saxon-
oriented crown prince. The upper chamber survived the turbulent years after the 
First World War, but it lost its significance.
Voices in favour of reforming the franchise after 1867 were few and far between 
in the lower chamber and almost non-existent in the upper chamber. The Farmers’ 
Party was worried about the potential power of the increasing multitudes of ten-
ants, agricultural workers and servants. For the freeholders, the real injustice was 
dominance by the elites in the upper chamber, preventing all political reforms that 
reduced their power.
For a long time, the conservative resistance to voting rights was grounded in the 
belief that voting was not a universal right. This was clearly expressed in 1896 by 
upper chamber protectionist Teofron Säve (1892–1910):
Franchise is a mandate, not a right given to all sorts of people; it is a mission 
that the state gives to individuals who are qualified to fulfil the mission, and 
it is definitely not a right that belongs to a person just because he is born or 
citizen of a society.
(Vallinder 1966, pp. 25–26)
However, after the turn of the century, expanded male suffrage was increasingly 
seen as inevitable, even by many conservative men (women were not allowed in 
the party before 1913). A modest reform was thought to satisfy middle groups of 
the peasantry and weaken the increasing demands for democracy. From that per-
spective, the main question became the introduction of conservative guarantees 
that were necessary to have the reform approved by the upper chamber. Another 
difficulty was the graded system of the election of the upper chamber, which made 
it a conservative stronghold against everything that threatened the traditional for-
mation of society. The system was modified in 1909 but not abolished until 1918.
Women’s suffrage was a subordinated issue in the beginning of the century, at 
least in parliament. Outside parliament, important women’s organisations were 
established, consisting of Social Democratic, liberal and conservative activists 
(Rönnbäck 2004; Florin 2006). Left-wing parties – Social Democrats and liber-
als – included demands for women’s suffrage in their political programmes but 
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were more hesitant with regard to fighting for male and women voting rights at the 
same time. There were still questions about whether women – if given the right – 
were prepared to vote. Maybe they would vote for the conservatives. There were 
also tactical questions. As long as the upper chamber had a conservative majority, 
any reform could be voted down. Accordingly, some wondered whether it was 
more practical to first secure voting rights for men and then use the increased 
power on the left to secure votes for women.
In 1902, landowner Erik Gustaf Boström became prime minister, a position he 
already had held from 1891 to 1900. During a parliamentary session in 1904, he 
presented a proposal on male suffrage and proportional elections for the lower 
chamber. At the same time, the restrictions were extensive – bankruptcy, unpaid 
taxes, dependency on benefits and the failure to report for compulsory military 
service all disqualified men from voting. Proportional elections were disliked by 
left-wing parties; therefore, the proposal was voted down by the lower chamber. 
In the following year, a similar proposal met the same destiny. The principle of 
universal (male) franchise had been established, but what did that mean?
For the first government (1905–1906) of the liberal Karl Staaff, universal male 
suffrage was at the top of the agenda. His proposal of voting rights and majority 
elections passed through the lower chamber without problem. Not surprisingly, 
though, it was voted down by the upper chamber. The alternative preferred by the 
senators included a cautious reform of local elections – a reduction of the maxi-
mum of an individual’s votes. At least the upper chamber had accepted a small 
change to the election system, a cautious reform of the graded scale – which liber-
als and farmer had disliked so intensely. Staaff did not mention this problem in the 
government’s proposal, which seems puzzling. But his radical, British-inspired 
parliamentary view gave the power to the democratic lower chamber. Its coun-
terpart should not be reformed, because it would only postpone full democracy. 
Instead, the upper chamber should be set aside, weakening into insignificance 
(Stjernquist 1996; Esaiasson 2010).
Franchise by the conservative government
After Staaff’s failure to realise his programme, conservative leader Arvid Lind-
man became prime minister. It seems like a paradox that the (male) franchise (in 
reality, 20 per cent of adult men were disqualified by unpaid taxes, etc.) was intro-
duced in 1909 by a conservative government, rather than by democratic heroes 
Karl Staaff and the Social Democratic leader Hjalmar Branting (1860–1925). 
A century later, this conservative reform (alongside the relegation of the graded 
scale to local elections) was used by politicians from the liberal-conservative 
Moderata samlingspartiet as evidence for the party’s democratic traditions. How-
ever, this statement is misleading (Nilsson 2011).
At a closer look, the mystery disappears. It was easier – or rather less difficult – 
for a leading conservative, a pragmatic politician like Lindman with his position 
and authority, to get a positive result in the Riksdag. The decisive factor was his 
capacity for presenting a proposal that could satisfy the moderate groups and at 
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the same time avoid opposition from the more conservative ones. Universal male 
franchise was supplemented by a reform of the local elections and the aforemen-
tioned restrictions that excluded 20 per cent of the potential male electorate. The 
proportional method would be used in elections for both chambers. For Lindman, 
it was better to take the initiative and realise a moderate franchise system than 
to find himself forced to accept a more radical system later. An expanded male 
franchise, with restrictions, was not as threatening as it had been before (Stjern-
quist 1996; Lewin 2010; Nilsson 2004). The reform of 1907–1909 reduced the 
exclusive character of the upper chamber and increased the prospects for the left 
parties. Yet the chamber kept its role as a conservative stronghold. Radical or 
moderate proposals would be voted down until full democratisation, 1917–1921.
When Karl Staaff became prime minister for the second time in 1911, the first 
proposal in the Swedish Riksdag on women’s enfranchisement and eligibility was 
presented. A large majority in the lower chamber voted yes (140–66), but the 
upper chamber – appointed in accordance with the new rules – maintained its 
opposition, although by a smaller margin than before (86–58). Voting rights for 
women subsequently disappeared from the parliamentary arena between 1913 and 
1917. The struggle for parliamentary government and the party truce during the 
First World War became obstacles.
The first government, including Social Democrats, was appointed in the autumn 
of 1917, with a liberal prime minister, Nils Edén. The upper chamber still resisted 
women’s suffrage and dissolution of the graded scale that guaranteed a conserva-
tive majority in the upper chamber. The latter issue was most controversial. Wom-
en’s suffrage was now seen by some conservatives as positive and they expected 
stronger sympathies for conservative ideas among women. There are no secure 
figures of female turnout at elections, in some way confirming conservative state-
ments on politically uninterested women. In the first election, 47 per cent partici-
pated (62 per cent of men). In 1928, the figures were 63 per cent and 73 per cent 
respectively. More challenging was the democratisation or even the dissolution 
of the upper chamber. Liberals and Social Democrats (already the largest party 
in the lower chamber) would dominate both chambers. The conservatives’ only 
chance was to get acceptance for minority guarantees and restrictions of voting 
rights that would affect poorer people most, such as age restrictions (minimising 
the role of the younger, presumably radical voters) and disqualification of all per-
sons depending on welfare or with unpaid taxes (in this period, this usually meant 
poorer people). Another proposal was a slower implementation of the reform, 
avoiding the electorate doubling in size in one fell swoop.
Democratic breakthrough, 1918–1921
During the ordinary parliamentary session in the spring of 1918, a proposal from 
the leftist government on democratisation of the upper chamber and women’s suf-
frage was once again stopped by the upper chamber. It would be the social upheav-
als in the final phase of World War I that at last opened the upper chamber up to 
democratic reforms (Stjernquist 1996; Andræ 1998; Nilsson 2005; Olsson 2000).
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An extraordinary parliamentary session was summoned to sit in Decem-
ber 1918. The salaries of the civil servants had been greatly reduced because 
of wartime inflation war and had to be raised by the Riksdag. The collapse of 
Germany and the end of the war in November led to widespread social protests. 
Radical socialists wanted to proclaim a socialist state, inspired by the Bolshevik 
coup in Russia in 1917. In Finland, Hungary and the Baltic states, revolution-
ary uprisings had also occurred in 1918. Conservatives, liberals and the major-
ity of the Social Democrats were worried that Sweden, too, would be subjected 
to social disturbances and revolutionary upheaval. Military preparations were 
made to meet riots and the trade unions were mobilised for a peaceful transition. 
Most likely, some of the Social Democratic leaders thought they could control 
the labour movement and used the threatening revolutionaries as an argument for 
democratic reform.
Conservatives in the upper chamber were subjected to strong pressure to yield 
to democratic reform. Especially important were the attitudes of business leaders 
(Söderpalm 1969). Archbishop Nathan Söderblom also requested conservatives 
to accept full democracy. The king (Gustaf V) tended to the same view, as did the 
crown prince, Gustav Adolf, who married to British princess. He was seen to be 
more amenable to British democratic traditions. The fear of a more radical devel-
opment and the need for stability forced these groups to support reform. Some 
businessmen had sympathies for the liberal party and Branting and the union lead-
ers had long shown themselves to be in favour of a lawful policy, avoiding revo-
lutionary attempts and militant trade union actions.
The rapid development of riots and revolutions in Europe put democracy on the 
parliamentary agenda, although a formal decision on women’s suffrage could not 
be made, just an agreement to schedule decisions for the coming years. Political 
suffrage, contrary to local suffrage, formed part of the constitution, and a change 
required a vote by an ordinary parliamentary session (1919), an election (1920) 
and then a new vote in the Riksdag (1921). The first parliamentary election on 
women’s suffrage therefore was held in the autumn of the same year.
However, a real breakthrough for a democratic system had already been made 
in 1918, when both chambers accepted the democratisation of local elections (one 
person, one vote) on December 17. The rules concerning the upper chamber were 
approved in the lower chamber by a great majority (167–12). Only the left-wing 
Social Democratic party voted against them, advocating a more radical solution, 
including transitioning to a republic. In the upper chamber, the proposal was 
approved without a vote, which should not be interpreted as a total acceptance of 
democracy.
Some franchise restrictions were kept in the new system, such as bankruptcy, 
dependency on poor relief and unfilled compulsory military service. These quali-
fications would be abolished step by step and can be seen as guarantees that the 
conservatives demanded for accepting the democratic proposal. The voting age 
for the lower chamber was raised to 23 – for the county councils (that appointed 
the senators), it was raised to 27. The term of office in the upper chamber was 
extended from six to eight years, and the demands on eligibility (e.g. a voting 
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age of 35) were still more restricted than those of the lower chamber. All of these 
rules can be seen as conservative guarantees. Their effect, however, was limited, 
and they failed to prevent the left-wing parties (Social Democrats and liberals) 
from taking a dominant position. More decisive were the deteriorating relations 
between these two parties, resulting in weak governments for a decade.
Epilogue
From a parliamentary (and Western) view, the nineteenth century can be described 
as an era of bicameralism (Nilsson 1994; Miller 1968; Azéma & Winock 1972; 
Elwitt 1975). In many countries, absolutism or different forms of estate systems 
were replaced by two-chamber systems, different in form but sharing a common 
purpose: to guarantee the power of the important groups of factory owners and 
financiers, civil servants and more flexible landowners, both against the reac-
tionary forces of the ancien régime and the calls for democracy from the under-
privileged classes. At least in Sweden, the bicameral system largely succeeded in 
modernising society and meeting the demands set by intensified international eco-
nomic competition. In Sweden, then, bicameralism can be seen as a transitional 
system between royal power and modern democracy. Needless to say, this per-
spective was not shared by the individuals involved in nineteenth-century politics.
The social tensions in the Swedish Riksdag largely correspond with the situa-
tion in Denmark, where the landowners in the upper chamber (Landsting) clashed 
with the farmers and urban radicals in the lower chamber (Folketing) (cf. Chris-
tiansen, this volume; Skjæveland, this volume). In contrast to Denmark, the Swed-
ish system contained a mechanism for solving conflicts between the chambers on 
budgetary issues. Therefore, no political standstill could occur like the one in 
Denmark, which led conservative Prime Minister J.B.S. Estrup (in power between 
1875 and 1894) to initiate emergency financial laws as a response to the resistance 
against the budget in the lower chamber (Fink 1986).
In the beginning, the French Senate was considered to be a conservative branch 
of government; however, in 1884, the lifelong mandates were abolished because 
of democratic demands. The Senate became a stronghold for moderate republi-
can views. Following a monarchical constitution, though, moderate liberals in 
Sweden could be inspired by the French system, with a senate that encouraged 
deep reflection and common sense and defended the nation against the unreliable 
masses on the one hand and the reactionary aristocracy on the other.
The establishment of the two-chamber system with an elitist – or aristocratic – 
upper chamber can be viewed in the perspective of nineteenth-century European 
political history. Bicameralism was a transitional system between absolutism 
and modern democracy, at least when seen through the lens of posterity. These 
constitutional changes did not occur at the same time across Western Europe, 
but political developments from absolutism to democracy shared similar traits. 
In Sweden, this alleged conservative bulwark contributed to the modernisation 
of Swedish society up until the 1880s while remaining conservative in political 
respects.
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The democratic breakthrough in the beginning of the twentieth century was 
more simultaneous, occurring during a period of fifteen to twenty years across 
various countries, gradually reducing the power of the Swedish upper chamber. 
The new democratic system in Sweden, introduced in 1921, soon made the two 
chambers politically identical. Variations in eligibility and term of office were 
too weak to challenge the strong party loyalty that was characteristic of Swedish 
political culture. In the 1950s and 1960s, it mainly worked to preserve the Social 
Democratic majority in votes in which both chambers participated. The system 
favoured big parties, and Social Democratic victories in the 1940s were decisive 
up to the 1960s because of indirect elections and long terms of office.
As early as the 1950s, claims for abolishing the upper chamber were raised – 
not for being undemocratic but for lacking a real function in the democratic sys-
tem. Traditionally, the ideas of rationality and symmetry have been important in 
Sweden. Today, a 32 per cent share of the vote corresponds to exactly the same 
share of mandates. A unicameral Riksdag was introduced in 1970, and a couple of 
years later, a new constitution replaced the version drafted in 1809. The last ses-
sion of the upper chamber was discretely concluded on 16 December 1970. The 
event was mentioned in the press, but very briefly. As a whole, the Senate disap-
peared quietly (cf. Nergelius, this volume). In a modern political system, a senate 
was seen as unnecessary, a relic from a distant past.
The further destiny of senates does not show any clear pattern. Some have 
survived, while others have been abolished (Denmark 1953, Sweden 1970). With 
the exception of federal states, the senates lack a strong position, at least in com-
parison with their position in the nineteenth century. Although, now and then, the 
need for a more careful and maybe less party-oriented parliamentary chamber is 
wanted. However, it seems that profound political changes must occur before a 
senate will be used once more in Swedish politics.
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Introduction
After the revolution of 1848 and the constitutional reforms that followed, Dutch 
parliamentary history entered calmer waters. The Netherlands, as did many small 
power constitutional monarchies, developed into a rather balanced society with a 
constitution that has remained more or less stable to the present day. This stabil-
ity, of course, did not mean there were no tensions or that everyone liked such 
constitutional stagnation.
One of the hotly debated issues in the surrounding countries around 1900 was 
the question of universal suffrage, and the Netherlands was no exception. Both 
liberals and conservatives abhorred this social-democratic ideal. One of those 
opponents of universal suffrage was a famous Dutch political commentator, 
prof. Joannes Theodorus Buys (1826–1893), who in the late 1880s wrote an exten-
sive three-volume commentary on the Dutch constitution of 1848 that served as 
a textbook for a whole generation of students. In this study, Buys formulated a 
political model in which a meritocratic senate could act as a representation of 
what he called ‘the Social Majority’ of the nation. In this way, he hoped, one could 
circumvent the highly contested matter of universal suffrage. This idea highlights 
an outspoken, idealistic notion of what a senate might be and sober thoughts about 
the shortcomings of the Senate in the well-established Dutch constitutional frame-
work that came into being in 1848.
Prof. Joannes Theodorus Buys (1826–1893)
Although he had already been forgotten within a few decades after his demise, Buys 
was a famous commentator on Dutch political developments in his lifetime (cf. 
Aerts 1997). He started as a liberal but became more and more conservative with 
regards to the ‘social question’ towards the end of his life. He supported the consti-
tutional monarchy and developed an almost sentimental nationalism later on in his 
life. Born in Amsterdam, he became a well-to-do and versatile man in politics. He 
was a member of the Leiden city council (1881–1886) and a member of the provin-
cial estates of Holland (1871–1893). As professor, first at the University of Amster-
dam and later at Leiden University, he wrote many quoted and reviewed articles 
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on politics for an intellectual audience. Buys was also an official political advisor 
to the government and twice a member of state commissions on parliamentary 
reforms. He was the vice-president of the committee that studied the constitutional 
reforms of 1887, which gave non-binding advice to government and parliament – a 
difficult and time-consuming job (Staatscommissie 1884; cf. Heemskerk 1889). 
Not surprisingly, considering his positions, one of his more long-remembered criti-
cisms was that it took much too long to change the Dutch constitution (Buijs 1887; 
cf. Kiewiet & Tang 2018; Hirsch Ballin & Leenknegt 2018). Between 1883 and 
1888, he published three trend-setting books about the Dutch constitution. Part 
three, published in 1888, became a necessary supplement because the Dutch consti-
tution was changed while he was writing parts one and two. Buys’s books contain 
many comments on all aspects of the old and the new constitutions. When talking 
about the Senate, Buys especially elaborated on the ideas behind preserving the 
upper chamber in 1848 despite the criticism and ambiguities that surrounded the 
institution. Buys’s comments on the constitution became standard reading material 
at universities, and many contemporary commentators drew upon them in their 
own works. Some of their comments are quoted in the conclusion of this chapter, as 
they are useful for a better understanding of Buys’s opinions in the context of late 
nineteenth-century Dutch political developments and also explain why his ideals 
became obsolete in the age of universal suffrage.
The Senate and constitutional change in 1887
The Kingdom of the Netherlands came into existence in 1813. Its 1814 constitu-
tion envisaged a single people’s assembly and not an upper and a lower chamber. 
The argument was that, before the French Revolution, the States General of the 
Republic of the Seven United Netherlands had also consisted of only one assem-
bly. Neither the nobility nor the clergy had a separate assembly on the national 
level, as in France (before 1615) or England. Only at the local level and not even 
in all provinces, nobles had a separate voice alongside the cities. After the Refor-
mation, the clergy lost this privilege. According to Gijsbert Karel Van Hogendorp 
(1762–1834), the main author of the constitution of 1814, aristocracy was already 
safeguarded because the (small) electorate would in all probability prefer notables 
to represent them (Buijs 1883–1888). In other words, the assembly itself, indi-
rectly chosen, was ‘aristocratic’, a rule of ‘the best’.
In 1815, the Northern Netherlands and the Southern Netherlands were united to 
form a strong buffer state against a revolutionary France. The clergy and the nobil-
ity in the South asked for an upper chamber and received it because the Dutch king 
needed their assistance to back up his contested power in this part of his new kingdom 
(cf. Witte, this volume). This upper chamber was mocked for being ‘la ménagerie du 
roi’ because its members were nominated by the king and were not expected to act 
independently. This upper chamber was designed as ‘a bulwark’ against the ‘rush’ of 
the lower chamber. Buys mocked this function on the grounds that, in the peaceful 
Dutch Parliament, no ‘destructive torrent’ could be expected (Buijs 1883).
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In the revolutionary year of 1830, the Southern Netherlands formed a new king-
dom, with its own upper chamber. Meanwhile, the upper chamber in the North-
ern Netherlands remained in place. Things changed considerably in 1848, when, 
faced by the threat of revolution, a new, far more liberal constitution came into 
being in the Netherlands. As a brake on liberalism, however, both the Dutch gov-
ernment and Parliament now chose to keep the upper chamber, while they had 
been opposed to such an institution in 1815.
Things changed again in the 1870s and 1880s. We should note that the Neth-
erlands was in turmoil in these decades. The call for social reforms and universal 
suffrage became stronger, the first conference of the Communist International was 
held in The Hague in 1872, labour unions were becoming more powerful and, in 
1881, the first Dutch socialist party was founded (Van Welderen-Rengers 1918). 
There were political demonstrations in support of universal suffrage in the capital, 
The Hague, in 1885 and fierce riots with lethal consequences in Buys’s hometown 
of Amsterdam in 1886 (Van den Berg & Vis 2013). Buys was no friend to universal 
suffrage and feared its arrival, knowing all the while that the trend looked unstoppa-
ble. The other main background of the constitutional reforms of 1887 concerned the 
discussion of whether or not the state should subsidise not only public schools but 
also schools with a religious background (as was demanded by religious minorities).
Buys and the Dutch Senate
Buys devoted three commentaries to the Senate in his discussion of the Dutch 
constitution. The first and most important one is about twelve pages long, analys-
ing Articles 75 and 78 of the constitution of 1848 (Buijs 1883). The articles them-
selves were no longer than one page. They state that the States-General consists 
of an upper (‘first’) and a lower (‘second’) chamber (Article 75). Article 78 estab-
lished the number of members of the first chamber, the franchise qualifications for 
voters and the fact that senators are chosen by the Provincial Estates (Buijs 1883). 
Buys’s second treatise offered a commentary of three pages on the international 
and historical position of upper chambers and the lack of a right of amendment 
in the upper chamber (Buijs 1883). The last treatise concerned Article 78 and the 
position of the upper chamber after the revision of 1887 (Buijs 1888). According 
to Buys the parliamentary committees that formulated the constitution of 1848 
proved unable to offer any solid proposal concerning the upper chamber, so what 
came out of all deliberations was a pis-aller, or half-measure (Buijs 1883). In 
the reformed constitution of 1887, the requirements for membership of the upper 
chamber moved in the direction of Buys’s ideas. We will return to this important 
change in more detail later on.
When reading deeper into the subject, it becomes clear that Buys mainly wrote 
about one central aspect of the upper chamber: its position between the govern-
ment (including the monarch), the lower chamber and ‘the people’. This basic 
aspect can be subdivided into four questions: What was the power of the upper 
chamber? Who were its members? How were they chosen? What balance did the 
upper chamber hold between the three others?
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The power of the Dutch upper chamber after 1848
One of the basic principles Buys elucidated was the very limited options the upper 
chamber had to intervene in the political process. The Dutch upper chamber could 
(and can) either totally accept or totally reject a proposal forwarded by the lower 
chamber. Buys called this ‘the murder axe’ (nowadays also called ‘the nuclear 
option’), and he preferred a situation in which the upper chamber could change 
proposals by amendment (Otjes 2015; Buijs 1888). Like his criticism on the slow 
process of constitutional amendment, this idea was also picked up in later discus-
sions (De Beaufort 1893). Buys explained to his readers why the reformers had 
wanted to place this limit on of the power of the upper chamber in 1848. The 
idea ran as follows: if a government proposal were to be amended by the lower 
chamber in a way the government could not accept, the upper chamber should be 
able to make the whole proposal ‘harmless’ (Buijs 1883). The murder axe was 
also necessary because the nation (not the people) should be protected against 
a random power grab by the lower chamber. In other words, the upper cham-
ber existed to protect and support the government. The upper chamber should 
be a counterweight of ‘state and throne’ to the ‘democratic principle’. An upper 
chamber was considered necessary to undermine ‘brash decisions’ by its ‘irasci-
ble sister’, the lower chamber (Buijs 1883). Buys looked critically at this line of 
thought. If this were the only function of the upper chamber, why not stick to the 
old constitution, in which members of the upper chamber were appointed by the 
crown (Buijs 1883)?
As Buys critically stated, the upper chamber was a representative body that 
was supposed to protect the nation against the representatives of the people (in 
the lower house). According to him, this was so contradictory that he called it a 
‘circle squarer’ (Buijs 1883). We should remember that, in the beginning, in 1813, 
the Northern Netherlands’ lower chamber was not considered ‘dangerous’, as it 
was indirectly elected. For that reason, Van Hogendorp saw no need for a separate 
upper chamber. But, after 1848, the lower chamber was directly elected, albeit by 
a very small constituency. The main reason the upper chamber was preserved in 
1848 was a perception that the people’s chamber had become too democratic and 
operated too ‘closely’ to its constituency. The upper chamber was there to prevent 
the potential overthrow of government when ‘tempers would have made reason-
able deliberations impossible’ (Buijs 1883). This, explained Buys, was the ‘demo-
cratic principle’ feared by the conservative majority in parliament (Buijs 1883).
But why only the ‘murder axe’? The argument ran like this, Buys wrote: if an 
upper chamber could make amendments, this meant that an upper chamber could 
formulate its own opinion, probably against the government (Buijs 1883). This 
was not the role envisioned for the upper chamber. The upper chamber should 
have real power but not be independent. As mentioned earlier, Buys supported the 
opposite idea – that a senate could make amendments. In practice, however, Buys 
acknowledged the usefulness of a dependent upper chamber. Because the lower 
house knew that the upper chamber might murder a proposal, the lower house 
would think twice when considering radical proposals (Buijs 1883).
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Who were the senators?
After 1848, members of the upper chamber were no longer appointed but indi-
rectly chosen by the electorate. A high franchise qualification census guaranteed 
that only the wealthiest in each province voted for members of the States- 
Provincial, who chose the members of the upper chamber (something they still 
do). According to the Catholic parliamentarian C.J.H. van Nispen van Sevenaer, 
who also sat as a member on the aforementioned committee of 1887, it would 
have been unfair if those who paid little in taxes held as much power as those who 
carried the heaviest burdens (Staatscommissie 1884).
Buys argued that these indirect elections implied a problem with the small elec-
torate itself but acknowledged that it was in line with the fears of a directly elected 
assembly. So in 1848, the upper chamber became a timocracy (money-aristocracy). 
Only the wealthiest taxpayers could become senators. The qualifications proved 
so high that only one in 3,000 people in the provinces could be elected after 1848. 
After 1877, that number changed to one in 2,000 (Buijs 1883, 1888).
In 1887, parliament decided it wanted to change these rules. If the upper cham-
ber wanted to ensure its place in the political future, Buys argued, it should not 
represent nobility or wealth but consist of a real aristocracy ‘comprising the best 
elements of society’ (Buijs 1883). In the discussions about constitutional reform, 
one member of Parliament, W. H. de Beaufort, asked for a wider pool of can-
didates for the upper chamber. The electorate (i.e. the States-Provincial), he 
believed, should be free to choose anyone who could sit as a member of the lower 
chamber, not just those from the small number of candidates the government had 
in mind. This would open the door for less wealthy, but intellectually highly quali-
fied people (Buijs 1888). Buys sincerely appreciated this idea. For him, this would 
allow the upper chamber to compensate for one of the main shortcomings of the 
principle of ‘one man one vote’ (because the franchise counts only votes and does 
not weigh the qualities of the delegates) (Buijs 1883). Parliament discussed the 
way to solve this shortcoming. How could this principle be implemented? The 
rather straightforward idea of De Beaufort encountered some objections. First, 
the government believed the idea to be ‘too democratic’. Second – and this was a 
remarkable objection – it would mean that the upper chamber could be become a 
real competitor of the lower chamber. The reason? Highly esteemed people would 
make the upper chamber too popular. Buys summed his reaction to this latter argu-
ment in one word: ‘weird’ (zonderling) (Buijs 1888). Parliament agreed that the 
upper chamber should not stay a timocracy. The final compromise was that mem-
bers of the upper chamber should 1) be eligible for the people’s chamber and 2) 
be among the highest taxpayers or (interestingly) 3) hold or have held important 
public functions. As a result, former judges, governors, cabinet members, ambas-
sadors and the like could qualify for a position in the Senate, even if they were 
not among the elite taxpayers (Van Welderen-Rengers 1918). This was the Dutch 
meritocracy that populated the Dutch upper chamber after the reforms. It is a small 
wonder why Buys called the compromise ‘flawed’, but he was nevertheless satis-
fied that ‘merit’ was accepted as a criterion in some way or another (Buijs 1888).
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The upper chamber and the people
Buys was not just skeptical about the Dutch constitution of 1848 and the reformed 
version of 1887. With the exceptions of the United States and England, upper 
chambers proved ‘defective all over the world’ (Buijs 1883). Buys meant that 
upper chambers had a rather passive, secondary role in policy-making. What dis-
tinguished the upper chamber of the United States from other upper chambers was 
the fact that it really was a different kind of representation (i.e. of the individual 
states) but nevertheless a real representation of the common interests of the nation 
(Buijs 1883). As the Dutch upper chamber was (and is) chosen by the representa-
tives of the provinces, one could argue that this construction was rather close to 
the American one. Firstly, however, the power of the provinces in the Netherlands 
is very restricted compared to that of the American states, and secondly, members 
of the Dutch upper chamber do not represent their provinces in the way that Amer-
ican senators represent their states. The other exception, the English House of 
Lords, represented the nation in a totally different way. It represented not the elec-
torate but the local (noble or aristocratic) rulers who, according to Buys actually 
ran the country(side). They were the ‘natural bearers of the legislative process’ as 
they were the people who had to work with the legislation in practice. Elsewhere, 
such ‘components’ (‘grondstoffen’, lit. ‘resources’) for an upper house were not 
available (Buijs 1883). Buijs (1888) mistakenly believed that the (indirect) Dutch 
way of electing senators was exceptional in that it was both strange and unique, 
when making comparisons with, e.g. Sweden (cf. Nilsson, this volume). With this 
in mind, what did the Dutch upper chamber actually represent?
We have already mentioned Buys’s complaint about the contradiction that 
the upper chamber was a body that represented the people and functioned as 
a dam against the people’s assembly. Buys offered an alternative opinion. The 
upper chamber, he wrote, should represent ‘the Social Majority’ (Buijs 1883). 
In all likelihood, he was referring to the people who did not have the vote. 
He explicitly refused to make clear what he meant by that, for which he was 
severely criticised later on (De Vooys 1906). Buys strongly distrusted universal 
suffrage, but he also distrusted the German example of a parliament under the 
powerful control of Bismarck (De Beaufort 1893). When coming of age, Buys, 
like the Dutch liberal statesman Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798–1872), who 
drafted the 1848 constitution, became more and more concerned about Ger-
many (Drentje 1998). Like Thorbecke, he felt that the only answer to German 
imperialism was a steadfast nation and parliament. Only then would the cost 
of swallowing up the Dutch nation be too high for Germany. The Netherlands, 
however, was not a steadfast nation, nor did it possess a strong parliament, 
because Dutch politics, in Buys’s view, had become too opportunistic instead of 
being governed by principles.
Other political commentators alongside Buys feared an American system, where 
universal suffrage went hand in hand with corruption and violence (Van Welderen- 
Rengers 1918). Buys’s fear was not based on some abstract notion. France was 
scapegoated by Buys and many other Dutch liberal intellectuals because of its 
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socialist experiments after 1848 and even more because of the political effects 
of the plebiscites in France during the reign of Napoleon III (Aerts 1997). Such 
plebiscites were his worst nightmare, so to speak, because they showed that uni-
versal voting rights could easily result in the end of democracy.
It was obvious, however, that the higher echelons of Dutch society, which were 
represented in the lower chamber, did not speak for the entire population. That 
responsibility, almost by default, fell to the members of the upper chamber. In his 
later years, Buys became somewhat tangled in his fears, writing, for instance, that 
the lower classes, in the end, would rather rely on the monarch than on the ‘tyran-
nical majority’, without explaining what the difference was between the people, 
the Social Majority and the tyrannical majority. He also wrote that the modest 
nature of the Dutch people would prevent the emergence of universal suffrage. 
The point was, of course, that Buys did not trust the political wisdom of ‘the peo-
ple’ or the people’s assembly. He looked to the wiser men in politics, the members 
of the upper chamber, to protect the nation against its whims.
Final remarks: Buys and his critics
Buys strongly criticised the way the Dutch constitution had arranged how sena-
tors were chosen and the limited way the Senate could influence politics. It was 
surely a chamber of ‘reflection’, but it was also an institution that should protect 
the people and the nation against an overly democratic lower chamber (given that 
universal suffrage looked inevitable). To play such a role convincingly, members 
of the upper chamber should be chosen from the best people available and not 
from a ‘moneyed aristocracy’.
Buys was not without opponents. Radical politicians in particular mocked his 
conservative ideas about universal suffrage and his vague ideas about the rep-
resentation of the Social Majority (De Vooys 1906). We can make a distinction 
between those who knew he had become outmoded but accepted his standing as a 
wise political commentator and those who mocked him. For instance, in a memo-
riam, it was said that Buys watched from the dunes with a certain melancholy as 
universal suffrage washed ashore the coast of Holland, knowing it was unstop-
pable. In 1888, however, another commentator called him the Rip van Winkle 
of Dutch politics (Aerts 1997). He had been asleep for too long, so to speak, and 
was out of touch with the times. One of his critics wrote in 1888: ‘there is nothing 
wrong with the political view of Buys, besides the year at the end of the article’ 
(Hack van Outheusden 1888, p. 138). In the new constitution of 1887, Buys got 
his way, insofar as it became possible for former experienced politicians and high 
officials to become members of the upper house, even if they did not belong to 
the taxpaying elite. Buys’s ideal that such a wise senate should have real power 
through capacity to amend laws, though, never materialised.
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Introduction
In the years 1920–1921, Ireland had its first (short-lived) Senate under Home 
Rule (1914–1920). This chamber was the immediate predecessor of the independ-
ent Irish Free State Senate. The Senate of the Irish Free State lasted just fourteen 
years, from 1922 to 1936. It was established as the upper house of the Parlia-
ment of the newly founded Irish Free State after the enactment of the Anglo-
Irish Treaty in 1922. It was intended to represent southern Ireland’s Protestant 
minority, especially its landed, business and intellectual elite, in a country where 
the lower house would inevitably be dominated by Catholic Irish nationalists. 
A secondary function was to provide expert guidance for the Parliament’s lower 
house, the Dáil, in enacting legislation, which it could delay or amend. In 1933 it 
was abolished by the nationalist Fianna Fáil (the ‘Soldiers of Destiny’) govern-
ment under Eamon de Valera (1932–1948) as a result of its continual blocking of 
that government’s legislation. The Senate deployed its delaying powers against its 
own abolition but gave itself only a stay of execution of two and half years, until 
1936, when it ceased to exist.
This chapter examines the aims of the Irish Senates in the tumultuous period 
from 1920 to 1936, a period that encompassed the Irish achievement of independ-
ence, civil war and the painful integration of the losing faction of the war into 
democratic politics. The chapter will focus on two aspects of these Senates and 
the discussions they generated. First, these Senates were supposed to be insti-
tutions that would safeguard special interests, especially those of the Protestant 
minority and of women. Second, it was envisaged that they would look after the 
quality and legality of government proposals. This chapter on the Irish interbel-
lum Senates will be subdivided into six periods (to some extent overlapping) and 
the discussions therein – about its functioning and the desirability of its mainte-
nance. In this way, it explores how these Senates functioned in practice and why 
the Irish Free State Senate was finally abolished.
It will argue that the decline of the Irish Senate was due in part to the ascend-
ancy of the idea of popular sovereignty, vested in a lower house of Parliament 
and elected by universal suffrage. In light of this, the role of upper houses came 
to be seen as an illegitimate block on the powers of elected government or an 
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unnecessary duplication of the lower house. For instance, in Britain, after the 
hereditary House of Lords rejected the Liberals’ left-of-centre ‘People’s Budget’ 
of 1909, the power of the Lords to oppose a ‘money bill’ was abolished and its 
veto over other legislation was reduced to a delay of two years (cf. Slapper & 
David 2009, p. 69). The Irish Free State Senate never had a power of veto, but 
nevertheless it eventually incurred the ire of the directly elected government, 
which felt the Senate was infringing on its powers. While on numerous occasions 
the Senate did provide useful aid to an inexperienced lower house of Parliament 
in drafting legislation, ultimately it saw its powers eroded and eventually abol-
ished by parliamentarians who viewed political legitimacy as vested solely in 
the popularly elected lower house, the Dáil. The Senate’s ostensible purpose as 
a seat of representation for Southern Ireland’s Protestant minority was not easy 
to achieve. On the one occasion in which senators were directly elected by the 
public, in 1925, most Protestant ‘Anglo-Irish’ senators lost their seats, and it was 
only by the reintroduction of nomination and indirect election in 1928 that some 
of them were reinstated. Antagonism towards the Free State’s Senate was particu-
larly pronounced on the part of Irish Republicans, who viewed the upper house as 
a pro-British brake on progress towards full Irish independence. For this reason, 
senators came under physical attack during the Irish Civil War of 1922–1923, 
being specifically targeted by Republican paramilitaries in the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA). Once the political representatives of the Republicans opposed to the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922 (the party of Fianna Fáil) were voted into government 
in 1932, the Senate became a battleground in which senators attempted to block 
Fianna Fáil’s agenda.
The ‘Home Rule Senate’, 1920–1921
Home Rule, or limited self-governance for Ireland within the United Kingdom, 
had first come on the agenda of British politics in the 1880s, when the Liberal 
government of William Gladstone tried but failed to pass it into law in 1886 – the 
Bill being voted down in the House of Commons by MPs who were concerned 
that it would prompt the breakup of the United Kingdom and possibly even of 
the British Empire. A second Home Rule Bill was passed in the House of Com-
mons in 1893 but voted down in the Conservative and Unionist-dominated House 
of Lords; therefore, it did not become law. An upper chamber as part of an Irish 
Home Rule Parliament was included in the first and the second Home Rule Bills. 
The idea of the Senate was to ensure representation for Irish Protestants, many of 
whom, particularly in the northern province of Ulster, were Unionists – that is, 
for union with Britain and against Irish self-government – in a country that was 
approximately 70 per cent Catholic.
A third Home Rule Bill was drafted in 1912 as part of an electoral deal between 
the Liberal government of Herbert Asquith and Irish nationalists in the British 
Parliament at Westminster in return for the Irish Party’s support for the Liberal 
government. By this time, the House of Commons had curtailed the powers of 
the House of Lords to a mere two-year delay on bills received from the House 
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of Commons. As a result, the first Home Rule Bill actually passed into law in 
August 1914. The legislation was, however, never enacted. In the face of Ulster 
Unionist resistance, it was suspended for the duration of the First World War, 
and ultimately Home Rule never became a reality. The 1912 Home Rule Bill 
envisaged an important role for a senate in an autonomous Ireland. Under this 
legislation, Ireland would have had two houses of Parliament: a House of Com-
mons, with 164 elected members, and a Senate, with forty members, nominated 
by the Imperial Parliament at Westminster and intended to represent the interests 
of the Protestant minority. The Senate would have the right to hold up legislation 
and appeal it to the Imperial Parliament but not to ultimately block it. Given that 
the Westminster Parliament could overturn any law passed in Dublin – indeed, 
according to Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, ‘the over-riding force of the Impe-
rial Legislation can at any time nullify, amend or alter any act of the Irish Par-
liament’ – the Senate’s power would have been significant (Jackson 2000). The 
last attempt to enact Home Rule in Ireland came in 1920, when the Government 
of Ireland Act created parliaments in a partitioned Ireland, one for Northern Ire-
land, based in Belfast, and one for Southern Ireland, based in Dublin. The Act 
proposed a Senate in both Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. The Northern 
Senate lasted as long as the original Northern Ireland administration, that is until 
direct British rule was reintroduced in 1972. The Southern Senate was instead a 
short-lived affair, meeting only once in 1921 in the midst of the guerrilla war now 
termed the Irish War of Independence. It was, however, important to the even-
tual evolution of the Irish Senate, as it heavily influenced the first working Irish 
Seanad of 1922–1934.
The Southern Ireland Home Rule Senate was to have sixty-four members. Three 
were co-opted automatically by virtue of their office: the lord chancellor and the 
lord mayors of Dublin and Cork. Seventeen were nominated by the lord lieuten-
ant (the British Crown’s representative in Ireland) to represent ‘commerce, labour 
and the learned professions’. Four were to be elected by the Catholic bishops and 
two by the Protestant Church of Ireland. Another sixteen were peers, or mem-
bers of the British House of Lords, who would hold their seats by virtue of their 
hereditary titles. Eight were nominated by British privy councillors and fourteen 
by Irish county councillors. In short, out of sixty-four senators, only twenty would 
be elected in Ireland and none by a popular vote (Coakley & Gallagher 1999). 
This Senate had a short life. It was ignored by Sinn Fein, the separatist party now 
ascendant in Irish politics, which boycotted the Southern Ireland Parliament. Only 
five senators turned up at the opening of the Parliament in June 1921, and it never 
met again. The Southern Ireland Senate was formally abolished with the sign-
ing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921. There was, however, a strong 
overlap between the Home Rule Senate and the Free State Senate, or Seanad, that 
was created the following year. Moreover, because of its purpose under the 1920 
Act as representative of Southern unionists, the Senate carried with it the baggage 
of a pro-British institution that was an impediment to the fully independent Irish 
Republic that many aspired to.
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The making of the Free State Seanad, 1922
The Anglo-Irish Treaty signed on 6 December 1921 formally ended the war 
between the British government and the Irish separatists of Sinn Fein and the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA). The British did not concede a fully independ-
ent, all-Ireland Republic but rather an Irish Free State, on the same territory as 
Southern Ireland – that is, twenty-six of Ireland’s thirty-two counties – which 
was to be a self-governing dominion of the British Commonwealth. The Treaty 
made no mention of the form of government the newly created Irish Free State 
would take. This decision was left to the Irish authorities, who were to draw up 
a constitution for the Free State that would in turn require approval by the Brit-
ish Parliament. Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith, heads of the Provisional 
Government set up to oversee the transition from British rule to the Free State, 
formed a committee in early 1922 to draft a new constitution. During the Treaty 
negotiations, Arthur Griffith had assured representatives of Southern Irish 
unionists that their interests would be safeguarded by the use of proportional 
representation in voting: a mechanism designed to ensure that minorities were 
fairly represented and that Southern unionists received ‘due representation’ in 
the Seanad (Byrne 2015).
It was not until June of 1922 that the first Irish constitution was published 
by Free State authorities, and it was October of that year when it was brought 
into force. Like the Home Rule bills that had preceded it, the 1922 constitution 
envisaged a two-house Parliament. The Dáil, directly elected by all citizens 
over 21 years of age, would enact legislation, while a senate or Seanad, sixty 
strong, would represent various social groups. The establishment of a sen-
ate and a proportional representation system of voting for the Dáil were two 
major safeguards sought by Unionists against the domination of the Protestant 
minority by the Catholic majority. The Unionists had a significant influence 
on determining the composition of the Seanad, but not all of their demands 
were agreed to. For instance, they sought a property qualification for voting 
for the Seanad which was rejected. As a compromise, the vote was restricted 
to those over 30 years of age (Manning s.d.). According to the constitution, 
‘citizens who shall be proposed on the grounds that they have done honour 
to the Nation by reason of useful public service or that, because of special 
qualifications or attainments, they represent important aspects of the Nation’s 
life’ – and oversee the legislation passed in the lower house. Unlike the Home 
Rule Senate, the first Seanad was envisaged as a rather democratic body. The 
constitution stated,
All citizens of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) without distinction of 
sex who have reached the age of thirty years and who comply with the provi-
sions of the prevailing electoral laws shall have the right to vote for members 
of Seanad Eireann.
(Irish Free State 1922)
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The candidates would first be selected by the Dáil and the existing Seanad mem-
bers. Senators would serve terms of twelve years, and a quarter of the Seanad’s 
members would face re-election every three years.
The Senate’s powers were principally to delay and amend legislation. Dermot 
O’Sullivan, the Senate’s clerk, remarked that ‘the powers of the new Senate were 
severely restricted as compared with Second Chambers elsewhere’ (O’Sullivan 
1940). It had no absolute veto but could send legislation back to the Dáil if it did 
not agree with the proposal, and in the event the Dáil continued to pass it, it could 
suspend that legislation for 277 days, or nine months, before it was presented 
to the governor-general for the formality of the king’s assent and then passed 
into law. In practice, this could mean a delay of up to eighteen months, as the 
Senate could invoke its delaying powers twice if the Dáil presented the same 
legislation the Senate had opposed on the first occasion. The exception to this 
was a ‘money bill’ – anything connected with taxation or public finances – which 
it could only hold up for twenty-one days. The Seanad had the right to initiate 
legislation which, if passed in the Senate, would come before the Dáil and, if 
passed there, would become law (Irish Free State 1922). There was, moreover, a 
provision whereby the Senate could request a joint sitting of both houses to dis-
cuss a money bill (O’Sullivan 1940). A further power the Senate possessed was, 
with a three-fifths majority in the upper house, to force a popular referendum on 
a law passed in the Dáil which had been rejected in the Senate. There was also a 
provision for senators to be nominated as ‘external ministers’ in the government 
(O’Sullivan 1940, pp. 87–89). Southern Unionists had wanted a minimum delay-
ing power for the Senate of one year, while the provisional government, made up 
of pro-Treaty nationalists, had wanted a maximum delaying power of one year, 
so the nine-month delay the Seanad could impose was a compromise (O’Sullivan 
1940). The Seanad was due to meet for the first time in December 1922. However, 
a furious division had arisen in the Irish Republican movement over the Anglo-
Irish Treaty by this time, which some considered to betray Republican principles. 
In late June 1922, the split over the Treaty led to civil war between those who 
accepted the Free State and those who insisted on rejecting the Treaty in favour of 
an Irish Republic. Against this background, the Senate, associated strongly with 
the pro-Treaty position and its acceptance of membership of the British Common-
wealth, became a target for violent attacks by the Republican faction.
The Free State Seanad in civil war, 1922–1923
While the constitution envisaged a directly elected senate, this was not possible 
in late 1922, with civil war raging across much of the country. Instead, the first 
Seanad was half nominated by the president of the Dáil, William T. Cosgrave 
(effectively the prime minister), while the other half was elected by members 
of the Dáil (Townshend 1998). Cahir Davitt, the Free State’s attorney general, 
recalled:
On December 6th [1922] the Irish Free State had come into being when its 
constitution was enacted by the Dáil sitting as a Constituent Assembly. The 
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first Senate came into existence [. . .] by being partly elected and partly nomi-
nated as provided by the constitution and held its first meeting on Decem-
ber 9th under the Chairmanship of Lord Glenavy.
( Davitt s.d.)
It was agreed that the senators would be nominated ‘in a manner calculated to rep-
resent minorities or interests not adequately represented in the Dail’ (O’Sullivan 
1940). The Free State authorities depended on military and financial support from 
the British to get through the crisis of the Irish Civil War, and they knew that as a 
result they would have to reach out to members of the old pro-British elite in Ireland 
in the selection of senators. As Minister for Home Affairs Kevin O’Higgins put it:
it comes well from us [the Catholic and nationalist majority] to make gener-
ous adjustment to show that these people were well regarded, not as alien 
enemies, not as planters [colonists] but that we regard them as part and parcel 
of this nation and that we wish them to take their share of its responsibilities.
(Byrne 2015)
As a result of the need to placate Southern Unionists, the Senate, in fact, quite 
closely resembled the Home Rule Senate of 1920; former Unionists and holders 
of British hereditary titles were notably represented. The Cathaoirleach or chair-
man of the new Senate was, for instance, James Campbell, the Baron of Glenavy, 
a former Unionist member of Parliament for Dublin and lord chief justice for 
Ireland under British rule. He had participated in the Ulster resistance to Home 
Rule in 1912.
Anti-Treaty Republican propaganda in 1922 called the Senate ‘England’s faith-
ful garrison in Ireland’(Foster 2015). One anti-Treaty writer catalogued Cos-
grave’s thirty nominees to the Senate as ‘24 confirmed imperialists and [Dublin] 
Castle hacks [i.e. pro-British careerists], 18 Freemasons [generally associated 
with Protestants and unionism] and 25 who were ‘bitterly opposed to the idea of a 
Gaelic civilisation’ (Foster 2015). Former Unionists were indeed overrepresented 
in the Seanad for their share of the population, but they were not a majority. The 
new Senate included sixteen former Unionists, including seven peers and five 
other aristocrats. In all, it included thirty-six Catholics, twenty Protestants, three 
Quakers and one Jewish member. Eleven senators had served in the British Army. 
It also included representatives of organised labour and small farmers, as well as 
representatives of big and small business (Byrne 2015). The Seanad was targeted 
by the anti-Treaty IRA in reprisal for the executions of their imprisoned fighters 
by the Free State. In response to such executions, Liam Lynch, the IRA leader, 
issued an order that ‘all Free State supporters are traitors and deserve the latter’s 
stark fate, therefore their houses must be destroyed at once’ (Lynch 1922). And 
on 26 January 1923, anti-Treaty IRA Adjutant General Con Molony issued the 
following order:
1.Houses of members of ‘Free State Senate’ in attached list marked A and B 
will be destroyed. and 2.From the above date if any of our Prisoners of War 
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are executed by the enemy, one of the Senators in the attached list [. . .] will 
be shot in reprisal.
(O’Malley & Dolan 2007)
Moloney attached a list of the names of twenty senators and their addresses. Of 
these, fourteen were named as targets for assassination. Those marked for death 
included ‘John Bagwell, General Manager Great Northern Railway, Imperialist 
and Freemason’ and Henry Wilson, ‘heir to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Impe-
rialist and Freemason’. It also included Andrew Jameson, chairman of the Bank 
of Ireland; and Bryan Mahon, commander-in-chief of British forces in Ireland, 
1916–1918 – respectively ‘Imperialist and Freemason’ (Lynch 1922). The list 
tells us something of Republican prejudices. Those marked for death were dis-
proportionately upper-class ‘Anglo-Irish’ Protestants of either landed or capital-
ist background. However, it also tells us something about the nature of the first 
Free State Senate that so many of its members had occupied such senior social 
and political positions in British-ruled Ireland. Early 1923 saw an onslaught on 
the homes of senators and other ‘Imperialists’ around Dublin. Among the homes 
destroyed were those of Glenavy, the Senate’s chairman, senators Bryan Mahon, 
Horace Plunkett, Maurice Moore and others (IRA [1923a]). Out of 199 ‘Big 
Houses’ or mansions destroyed by the Republicans as reprisals, thirty belonged to 
senators (Dooley 2001). IRA Chief of Staff Liam Lynch also contemplated even 
more radical action, writing to anti-Treaty political leader Éamon de Valera in 
January 1923, advocating ‘shooting a large number of senators’ – ‘at least four’ – 
in reprisal for each execution of an IRA prisoner. At least in this case, de Valera 
managed to restrain the IRA chief of staff, telling him: ‘it is unjustifiable to take 
the life of an innocent man and to make him suffer for the acts of the guilty’ (De 
Valera 1923). There were several attempts to abduct and kill senators, but ulti-
mately none were actually killed by the IRA during the Civil War (Dáil Eireann 
1923). Senator John Bagwell, for instance, was kidnapped at gunpoint from his 
house in Howth, Dublin, and he was released only when the Free State threatened 
to execute several imprisoned Republican leaders if he was killed. Senator John 
Gogarty was also kidnapped and threatened with death but later released. The risk 
to the lives and homes of senators was not brought to an end until the IRA called 
a ceasefire in April 1923 and in May of that year instructed its fighters to ‘dump 
arms’ (Hopkinson 2004). Several prominent senators, notably James Douglas and 
Andrew Jameson, were involved in back-channel negotiations with anti-Treaty 
political leader Eamon de Valera, which helped to bring about the ceasefire and 
the end of the Civil War (IRA [1923b]).
The Seanad in the early Free State period, 1923–1932
The Seanad limped through the Civil War as an unelected and traumatised body. It 
did, however, make a number of notable contributions to the new Irish state in the 
following years. As political scientist Elaine Byrne (2015) argues, many senators 
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had experience in government and law that the directly elected Teachta Daila, 
or TDs [members of the Dáil], did not. Only five of the 153 members of the Dáil 
elected in 1923 had served in the British Parliament, and none had any ministerial 
experience outside the rebel underground Republican government of 1919–1921. 
In the upper house, by contrast, several members had served in either the House 
of Commons or the House of Lords in Westminster. James Douglas, the vice chair 
of the Seanad, took on the role of drafting standing orders and private members 
bills for both houses.
Between 1922 and 1928, the formative years of the Free State, a total of 238 
bills came before the Senate for approval, including bills formally setting up the 
Garda Siochana or Irish police force, courts of Justice, local government bodies 
and rules for elections. Of these, the Seanad sent back and managed to amend 
ninety-three bills before they became law (Byrne 2015). The most significant of 
these was an amendment to the Courts of Justice Bill (1924). The original draft 
proposed that the executive (cabinet) could set the salaries of district judges. The 
Seanad, led by Glenavy, a former chief justice for Ireland himself, argued that 
this imperilled the independence of the judiciary and managed to get it amended 
so that the Oireachtas (houses of Parliament) as a whole could vote on setting 
judges’ pay until 1926 (Byrne 2015). Maurice Manning (s.d.) notes that the Free 
State Senate received 489 bills from the Dáil; of these, the Senate amended 182, 
with virtually all amendments being accepted by the Dáil. The Senate used its 
power of suspension in only nine cases – and in two of those cases, the govern-
ment refrained from passing the bills into law when the period of suspension had 
expired.
Yet in general, the Senate had only a limited effect in its original proposed 
function of safeguarding the interests of the Protestant minority or, for that matter, 
women’s rights. This was at a time when, among other things, bans on divorce, 
contraception and women serving on juries were passed into law. In June 1925, 
the poet and senator W. B. Yeats (himself a Protestant by background, though a 
nationalist by conviction) famously railed against the banning of divorce by a 
majority Catholic lower house, claiming that it would alienate Irish Protestants 
from the state and crystallise the partition of Ireland. As he phrased it:
It is perhaps the deepest political passion with this nation that North and 
South be united into one nation. If it ever comes that North and South unite, 
the North will not give up any liberty which she already possesses under her 
constitution. You will then have to grant to another people what you refuse 
to grant to those within your borders. If you show that this country, South-
ern Ireland, is going to be governed by Catholic ideas and by Catholic ideas 
alone, you will never get the North. You will create an impassable barrier 
between South and North, and you will pass more and more Catholic laws, 




Yeats’s speech was essentially nationalist in tone, citing the unification of Ireland 
as his ‘deepest political passion’. But it also reflected one of the original pur-
poses of the Senate in that he claimed to speak on behalf of the Southern Protes-
tant minority. Despite his efforts, the bill prohibiting divorce was passed in both 
houses. Indeed, the clerk and historian of the Senate, Dermot O’Sullivan, thought 
Yeats’s speech ‘deplorable [. . .] an envenomed attack on the religion of the major-
ity of his countrymen’ (O’Sullivan 1940).
The Senate of 1922 was not popularly elected – it was half nominated and 
half elected by members of the Dáil. Only in 1925 did the Seanad hold its first 
elections, for nineteen of the sixty seats in the Senate. In the face of a boycott by 
supporters of the anti-Treaty Sinn Fein party, only approximately 25 per cent of 
the electorate turned out to vote for seventy-six candidates, and they re-elected 
only eight of the existing senators nominated in 1922. Many former Unionists 
lost their seats, and the Seanad was now dominated by the representative of the 
pro-Treaty ruling party, Cumann na nGaedheal (roughly, the ‘League of Irish’), 
followed by the Labour Party and the Farmers’ Party (Coakley 2005). The Seanad 
had already effectively lost its original purpose of providing minority represen-
tation: an inevitable consequence of its being directly elected by an electorate 
that was overwhelmingly Catholic and nationalist. After the 1925 elections, the 
electoral system for the Seanad was changed so that in the senatorial elections of 
1928, 1931 and 1934, its members would only be chosen by members of the Dáil 
and the Senate itself, not popularly elected. The contradiction was that a directly 
elected assembly would not represent minorities, while an indirectly elected one 
lacked popular legitimacy in the eyes of both the public and many members of 
the lower house.
Dermot O’Sullivan, a highly sympathetic observer of the Seanad, neverthe-
less noted that there was ‘imperfect sympathy’ between the members of the Dáil 
and those of the government on the one hand, most of whom had fought in the 
independence struggle against the British, and the Senate on the other, which was 
‘largely composed of men whose attitude during the national struggle was sup-
posed, rightly or wrongly to have been one of apathy or even passive hostility’. 
What was more,
The Dáil, moreover, was a product of universal suffrage and regarded itself 
as the real repository of the sovereign rights of the people; and in respects 
of law-making intended to share them as little as possible with the ‘unrepre-
sentative’ second chamber’.
(O’Sullivan 1940)
Perhaps as a result of this attitude among parliamentarians, the Seanad began 
losing power and influence by the late 1920s. In 1926 the upper house opposed 
but failed to stop legislation that barred women from taking civil service exami-
nations. In 1927, senators had only limited success in amending a law passed by 
the Dáil removing women from jury duty. Under the compromise worked out 
between senator James Craig of Trinity College and Minister for Justice Kevin 
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O’Higgins, women would instead be excluded from the jury rolls but have the 
right to put themselves forward for inclusion if they had a special talent for the 
law, or as O’Higgins put it, ‘an aptitude for that particular line of life’ (McCa-
rthy 2006). In the same year, O’Higgins managed to remove a provision in the 
1922 constitution whereby a senator could be made a minister in the executive 
council or cabinet. O’Higgins thought it was ‘a wrong thing’ that senators, who 
were elected or nominated only ‘with powers of revision, powers of criticism, 
powers of suggestion and even maximum powers of delay’ could hold executive 
office over directly elected members of the Dáil (McCarthy 2006). O’Higgins’ 
also removed the right of the Seanad to initiate legislation. His position was that 
sovereignty and real power must lie, in his view, with those directly elected by 
universal suffrage. In 1928, the right of the Senate to demand a referendum was 
also removed (O’Sullivan 1940).
Despite the fact that it would sometimes have a different opinion from that 
of the ruling party, Cumman na nGaedheal, the Seanad remained a bastion of 
pro-Treaty support. Cumman na nGaedheal was the party that grew out of the 
pro-Treaty faction of the Irish Civil War and was identified with a conciliatory 
attitude towards Britain. The Senate’s close identification with one side of the 
Treaty identified the house as a whole with partisan politics and put them at odds 
with a resurgent anti-Treaty Republican political party. In 1926, most of the anti-
Treaty veterans of the Civil War regrouped under Eamon de Valera in a new party, 
Fianna Fáil, which split from the older separatist party, Sinn Fein. Fianna Fáil was 
dedicated to dismantling the Treaty settlement and securing full Irish independ-
ence by political rather than military means. Fianna Fáil entered Parliament in 
1927, ending their previous boycott of the Dáil (Coakley & Gallagher 1999).
In 1928, Fianna Fáil had six senators elected to the Seanad on the votes of 
their TDs or members of the Dáil. Campaigning for a dismantling of the Anglo-
Irish Treaty, as well as a programme of social housing, land reform and economic 
nationalism, Fianna Fáil came to power after winning the General Election of 
1932, with support from the Labour Party. Its stated goal was to undo the Treaty 
settlement and tear down those of its institutions – the Oath of Allegiance to 
the British monarch, the office of governor-general and the Seanad – that, so it 
believed, represented ‘imperialist’ interests in Ireland. One of the rising stars in 
the Fianna Fáil party, Sean Lemass, said in 1928 of the Senate: ‘this bulwark of 
imperialism should be abolished by the people’s representatives on the first avail-
able opportunity that they get’ (Houses of the Oireachtas 2019). Lemass’s words 
were prophetic, as within two years of coming to power, Fianna Fáil would indeed 
abolish the Irish Senate.
The Seanad under Fianna Fáil, 1932–1933
Many Irish parliamentarians from both sides of the Treaty divide had become 
impatient with the Senate’s interfering, as they saw it, with the business of elected 
government. However, Fianna Fáil, with its objective of removing the remain-
ing links with Britain, was an ideological enemy of the Seanad. Unsurprisingly 
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perhaps, the Seanad became a battleground in the first years of the Fianna Fáil 
government. Now it found itself in the classic position of an upper house: resist-
ing, as most senators saw it, hasty and possibly unconstitutional legislation being 
introduced by a populist-dominated lower house of Parliament. Fianna Fáil and 
Eamon de Valera’s first move with regard to remaking the Irish constitution was 
to neutralise the opposition to changes in the constitution of the governor-general, 
the king’s representative in Ireland, whose approval was needed to pass any bill 
into law. They did this by replacing the incumbent pro-Treaty governor-general, 
James MacNeill, with de Valera loyalist Domhnall ua Buachalla, who dutifully 
signed into law any legislation passed by the Fianna Fáil government. By these 
means, de Valera successfully enacted a series of constitutional changes, despite 
the resistance of the Seanad, which could delay but not stop them (O Suilleabhain 
2015). In 1932, Fianna Fáil passed a bill in the Dáil abolishing Article 17 of the 
Irish Free State’s constitution, which obliged members of Parliament to take the 
Oath of Allegiance to the British monarch. The presence of such an oath was 
one of the major Republican objections to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The Seanad, as 
was its right, proposed heavy amendments to the bill and returned it to the Dáil, 
delaying it by nine months. This was a clear case of a conservative upper house 
attempting to block or at least slow down what it considered to be radical legisla-
tion, incompatible with the Free State’s constitution. De Valera himself, speaking 
before the Senate, argued that the Oath did not have democratic legitimacy, not 
having been chosen by the Irish people but imposed by Britain at the time of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922. He argued that having been popularly elected, his 
government had a mandate to abolish the Oath (Seanad Éireann 1932).
De Valera’s critics in the Seanad, with its disproportionate share of former 
Unionists, argued that abolishing the Oath risked alienating Britain. Senator James 
Douglas, a businessman senator since 1922 and a Quaker, for instance, alleged 
that de Valera preferred confrontation with the British to negotiation. He worried 
that the bill would ‘affect our membership of the British Commonwealth – our 
trade and commerce, and last, but not least, the ultimate political unity of Ireland’ 
(Seanad Éireann 1932). Somewhat ironically, pro-Treaty nationalist senators from 
Cumann na nGaedheal were far more intemperate in their criticism than former 
Unionists. Senator Sean Milroy, for instance, likened the Fianna Fáil government 
to ‘pirates’ who sought to ‘scuttle the Free State’. Milroy believed that de Valera’s 
government had no right to tamper with the constitution: ‘I contend that the only 
valid authority upon which a proposal of this nature could rest is a clear mandate 
from the people, the electorate’. De Valera deftly outflanked this line of argument 
and the Senate generally by calling a fresh general election in which his Fianna 
Fáil party won an overall majority. Assured now of popular support, the Removal 
of the Oath Bill duly passed into law in May 1933 (Townshend 1998).
The abolition of the Seanad and the new Seanad of 1937
From this point onwards, the days of the first Seanad, now marked as a staunch 
opponent of de Valera’s agenda, were numbered. It narrowly passed, albeit with 
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many amendments, his Land Annuities Bill in 1933, which withheld payments 
owed to Britain under the Treaty, starting a damaging trade war that lasted until 
1938. Thereafter, de Valera unsuccessfully attempted to curtail the Seanad’s 
power by suggesting reducing the maximum length of time it could hold up a bill 
from eighteen to three months ( Manning s.d.). The next confrontation de Valera 
had with the Senate was when he attempted to broaden the local government 
franchise – the Senate resisted the widening of the right to vote in local elections 
and delayed it until 1934 (Manning s.d.).
The final conflict between the de Valera government and the Seanad – and the 
one that ultimately led to the Senate’s abolition – resulted from the proscription 
of a right-wing paramilitary group. Upon coming to power, de Valera had sacked 
Garda Commissioner (chief of police) Eoin O’Duffy, an outspoken former pro-
Treaty general. At the same time, he legalised the Republican paramilitaries of 
the IRA until 1936. In response to IRA intimidation of Cumman na nGaedheal 
supporters, O’Duffy gathered pro-Treaty army veterans into a grouping named the 
Army Comrades Association, popularly called the Blueshirts for their military- 
type uniform consisting of a blue shirt and black beret. O’Duffy adopted the trap-
pings of continental fascism and some of its policies. He was by no means a 
fringe figure, becoming the first leader of the main opposition party – Fine Gael – 
which was a merger of Cumman na nGaedheal, the National Centre Party and 
the Blueshirts, now named the ‘National Guard’. O’Duffy told the first Fine Gael 
congress that ‘we should not make an idol of parliament, it is a human institu-
tion’ (McGarry 2007). De Valera, meanwhile, commented that, ‘we have not been 
unmindful of the developments on the continent [of Europe]’ and accused the 
Blueshirts of having ‘adopted the methods and symbols associated with dictator-
ships in other countries’ (Broderick 2010).
With rioting taking place around Ireland between Fianna Fáil and IRA sup-
porters on the one hand and the Blueshirt movement on the other, the Fianna Fáil 
government passed a law banning the wearing of uniforms – effectively proscrib-
ing the Blueshirts. The Seanad voted down the bill, delaying its passing by nine 
months. Again, in the face of entrenched partisan divisions, there was little possi-
bility that the lower house, with its Fianna Fáil majority, would reflect on the Sen-
ate’s opposition and simply change its mind. Rather, its opposition merely delayed 
the Blueshirt ban until the following year. Fianna Fáil and Republicans in general 
usually depicted the Free State Senate as a reactionary, pro-British institution that 
defied the will of the elected government. Certainly, the Seanad’s last stand, trying 
to prevent the banning of a quasi-fascist street-fighting movement, appears some-
what sinister today. At the time, however, senators argued that de Valera’s govern-
ment was not only unconstitutionally dismantling the Anglo-Irish Treaty but also 
infringing on basic civil liberties, such as the freedoms of speech and association, 
given that he appeared to tolerate the activities of the IRA (O’Sullivan 1940). That 
this depiction had at least some truth was underlined when de Valera then passed 
another bill, the morning after the Senate had opposed the bill banning the wear-
ing of uniforms. This bill, however, sought to abolish the Senate itself. Ordinarily, 
abolishing a house of Parliament would be extremely difficult, but by neutralising 
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the position of governor-general, which de Valera had filled with the compliant 
Domhnall Ua Buachalla, and with a safe majority in the Dáil, de Valera’s govern-
ment faced little legislative opposition. Predictably, de Valera’s bill abolishing the 
Senate was not passed in the upper house itself. But after the maximum delay of 
eighteen months, the first Seanad ceased to exist on 29 May 1936 (Keogh 1994).
From 1936 to 1937, the Irish Free State had no upper house. In 1937, however, 
when introducing his new constitution – still the basis of law in Ireland today – 
de Valera set up a new Seanad. De Valera’s constitution was passed by referen-
dum and, unlike its predecessor, it could only be altered by popular vote through 
a referendum. The 1937 Seanad, its creators were determined to ensure, would 
not obstruct the powers of the lower house as had its predecessor. Many Fianna 
Fáil supporters had regarded the old Senate as a bastion of pro-British privilege. 
Sean Lemass, one of de Valera’s most able lieutenants, said, ‘if there is to be 
a second house, let it be a second house under our thumb’ (Townshend 1998). 
Although ‘vocationalism’ served as the basis for representation in the Senate – 
whereby social groups, such as employers, labour, farmers and others, would be 
represented – in practice, the new Senate had little independence, and the Seanad 
was tightly controlled by whichever party controlled the Dáil. Many of the seats 
became jobs for either aspiring or retiring politicians, and, unlike its predecessor, 
the 1937 Seanad could not initiate legislation – it could only hold up bills for 
ninety days, which it has only done on the rarest of occasions (Coakley & Gal-
lagher 1999; cf. O’Donoghue, this volume).
Conclusion
The Irish Free State Seanad was originally envisaged as a way of managing Irish 
democracy, representing the Unionist minority and preventing (or at least delay-
ing) legislation that senators deemed hasty, ill-advised or unconstitutional. In 
these respects, it was not without achievement. It did bring members of the old 
Anglo-Irish class into Free State politics, for which it has been lauded as ‘a unique 
experiment in idealism’ (Byrne 2015). Moreover, the administrative experience 
of some members of the Senate was a significant help to Irish parliamentarians in 
enacting formative legislation, such as setting up standing orders for Parliament 
and officially establishing the police and law courts.
As a means of representing minorities, however, the Seanad ultimately suffered 
from a fatal contradiction. It could be popularly elected or represent former elites, 
but not both, as the 1925 election proved. Having largely lost its position as a 
body representing minorities after the 1925 election, its distinctive role in Irish 
politics was no longer clear, with the result that it was again nominated rather 
than directly elected in 1928. If, moreover, it was not to be popularly elected, it 
would lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the public, who did not share the 
enthusiasm of the drafters of the 1922 constitution for an upper house that would 
represent former Unionists.
Had there been a consensus in Irish politics on the fact that power lay not only 
in popular sovereignty but also with the Crown and its appointees – as was the 
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case, for instance, in Canada during this period – the Seanad could have perhaps 
continued as a check on the power of the executive. But Ireland, with its particu-
larly Irish Republican tradition of majoritarian democracy, was different. During 
the 1920s, even pro-Treaty Free State politicians grew irritated by the interference 
of the upper house in matters they considered to be the exclusive legislative pre-
rogatives of the directly elected Dáil. The anti-Treaty Republicans were overtly 
hostile to the Senate as established under the 1922 constitution. In a system where 
the constitution could be changed by a majority vote in the lower house of Parlia-
ment, the Senate was uniquely vulnerable once it became identified as a partisan 
opponent of the de Valera government in 1932. For all of these reasons, the Free 
State Senate disappeared in 1936 and was replaced in 1937 by an almost power-
less successor.
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Ireland and Northern Ireland today

Part III
Does a state still need a 
senate? (c. 1920–present)    

Introduction
The Dutch Senate (Eerste Kamer, lit. first chamber) has not only survived several 
attacks on its existence but also managed to covertly increase its political power 
in the process (Broeksteeg 2007). This chapter aims to explain how and why the 
Senate has been able to remain a major and respected force in Dutch politics.
To understand the history of the Dutch Senate, it should first be clarified why 
the Netherlands, which regained its independence after the Napoleonic era in 
1813, has a bicameral system at all. What role did the 1815 constitution reserve 
for the Senate? What specific role would the Senate actually play? Was it a bul-
wark for the ruling class or an obstacle for legislation considered either too liberal 
or too democratic – or did the Senate make positive contributions as well? If so, 
what were they? Furthermore, I will analyse how the Senate managed to adapt to 
new situations and overcome the frequent accusations of its being superfluous and 
undemocratic. There were several instances, e.g. in 1830, 1848, 1918, 1922 and 
the 1960s, when the position of the Senate seemed to be in jeopardy. Why was the 
Senate not abolished at those times? Perhaps the existence of the Senate was not 
under nearly as big a threat as is commonly believed.
A major aspect of my analysis concerns the composition of the Senate. How did 
the background of the members of both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives differ? In many countries, regional representation is an important reason for 
the existence of an upper house. Was this the case in the Netherlands as well? And 
in what way, if any, are the provinces of the Netherlands and the Senate linked?
There has always been an ongoing discussion about the necessity of a senate 
in the Netherlands. The main conclusion of my 1998 study on the Dutch Senate 
was that the institution would not be abolished, and politicians would do better to 
change the discussion to how the role of the Senate could be improved (Van den 
Braak 1998). This is also what would eventually happen. I would still agree with 
my conclusion that the Senate could not be abolished, but in the years after the 
1990s, there were several developments that should be considered, such as politi-
cal fragmentation and instability and occasional opposing majorities in the House 
of Representatives and the Senate. At a later point, I will discuss the functioning 
of the parliamentary system in recent years. A final question we will consider is 
12  The vitality of the Dutch 
Senate
Two centuries of reforms and 
staying in power
Bert van den Braak
174 Bert van den Braak
how likely it is that the current system will be changed and what possibilities exist 
to facilitate that change, given the fact that constitutional reform in the Nether-
lands is a long and laborious process.
The workings of the Senate, 1815–1923
In the nineteenth century, bicameralism was generally seen as the ‘normal’ 
parliamentary model, used by most semi-democratic nations. For that reason, 
the Dutch unicameral Parliament, instituted in 1814 and called States-General 
in remembrance of the former Dutch Republic, was rather exceptional (Blom 
1992; cf. Oddens, this volume). However, after the Netherlands was unified 
with the Southern Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1815, a constitutional com-
mission was set up and concluded that there was good reason to divide Par-
liament into two houses (cf. Witte, this volume). The commission referred to 
the parliaments of major countries, such as those of France and the United 
Kingdom.
The first purpose of the second (upper) house was to create an institution that 
could prevent hasty law reforms and ‘evil’ (De Vries 2000). Those tasked for this 
job were appointed by the king (Beekelaar & De Schepper 1992). Any eminent 
man from the age of 40 could be appointed as a member for life. Thus, the Senate 
was not a house reserved for the nobility, as, for example, the British House of 
Lords was. Distinguished mayors in the North and landowners could be members 
as well. Nobility had never – save for in the South – played a prominent role in the 
North. In the Southern (Austrian) part of the Netherlands, nobles had been closely 
connected to the Austrian imperial court.
By creating this new house, King William (crowned on March 16, 1815 – 
before which he was only a sovereign) achieved what he wanted. This meant 
that the Senate could form a bulwark for him against the elected House of Repre-
sentatives, which had the right to put forward bills – or the right of initiative. Bel-
gian nobles would be incorporated in the new governmental system and the king 
could appoint and – as would become clear some years later – sack whomever he 
wanted (Van den Braak 1998).
In general, the Senate played the political role the king had intended, but dis-
satisfaction soon grew among the Belgian members (Witte, this volume). The 
few bills that were rejected were mostly initiated by Belgian MPs and dealt with 
taxes, trade, freedom of press, and the judicial system. This discontent could be 
linked to the general distress among Belgians with Northern domination and its 
free trade policy. The upper house appeared to be a bulwark not only for the king 
but also for the Northern part of the kingdom. Although the number of inhabitants 
in the South was much higher than that in the North, it had fewer representatives 
in Parliament, both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives. In the Sen-
ate, there were always some Southern members who remained loyal to the king 
and voted accordingly. Discontent in the South in 1830 ended in the separation of 
North and South and the emergence of the Kingdom of Belgium. Nevertheless, 
that did not mean the end of the Senate.
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It took until 1840 for the separation to become anchored in a new constitution 
because it was not before 1839 that King William I accepted the cessation of the 
Southern half of his country. The constitution of 1815 stated that constitutional 
reform had to pass both houses twice. After it passed the House of Representatives 
for the second time, the new constitution doubled the number of members of the 
chamber and stipulated that it would act as a sort of constituent assembly.
Only a few (newly chosen) MPs advocated the abolition of the Senate. Johan 
Thorbecke, professor at Leiden University and future leader of the liberal (demo-
cratic) opposition, asserted in his writings that he saw no reason for the existence 
of a senate at all. Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer, the leader of an even smaller 
Protestant group, said that he considered the Dutch Senate a failed facsimile of 
the British House of Lords. Others pointed out the high costs. Still, the opponents 
were a minority. In general, it was accepted that only the king himself could put 
forward a constitutional reform. Since the king was satisfied with the existence 
of the Senate, no such proposal was to be expected, and the Senate’s position was 
not in danger.
Yet in 1848, King William II, impressed as he was by the news of revolutionary 
movements in Germany and the stirrings of turmoil in Holland, ‘went from being 
a conservative to a liberal in one night’, as the popular saying goes. Thorbecke 
was asked to lead a commission tasked with creating a draft for constitutional 
reform. Beside ministerial responsibility, the proposed reforms included the pos-
sibility to dissolve Parliament and call new elections, the introduction of a yearly 
budget, Parliament’s right to inquiry, the right of the House of Representatives to 
amend bills, and direct elections for both houses. As in 1840, all these reforms 
had to pass both houses twice, including the still staunchly conservative Senate.
In both houses of Parliament, several members opposed the king’s political 
shift. These members wanted to maintain the strong position for the king, includ-
ing his right to nominate the members of the Senate. Abolition of the Senate cer-
tainly stood no chance. In order to secure a majority for other, more important 
reforms, the liberals had to concede to a less democratic electoral system for the 
Senate. That electoral system was a copy of the one that had been used for elect-
ing the House of Representatives before 1848. Members of the Senate would be 
elected by the States-Provincial, the provincial parliaments, but only those who 
paid the highest taxes were eligible. The thirty-nine members were elected for a 
nine-year term, and there would be new elections for one-third of the Senate every 
three years.
The voting results in the Senate were very close. To prevent a negative out-
come, the king had asked some elderly members to step down and appointed sev-
eral new, more reform-minded members in advance. After a tie in the first vote, he 
persuaded one member, one of his own court officials, to change his vote to pass 
the first round. Before the vote for the second reading, a few new reform-minded 
members were again appointed. The reform was accepted with a clear majority. In 
1849 a reformed Senate emerged (Van den Braak 1998). In its defence, Minister 
Dirk Donker Curtius stated that the main goal of the Senate was not to establish 
the good but to prevent ‘evil’.
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In 1849, a moderate liberal era started. In the years 1850–1851, Thorbecke, 
as home secretary, successfully defended legislation to implement constitutional 
reforms, such as laws on municipal and provincial government, parliamentary 
inquiries, and the new electoral laws. None of these governmental reforms, nor 
the process of economic liberalisation, faced strong opposition in the Senate. It 
was expected that the fact that only the extremely wealthy could become mem-
bers of the Senate would have led to a more conservative body, but, in practice, 
the politics of both houses did not differ much at all. This does not mean that the 
Senate had no importance in Dutch politics. For example, the king still tried to use 
the Senate to block unwelcome legislation but was only successful in a few cases, 
using his influence to block a law on the laying of railway tracks, for instance. 
However, he could not prevent the passing of legislation which abolished the 
death penalty and repealed the tax on newspapers. The number of members loyal 
to the king decreased rapidly, and the capricious king soon lost interest in politics 
altogether.
In 1868, the Senate played a role in mediating a conflict between the liberal 
majority in the House of Representatives on one side and the king and his con-
servative government on the other. Despite suffering defeats in Parliament, the 
king would not let go of his cabinet. He dissolved the House of Representatives 
twice and threatened to do so a third time. Some senators intervened as mediators, 
thereby gaining the appreciation of some politicians, especially liberals, for the 
Senate.
Although the Senate’s rejection of a bill would sometimes be criticised, there 
was no general discontent regarding the institution. From the 1880s onwards, 
most liberals were in favour of maintaining it so that it could act as a counter-
weight against the up-and-coming Christian parties. Since the late 1870s, prot-
estant MPs had started to become a political force. In 1879, Abraham Kuyper 
successfully transformed the movement started by Groen van Prinsterer into a 
parliamentary faction and political party – the ARP (Anti-Revolutionary Party). 
At the same time, Catholic MPs broke off from the liberal line and also formed 
a faction in Parliament. Liberal power suffered slightly. Thus, it was the liberals 
who supported maintaining the Senate in the debates on constitutional reform in 
the 1880s, while the ARP and Catholics were in favour of transforming it. They 
wanted the Senate to become a house of broader social interests, consisting of 
dedicated delegates, for example, for scientists, employers, and trade unions (Van 
den Braak 1998).
However, there was no longer any support for the eligibility rules based on 
income. Eventually, a compromise was reached between the liberal and Christian 
parties. Membership of the Senate was opened for new groups, firstly by reducing 
the tax threshold for eligibility and secondly by extending the right to be elected to 
several high positions, e.g. judges, high-ranking officers, ministers, MPs, mayors 
of large cities, and professors. The reform was accepted in 1887, the same time as 
the expansion of suffrage. Now, all male citizens meeting a specific qualification, 
namely paying a certain amount of rent, having savings, or having passed exams, 
could become voters. As a part of constitutional reform, the Senate was expanded 
The vitality of the Dutch Senate 177
to fifty members. Senators were still elected for terms of nine years, with one-
third cycling out every three years.
The emergence of Christian and later socialist parties and the decline of liberal 
parties complicated politics, especially regarding the distribution of power in both 
houses. In the years 1888–1917, cabinets would occasionally have a majority in 
the House of Representatives, while having a minority in the Senate. In the gen-
eral elections of 1888, the Christian parties, known as ‘the coalition’, achieved a 
small majority in the House of Representatives, and the first Christian cabinet was 
formed – named the Mackay cabinet, after its prime minister. The liberals contin-
ued to dominate the Senate. Despite the acceptance in both houses of an impor-
tant new law on education, which would allow subsidisation of Christian primary 
schools, the cabinet faced a generally ‘hostile’ Senate. In the years after 1891, 
liberals came back into power, but in 1901 the Christian parties again became 
the largest block and took power, though faced by an opposing majority in the 
Senate. This was the Kuyper cabinet. In the years between 1888 and 1901, the 
Christian parties had won more seats in many provincial estates, but the nine-
year term of senators slowed down that political shift in the Senate. Nevertheless, 
a shift in power did occur in some provinces, especially the large province of 
South-Holland.
When, in 1904, the Senate rejected a bill on higher education, the cabinet dis-
solved the Senate. The bill would have given graduates of the private (Christian) 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, founded by Kuyper in 1880, equal rights to gradu-
ates of public universities. Liberals rejected the proposal vehemently. Election of 
all fifty seats in the Senate had the effect Kuyper had hoped for: Christian parties 
managed to acquire a majority in the Senate. After being issued a second time, the 
bill achieved a majority in both houses. The 1904 election led to a lasting shift in 
power. Until the 1960s, Christian parties would continue to dominate the Senate.
After the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, all parties agreed to pause. 
They also agreed to constitutional reforms to introduce general male suffrage, as 
well as formally regulating the equal subsidisation of public and private (Chris-
tian) schools. The latter issue had caused quite a political crisis at the time and 
led to a political deadlock between Christian parties on one side and socialist and 
liberal parties on the other. This ‘pacification’ of Dutch politics came into effect 
in 1917. It not only led to an increase in the number of voters but also extended 
passive suffrage to women. It would take until 1919 for women to obtain active 
suffrage, and in 1920 the first woman became a member of the Senate.
After the constitutional reforms of 1917, there were no longer specific con-
ditions for eligibility for the Senate. However, the old electoral system for the 
Senate, which required that potential members be supported by a majority in the 
States-Provincial, stayed in place. Since Christian parties again benefitted most 
from the extension of suffrage, they now obtained an overwhelming majority in 
the Senate (Prakke 1990). It took until 1922 for a new electoral system for the Sen-
ate to be introduced, based on proportional representation. All members were to 
be chosen every four years by all members of the States-Provincial. The weight of 
the States-Provincial’s votes was linked to the number of inhabitants per province. 
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Therefore, a vote in the province South-Holland, for instance, counted for much 
more than a vote in a sparsely populated province, such as Zeeland. Although the 
connection had never been particularly strong, many senators wanted to keep the 
connection between provinces and ‘their’ senators and opposed this idea of pro-
portional representation.
A second, rather far-reaching proposal for reform was that the dissolution of 
the Senate could be followed by abolishing the States-Provincial, which would 
lead to new elections for the provincial assemblies. There was fierce resistance 
against this proposal in the Senate, fearing that it would disturb provincial gov-
ernment. Some also feared that party influence on the composition of the Senate 
would increase. The proposed electoral system made it possible to calculate the 
number of seats a party would get in the Senate in advance. Elections would thus 
become an almost mathematical process. The Senate rejected the bill with a vast 
majority. The cabinet had to come up with an alternative bill. The idea of dissolv-
ing the States-Provincial along with the Senate was left by the wayside and the 
new electoral system was proposed, consisting of four groups of provinces. Each 
group, which had no specific regional cohesion, would choose twelve or thir-
teen members of Senate. North-Holland and Friesland, for example, were tasked 
with choosing twelve members. The cabinet also proposed reducing the term of 
office to six years, with election for twenty-five members every three years. That 
way, there would still be some delay in the manifestation of electoral changes. In 
practice, this meant that elected States-Provincial were sometimes called to elect 
senators after only the second year of a three-year term.
Although few MPs and senators were particularly satisfied with this second 
bill, the necessity to have a new, fairer electoral system by the 1923 election year 
was more pressing. The second bill was adopted. In 1923, shortly before the new 
elections were to be held, a bill to implement this constitutional reform as elec-
toral law was accepted as well. The outcome was a system that few approved of 
and that was, at most, considered ‘second best’ (Van den Braak 1998).
Members of the Senate
Given the royal right of appointment in the early nineteenth century, it is not 
surprising that all members of the Senate in 1815–1848 were from the upper 
class. Among them were court officials, high-ranking military officers, former 
ministers, and members of the urban elite and landowners, both from the North 
and South. Almost all Belgian members were noblemen. The composition of the 
House of Representatives was clearly very different. The Belgian members of 
that house included, for instance, various industrialists and several lawyers and 
judges. Some Northern members were merchants or bankers, but most of them 
were gentry or local governors. After the Belgians had seceded in 1830, the simi-
larities between the members of both houses grew closer, although the Senate 
remained more elitist.
The constitutional change of 1848 and the new rules for elections led to major 
changes in both houses, both in terms of political composition and in the social 
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backgrounds of their members. The main intention behind this new electoral sys-
tem was to ensure that the Senate would not be a copy of the House of Representa-
tives. The States-Provincial was responsible for electing senators, and only the 
extremely wealthy were eligible. The minimum age for eligibility in the Senate 
was, however, lowered from 40 to 30 years, making it the same as the minimum 
age in the House of Representatives. There certainly were some differences, of 
course. There were more landowners and wealthy merchants among the senators, 
while the number of lawyers and judges was higher in the House of Representa-
tives. After 1870, there were even some MPs who had been or still were journal-
ists or middle-class merchants. In general, the House of Representatives and the 
Senate after 1848 did not differ as much as one would have expected. There were 
even family relations between members of both houses.
As mentioned earlier, the constitutional reform of 1887 brought an end to the 
exclusive right of the very wealthy to become member of the Senate. New groups 
were now eligible as well. Most importantly, MPs, some of whom came from 
the lower class, became eligible. Nevertheless, the electoral system ensured that 
it was not until 1911 and 1913 that a progressive liberal and a social democrat, 
respectively, were elected to the Senate. The reform in 1917 brought with it two 
houses without any formal distinctions with regard to eligibility.
The new electoral system in 1923 greatly increased the similarity of both houses 
in terms of political composition. The number of social democrats in the Senate, 
for instance, increased from four to eleven. Among them, as among Catholic and 
Protestant MPs, there were some trade union leaders and members of the working 
class. In comparison to the House of Representatives, the number of professors 
in the Senate was higher. Full-time professors could not become MPs. The House 
of Representatives had more journalists, party officials, and Protestant clergymen 
as members. This undoubtedly contributed to a different tone of debate in the 
two houses but not to different outcomes. A major change in 1923 was that the 
States-Provincial, as such, no longer elected senators. This appeared to dimin-
ish regional representation, but as stated earlier, regional representation was not 
common before 1923 either. Parties just looked for the provinces where they had 
the greatest chance of winning. The first socialist senator, Henri Polak, lived in 
North-Holland but was elected in Friesland. Catholics from Northern provinces 
had to apply as candidates in the Catholic Southern provinces to stand a chance 
of winning. The western provinces always dominated the Senate, and that did not 
change after 1923.
Still, in general, there were major differences in the social composition of both 
houses before and after 1917. They both became less elitist and soon started to 
better reflect a highly organised Dutch society, the so-called Verzuiling (com-
partmentalisation). Under Verzuiling, Dutch society was divided into four major 
social pillars: Catholic, Protestant, social-democratic, and liberal, each with its 
own organisation. This division of society lasted until the 1980s.
From the 1960s, distinctions between the Senate and House of Representatives 
grew again, mainly because of changes to the House of Representatives. After 
1960, a process of professionalisation was set in motion. Until then, members of 
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both houses combined their political life with a separate profession, such as trade 
union leader, mayor, alderman, or provincial governor. In the 1960s, MPs more 
often became full-time professional MPs because of better pay and better work in 
an increasingly complex government. They simply had to focus on their parlia-
mentary work. Among the MPs, now somewhat younger than before, there were 
many who had started off their careers in politics, which simultaneously led them 
to play a more active role in government. This development helped the Senate 
profile itself as a more distanced institution, with fewer ‘politicised’ members. To 
that extent, it was able to play a role as a ‘house of reflection’. Sometimes senators 
even profiled themselves as ‘amateur’ politicians (which they were not, of course) 
to emphasise their somewhat greater degree of independence.
In the decades after 1980, the strictly divided Dutch society and its parallel 
political system gradually disappeared. The socialist and Catholic trade unions 
merged to a new federation, as did organisations of employers and farmers. The 
three Christian parties – two Protestant and one Catholic – merged into one, the 
CDA. Furthermore, society became more secular, and voters became more vola-
tile. This was reflected in the composition of both houses. Representatives of new 
interest groups emerged, and those of traditional groups declined. The Senate, 
however, had more elderly members (although a 19-year-old member was elected 
in 2003), which meant that senators were generally more experienced than MPs. 
From 1983, parties also started sending more experienced managers to the Senate 
from sectors such as healthcare, insurance, welfare, and finance. Close connec-
tions with the daily practice of the sectors in which legislation had to be imple-
mented helped them bring forward meaningful arguments. Simultaneously, the 
number of former ministers and leading politicians in the Senate increased.
This all contributed to growing self-confidence and public appreciation of the 
role of the Senate (Van den Braak 2009). It is not unusual for senators who are 
members of parties that oppose the existence of the Senate to become convinced 
advocates of the institute after a while. The combination of all these developments 
certainly helped the Senate to play a constructive role.
Discussions
Although liberals initially criticised the Senate, followed by Christian politicians 
in the 1880s, it was not until the emergence of socialist and radical-liberal politi-
cians that a clear call for abolition was voiced. These politicians opposed the 
strong position of the Senate and its restricted accessibility. Given the relatively 
weak position of these groups, however, their proposals stood no chance.
The balance of power seemed to change for only a short period of time. Dur-
ing the revolutionary turmoil of November 1918, after the fall and flight of the 
German Emperor, who sought refuge in the Netherlands, Dutch socialist leader 
Pieter Jelles Troelstra believed that a political, nonviolent revolution was immi-
nent. He was soon proved wrong, but centre-right politicians, including the Chris-
tian Charles Ruijs de Beerenbrouck cabinet, formed in 1918, were startled. They 
agreed on social and political reforms which were, as they said, in accordance 
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with the spirit of the times. A constituent commission was set up, chaired by the 
prime minister. Even some conservative liberals questioned the need for a senate 
in November 1918. One liberal MP said that only the parliamentary clerks would 
weep at the Senate’s grave. Two years later, when everything calmed down, noth-
ing had fundamentally changed. In the parliamentary debates on constitutional 
reforms, some right-wing MPs were sceptical about the necessity of a senate, but 
they were equally aware that there was only a very small chance that senators 
would vote for their own abolition. In the end, the proposal was not even sup-
ported by a plain majority, let alone the required two-thirds majority. Those in 
favour of maintaining the Senate stated that a second reading (‘reflection’) of bills 
remained useful.
After 1923, the Senate was almost a political copy of the House of Representa-
tives. Conflicts in which the Senate played a major role were very rare, and only a 
small number of bills were rejected. The only bill worth mentioning is one in 1927 
to approve a treaty with Belgium. In the aftermath of the First World War, rela-
tions between the Netherlands and Belgium were disturbed by Belgian accusa-
tions of Dutch passivity towards German demands during the war. Dutch foreign 
minister Herman Adriaan van Karnebeek made efforts to restore good relations, 
and in 1925, a treaty between the two nations was signed, creating a new connec-
tion between the Schelde, a river near Antwerp, and the Rhine, near Rotterdam. 
A broad protest movement was set up because many feared that the port of Rot-
terdam would be negatively impacted by this move. Most political parties were 
divided on the issue. In the House of Representatives, the bill to approve the treaty 
was accepted by a very small majority, but the Senate rejected it with thirty-three 
votes against seventeen. Minister Van Karnebeek resigned.
In the eyes of many, the rejection confirmed the necessity of a senate. It did not 
have to reject many bills, but by doing so, occasionally, it proved its right of exist-
ence. The Senate was seen as a valuable slaperdijk (lit. a sleeping dike, a backup 
dike in case the first dike were to fail). It was essential that there was always a 
possibility to block a bill in the Senate so that the House of Representatives would 
not have the final say. One of the other rare cases in which the Senate would 
again prove its usefulness was in 1968, when a tax bill was put forward to force 
tenants who lived in relatively cheap housing to move to more expensive homes. 
The Senate used its veto to safeguard the interests of the middle class, who would 
have suffered most from that bill. Only three senators supported the bill. A lack of 
political debate on legislation within the Senate raised questions about the need 
for this institution, as some saw it as a superfluous delay in the legislative process.
In the years between 1925 and 1965, the position of the Senate was not the 
subject of much discussion. In the 1950s, some members of a constitutional com-
mission proposed taking away the Senate’s right of budget, but no steps were taken 
to do so. In the 1960s, younger politicians started to question the political system, 
specifically addressing the formation of a new coalition without new elections after 
a political crisis. The influence of voters on the formation of government was very 
limited. Furthermore, the Christian central parties were considered to be too domi-
nant, as they could always form a cabinet with either liberals or social democrats.
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A new, less proportional electoral system and direct elections for the prime 
minister were proposed in order to increase voters influence. A major objective 
was a clear division between the political left and right. A new non-ideological 
party, D66 (lit. Democrats 1966), was established, with constitutional reform as 
its key issue. Some of these ideas were embraced by the social democrats and 
by some left-wing Christian politicians. In this political climate, characterised 
by a call for constitutional change, the existence of the Senate was also put on 
the political agenda. After the 1967 elections, in which D66 won seven seats, the 
centre-right De Jong cabinet (1967–1971) set up a new constitutional commis-
sion which recommended holding direct elections for the Senate in 1971. Only a 
minority of the commission favoured abolition.
In the early twentieth century, politicians had already considered altering the 
Senate’s veto into a right to just return a bill. However, parties did not agree upon 
the question of who would have to make the final decision: the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Senate. The Senate’s right to return bills, without a (final) veto, 
would undermine its position, but giving the Senate both a right to return and 
allowing it to retain its veto would strengthen it. After parliamentary discussion in 
1975, a motion was adopted that there should be no infringement on the position 
or rights of the Senate. The motion was put forward by the Christian democrats 
and supported by liberals and small Protestant parties. This meant the end to all 
discussion about the Senate. In 1983, the constitution was modernised, but no 
major changes were made to the system of government.
However, reconfirmation of the Senate’s position was not the only outcome of 
these discussions. From 1983, all members were elected every four years, directly 
after the elections for the eleven (twelve after 1986) provincial states. As a result, 
there would now be a clear link between these two elections. All elected provin-
cial deputies now acted as a single electoral college. Several politicians warned 
that this might cause problems in the future, for there certainly was a risk that 
national issues would overshadow the provincial elections. National politicians 
soon understood the importance of the provincial elections, even though they 
were second-order elections, with turnout being limited to less than fifty per cent 
on a few occasions. As they were midterm elections, they would function as a sort 
of poll on government policies.
Some argue that the political role of the Senate had increased because the elec-
tions for the States-Provincial – and thus indirectly the elections for the Senate – 
would be dominated by national issues. This is an oversimplification. From the 
1980s, Dutch society and the economy started a period of reform and transition. 
Between 1945 and 1975, the Netherlands had seen a period of economic recovery 
and growth. A welfare state was established, and legislation did not face much 
resistance. That, in fact, was the main reason why the Senate did not play a par-
ticularly visible role: there was no need for it to do so. The economic crises of 
the 1970s ended this. After 1980, a neoliberal era started, characterised by priva-
tisation and a limited government role. Austerity, especially in social laws, was 
unavoidable. Employers’ rights came under pressure.
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In order to successfully introduce legislation and decrease public spending after 
elections, coalition parties had to make firm agreements and tightened discipline 
among their fractions. By doing so, the role of the House of Representatives as 
counterweight against the government in the passing of legislation was weakened. 
The position of the Senate as a chamber of reflection grew stronger because hasty 
proposals occasionally led to bad legislation in years of crisis (Visscher 1994). 
Moreover, civilians and organisations turned to the Senate to voice their concerns 
much more often than in the past. At the same time, parties, mostly on the left, that 
had pursued the abolition of the Senate ‘rediscovered’ the political opportunities 
it offered. Its speaker (1987–1997), Herman Tjeenk Willink, a Labour politician, 
advocated that a united Senate which scrutinises and judges bills could play a use-
ful role in the political process (Van den Braak 1998). The Senate ought to exam-
ine whether new rules were necessary, how they would be implemented, whether 
there was no disproportionate breach of rights, etc. (Bogdanor 1992). In that way, 
the Senate could play a positive role in the legislative process and could claim to 
be an almost apolitical judge of legislation.
Current role of the Senate
Compared to other senates, the Dutch Senate has a strong position in the legis-
lative process (Knippenberg 2002). All bills that are accepted in the House of 
Representatives must also be scrutinised by the Senate. It does not have the right 
of amendment, but it does have a non-restricted veto. In practice, the veto does 
not seem to cause major problems, because it is not used very often. Bills are only 
rarely rejected (Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2019).
Instead, the Senate uses its veto in a more subtle way (Westerveld 2007). By 
threatening to use it, it can trigger informal adjustments or promises to improve a 
bill (Van den Berg 1994). Sometimes, government is forced to delay implement-
ing a bill or to vow that existing rights will be guaranteed. Sometimes, govern-
ment is compelled to agree to evaluate a bill sooner than originally proposed. 
Only after these promises are made will parties in the Senate show willingness to 
vote in favour of the bill. In recent years, the number of motions for anchoring the 
outcome of debates in the Senate has risen and promises made by government to 
the Senate are officially registered. This practice of expanded influence on legisla-
tion is described as ‘a disguised right of amendment’. It is an additional right for 
a house that can formally only say ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
There are several ways in which this right can be reinforced. The Senate can 
threaten to reject a bill if the cabinet is not willing to propose a new bill to change 
it (that new bill is called a novelle). This novelle, of course, must first pass the 
House of Representatives, as it is just like any other ‘regular’ bill. In general, that 
house will be willing to cooperate, because if it fails to do so, the law will presum-
ably fail. However, a novelle can only be used to amend a very specific part of the 
present bill, and it is not applied very often. Sometimes, the Senate conditionally 
approves a bill. In that case, the government has to promise to amend the new 
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bill afterwards, before it comes into force. When the Senate is very critical about 
a bill, government will sometimes repeal it entirely before proposing a revised 
version at a later date. Most often, the Senate functions as a sort of marketplace 
where ministers and senators negotiate about amendments and promises (Van den 
Berg 1994). If the government has shown sufficient commitment, senators are 
generally willing to forget about their earlier objections.
Those in favour of a bicameral system know that the Senate should not become 
an obstacle in the legislative process. One can assume that using the veto too often 
could undermine the Senate’s position. No political system is particularly satisfied 
with an institution that hinders legislation, and it would certainly prompt discus-
sions about bicameralism. Therefore, the best senators can do is seek to strike 
a balance: threaten to reject a bill when there is a good chance of success and 
occasionally – but not too often – use the veto to let government know that victory 
is never guaranteed. It is not using the veto that matters as much as threatening 
to do so.
Cooperation between parties (both in government and the opposition) in the 
law-making process is now more common, with occasional successes. In debates 
about a new health insurance system in 2006, the health secretary had to make 
several concessions to the Senate, and the same happened in debates about new 
legislation on social welfare. A law for a new police organisation could only be 
implemented after the justice secretary had promised to submit a second law with 
modifications. Not all parties are always satisfied with the outcome of a debate, 
and the Senate is not apolitical at all, of course. Its members are politicians, and 
the government and opposition can play as much of a role in the Senate as they do 
in the House of Representatives. Political dominance in decision-making remains 
a fact. Most members of the Senate do agree that the House of Representatives 
is the primary political power. There is an awareness of the need to be somewhat 
restrained, but determining which specific situations require restraint is a matter 
of political consideration.
We inevitability saw this in the years 2011–2017, when the government coali-
tion no longer had a majority in the Senate (Otjes & Louwerse 2014). Opposition 
parties are not obliged to vote in favour of government bills. During the second 
Rutte cabinet (2012–2017), the liberal–Social Democratic coalition did not have 
a majority in the Senate. Therefore, it had to negotiate with opposition parties to 
ensure a majority in both houses, with advantageous results for the coalition. By 
broadening support in the House of Representatives, it could also successfully 
manage the Senate. Parties in the Senate were compelled to follow the party line 
of their respective parties, which was determined in the House of Representatives. 
Senators had to accept these deals without having much chance to use the Senate’s 
usual power.
The need to negotiate for the ruling parties could be explained from the increas-
ing importance of the Senate, but at the same time the outcome confirmed that 
Senate fractions will mostly follow the judgement of their fellow party members 
in the House of Representatives.
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Conclusion and implications
It seems obvious, but the main reason why the Netherlands still has a significant 
senate is political. It has managed to occasionally reform itself. Although there were 
some moments at which the Senate seemed to be in jeopardy, there was never any 
real momentum for it. Dutch politics has always been based on ‘wheeling and deal-
ing’ and seeking compromise. Government policy in the Netherlands not only has 
to be vigorously supported but also, preferably, must be well and broadly supported 
(Timmermans & Andeweg 2000). Since 1922, no bill has been proposed with the aim 
of abolishing the Senate (Van den Braak 2000). Discussions about the Senate’s con-
tinued existence ended as early as 1975. From the 1980s, a positive and constructive 
role of the institution had to be accepted by former critics because experience showed 
that the Senate had survived all attacks on its existence. Opposition parties, especially 
on the left, were all too keen to use the Senate as a useful institution by which they 
could obtain a firmer grasp on government policy. Although the Senate was set up 
as a bulwark, first for the king and, after 1848, more or less for the upper-class, it 
never was a hindering power. After the period between 1888 and 1918, in which both 
houses sometimes had opposing majorities, the Senate did not play a very significant 
role. That ‘invisibility’ only led to an absence of discontent (Cramer 1990).
New discussions about the role of the Senate began after 2010, when cabinets 
(led by Mark Rutte) had to deal with a stronger opposition in the Senate. The main 
question still is this: can it always be justified that an indirectly elected senate 
overrules decisions taken by the directly elected House of Representatives (Van 
den Braak 2015)? Some politicians reject such a ‘political’ role for the Senate. 
They want the Senate to play a merely non-political role in which guarding the 
quality of legislation is the main objective. There are, however, two issues with 
such an approach. First, the Senate is a political body with party politicians as 
members; second, the line between political and non-political arguments is often 
very thin. Some members, for instance, can state that a new bill will be hard to 
implement, while others may see no problems with that at all. A ‘technical’ judge-
ment can and very often will be influenced by political opinion.
In 2016, a commission was installed and asked to investigate whether the par-
liamentary system requires improvement and if so, how (Staatscommissie parle-
mentair stelsel 2017). The commission suggested the introduction of a right for 
the senate to send back bills to the lower house, with suggestion for adjustments. 
That House then should make a final decision about the bill. There also might be 
a slight chance that some sort of conciliation procedure for disputes between both 
houses will be introduced. That could be made possible if the united assembly of 
both houses is given a new role as mediator. That, too, will need constitutional 
reform, requiring a two-thirds majority in the second reading.
Such constitutional change would only be necessary if there were a greater 
chance of political stagnation in a situation where the two houses have opposite 
majorities, and opposition parties are unwilling to compromise on major issues. 
The problem, of course, is that nobody knows whether this is a realistic scenario. 
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Not only is changing the constitution not a political venture but it also would take 
several years. It can only be accomplished after elections (the first are in 2021, and 
after that, probably in 2025). So the Dutch Senate certainly will not be abolished 
soon, and fundamental changes are not to be expected either. For the future, the 
Senate will, in all likelihood, remain free from any crises that might jeopardise its 
continued existence.
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Introduction
Canadian voters in the 1921 Federal Election produced one of the most unex-
pected Parliaments in Canadian history. The incumbent Conservative Party, 
which had governed for the past ten years and seen Canada through the First 
World War, was now the third party in the House of Commons, and a combina-
tion of electoral defeats and retirements left it bereft of almost all of their senior 
leadership. As a final insult to the party, its new leader, Arthur Meighen, even lost 
his riding in Portage-Le-Prairie, Manitoba, to the newly formed Progressive Party. 
It was this Progressive Party, a collection of rural parliamentarians united under 
the informal leadership of Thomas Crerar, a former minister in the Conservative’s 
wartime government, which was now the second largest party in lower chamber. 
The Progressives’ rapid rise had only begun two years earlier when a group of 
angry farmers ran a candidate in an Ontario by-election to protest the Conserva-
tive’s support for high tariffs on imported goods. Now this grassroots movement 
was the official opposition.
Most surprising of all was that the Liberal Party, now led by William Lyon Mac-
kenzie King, had secured the majority of seats in the Commons. Having refused to 
support conscription in 1917, the Liberal caucus was reduced to a rump of Quebec 
members led by former prime minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier. By 1919 Laurier had 
died and King, a unilingual Anglophone who had spent the war working with the 
Rockefeller family in the USA, was elected leader of the Francophone-dominated 
party. Yet public anger at the Conservatives’ failure to effectively manage the 
peacetime economy combined with the Progressives’ surge in Western Canada 
handed the Liberals a one-seat majority on election night 1921.
In spite of his party’s victory and the shambolic state of the Conservative Party, 
the new prime minister still faced substantial obstacles to implementing his leg-
islative agenda. With only a one-seat majority in the House of Commons, the 
Liberal government was forced to temper their legislative ambitions. Addition-
ally, the Liberals faced a hostile Senate dominated by Conservative partisans 
appointed by Prime Ministers Borden and Meighen during their decade in office. 
In order to meet this challenge, the Liberals needed to justify the supremacy of 
the House of Commons as the preeminent chamber of Parliament and thereby 
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delegitimise any attempt by the Senate to invoke its constitutional power to delay, 
block or amend legislation. It is this process and its long-term consequences that 
will serve as the focus of this chapter. Specifically, it will argue that, between 1921 
and 1930, the King-led Liberals drew on the concept of the democratic mandate or 
the idea that the governing party and its leader were chosen to speak for the Cana-
dian people, in order to bolster their own political standing and limit the ability of 
the appointed Senate to hinder the Liberal government.
This particular case study demonstrates how governing parties in Westmin-
ster systems employed democratic concepts, such as the democratic mandate as 
a means of solidifying their own position while limiting any opposition from the 
upper chamber. Particularly in countries like Canada, where constitutional reform 
was not politically feasible, the possibility of structural reform to the Senate was 
nil. Hence, a government facing a hostile Senate in this constitutional context had 
to ensure that voters viewed any exercise of power by senators, however legally 
valid, as a violation of democratic norms. However, the long-term effect of such 
a strategy was to further undermine the legitimacy of the Senate in the eyes of the 
voting public. In Canada’s case, for an institution that had faced questions of legit-
imacy since its creation in 1867, these attacks could be particularly successful.
In order to demonstrate this argument, the chapter draws on two types of 
sources. The first consists of public remarks of key Liberal politicians, particu-
larly those of Prime Minister King. The second is articles and editorials from 
prominent liberal newspapers of the era, such as the Manitoba Free Press (after 
1931 the Winnipeg Free Press) and the Toronto Globe (later the Globe and Mail). 
Unlike earlier in Canadian history, when papers like the Globe were owned by 
political party leaders, they were independent operations with editorial policies 
controlled by their owners/operators, not the Liberals or the Conservatives. How-
ever, these newspapers still maintained strong connections to political parties, and 
their owners and editors were often involved in the affairs of the party. The most 
prominent example was the Winnipeg Free Press, which was owned by former 
Liberal cabinet minister Clifford Sifton and run by overtly partisan editor J. W. 
Dafoe. These papers thus provide a window into broader Liberal attitudes towards 
the Canadian Senate during the 1920s.
Historical and political context
Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s (1874–1950) personal 
history was unique for politicians of his era. While most Canadian politicians 
during the country’s first fifty years were either born in the British Isles or heavily 
influenced by its history and politics, King was much closer culturally to Canada’s 
southern neighbour, the United States of America.
King was the son of John King, an unsuccessful lawyer, and Isabella Grace 
Mackenzie, the daughter of William Lyon Mackenzie, a noted reform politician 
in early-nineteenth-century British North America and one of the leaders of the 
Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837 who spent time in exile in the United States. 
King spent his early life in Berlin, Ontario (now Kitchener), and completed his 
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BA at the University of Toronto before studying law at Toronto’s Osgoode Hall. 
King’s formative educational experiences, however, were in the United States. 
After failing to get a professorship at Osgoode Hall, King studied at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, where he worked closely with American reformer Jane Addams. 
He subsequently received his MA in political economy and his PhD from Har-
vard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. King returned to Canada in 1900 to 
work as a civil servant and in 1908 was convinced to run for the Liberal Party in 
a federal by-election. Upon winning a seat in Parliament, King was made minister 
of labour by Liberal leader Wilfrid Laurier. Yet King, like most Liberal minis-
ters, lost his seat in the federal election of 1911 and subsequently returned to the 
United States, where he was hired by John D. Rockefeller Jr. to head the Rock-
efeller Foundation’s Department of Industrial Research. King served in this role 
throughout most of the First World War, only returning to Canada in mid-1917 to 
run unsuccessfully for the Liberals in the 1917 federal election.
Two years later, in 1919, Wilfrid Laurier, longtime Liberal Leader and King’s 
political mentor, died, precipitating the first leadership convention in Canadian 
history. King ran for the leadership and won on the fourth ballot. Ironically, 
King, a unilingual Anglophone, won thanks to the support of Quebec delegates 
marshaled for King by his Quebec-lieutenant and later attorney general, Ernest 
Lapointe. King thus led the Liberal Party into the 1921 federal election, the first 
after the return to peacetime after the upheaval of the First World War.
King’s invocation of the democratic mandate during the 1921 campaign was 
one example as to how his time in the United States shaped his politics. King’s 
specific interpretation of the democratic mandate as conferring power on the 
executive was an invention that traced its origins to the nineteenth-century United 
States and the rhetoric of American president Andrew Jackson (1829–1837).
Within parliamentary systems, a majoritarian interpretation of political power 
has always emphasised the presidential-like role of the prime minister and sought 
to reduce Parliament to simply a ratifying body. However, the idea that the peo-
ple directly conferred power on a specific individual was an American reinter-
pretation of this idea (Ihalainen, Ilie & Palonen 2016). This theory of mandate 
politics as it relates to elections rests on three basic assumptions. The first is the 
idea that election results carry a clear and directive message from the people to 
political leaders about their policy proposals. The second assumption is that this 
message is authoritative, and political leaders are duty-bound to uphold it. The 
final assumption is a negative imperative, stating that political leaders should not, 
barring exceptional circumstances, take substantial action without the expressed 
approval of the people in the form of a mandate granted through an election (Kel-
ley Jr. 1983). Essentially, the idea of a mandate can be summarised as follows: 
voters send a message with their votes and public officials receive this message 
and act on it (Grossback, Peterson & Stimson 2006).
Andrew Jackson was the first to interpret majoritarian ideas through the lens of 
executive action: he argued that the president embodied the will of the American 
people and that his election was a mandate in favour of his key policies (Dahl 1990). 
Yet Jackson’s views were not widely accepted by subsequent nineteenth-century 
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presidents, as the majority continued to argue for legislative or parliamentary, 
rather than executive, superiority. In 1912 Woodrow Wilson’s electoral victory 
marked the reintroduction of mandate politics to American democracy. Rather 
than accepting the argument that legislative superiority was imperative for true 
democracy, Wilson reversed the proposition, arguing that legislative restrictions 
on presidential power were undemocratic. For Wilson, as for Jackson before him, 
the president was the only truly elected representative of the American people and 
had a popular mandate to act, while congressmen spoke only on behalf of specific 
regional interests (Dahl 1990).
As this chapter will demonstrate, Mackenzie King adopted this idea of the dem-
ocratic mandate to reinforce his position as prime minister. The major challenge 
for King and his party in adopting this strategy was that, unlike in a proportional 
representative system and to a lesser degree the American system, in the West-
minster system, there was no direct link between the popular vote and what party 
forms government. Rather, King was forced to construct what Matthew Shugart 
and John Carey describe as a ‘false mandate’ (Shugart & Carey 1992). These cir-
cumstances meant that it was much more challenging for King to convince Cana-
dians that such a concept was relevant to Canadian politics. Ultimately, though, 
King and the Liberals were able to take a concept developed in the United States 
and successfully employ it in a Canadian context.
While King’s invocation of the democratic mandate was new, as the Ottawa 
Evening Citizen highlighted in their 1921 election day issue, debating how the 
Senate and House of Commons related to each other was not. It had been the 
subject of political discussion in Canada since even before the Confederation in 
1867. The newspaper chronicled eight previous attempts by the Commons to pass 
legislation limiting the power of the Senate, all of which failed (Ottawa Evening 
Citizen 1921). Additionally, as Norman Rogers informed King in a 1927 report, 
the Conservative MP Edward Lancaster had introduced legislation in the lower 
house calling for the complete abolition of the Senate in 1909, 1910 and 1911 
(Rogers 1927). Finally, the Liberal Party’s grassroots had repeatedly voiced their 
opposition to the power of the appointed Senate. Particularly during the 1919 
party convention, numerous local Liberal organisations had forwarded resolutions 
supporting a variety of legislative proposals relating to the Senate, with options 
ranging from a mandatory retirement age to outright abolition. The predominant 
argument used to justify their resolutions was that, as the Northern Ontario Lib-
eral Association detailed, the Senate was ‘an appointed body, holding office for 
life, which is contrary to Liberal opinion and principle’ (National Liberal Conven-
tion 1919). Thus, King’s attacks on the power of the Senate not only were timely 
but also reflected a history of Liberal support for Senate reform initiatives and 
tapped into existing sympathies among many of the party’s grassroots.
The English example
When discussing the role of the upper chamber of Parliament, the Liberals not 
only drew on Canadian history, but also on the debate over the powers of the 
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House of Lords in Britain. Particularly, in the years leading up to the First World 
War, clashes over what legislative or procedural mechanisms were required to 
resolve deadlock between the Commons and Lords became one of the most con-
troversial issues in early-twentieth-century British politics. Traditionally, the only 
mechanism for resolving a deadlock between the Commons and the Lords was 
for the Crown to appoint additional Lords supportive of the particular piece of 
legislation. With the passage of the Reform Act 1832, only after King William IV 
threatened the Lords with creating an additional eighty peerages to ensure the bill 
passed, the convention developed that the Lords would not defeat publicly popu-
lar legislation. Additionally, convention dictated that the House of Lords could 
not amend money bills, as only the Commons had the ability to decide what funds 
would be available for the Crown to spend. Although unable to amend money 
bills, the Lords still had the prerogative to defeat them outright, setting the stage 
for the 1909–1911 conflict over the People’s Budget (Bradley & Ewing 2008).
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Conservative-Unionists had a sub-
stantial majority in the Lords. Despite their dominance in the upper house, the 
1906 general election saw the election of a reform-minded Liberal administration 
which had publicly committed to substantial public welfare programs. Between 
1906 and 1908, conflict simmered between the two chambers, with the Lords 
rejecting or modifying key pieces of Liberal legislation. The conflict came to a 
head in 1909 when Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George introduced 
‘The People’s Budget’, which, among other measures, increased income taxes on 
the wealthy and instituted an additional land tax targeting the gentry. Conserva-
tives in both houses saw the budget as highly redistributive and an attack on the 
aristocracy. While the Conservatives did not have the votes to defeat the budget 
in the Commons, they did in the House of Lords and voted 350 to seventy-five to 
veto the budget (Ball & Seldon 1994).
In response, the Liberals derided the upper chamber as undemocratic and called 
for a reform of the House of Lords. Additionally, Prime Minister Herbert Henry 
Asquith asked King Edward VII to appoint enough Liberal peers to ensure the 
budget’s passage. However, that would require appointing over three hundred 
new peers, and the King refused to take such drastic action without the clear 
support of the British electorate. Consequently, Asquith asked for Parliament to 
be dissolved, and in the General Election of January 1910, the Liberals retained 
power, albeit with the help of Labour and Irish Parliamentary Party support in 
the Commons. This coalition was subsequently able to force through a modified 
version of the 1909 budget but with the controversial land tax removed. Inspired 
by the budget crisis, Asquith attempted to use his parliamentary majority to pass 
legislation removing the House of Lords’ veto over legislation and replace it with 
the ability to delay money bills for one month and all other bills for a maximum of 
two years. This measure was, as predicted, quickly defeated in the upper chamber. 
Yet with the death of Edward VII in May of 1910 and George V’s ascension to 
the throne, Asquith now had a sympathetic monarch willing to appoint additional 
peers to ensure the passage of reform legislation. When the Liberals’ reform leg-
islation was once again defeated in the House of Lords, Asquith requested another 
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general election for December 1910, which his coalition subsequently won. The 
Liberals were now able to pass a reform bill similar to the one rejected in 1910, 
and in August of 1911 the House of Lords passed the Parliament Act 1911 by 
a seventeen-vote margin. The political drama surrounding the House of Lords 
reforms was well covered in the Canadian press, and many Canadians believed 
that Asquith’s reforms should serve as inspiration for King and the Liberals.
The main problem was that the Parliament Act 1911 did not address the main 
obstacle to the Liberal Party of Canada’s legislative agenda. One of the key con-
stitutional justifications for legally defining the powers of the Lords in respect to 
the Commons was to ensure that the Lords could not dictate government spending 
by amending or defeating a budget. On other legislation the Lords could delay a 
bill by two years. It was thus possible to understand the 1911 reforms not as a radi-
cal redistribution of powers within Parliament but rather a codification of existing 
convention. Within the Canadian context, however, the issue was not money bills, 
as King’s budgets easily passed the Senate, but rather criminal code reform. In 
particular, since their convention in 1919, the Liberals had pledged to repeal the 
wartime anti-subversion provisions in Section 98 of the Criminal Code of Can-
ada. Since the end of the First World War these laws had been used by police to 
target left-wing organisations, and repealing the section was almost unanimously 
opposed by Conservative senators. In order to ensure that his government’s leg-
islation passed unimpeded, any Senate reform bill would have to sanction much 
more extensive changes than the 1911 British one. Hence, the Liberals had to jus-
tify any future proposal not by appealing to constitutional precedent, as the British 
Liberals did, but by creating their own standards of democratic legitimacy based 
on the supposed desires of the Canadian people.
Attacks on the legitimacy of the Senate
Despite the centrality of the Senate in Liberal Party discourses and a legis-
lative template based off the British Parliamentary Act 1911, Prime Minister 
King did not publicly discuss the need for such a bill until the summer of 1924, 
three years after being sworn in as prime minister (Manitoba Free Press 1924a). 
Rather, for the first three years of their term the Liberals relied on the Manitoba 
Free Press and their partisan Liberal editor J. W. Dafoe to build support for 
legislation limiting the Senate’s power by highlighting how the Senate abused 
its power to ‘trip up the government’. When King finally did address the issue 
in July 1924, he told the House, ‘This year we have instances of bills that have 
passed this House in three separate sessions of parliament, and which have been 
rejected each time by the second Chamber’. King then referred to the 1911 Brit-
ish bill and argued,
The time has come when the Commons in Canada should seek to gain rights 
and privileges with respect to legislation originating in the Chamber similar 
to those which have been obtained by the House of Commons in the Parlia-
ment of Westminster.
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After assuring the House that his government would introduce legislation to ensure 
the supremacy of the House of Commons in the near future, King proceeded to 
justify his proposal by invoking a sense of civic duty in his audience. King told 
the House, ‘I think we owe it to the people of our country with respect to laws 
demanded by the electorate to see to the supremacy in parliament of the elective 
chamber’ (King 1924b). King claimed the electorate had chosen the Liberals to 
govern on the basis of their proposed laws, so the Senate had no moral authority to 
subvert the desires of not only cabinet but also the people they claimed to represent.
This message, that the Liberals’ attempts to limit the power of the Senate were 
part of the fight to protect the rights of the people, was a key theme in many 
of the Prime Minister’s speeches throughout the summer of 1924. In one from 
20 August 1924 to the Kent County Liberal Association in Chatham, Ontario, 
King assured his audience, ‘The government would proceed with all due caution 
in an effort to secure supremacy of the people’s will’. While downplaying the 
radical natures of his party’s proposals, King stated,
I do believe the people will expect a Liberal government to see that the 
machinery of government is so arranged as to make possible that the will of 
the people will prevail in those great measures which are of such great con-
cern to the people as a whole.
(King 1924a)
For King it was obvious that the House of Commons should be preeminent, and 
any limits imposed on it by an appointed Senate were necessarily anti-democratic. 
Much like his comments in the Commons in July, King asserted that the Liber-
als, by virtue of their position as the governing party, were duty-bound to imple-
ment the wishes of the people expressed through a general election. Any partisan 
advantage the Liberals gained from this legislation was simply a by-product of the 
party’s resolute commitment to democratic governance.
Despite spending the summer rallying support for his cause, King and the Lib-
erals lacked sufficient confidence in their one-seat majority to introduce legis-
lation on the matter during the fall session of 1924. Rather, King made vague 
promises to pass a bill similar to the 1911 British one without actually committing 
to anything. Such hesitancy did not stop the Manitoba Free Press from outlining 
potential legislation in a most generous light. In an editorial from October of 1924 
Dafoe argued, ‘The object of a second chamber is to ensure careful deliberation 
and to prevent hasty, ill-considered legislation. The proposed amendment would 
allow for this without permanently blocking the will of the people’. Additionally, 
Dafoe attempted to undermine any opposition to reform, stating,
Opposition to such an amendment cannot come from regard for the public 
interest but only from dark, ulterior considerations. Is the will of the people 
to prevail in Canada, or are the interests to retain the hold which they have 
had upon the government of the country through the irresponsible Senate and 
otherwise?
(Dafoe 1924)
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By invoking the idea that the Senate was not responsible to any elected body, 
Dafoe sought to stigmatise any exercise of the Senate’s constitutional power to 
block legislation. In the pages of the Free Press, what could be interpreted as 
a simple partisan conflict between Liberals and Conservatives was instead pre-
sented as a clash between the democratically elected representatives of the Cana-
dian people and nefarious forces acting out of self-interest.
In December of 1924 The Manitoba Free Press published another editorial 
attacking Conservatives who defended the status quo with regard to the Senate. 
The paper characterised the Tory intransigence as misguided, stating, ‘The Second 
Chamber occupies no such invincible position as our die-hards and stand-patters 
think’ (Manitoba Free Press 1924b). In the face of substantial and sustained oppo-
sition from Conservative parliamentarians, the Free Press became more vocal in 
their support of the Liberal position. In an article from the summer of 1925 titled 
‘The Senate Reaches Out’, the paper informed readers that not only were Senators 
and their Conservative allies in the House of Commons resisting reform but they 
also were the driving force behind
a persistent movement to enlarge the powers of the Canadian Senate for a 
reason that is quite plain. Powers and influences that believe they have an 
indefeasible right to control this country are turning to the Senate as the grip 
upon the Commons shows signs of weakening.
Much as they had during the 1921 election campaign, the Liberals and their sup-
porters sought to continue this attack on the Conservatives for failing to respect 
the basic pillar of Canadian democracy: responsible – or cabinet – government. 
As Dafoe reminded readers, ‘our nominated Senate is . . . entirely irresponsi-
ble’ (Manitoba Free Press 1925). But just as the Conservative or Union Govern-
ment had had every constitutional right to govern until the House was dissolved, 
for they commanded a majority in the Commons, the Senate had a legal right to 
amend or veto legislation, and doing so did not contravene the tenants of responsi-
ble government. However, rather than relying on constitutional arguments which 
served only to undermine the Liberals’ position, the party’s intellectual leaders 
drew on the rhetoric of popular democracy to argue for an entirely new constitu-
tional convention.
The Manitoba Free Press was not alone in supporting the Liberals. On 22 
December 1924, the same date as that of the Free Press editorial quoted ear-
lier, the traditionally Liberal Toronto Globe published a long editorial arguing in 
favour of legislation limiting the Senate’s power. Specifically relying on Western 
Canadian grievances to bolster its contention, the Globe piece presented the Cana-
dian Senate as a unique institution in democratic countries, stating,
In no other country with a parliamentary tradition is the Upper House so 
frankly based on party patronage and so wholly independent of public opin-
ion or public favour. Students of constitutional history who believe in democ-
racy have a logical quarrel with such a body.
(Toronto Globe 1924)
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The paper declined to offer any evidence for its assertion, demonstrating how 
alleging that the Senate was uniquely undemocratic had simply become part of 
the arsenal of arguments Liberal supporters deployed with regularity. In the Free 
Press editorial from June of 1925, Dafoe compared the Senate unfavorably with 
the British House of Lords, writing, ‘The House of Lords, it appears, is a mere 
shadow of a legislative body compared with our nominated Senate’ (Manitoba 
Free Press 1925). Dafoe chose to ignore the hereditary nature of the House of 
Lords or the presence of Church of England bishops in the British upper house, 
rather emphasising that the appointed nature of the Senate combined with its unre-
stricted power to amend or veto legislation should be the primary factor in deter-
mining the democratic nature of each country’s parliament.
Legislative inaction
Despite the advocacy of Liberal newspapers, legislation similar to the British 
initiative faced substantial obstacles. First was that it would require approval 
from both the House of Commons and the Senate. Essentially, the Conservative- 
dominated Senate would have to acquiesce to the supremacy of the Liberal-
controlled Commons. Furthermore, the Senate had a constitutionally mandated 
number of seats, so the Prime Minister could not convince the governor general 
to appointing additional senators to ensure the government’s legislation passed. 
Such a political reality meant that any reform initiative was a long-term project 
for the Liberals. As a result, King was willing to use the possibility of Senate 
reform as a tool for ensuring the Progressive Party supported the Liberals’ tenu-
ous majority. To do so, King made a series of personal guarantees to the Progres-
sive Party regarding Senate appointments, pledging to appoint only Senators who 
would agree to support unspecified reform measures in the future. Thus, once 
the Liberals gained a majority in the Senate, they would then be in a position to 
pass whatever legislation deemed necessary. This solution to the challenge posed 
by the Senate was deeply flawed, as neither King’s assurances nor the pledge of 
newly appointed Senators was legally enforceable. Even if the Progressives with-
drew their support for the Liberals in the House of Commons to punish King’s 
perfidy, once a Senator was appointed, there was no way to ensure they honoured 
the pledge King had extracted from them. As a consequence the Progressive Party 
dismissed this overture from the Liberal Party (Fraser 1954).
With the Liberals frustrated in the Commons, King’s attempts to equate oppos-
ing the Liberal government’s policies with opposition to democratic governance 
generally became an important campaign message for the Liberal Party in the 
September 1925 federal election. In a campaign pamphlet titled “Progress and 
Achievement”, the National Liberal Federation employed King’s rhetoric to 
appeal directly to voters. The pamphlet first reiterated the problems the Liberal 
administration faced from a hostile Senate before demonstrating how they would 
solve this problem:
When there is a change in Government in Canada it usually happens that the 
Senate is controlled by the Opposition. This embarrasses a new government 
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and its majority in the House and prevents the will of the people being fully 
carried out as expressed at the general election. . . . The people believe that 
the Canadian House of Commons should have the same power as the British 
House of Commons to pass legislation and the Prime Minister personally 
declared this to be his view. How he is going to bring this about was fully set 
forth in his keynote speech in North York. Liberal Senators already in office, 
as well as those who are to be appointed, will be pledged to support the nec-
essary constitutional change. The government in this campaign is seeking a 
mandate from the people. If that be forthcoming, the will of the people will 
be translated into political action as soon as the supporters of the government 
constitute a substantial majority of the senate.
(Liberal Party of Canada 1925)
What was essentially King’s promise to the Progressives earlier in 1925 was now 
elevated by the National Liberal Federation to a key election pledge. The author 
echoed King’s public comments by emphasising how critical it was that the Com-
mons and through it the cabinet have unimpeded power to pass legislation. The 
Liberals justified this position by appealing to the idea of a democratic mandate 
conferred through a general election. Specifically, the Liberals argued that the 
victorious party in an election represented the will of the Canadian people. Such 
a claim was a fabrication though, as only 41 per cent of voters supported the 
Liberals in the 1921 election. Furthermore, with only 67.7 per cent voter turnout, 
only 29 per cent of eligible Canadians actually voted for the Liberals. For King to 
claim that the 1921 election results meant the Liberal Party spoke on behalf of all 
Canadians was a rhetorical sleight of hand designed to delegitimise opposition to 
the Liberal legislative agenda.
King’s ability to claim a mandate from the people was further undermined after 
the 1925 federal election. The Liberals lost the popular vote 46 per cent to 40 per 
cent to the Conservatives and also won fifteen fewer seats, taking one hundred 
to the Conservatives 115. Yet King refused to resign as prime minister and, with 
the support of the twenty-two Progressive Party members, continued to govern. 
King’s ministry managed to hold power until June 1926, when a scandal over 
bribery in the Department of Customs and Excise brought down the government. 
Before his government was defeated on a motion of censure, King requested the 
governor general dissolve Parliament and call a general election, but his request 
was refused. Instead, the governor general offered Arthur Meighen a chance to 
govern. Meighen’s ministry lasted only three days before being defeated in the 
House of Commons, forcing a general election. Ultimately, though, the federal 
election of 1926 was only a partial victory for the Liberals. While they managed 
to win a plurality of seats with 116 and increase their share of the popular vote by 
3 per cent (to 43 per cent), the Liberals lost the popular vote by 2 per cent to the 
Conservatives and were still seven seats short of a majority. However, King was 
able to rely on the eight votes of the Liberal-Progressives who, led by Manitoba 
MP and former Progressive Party leader Robert Forke, agreed to caucus with the 
Liberals and support the government on matters of confidence. Thus, much like 
after 1921, the Conservatives were once again facing a majority government in 
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the House of Commons and had to rely on their presence in the Senate to obstruct 
King’s legislative agenda.
Without the political imperative of securing Progressive Party support on a 
vote by vote basis and with an increasing number of Liberal appointees in the 
upper chamber, curbing the power of the Senate was a much less pressing issue 
for King. Rather than risk engaging in public debates regarding the Senate, King 
commissioned a private report for the cabinet on political options regarding the 
upper chamber. King’s personal secretary and future Liberal Member of Parlia-
ment Norman McLeod Rogers was tasked with writing this report and presented 
his recommendations to the Liberal Cabinet on 12 September 1927. In his report 
Rogers engaged with the idea of how the Senate limited the power of the elected 
House of Commons. Rogers recognised that, ‘An elective Senate having a direct 
mandate from the people would be more aggressive and active in the discharge of 
its functions, and would thus command a greater respect throughout the country’. 
However, he then went on to clearly articulate the Liberal Party’s reasons for 
opposing an elected upper chamber, stating:
If the Senate were elective, would it not be disposed to claim equal powers 
with the House of Commons, or at least to insist on a measure of control with 
respect to money bills? Moreover, an elected Senate would be an avowedly 
partisan body. If the majorities in the two houses were of the same politi-
cal complexion, the Senate would impose no effective check on the House 
of Commons. If the majorities in the two houses were of opposite political 
complexions, the Senate under partisan influence might abuse its powers for 
political purposes.
(Rogers 1927)
This report, produced by King’s political ally, provided the necessary justification 
for the prime minister’s approach towards the Senate. Rather than focusing legis-
lative efforts on changing how the Senate was constituted, for as Rogers argued, 
no method would resolve the problem of partisanship in the upper chamber, the 
Liberals instead chose to focus on limiting the powers of the Senate. This approach 
still preserved the ability of the governing party to use Senate appointments for 
patronage purposes but also confirmed the power of the prime minister and his 
cabinet to ensure that the Senate would not have the democratic legitimacy to 
challenge the legislative power of King and his ministers.
From 1926 through the end of King’s term in 1930, the Senate continued to 
delay controversial aspects of the Liberals’ legislative agenda. Most notable was 
the government’s continued attempts to repeal Section 98 of the Criminal Code, 
which the Senate defeated five times between 1926 and 1930. As well, the Sen-
ate defeated proposed changes to the Immigration Act in 1927. Yet these defeats 
presented an excellent opportunity for the Liberals to highlight their supposed 
superiority. In January 1928, Vancouver Sun editor and partisan Liberal Robert J. 
Cromie published an editorial condemning the Conservative Party, arguing that its 
willingness to obstruct legislation in the Senate was undemocratic. An exchange 
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of letters between Cromie and Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe demonstrated 
how the Liberals were happy to exploit the Conservatives’ intransigence. Cromie 
told Lapointe, ‘If the Liberal Party can hang this [anti-democratic] angle onto 
Toryism and drive it home . . . it will be a master stroke’. Cromie then went on to 
offer a historical analogy:
From 1890 to 1900 there was an inferiority complex about the Conservative 
party in England because of their associations with the rich and rotting House 
of Lords; there was a superiority complex associated with Liberals during 
that period because they had associated with them the idea of progressive-
ness and intellectualism. That superiority complex is offering and is available 
to either of the political parties in Canada today; it properly belongs to the 
Liberal Party with its Liberal program of Canadianism.
(Cromie 1928)
The Senate certainly did obstruct Liberal legislation, but their opposition allowed 
the governing party to reinforce to voters that the Liberals were the true protec-
tors of Canadian democracy. The Liberals were also willing to further enhance 
this impression by letting the Senate Conservatives defeat legislation in the upper 
chamber by ensuring enough Liberal Senators missed key votes (Government 
of Canada 1936). In the short-term, these defeats were a slight setback to that 
session’s agenda but cumulatively they reinforced the image the Liberal Party 
wanted to present to the Canadian public. The fact that, after the 1930 federal 
election, the now governing Conservatives refused to take any action to address 
the Senate or to reform its practices also reinforced the Liberals’ narrative. Ulti-
mately, telling people that a certain party was anti-democratic was a much more 
effective when they occasionally acted in the exact manner that the Liberals 
warned they would.
Conclusion
Returning to power in 1921 after a decade in opposition was always going to 
present a number of challenges for the Liberal Party of Canada. Besides manag-
ing a razor thin majority in the House of Commons, the Senate of Canada was the 
largest obstacle to the Liberals’ and Prime Minister King’s ambitions. The chal-
lenge for the Liberals was how to sideline the Senate and make senators hesitant 
to use their constitutionally prescribed powers to delay, block or amend legisla-
tion. Barring that, how could the Liberals ensure that any short-term defeat in the 
Senate was turned into the Liberals’ long-term advantage? As this chapter has 
argued, the approach King, his party and their allies in the media adopted was to 
invoke the concept of a democratic mandate, supposedly conferred on the Liberals 
by the Canadian people. That is, the Liberals claimed that they, as the ruling party, 
and King, as their leader, spoke and legislated on behalf of the Canadian people 
as a whole. Consequently, the Senate represented only the parochial and selfish 
interests of Conservative elites.
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Positing the existence of a democratic mandate, much less claiming that the 
Liberal Party had been granted one, required importing an American concept into 
a Canadian political system deeply influenced by its British connection and his-
tory. The Liberals and King exploited the lack of a consultative mechanism in the 
Westminster system through which the governing party could be clearly granted 
a mandate, allowing the Liberals to be vague in asserting how exactly they had 
been empowered to speak for the people. While Senators could point to the British 
North America Act 1867 and conventions in the Westminster system as the source 
of their powers, these claims could be undercut by appealing to broader princi-
ples and malleable concepts, which were used by the Liberals to delegitimise any 
attempt by the Senate to assert its authority. Ultimately, as demonstrated, Senators 
were still willing to use their power to defeat government legislation and did so 
with semi-regularity throughout the 1920s. But each defeat also further enhanced 
the Liberals’ narrative of a democratic party protecting the people and their free-
dom to govern themselves. By using its constitutionally granted powers, the Sen-
ate did not effectively assert itself but rather contributed to its ongoing irrelevance 
by confirming the worst allegations of King and the Liberal Party.
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Introduction
It is easy to justify the bicameral system in the abstract – the pitiably weak attempts 
to discredit it in some of the Presidential speeches [Éamon de Valera’s] are the best 
proof of that; but it is very difficult to suggest a scheme for a Second Chamber 
[Senate] that will function both efficiently and smoothly.
– Binchy, 1936
The words of Daniel A. Binchy, University College Dublin scholar and former 
Irish Free State envoy to Germany, encapsulated the conundrum facing Irish 
advocates for a new senate in the 1930s. Many politicians and commentators 
desired the additional oversight offered by a second chamber, yet the govern-
ment’s actions made it clear that any effective senate would have to be different in 
character and composition from its predecessor. After the tumultuous final years 
of the state’s first upper house, the reconstituted Senate emerged in 1938 from a 
constitutional crusade undertaken by the state’s leader, Éamon de Valera, and his 
Fianna Fáil party, in power from 1932 to 1948. The clashes between de Valera and 
the previous Senate over issues relating to the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and Irish 
sovereignty contributed significantly if not exclusively to that chamber’s demise, 
while the state’s new constitution (Bunreacht na hÉireann), 1937, laid out the 
framework for its successor (O’Sullivan 1940; Manning 1970; cf. Dorney, this 
volume). It is perhaps for this reason that much of the scholarship on senates in 
independent Ireland has focused on the more colourful (and powerful) first incar-
nation of the upper house, which had such a public confrontation with the govern-
ment in the early 1930s (O’Sullivan 1940; Byrne 2015). The scholarly consensus 
on the 1938 incarnation has been negative; many have criticised the chamber’s 
shortcomings while pointing to possibilities for reform, while others have been 
scornful of its vocational ethos – an element instituted as a nod to the Catho-
lic social thought popular among many Irish academics and writers at the time 
(Chubb 1954; Garvin 1969; Lee 1989). However, an examination of the chamber 
in the period between 1938 and 1948 reveals both its tendencies to confirm some 
of the its worst dismissals and to confound some of the broad generalisations 
made about the Senate.
14  Vocational voices or puppets 
of the lower house?
Irish senators, 1938–1948
Martin O’Donoghue
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The early years of the new upper house coincided with a critical juncture in the 
early history of the Irish state, Europe and the wider world. The new constitution 
gave the Irish state many of the features of a republic, settled its tariff war with 
Britain and, just as Europe seemed destined for conflict, secured the return of 
ports which had remained in British control in 1921 (Keogh & McCarthy 2007). 
The new Senate, Seanad Éireann, which met for the first time on 27 April 1938, 
bore the outward appearance at least of vocationalism, an ideal being espoused 
by Catholic thinkers and Fascist leaders on the continent. This chapter will inves-
tigate this influence, assessing the controversies over its vocational character and 
the problems faced by the chamber if it was to remain true to this ideal. However, 
while there is no denying the weaknesses of the Senate’s selection and election 
procedures, the partisan nature of much of its proceedings and the limited scope of 
its legislative powers, this chapter intends to situate its origins and development in 
the context of the domestic and European crises in which it emerged. In doing so, 
it will seek to reflect on not only the membership of the house and the elements of 
vocationalism which did inform its activities but also the character of the Seanad 
and how members perceived their role in its first decade of operation.
Why vocationalism?
The rationale for the Senate established in 1922 had been clear: it provided a 
safeguard for religious minorities in the state which might not be represented in 
the lower house (the Dáil). It also followed a legislative idea visible in a number 
of proposals for ‘home rule’ in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century 
(Akenson & Fallin 1970; Cahillane 2016). By the 1930s, however, the Free State 
Senate, along with other elements of the 1922 constitution, were no longer fit for 
de Valera’s purpose (Coffey 2018b; cf. Dorney, this volume). The abolition of the 
Senate can be grouped together with de Valera dismantling the Treaty of 1921 
and the tariff dispute with Britain, as issues causing disquiet among not only the 
Protestant minority but also the opposition more generally, partially explaining 
the desire for a new upper house (Bowman 1982).
The concerns of 1922 would not influence Fianna Fáil legislation in the 1930s. 
The party’s Seán T. O’Kelly argued that provisions for minorities were no longer 
required and pointed out that it was the actions of Cumann na nGaedheal-led 
government in the 1920s that removed many of the previous Senate’s more wide-
ranging functions, including the power of referendum (Rohan 1982). Yet the 
action of O’Kelly’s party in abolishing the upper house in 1936 and his subse-
quent commentary highlighted the fragile constitutional state of the country after 
so many amendments to the 1922 constitution and the practical destruction of the 
Treaty with Britain. The legacy of bitterness over the Civil War (1922–1923) also 
maintained an atmosphere of distrust in political circles; one contemporary com-
mentator noted that the demise of the upper house meant de Valera had removed 
‘the last effective brake on his power’ (Horgan 1934). Regardless of the fears 
and suspicions his political opponents may have held, it was, as Brian Farrell has 
noted, a ‘classic opportunity for dictatorship’ in an era of dictatorships (Farrell 
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1988, p. 30; cf. Keogh & McCarthy 2007). Instead, however, de Valera had begun 
to work on a new constitution, and the result, Bunreacht na hÉireann, was to 
include the re-constituted Senate.
As outlined by John Dorney in this volume, the method of election to the 1922 
Senate on a triennial basis proved problematic, producing a dismally low turnout 
and a counting process that dragged on for weeks in 1925 (Coakley 2005). In the 
mid-1930s, de Valera himself seems to have been unconvinced by theories of 
bicameralism and, as Nicholas Mansergh (1934) pointed out, a unicameral sys-
tem perhaps would have been more in tune with republican ideals. While Donal 
Coffey’s recent research on the drafting of the 1937 constitution has pointed to 
the ‘constitutional experimentation’ visible in interwar Europe, his work has pre-
sented Bunreacht na hÉireann as a ‘melange’ of four influences – nationalism, 
interwar liberalism, the British parliamentary tradition and Catholicism (Coffey 
2018a, pp. 2–4). While liberal democracy has been judged a dominant influence 
in the overall document, it was in the Senate where Catholic social thought was 
brought to the fore (Hogan 2012; Broderick 2017). Public debates on the Senate 
had long referenced Catholic social theory, which had grown in popularity and 
esteem, especially since the 1929 Papal Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, which 
followed the earlier Rerum Novarum (1891) (Mullarkey 1999; O’Leary 2000; cf. 
Coyne 1934). In fact, a minority draft of a constitution in 1922 put forward by 
University College Cork academic Alfred O’Rahilly included a number of Catho-
lic social principles, including a senate organised on vocational lines (Cahillane 
2016). Ideas on these lines featured heavily in discussions for a second chamber in 
the intervening years, although Labour Party proposals to this effect in 1928 were 
withdrawn amid doubt as to how workable such a scheme would be (Kohn 1940). 
Such misgivings failed to dissuade advocates for vocationalism, who became 
more visible once the Free State Senate was set for abolition.
The Irish Jesuit literary and academic journal Studies was the forum for several 
ideas from Catholic intellectuals concerning the new Senate (Faughnan 1988). 
Expressing belief in vocationalism as the ‘only alternative to the present intolera-
ble’ situation, O’Rahilly (1936, p. 8) warned the journal’s readers that Ireland was 
‘well on our way towards what in another generation will be a totalitarian state 
under the dictatorship of a political clique and set of commissars miscalled civil 
servants’. He wanted a senate partially elected from the Dáil and partially elected 
from the vocational groups that existed in the state, admitting that the country was 
not yet organised properly in a vocational manner. Daniel Binchy (1936) lamented 
the decline and fall of the first Senate, owing to its amended method of election. 
He echoed the claims of many theorists that a senate should ideally be free from 
‘political strife’ and contain a better class of representative than the lower cham-
ber – whatever that might mean. Thus, he too argued for a senate based ‘mainly, 
though not exclusively on vocational representation’ (Binchy 1936, pp. 25–28). 
His proposal for a senate included a six-month power of delay on legislation, 
except where three-fifths of the senate rejected the bill. The bill would then be 
dead unless three-fifths of the Dáil passed it after six months. For Rev. Denis 
O’Keeffe (1936), professor of ethics and politics at University College Dublin, 
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the circumstances of the time, where ‘representative democracy is no longer taken 
for granted’, meant a second chamber was preferable as ‘unicameral government 
makes it extraordinarily difficult for a democratic system to survive’.
Developments in European politics made such concerns easily understandable 
as ‘strongmen’ leaders of the right and left came to power. It must be highlighted, 
however, that the writers very much argued in the vein of the ‘vocationalism’ of 
the Vatican rather than the ‘corporatism’ of Mussolini, notwithstanding the fact 
that corporatism had been briefly espoused by the main opposition party, Fine 
Gael though it slowly abandoned the policy after the short-lived leadership of 
Eoin O’Duffy (Broderick 1994; Manning 1970; McGarry 2005). In any case, 
despite such dire warnings that an upper chamber based on vocational representa-
tion could help to preserve democracy, de Valera’s interest seemed to extend only 
to a house with purely revisory responsibilities, and he mentioned the Norwegian 
example of a senate reflecting the lower chamber and therefore guaranteeing a 
government majority (Garvin 1969; cf. Smith, E., this volume). He also doubted 
whether a senate could either be neutral or work as a brake on the power of the 
lower house (Coffey 2018b). This makes it difficult to discern the exact reasons 
why he bowed to calls for a senate by setting a Commission on the Second House 
of the Oireachtas (Parliament) in 1936.
The commission featured a range of senior legal and administrative figures who 
met between June and September 1936 and produced a majority report along with 
two minority reports (Broderick 2017). While the majority report was influential 
in other respects, the system of choosing senators de Valera adopted drew on a 
vocational model suggested by one of the minority reports. While vocational on 
the one hand, de Valera’s model included an electorate of politicians. Eleven of 
the senators were to be ‘Taoiseach’s nominees’ (i.e. nominated by the PM) in a 
move that guaranteed a government majority and six senators to be elected from 
the University of Dublin (Trinity College) and the National University of Ireland. 
The composition of the rest of the house was organised along a system of voca-
tional panels. This left forty-three seats to be filled from five ‘vocational’ panels 
drawn from the minority report: ‘Culture and Education’, ‘Industry and Com-
merce’, ‘Labour’, ‘Agriculture’ and ‘Administration’. Senators were expected to 
have ‘knowledge and practical experience’ of the areas they represented (Bun-
reacht 1937, Art. 18). The electorate for these seats and the exact allocation of 
places on each panel was left to subsequent legislation rather than being enshrined 
in the constitution. The agreed tallies were ‘Cultural and Educational’ (five), 
‘Agricultural’ (eleven), ‘Labour’ (eleven), ‘Industrial and Commercial’ (nine) and 
‘Administrative’ (seven). However, the use of councillors and TDs (Teachta Dála – 
MPs) as electors – along with the fact just over half of candidates elected for the 
panels (twenty-two out of forty-three) would be nominated by TDs rather than 
nominated directly by ‘vocational’ bodies (Garvin 1969) – seemed to delay at best 
the provision contained in Article 19:
Provision may be made by law for the direct election by any functional or 
vocational group or association or council of so many members of Seanad 
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Éireann as may be fixed by such law in substitution for an equal number of 
the members to be elected from the corresponding panels of candidates con-
stituted under Article 18 of this constitution.
(Bunreacht 1937, Art. 19)
Yet de Valera persisted with the minority report as part of his constitutional over-
haul. Prof. James Hogan of University College Cork encapsulated the contradic-
tions, writing to fellow enthusiast Alfred O’Rahilly. Welcoming the inclusion of 
vocational principles in the constitution, Hogan looked forward to the provision 
for direct election from functional councils. However, he added:
Unfortunately, it seems to me that most of the good is taken out of the provi-
sion by the fact that representatives of vocational groups are to be substituted 
for those elected by TDs and would-be TDs. We all know how slow people 
are to let go of any powers they may have, and I do not think it likely that TDs 
will be capable of that sort of self-denying ordinance by which representa-
tives of functional or vocational groups would be directly elected. If TDs then 
don’t give up their right to elect the 43 panel senators, then direct election 
will remain a dead letter.
( Hogan s.d.)
He was to be proven correct.
The electoral system
Concerns about the electoral system were also articulated within government at 
the time and among those with no particular desire for vocational organisation. 
Minister for Finance Seán MacEntee wrote to de Valera in November 1936, argu-
ing that ‘the defects inherent in such a system are obvious’. At the very least, the 
franchise had to be widened in his view. Presuming that the desire was for an upper 
house with the ‘same political outlook’ as the Dáil, MacEntee suggested a senate 
elected by local politicians from around the country under three constituencies 
with proportional representation: ‘rural areas’, ‘smaller urban areas’ and ‘larger 
urban areas’ (MacEntee 1936a). In fact, MacEntee felt so strongly about the mat-
ter that he felt the government could lose a Dáil vote on the new senate unless 
they presented a house that was not ‘the creature or the puppet of the Dáil’ (Mac-
Entee 1936b). As the cabinet intervened, diluting the university representation – 
potentially an obstacle to the government and a legacy of university representation 
in the lower house – was also considered, and the number of senators increased 
during the drafting process (Coffey 2018a). The mechanism for making vocation-
alism truly workable, however, still appeared to be missing.
Indeed, the work of the Seanad in its early years would often be undermined 
by accusations of corruption in the electoral system. As early as July 1942, agri-
cultural panellist John Joseph Counihan raised a motion seeking a committee 
be appointed to investigate the method of electing the Seanad (Seanad Éireann 
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1942, 15 July; O’Donoghue 2016). While senior government senators immedi-
ately sought to defend the chamber, public and private concern at the operation of 
Senate nominations and elections only increased (Seanad Éireann 1942, 15 July). 
Agriculture Minister James Ryan wrote to de Valera on 27 October 1943, suggest-
ing 1) enlarging the franchise and 2) for each county to return a candidate because 
‘I feel that it would not be possible for any candidate to bribe the majority of the 
members of any County Council’ (Ryan 1943).
While another Senate motion calling for a judicial investigation into the elec-
tions was rejected in 1943, Labour party senators Michael Foran and Michael Col-
gan were unambiguous in their views that corruption was widespread – a theme 
taken up at the party conference in 1945 (Seanad Éireann 1943, 27 Oct.; Irish 
Independent 1945). Parties often instructed their members how to vote in Senate 
elections (Chubb 1954; Broderick 2017). Although only one case of corruption 
was ever proven, an Oireachtas committee was eventually set up to look at chang-
ing the method of election amid efforts on similar lines within Government (Lee 
1989; Byrne 2013).
When the eventual reform bill was passing through the Seanad in 1946, oppo-
sition leader Michael Hayes argued that the Seanad ‘was not in any sense voca-
tional’ and that the new legislation would do little to effect change in that regard 
(Seanad Éireann 1947, 12 Dec., cc.1599). The 1947 Seanad (Electoral Panel 
Members) Act maintained a complicated electoral system but at least increased 
the electorate to include senators and all councillors and greatly increased the 
quota required to be elected (which had been just eight under the original 1937 
Act). The new Act then applied to all elections from 1948 onwards (Chubb 1954). 
However, the truly vocational election method provided for by Article 19 of the 
constitution has never come to pass.
Politicians or vocationalists? The membership, 1938–1948
Criticisms of the vocational character of the chamber is sustained by analysis of 
the members returned between 1938 and 1948. The ‘2nd Seanad’ in 1938 con-
tained nineteen senators who had served in the previous Senate between 1922 
and 1936, while eighteen had been TDs prior to 1938, a figure only somewhat 
explained by the transfer of university representation from Dáil to Seanad (Rohan 
1982). Such figures suggest a certain amount of continuity between the two ver-
sions of the upper house. In fact, the number of the senators who had also been 
members of the previous house at some point between 1922 and 1936 remained 
a sizeable minority throughout the period 1938–1948, with nineteen in the 3rd 
Seanad, eleven in the 4th Seanad and thirteen in the 5th Seanad. The number of 
ex-TDs also floated around the figure of twenty (elections to the Seanad occur 
after general elections to the Dáil, allowing unsuccessful candidates to seek con-
solation in the upper house). The subsequent election of those losing seats in the 
Dáil and the ‘ascension’ of some senators to the Dáil would seem to betray the 
early signs of what Cohan saw as the Seanad acting as the first rung of the politi-
cal ladder for aspiring politicians and a resting home for older ones (Cohan 1972). 
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Although the majority report of the commission to set up the Senate called for 
women’s representation, just four served as senators in the first decade, out of 
a total of 117. Just two of the female senators (Linda Kearns MacWhinney and 
former TD Margaret Mary Pearse) were elected onto vocational panels; Helena 
Concannon held a university seat, while Margaret Kennedy was a Taoiseach’s 
nominee (Report 1936).
The selection of the eleven Taoiseach’s nominees, a function essentially 
designed to ensure government advantage, could not be said to have been entirely 
partisan in the early years. For example, Frank MacDermot had been a thorn in 
de Valera’s side in the Dáil as a representative of the National Farmers and Rate-
payers’ League (later the Centre Party), Fine Gael, and as an independent deputy. 
Nevertheless, the tone of appeals to de Valera for nomination preserved in Depart-
ment of the Taoiseach files often centred on the past record of prospective can-
didates, particularly drawing on the War of Independence period (1919–1921). 
Many other appeals were personal entreaties for nominations to keep someone in 
public life, sometimes even for the sake of the individual’s family, their locality 
or the strength of the Fianna Fáil party and were written by spouses, neighbours, 
community leaders or even other politicians. Such letters hardly speak of any 
idealised regard for the new chamber among party loyalists. Yet there is no evi-
dence these appeals influenced de Valera. Of the eighty-three direct applications 
for nomination for the 2nd Seanad made by individuals or third parties acting on 
one’s behalf, just one (Maurice George Moore) was nominated by the Taoiseach 
(Applications s.d.).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, since de Valera remained Taoiseach for this entire 
period under consideration here, the attrition rate in nominated senators was not 
very high. Including senators appointed during the life of each house to replace 
those Taoiseach nominees who vacated their seats, ten of those nominated by de 
Valera in the 3rd Seanad had been nominated by him for the 2nd. Of these, six 
remained nominees for the fourth and fifth houses. Two senators nominated by de 
Valera to the 3rd Seanad were again nominated to the fourth and fifth Senates by 
the Taoiseach. Furthermore, two senators, Seán Patrick Campbell and Margaret 
Mary Pearse, nominated for the first time to the short-lived fourth house, were 
again nominated to the 5th Seanad. This consistency may also be reflected in the 
fact that the second and fourth houses were of very brief tenure and did not afford 
adequate opportunities to representatives.
The work of the Seanad
The reconstituted Senate certainly lacked its predecessor’s capacity to disrupt 
legislation and antagonise the government. In terms of legislative powers, the 
commission’s majority report has been judged ‘influential’ as the Seanad’s power 
of delay was reduced to ninety days for non-money bills (Hogan 2012). It could 
also only delay a boney bill by twenty-one days. Other bills could only be sus-
pended by 180 days before a bill rejected by the upper chamber or one passed with 
amendments unacceptable to the lower house would be passed by the Dáil alone 
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(Bunreacht na Éireann 1937, art.23). However, the Seanad had the right to appeal 
whether a bill constituted a money bill to the newly created office of president 
(head of state), who could set up a Committee of Privilege with equal membership 
from both houses to rule on the matter (Bunreacht na Éireann 1937, art.22). Con-
versely, the constitution allowed for the delay period to be ‘abridged’ to a period 
laid out in the resolution of the Dáil if legislation was judged ‘urgent’ or occurred 
in time of national emergency and would remain law for ninety days unless both 
houses then agreed it should remain longer (Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937, art.24).
Party politics unquestionably dominated debating and voting patterns in the 
Seanad. The (Irish Press 1938) estimated the composition after the announcement 
of de Valera’s nominees to be thirty-three pro-government senators and twenty-
seven anti-government. The chair and vice-chair were elected along partisan lines 
from the house’s inception (Byrne 2013). Between 1938 and 1948, responses 
were usually led by William Quirke and Michael Hayes as government and oppo-
sition leaders in the Seanad and Labour Party senators often grouped together in 
proposing and voting on motions, even in an era when the party was damaged by 
a lack of unity. Even if senators offered varying levels of agreement or disagree-
ment with motions or proposed legislation, their voting patterns usually stayed 
in line. A government-sponsored bill was not defeated in the Seanad until 1959, 
although the upper house did succeed in forcing changes to the 1943 Intoxicating 
Liquor Act (Garvin 1969). While a number of bills in this period were passed with 
amendments proposed in the Senate and amendments put forward in the upper 
house had usually been accepted by the Dáil, the partisan reality of the chamber 
and its operation must have been depressing for true vocationalists.
Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, the fact that a number of panel sena-
tors did behave in a vocational manner has often been lost in the fog of unsat-
isfactory electoral systems, accusations of corruption, party dominance and the 
progressive sidelining of the chamber in Irish public debate (O’Donoghue 2016). 
Despite such inherent problems, a significant portion of senators could be classed 
as representative of the sectors they were supposed to represent in the first decade, 
particularly on the labour and agriculture panels, though accurate classification is 
impeded by the fact that Irish society generally was not organised along vocational 
lines (O’Donoghue 2016). As Chubb (1954) pointed out, many of these examples 
owed to shrewd political connections rather than a suitable vocational electoral 
system. Yet motions moved by senators on their volition rather than legislation 
initiated in the lower house offered the best opportunity for independent action, 
and between 1938 and 1945, 76 per cent of motions on agricultural matters were 
moved or seconded by agriculture panellists; 58.3 per cent, in the case of industry 
and commerce (O’Donoghue 2016). While the fact that many senators withdrew 
motions having ‘ventilated’ the issue reflected the chamber’s paucity of legisla-
tive power, noteworthy examples of vocational behaviour include Industrial and 
Commercial panellist James Green Douglas’s proposal for a court for industrial 
disputes and Agriculture panellist Patrick Baxter’s motion on a proposed agricul-
tural commission. A similar idea to the former suggestion was behind the sub-
sequent establishment of the Labour Court, while the latter motion saw action 
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much sooner as a commission on agriculture was set up in 1939 (Finlay 1996; 
O’Donoghue 2016).
Yet the Seanad’s shortcomings as a vocational chamber undermined the work 
of any true idealists. In November 1938, Frank MacDermot and Michael Tierney 
moved a motion to set up a commission to examine ways of extending voca-
tional organisation in Irish society (Seanad Éireann 1938, 13 July). Such a move, 
so clearly linked to any future for the Senate as a truly vocational house, was 
ultimately successful. The remarks of Tierney, perhaps the greatest advocate of 
vocationalism in the house, which argued that the Labour Party and the Farmers’ 
Party would be redundant under vocationalism as both were symptoms of the 
disease of class warfare were interesting (Seanad Éireann 1938, 13 July). None-
theless, how many in both parties and elsewhere in politics were as dedicated to 
the papal solution to this remained questionable. The Commission on Vocational 
Organisation was set up under the chairmanship of the Catholic bishop of Galway, 
Michael Brown. It did not report to government until 1943, when it was, by gen-
eral historical consensus, largely ignored. While it was occasionally referenced 
after that, including in Seanad debates, the report was received badly, antagonis-
ing civil servants and cabinet members alike with its plans to reorganise Irish 
society and its suspicion of state bureaucracy (O’Leary 2000; Lee 1979). In fact, 
both then and afterwards, many senators disagreed with the vocationalist view. 
In 1946, William Fearon queried why party politics were sometimes referred to 
as something ‘not entirely respectable’ (Seanad Éireann 1946, 24 Jan., cc.124). 
Perhaps the Taoiseach articulated the majority view in the same debate when he 
told the house:
You come back therefore to the point where you have to deal with some of 
the fallacies underlying these attacks on Parties. When you come to examine 
it, you will find that democracy cannot work without Parties, that people who 
have a particular point of view in common, group themselves together – peo-
ple who can work together in order to get a particular point of view accepted.
(Seanad Éireann 1946, 24 Jan., cc.107)
Matters of nation and state
Regardless of the issue of vocationalism, another major critique of the chamber 
remains the accusation of irrelevance. A ‘farcical’ debate on literary censorship 
in November 1942, which lasted four days as world war raged, has been widely 
ridiculed in dismissals of the Senate as a serious debating chamber (Ferriter 2004). 
Yet in the early years, the peculiar circumstances of war meant the Seanad fulfilled 
a public role often concerning censorship of a different kind. When the Second 
World War broke out in September 1939, de Valera’s decision to declare neutrality 
received almost universal political support (Senator Frank MacDermot was a rare 
exception, but he resigned his seat in 1943 and criticised Irish neutrality from the 
United States) (MacDermot 1943; cf. Fisk 1983; Girvin 2006). The harsh enforce-
ment of wartime censorship which went along with neutrality, however, meant the 
Irish senators, 1938–1948 211
houses of Parliament assumed a stronger role as forums for the requests and griev-
ances of private citizens (Ó Drisceoil 1996). In addition to debates on ‘emergency’ 
legislation, senators raised motions on important issues such as the reception of 
refugees (Seanad Éireann 1940, 12 June). The danger of bombing raids on the 
country also saw debates on war risk insurance, where senator Hayes led opposi-
tion senators in seeking schemes to protect citizens and businesses in the event of 
attack (Seanad Éireann 1940, 28 August, 29 May, 25 Sept.). Censorship itself was 
regularly debated, whether because of senators moving motions on their own per-
sonal feelings or because of those of members of the public who petitioned them. 
One debate centred on the issue of constitutional rights and the necessary trade-off 
between the rights guaranteed in the new constitution and the precarious nature 
of Irish neutrality (Seanad Éireann 1941, 29 Jan.). Interestingly, one senator who 
raised complaints in the chamber, Donal O’Sullivan, was himself often censored 
or edited during the war, as he wrote articles for the formerly Unionist newspaper, 
the Irish Times, under the nom de plume ‘Outis’, which criticised Fianna Fáil, 
even comparing their policies to national socialism on one occasion (Seanad Éire-
ann 1944, 27 Jan.; Knightly 1942; O’Sullivan 1944a, 1944b).
In truth, the complaints about censorship could be viewed through either of the 
two prisms suggested by Donal Ó Drisceoil (1996) when he wrote of the associa-
tion of opposition to censorship with those uneasy at not being able to support 
Britain in war and the other perspective of the ‘liberal agenda’ of many independ-
ent senators. It was certainly a ‘liberal agenda’ at play in the famous case of liter-
ary censorship referred to earlier, when Sir John Keane moved a motion that the 
Censorship Board had lost public confidence. However, such representations gave 
the Senate a purpose and a certain degree of notoriety. As the war (and censorship) 
ended, this function of the Senate and the chamber lost one of its more effective 
means of garnering media attention. In contrast to the case in states which had 
been combatants in the conflict, the Irish Senate occupied a marginal role in any 
post-1945 imagining of a state which had escaped the worst ravages of the war 
(cf. Callabro 2015).
Conclusion
De Valera’s long period in power ended in 1948 as an inter-party government was 
formed. While the electoral reform calmed accusations of corruption in the Sen-
ate, its place in public esteem was neither altered very much with the change of 
government nor improved as decades passed. Few political commentators nowa-
days would refer to senators by their panel rather than their party designation. By 
international standards, an unusually high number of independent representatives 
have been returned to both the Dáil and the Seanad since the foundation of the 
Free State in 1922. However, the major scholarly study of independent parliamen-
tarians drew few distinctions between independents in the Dáil and the Seanad, 
even though it featured interviews with senators, including a history professor, 
John A. Murphy, who served as an independent in the upper house (1977–1982 
and 1987–1992) (Weeks 2017).
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Although, in one sense, the Seanad emerged between two crises – the tariff 
dispute and constitutional struggle at home and the subsequent outbreak of the 
Second World War – rather than in a crisis, the era of European dictatorships and 
the fragile constitutional state of the country make it easy to understand the desire 
for safeguards and another senate in 1938. The esteem in which social Catholic 
teachings were held meant that any ideas emanating from the Vatican could not be 
dismissed. This was evidenced by the distrust of civil servants and party politics 
expressed in academic and public debate, in the Report on Vocational Organisa-
tion and even, occasionally, in Seanad debates. It also seemed to satisfy the desire 
of some for a house which would protect the public from the government they had 
elected in the lower chamber and the hope that this house would produce a better, 
or at the very least different, house from the Dáil. The experience of the previous 
Senate ensured a contradictory tendency to look for a chamber that would be suf-
ficiently subordinate not to do battle with the lower house. This was the unclear 
picture from which de Valera oversaw, with seemingly ‘incompatible aims’, the 
constitution of a new senate (Chubb 1954).
As outlined here, in the first decade of this Senate, there were certainly clear 
examples of senators who did represent their vocational panels. However, it 
would be foolhardy to use examples of motions such as those referenced ear-
lier to make too strong a defence of vocationalism. Patrick Baxter represented an 
agricultural vocational body but was a member of the Farmers’ Party. It could be 
argued he was representing vocational interest or party interests or indeed both. 
In fact, the Farmers’ Party and the Labour Party could be seen as a ‘vocational 
political parties. One can also observe the personal interest that may be seen in 
any parliament, such as John Counihan’s moves to defend the cattle industry – 
hardly a surprise when we consider Garvin’s (1969) point about the role of senator 
being, in effect, a part-time position. The main employment of senators confuses 
the matter further when they can qualify for numerous ill-defined panels at once. 
Speaking in 1946, Senator Michael Hayes felt that true test of a chamber was not 
its constitutional capacity but the contribution of its members. He concluded that 
despite ‘severe handicaps’ it had become something valuable and tangibly ‘rather 
different from the Dáil’, citing instances of legislation where he believed real 
improvements had been sought by the Seanad and accepted by the lower house 
(Seanad Éireann 1946, 24 Jan., cc.94–96).
Did the new Senate therefore attract, as hoped, people who would not other-
wise find their way into public office? In some cases, the answer was yes. How-
ever, there was still serious overlap between Dáil and Seanad membership with 
career politicians dropping in and out of the second chamber. There were also 
senators who barely contributed to debates (Garvin 1969). In these ten years, the 
Seanad was home to many people who would fit the criteria required for govern-
ment advisors or perhaps have been seen as ‘social partners’ in a later era (Lee 
1979). Leading figures in the trade union movement and agricultural circles com-
bined experts in agricultural science, law and medicine, governors of the Central 
Bank, esteemed scholars and parliamentarians of proven regard. Nevertheless, de 
Valera had stated he wanted people with experience of life and not a committee of 
Irish senators, 1938–1948 213
‘experts’ (Chubb 1954). It could be argued that he got both and that this reflects 
the confused nature of the selection process and the membership.
While the number of motions withdrawn after lengthy debate might imply that 
the house became a fruitless debating society, the chamber provided the oxygen 
of publicity to certain issues – a function that acquired peculiar importance dur-
ing the Second World War. It did not equate to real power, but the Seanad was 
never intended to have such power, and in its early years, it enjoyed a prominence 
in the press and public debate that is now no longer the case. The reconstituted 
Seanad produced an intriguing mixture of senators; for a vocational chamber, it 
played host to a number of professional politicians and backbenchers, while a 
majority behaved primarily on party political lines. This is despite the fact that 
it attracted many high-calibre senators who drew attention to their own field of 
interest and represented their groups vigorously in public life, whether that group-
ing is judged as vocational or ideological. Such diversity of membership and con-
tributions shows that the reconstituted Seanad was not a homogenous chamber by 
any means. In this sense, its early years provides an opportunity to examine the 
chamber’s contribution and potential as well as the flaws which have undermined 
it from the beginning – an important starting point in any discussion of how the 
house might eventually be reformed.
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Introduction
The Swedish parliament of four estates followed from the constitution of 1809. In 
fact, however, it had older roots, dating as far back as the fifteenth century, when 
it consisted of nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie and peasants. In 1866, it was replaced 
by a bicameral system that was to last until 1970. The constitution of 1809 quite 
quickly became obsolete, and more gradually in other respects, which is hardly 
surprising given that it proclaimed, among other things, absolute monarchy. Thus, 
it quite simply seemed to be old-fashioned and failed to correspond to society’s 
needs in the late nineteenth century. After 1920, when democracy prevailed, and 
until the current constitution (Regeringsformen, the Instrument of Government, 
IG) was enacted in 1974, it could have even be said that Sweden was a state with-
out a wholly functioning constitution (Sterzel 1998).
The Swedish Parliament was thus bicameral from 1866 to 1970. This followed 
from the Parliament or Riksdagsordningen (Riksdag Act), which held a constitu-
tional status and was seen as one of Sweden’s four constitutional acts, although it 
regulated only the internal workings of Parliament. In 1970, that act was replaced 
by a new Riksdag Act, which was based on the fact that the Parliament is unicam-
eral and no longer has constitutional status (though it formally has a higher status 
than ordinary laws in the Swedish hierarchy of legislature). The new constitution 
of 1974, which still exists today, clearly states that Sweden has a unicameral Par-
liament – with 349 members elected every fourth year ( Instrument of government 
s.d., ch.3, art.1–3).
General historical background
Against this introductory background, we shall now see how the bicameral system 
in Sweden developed and then disappeared without following a detailed, linear or 
chronological path. It may be noted that, given the fact that the 104 years from 
1866 until 1970 marked a period of great economical, political and social success 
for Sweden, it is somewhat surprising that the bicameral model was quite sud-
denly abolished (and that there is very little debate about its possible reappearance 
today). The reasons for this are, I think, twofold.
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The first reason has to do with the perspective of popular sovereignty in the 
Swedish constitutional doctrine, heavily dominated by political scientists, from 
1920 until circa 1995, when Sweden joined the EU. Secondly, the fact that the 
model for bicameralism chosen in 1866 gradually became increasingly old- 
fashioned, leading to, among other things, several unfair electoral results (notably 
in 1948, as explained later). The first of these reasons should be seen in light of 
the fact that the old constitution of 1809 was formally – but not in reality – based 
on the principle of separation of powers, a theory and a constitutional model that 
were then, towards the end of the nineteenth century, considered undemocratic in 
Sweden and thought to contribute to preventing true democratic reforms. It also 
meant that other constitutional perspectives were difficult to introduce into the 
debate.
The second reason became a real political issue sometime around 1950. It 
resulted from the fact that the direct elections of the lower and upper chamber, 
composed according to the local and municipal election results, were not held 
simultaneously. This helped the Social Democratic Party to remain in power from 
1932 to 1976, to the great frustration of right-wing parties. The apparent weak-
nesses in the bicameral system eventually led to intensified demands for constitu-
tional reform(s). It may also be noted that it explains why Sweden, quite uniquely, 
has, since 1970, had only one single election day – in September, when all local, 
municipal and national elections take place.
However, it must be noted that, in most other aspects, Swedish experiences of 
the bicameral system were actually positive. The two chambers were relatively 
equal in terms of legislative and other powers. From 1894, the upper chamber had 
150 members; the lower chamber, 230 members. The explanation for the different 
sizes and electoral models of the two houses is that it allowed for equal represen-
tation for the cities and rural areas. One of the values that seem to have been lost 
after the reform in 1970 is, indeed, a kind of parliamentary protection of local and 
municipal self-governance.
Other traditional arguments in favor of bicameral systems advocated in other 
parts of the world, such as the need to protect a federal system or to secure repre-
sentation for an – allegedly – ‘enlightened’ aristocracy, have not been discussed as 
often in Sweden, despite the fact that the ‘upper classes’ lost parliamentary repre-
sentation of their own in 1866. Instead, other constitutional issues have been more 
visible in the debate. Ever since 1995, the development towards increased judicial 
review, a clearer constitutional role for the courts and some other aspects of sepa-
ration of powers have been highly visible in Sweden, where the EU membership 
has had a more profound constitutional impact than in most other member states. 
Still, the idea to reintroduce bicameralism is very rarely heard in the political or 
constitutional debate. That is due to the fact that other constitutional issues have 
been considered more urgent and, probably, also that Sweden has avoided falling 
into any deep economic or societal crises. For instance, during the last severe 
economic downturn in Sweden, in the early 1990s, attention was given instead to 
reforms in the budgetary process (that made it easier for parliamentary minorities 
to get their budgets approved) (cf.  Instrument of government s.d., ch.9). The issue 
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of bicameralism may, however, get more attention some other time in the future, 
should similar problems arise once more. It is a neglected issue in today’s current 
constitutional debate that merits more attention both from scholars and from poli-
ticians (cf. Nergelius 2001).
Some crucial moments from 1866 to 1966
But why did different crises occur, then, and what sort of crises were they? One 
of the beliefs presented in this book is ‘that the history of senates is related to 
political crises’. To some extent, this is true also for Sweden, though in relation 
to the bicameral system that existed from 1866 to 1970 (since the upper chamber 
in Sweden was never called or seen as a proper senate). Both the birth and the 
eventual abolition of this bicameral system are, in a way, related to different kinds 
of crises, though none of them may be described as fatal or extremely dramatic. 
However, in order to understand this, we have to go back to the period before the 
bicameral system was introduced, i.e. to the years 1809–1866 (cf. Nilsson, this 
volume).
Bicameral legislature replaced the old Swedish Parliament of Four Estates 
(Ståndsriksdagen) that, according to the constitution of 1809, consisted of nobility, 
clergy, bourgeoisie and peasants. It seems to have been the case that the introduc-
tion of bicameral legislature was discussed in Parliament as early as 1809–1810, 
when the new constitution was enacted, and the constitutional committee (Konsti-
tutionsutskottet) was actually in favour of it (Stjernquist 1996). A proposal along 
those lines was put before the Parliament in 1815, but it was voted down without 
much discussion (Stjernquist 1996; cf. Brusewitz 1917). Obviously, the political 
and economic interests that upheld the Parliament of Four Estates were significant 
at the time, before gradually diminishing during the nineteenth century, when 
new groups in society, such as craftsmen and businessmen who did not formally 
meet the economic requirements for being seen as ‘bourgeoisie’, started to push 
for more influence. Within the aristocracy itself, more modern philosophical and 
political ideas from the European continent also gradually undermined the idea 
of a parliamentary system built on these old, old-fashioned estates (cf. Stjernquist 
1996). It is worth noting that the main architect of the bicameral model, former 
Prime Minister Louis de Geer, was himself a member of the nobility.
The two chambers in the Swedish bicameral system were relatively equal in 
terms of legislative and other powers. From 1894 the upper chamber had 150 
members and the lower chamber had 230 members, of whom eighty were elected 
by the cities and 150 came from the rural areas. The two chambers had different 
sizes and electoral models in order to allow equal representation for the cities and 
the rural areas, but the two chambers did have more or less equal powers in leg-
islative matters, which gradually came to cause problems. This equality between 
the chambers was even written into a new article, §49 of the constitution of 1809. 
It also included a similar legal and political responsibility for the government 
before both chambers (Constitution of 1809, §107), as well as common commit-
tees and common voting in budgetary and tax matters. All these factors led to an 
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equalisation of the position and importance of the two chambers that seems to 
have had few equivalents within bicameral systems anywhere else in the world 
(Stjernquist 1996).
It was not until the bicameral system was introduced that the Swedish Parlia-
ment began to convene annually. Thus, parliamentary elections were organised, 
and both chambers were elected for a certain period of time. At the same time, the 
state budget was also made annual and the king was given the power to dissolve 
Parliament, provided that he called new elections either for both of the chambers 
or for just one of them (Stjernquist 1996).
What were the arguments, then, for this new parliamentary model? Arguments 
brought forward in the governmental bill introducing the new system included 
the wish for a balance of power between Parliament and government (but not for 
separation of power in the classical, American sense) and the idea that the upper 
chamber should guarantee a kind of continuity, preventing one-sided and hasty 
decisions by also taking the enlightened perspectives of wealthy and educated 
classes within society into account ( Proceedings from the Swedish Parliament 
s.d.). Such arguments are well known from other states, where they may have led 
to the establishment of senates.
The members of what was, in some way, the Senate, were originally elected for 
nine years, while the MPs of the lower chamber served three-year terms, before 
the latter was changed to four years in 1919. However, in 1909 the mandate of the 
members of the upper chamber was reduced to six years and in 1921, finally and 
until its abolishment in 1970, extended to eight years. At the same, a proportional 
electoral system was introduced, and the number of constituencies was reduced 
from thirty to nineteen for the upper chamber and from fifty-six to twenty-eight 
for the lower. All these rules and figures remained in force until 1970. It should 
also be noted that the ‘continuity’ mentioned earlier, which the upper chamber 
was supposed to ensure, was maintained by dividing the nineteen constituencies 
into eight different groups, which meant that when elections to the upper chamber 
(that were partly indirect and depended on the outcome of the local and regional 
elections) took place every fourth year, this happened only in some of these con-
stituencies. Here, the system had an obvious resemblance to the American bicam-
eral system, which is still in place today (though the regular re-election element 
there is much clearer). And though it was possible to dissolve the Swedish Parlia-
ment, as mentioned earlier and as opposed to the American system, this happened 
only once (in 1958, because of an intense debate concerning the future pension 
system).
These and other changes within the two chambers escalated and became par-
ticularly frequent circa 1920, a development resulting from accelerating democ-
ratisation and increased voting rights for men and women. The process towards 
full and equal voting rights for all men and all women (i.e. one person, one vote) 
took place through many gradual steps from circa 1880, first reducing differences 
in the voting rights scale for men and then finally, in 1921, also giving women the 
full right to vote. Real and full democracy was thus not achieved until the early 
1920s (cf. Andrén 1937; Vallinder 1962; Stjernquist 1996).
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During this whole time, from the early twentieth century or even from 1866 
until the 1960s, the bicameral system was very rarely questioned within public 
debates (Stjernquist 1996). It is very easy to identify the turning point(s) when 
critical voices were first heard and later taken seriously. As is often the case in 
Sweden, when the time was ripe, important changes could be brought about 
quickly.
First, after the general election for the lower chamber in 1948, dramatic events 
unfolded when the right-wing parties did actually win the election, but the 
Social Democrats managed to stay in power because of their remaining majority 
(together with the Communist Party) in the upper chamber. This outcome showed 
that there were weaknesses in the bicameral system and led to intensified demands 
for constitutional reform(s).
After the 1966 upper chamber election, the Social Democrats lost a significant 
portion of the vote, receiving some 42 per cent of the total popular vote. This was 
seen as a failure, though it did not lead to a loss of power and today it would have 
been hailed as a great success. The permanently governing Social Democratic 
party came to the conclusion that the criticism against the allegedly old-fashioned 
and unfair bicameral system was the main reason for this defeat. This criticism 
had been raised repeatedly by the right-wing opposition and primarily by the Peo-
ple’s Party and its well-known leader, Prof. Bertil Ohlin. In other words, many 
voters now shared the People’s Party’s critique that the Social Democrats wanted 
to preserve an unfair electoral system because it was in their own best interest to 
do so. Suddenly, then, the governing party agreed with the opposition and decided 
to abolish the century-old bicameral model, obviously because of a sudden politi-
cal obstacle and apparently without any real, profound constitutional analysis. It 
cannot, therefore, be said that this bicameral system failed, as such (cf. Nergelius 
2001). We may also note that though the constitutional and political importance 
of the issue was evident, it did not lead to any heated general political debate. The 
majority of the voters had a mild interest in the issue, caring, as they often did, 
more about social and economic matters than constitutional issues.
Analysis of specific political matters affected  
by the bicameral system
The monarchy
Sweden has been a monarchy for a very long time, even before 1523, when the 
first real ‘national’ king, Gustaf Vasa, came to power (after successfully organis-
ing an uprising against Danish invaders). It may, of course, be questioned whether 
this hereditary regime, with all its privileges, is really adapted to a modern, secu-
lar and highly egalitarian society such as Sweden has today, but regular opinion 
polls show that support for the monarchy as an institution continues to be strong 
among the citizens (with some 70 per cent being in favour of it). Today the major-
ity of MPs seem to be in favor of a republic, at least in their statements, but no 
party is actively pursuing this issue.
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The rules regulating the monarchy are to be found in Chapter 5 of the Instru-
ment of Government ( s.d.) and in the Act of Succession from 1810. Those rules 
and in particular the laws established in 1974 may be seen as giving the monarch 
as little power as possible, while at the same time preserving the representative 
and dignified nature, character and tasks of the institution. This is in contrast to the 
old 1809 constitution, which originally stated that ‘the King governs the country 
by himself’ (though, it was added, ‘in accordance with the constitution’) (Con-
stitution of 1809, §4). In other words, according to the letter of the constitution, 
Sweden was an absolute monarchy as of 1809, though it was never one in real-
ity. According to the old constitution, the king was assisted in his exercise of the 
governing power by the so-called Council of State (Statsråd), which gradually 
developed into a modern government. The legislative power was shared between 
the Parliament and the king but gradually, during the nineteenth century, became 
the responsibility of Parliament. Here, it is clear that the constitution contained 
and was based on certain ideas of balance or even separation of powers, though, 
as stated earlier, this constitutional model did not include any role for the courts. 
Thus, Montesquieu or the American Revolution was not among the inspiring ele-
ments for the group of persons who elaborated the constitution of 1809. After the 
introduction of the bicameral system, the king simply stopped using his veto in 
legislative matters. Parliamentarianism as a constitutional model, with a govern-
ment based on support from a universally elected parliament, was finally wholly 
accepted by the king in 1917, after a dispute concerning the defence budget and 
rearmament during the First World War.
In relation to the bicameral system, it may be noted that the king and the gov-
ernment did not always agree on the issue of when and under which circumstances 
one of the two chambers ought to be dissolved (cf. Stjernquist 1996). The king 
may have occasionally tried to put pressure on individual MPs in order to have his 
views supported, but there are also examples of him trying to help the government 
when it met resistance from Parliament (Stjernquist 1996). From 1866 to 1922, 
the king also appointed the speaker and vice speaker of both chambers (Consti-
tution of 1809, §52). However, after the introduction of parliamentarianism and 
universal suffrage, it was never doubted that the formal power to dissolve one or 
both chambers rested with the government. By and large, then, the relationship 
between the king, the government and Parliament was not a significant problem 
during the bicameral era and, in particular, not after 1920.
Political minorities within the parliamentary system
It is thus clear that the Swedish bicameral system managed to secure representa-
tion for both urban and rural areas in a way that was appropriate for Swedish 
society at least in the first half of the twentieth century but maybe less so in the 
1960s, when urbanisation started to be a real factor in societal development. Thus, 
this could have been a further argument for abolishing the bicameral system, but 
oddly enough, it was very rarely heard in the public debate, which focused almost 
entirely on the system’s alleged electoral unfairness. Here, we may also find one 
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of the reasons why local or regional self-governance and municipal autonomy do 
now enjoy rather weak constitutional protection, despite constitutional reform in 
2010 that aimed at strengthening them ( Instrument of government s.d., ch.14). 
Though they are both generally seen as very important parts of the Swedish 
democracy, as clearly indicated by the constitution, they are not given very many 
specific powers, and the current national electoral system is not in any way related 
to their existence ( Instrument of government s.d., ch.1:1,7).
The high degree of representativity within the electoral system was probably 
a positive factor, at least for a long time, but at the same time, the aftermath of 
the dramatic election for the lower chamber in 1948 showed that the system did 
not meet modern demands for electoral justice, equality between political parties 
and a parliamentarianism based on a proportional electoral system. Thus, we may 
say that, after 1966, the system was brought down by the contradiction/tension 
between the formally proportional electoral system of the 1920s and the ‘unfair’ 
elements of the bicameral system that enabled parliamentary minorities to remain 
in power after general elections.
But what about the effects of the system for different groups of political 
minorities while it lasted? Here, it is obvious that there were some differences 
if we compare the periods 1866–1920, on the one hand, and 1921–1970, on the 
other. Detailed studies conducted by different scholars show that although the 
two chambers actually managed to agree on most issues in the end, this hap-
pened after amended proposals and/or common votes in no less than 2,806 cases 
between 1867 and 1921, while it happened only 728 times from 1922 to 1970 (cf. 
Stjernquist 1996). During this period, proposals supported by the lower chamber 
won the final support of the majority of parliamentarians much more often than 
the opinion or position supported by the members of the upper chamber. Although 
the members of the upper chamber were often older and more experienced, politi-
cal power gradually seems to have turned more and more to the lower chamber, 
where the more crucial and vital political debates were often held.
The main gender-related issue during the bicameral era concerned equal voting 
rights for women, which were finally introduced in 1921. After that, the gender 
issue did not become a major political matter in Sweden until the 1970s, when the 
unicameral system was already in force. Gradually, the representation of women 
within political assemblies started to grow, including in Parliament and the gov-
ernment. In 1994, the number of men and women within the government was 
equal for the first time, but it may be noted that Sweden is now the only Nordic 
country that has never had a female prime minister.
Conclusions – experiences of a bicameral  
system and its abolition
Thus, Sweden had a bicameral parliamentary system for just over a hundred 
years, from 1866 to 1970. During that time, the country developed from one of 
the poorest in Europe to one of the richest, with a well-functioning democracy. 
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Though the bicameral system was by no means one of the main reasons for this 
spectacular economic and societal development, it is clear that the model enabled 
it or at the very least did not prohibit it. This period in Swedish history was quite 
simply remarkably successful. With that in mind, it is somewhat strange that the 
model was so quickly abolished and that its absence is not discussed more fre-
quently – in particular since the almost fifty years since its abolition have not been 
quite as peaceful and filled with harmony.
There are, of course, various reasons for this. Some of them have been identi-
fied earlier, such as the consequences for the Social Democrats of (the wide-spread 
criticism of) the alleged electoral injustice in 1948 and its aftermath, which made 
it impossible for the government to defend the system against the opposition and 
thus led to quick constitutional reforms, starting in 1970 but continuing through-
out the 1970s. Other, quite different aspects come into play here. For instance, 
the period from 1920 to 1970 was beneficial for Sweden in many ways, reflect-
ing uninterrupted peace, economic growth and a peaceful labour market. Politi-
cians involved in introducing the new constitution in the 1970s, which was built 
around the unicameral Parliament as a cornerstone, may have incorrectly believed 
that such fortunate circumstances were going to last more or less forever, which 
means that a proper analysis of what the abolition of the bicameral system would 
mean for Sweden was neglected. In retrospect, it is, in any case, obvious that the 
change from one parliamentary system to a quite different system happened very 
quickly – perhaps, in hindsight, too quickly, since some of the advantages of the 
former system seem to have vanished without being replaced by anything better.
A further argument in favour of introducing a bicameral system once again – 
though it has so far not been on the agenda – could be the potential advantages 
of introducing a kind of senate or ‘real’ upper chamber, with a role that is clearly 
different from that of the lower chamber and with other competencies. Such an 
institution, though small, could stand freer from different interest groups than 
Parliament and focus instead on long-term planning, perhaps related to globalisa-
tion. Though it is perhaps an unrealistic idea, it is definitely new and interesting 
and deserves to be taken seriously, given the many ‘pros’ or virtues that the old 
bicameral system seems to have had.
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Introduction
The Danish Senate, the Landsting, not only experienced a crisis but was also 
abolished. This paper investigates the abolition of the Landsting and the introduc-
tion of unicameralism (Arter 1991; Eigaard 1993;  Thorsen s.d.). Furthermore, 
it investigates how well Danish unicameral democracy is working, and it pre-
sents the current low-intensity debate on the possible introduction of an additional 
chamber. This chapter shows that while redundancy, which is due in part to the 
development of the composition of the Landsting, did play a role in its abolition, 
so did party tactics and even the entanglement with the matters of voting age and 
royal succession. Thus, the full explanation for the introduction of unicameralism 
cannot be found in the category of rational, national-level explanations. Yet Dan-
ish democracy is doing fine. Danish voters are satisfied and the overall diagnoses 
of political scientists are generally positive. Clearly, not all democracies need a 
senate to do well. Only rarely is a new senate proposed as a solution to problems 
identified by observers and actors. Per Stig Møller (former minister and MP for 
the conservatives [Det Konservative Folkeparti]) is an exception to the rule. He 
suggests that it would be a good idea to reintroduce something resembling the 
Landsting (Møller & Jensen 2010). Still, Danish democracy is not perfect, and 
in a recent book it has been suggested that it could be improved by introducing 
an additional chamber elected by lottery (Mulvad, Larsen & Ellersgaard 2017) to 
improve the descriptive representation of the Danish Parliament, since the new 
chamber would mirror the composition of the Danish voters in terms of descrip-
tors, such as gender and education.
The demise and abolition of the Landsting
Key years on the timeline of the demise and abolition of the Landsting are 1901, 
when Folketing (Danish name for the lower house, 1849–1953, for the Danish 
parliament after 1953) parliamentarism was introduced; 1915, when privileged 
voting to the Landsting was abolished; 1936, when the conservative party and 
the liberal party (Venstre) lost their majority in the Landsting and 1953, when the 
Landsting was abolished through a constitutional change.
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In the last decades of the nineteenth century, a constitutional battle raged 
between the king and conservatives on the one hand and the liberals on the other. 
In 1866, the 1849 constitution was replaced with a revised constitution that intro-
duced privileged voting rights to the Landsting, allocating special voting rights 
to the largest taxpayers and some members selected by the king or government 
(Hvidt 2004; Wendel-Hansen 2016). In 1901, with the political system change 
(Systemskiftet), the king agreed to appointing governments that were consid-
ered acceptable by the Folketing. Cabinet responsibility to the Folketing was not 
reflected in the words of the constitution until 1953. In the years preceding the 
change of system, the king had appointed conservative prime ministers leading 
governments of the Højre party (i.e. the ‘Right’). The people surrounding the 
court worked to the letter of the law, giving the king the right to appoint govern-
ments, and the appointment of conservative prime ministers could be justified by 
reference to the Landsting. The conservatives had a majority in the Senate, while 
the liberal party (or parties) had a majority in the Folketing (Hvidt 2004;  Thorsen 
(s.d.); Haue, Olsen & Aarup-Kristensen 1981; Thorsen 1972; Elklit 1984; Eigaard 
1993).
While the system change that introduced governments based on the Folketing 
was a major victory for the liberal party, privileged voting for the Senate still 
existed, and bills had to be passed by both chambers. The liberal party wanted 
privileged voting for the Landsting abolished, and the social democratic party 
had even proposed to abolish the Senate. Højre wanted to keep their power in the 
Landsting but wanted the electoral system for the lower chamber to change, in 
which both Højre and social democrats were underrepresented (Himmelstrup & 
Møller 1932; Hvidt 2004; Elklit 1984).
The death of J.B.S. Estrup (prime minister during the constitutional battle) on 
Christmas Eve, 1913, and the elections in 1914, with the supporters of reform 
winning a clear majority in the Senate, paved the way for constitutional reform, 
which was passed in 1915 (Thorsen 1972; Christiansen 2004). In 1915, equal 
and universal suffrage to the lower chamber was introduced (beginning the shift 
to a proportional system that was completed in 1920). Privileged voting to the 
upper chamber was abolished. Voters eligible to vote in Folketing elections were 
also allowed to vote in Landsting elections. However, they had to be 35 years 
old, compared to 25 years for elections for the Folketing. Moreover, the election 
determined only 75 per cent of the seats, while the remaining 25 per cent was 
determined by the previous Senate. Members were elected for eight years, with 
elections every four years and selection by the previous Senate every eight years. 
(Himmelstrup & Møller 1932; Elklit 1984). As Table 16.1 shows, the liberal party 
and the conservative party held a solid majority in the early days of the new elec-
toral system. However, a steady and substantial increase in the representation of 
the social democratic party (Socialdemokratiet) changed this, and in 1936 social 
democrats and the social liberal party (Det Radikale Venstre) held a majority in 
the Landsting, as they did in the Folketing (see Table 16.1).
Still, until 1936, the conservative party and the liberal party combined held a 
majority in the Senate (see Table 16.1), giving them the ability to block legislation, 
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which they did. Until its abolition, the Senate enjoyed substantial legislative 
powers. Bills could be proposed here and had to be passed by the Landsting to 
become law (Himmelstrup & Møller 1932; Wendel-Hansen 2016). This had con-
sequences. For instance, the social democrats and the social liberals proposed 
substantial cuts in defence spending in the 1920s, but the majority held by the 
conservatives and the liberal party in the Senate allowed the two parties to block 
such proposals (Kaarsted & Trommer 2004). This might be used as an example to 
argue that the Landsting served a purpose in protecting the country from overly 
eager progressive forces. The purpose of the Senate, presumably, was to be mod-
erating and reflective (Wendel-Hansen 2016;  Thorsen s.d.). It limited the cuts in 
defence spending and made it necessary for the social democrats and social liber-
als, despite their majority in the lower house, to seek cooperation with the liberal 
party (Kanslergadeforliget) in 1933 to have important social and economic pro-
posals passed (Arter 1991; Kaarsted & Trommer 2004). Unsurprisingly, the social 
democrats and the social liberals wanted the Danish Senate abolished (Arter 1991; 
Eigaard 1993).
After the 1915 reform, the electorates for the Landsting and for the Folketing 
were virtually identical (except for the different age limits and the 25 per cent rule, 
as described earlier). The electoral system for the Landsting was proportional and 
Table 16.1  Composition of the Danish parliament, the Rigsdag, 1920–1953, four old par-
ties only
Year the Landsting the Folketing
Total S SL L C Total S SL L C
1920 76 21 9 32 13 149 48 18 51 27
1924 25 8 30 12 55 20 44 28
1926 53 16 46 30
1928 27 8 28 12
1929 61 16 43 24
1932 27 7 28 13 62 14 38 27
1935 68 14 28 26
1936 31 7 22 15
1939 35 8 18 13 64 14 30 26
1943 34 8 18 14 66 13 28 31
1945 34 8 19 14 48 11 38 26
1947 33 7 21 13 150 57 10 49 17
1950 151 59 12 32 27
1951 33 6 22 12
1953 33 6 22 13 61 13 33 26
Sources: Folketinget 2019b; Johansen 2005
Note: Only totals include Faroese members.
S: The social democratic party
SL: The social liberal party
L: The liberal party
C: The conservative party
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indirect. In 1936, the voters and the outgoing Landsting elected thirty-seven social 
democrats and social liberals, as well as thirty-seven liberals and conservatives. 
On the island Bornholm, the voters elected twenty-three electors for the social 
democrats and the social liberals and twenty-three electors for the liberal party 
and the conservatives. It had to be decided by lottery which party was to receive 
the remaining seat from Denmark proper. The social democrats won (Kaarsted & 
Trommer 2004; Himmelstrup & Møller 1932).
After the victory of the social democrats and the social liberals in 1936, the 
leader of the conservative party, John Christmas Møller, looked for new con-
servative guarantees. He wanted constitutional reform that could also bring the 
conservative party closer to the social democrats, which might further the con-
servatives’ pro-defence stance. After various proposals, the social democratic–
social liberal government proposed constitutional reform, which the conservative 
party but not the liberal party could support. The Landsting would be replaced 
by a Rigsting, which would become the new upper house. Thirty-four members 
would be chosen in an election in which the entire country constituted one con-
stituency, and thirty-five would be chosen from those elected to the Folketing. 
With an additional Faroese member, the Rigsting would have seventy members; 
the Folketing, 140 members. The Norwegian inspiration was evident (cf. Smith, 
E., this volume), and some even considered it a camouflaged one-chamber sys-
tem. Had it been passed, it would have maintained a Danish senate. In reality, 
it was passed by two consecutive Parliaments with a parliamentary election in 
between, as stipulated in the constitution (Kaarsted & Trommer 2004). As shown 
in Table 16.2, it also won a huge majority among the voters in the 1939 referen-
dum that was also necessary to change the constitution. However, only 44.5 per 
cent of all voters approved the reform. As the constitutional minimum threshold 
was 45 per cent, the attempt to reform the constitution failed. The conservative 
leader had threatened to resign if the reform was not passed. His party was divided 
on the issue, but it has been suggested that some considered his statement a prom-
ise rather than a threat (Kaarsted & Trommer 2004). Still, the fact that the liberal 
party had not supported the new constitution may have been more important for 
the low turnout.
After the Second World War and the German occupation of Denmark, a feeling 
of gratitude towards the young people who had participated in the resistance led to 
Table 16.2  Voting results of the Danish referenda in 1939 and 1953 on constitutional 
reform
Year Number of valid votes  
cast
Percentage of voters eligible 
to vote
Yes votes No votes Yes votes
1939 966277 85717 44.5
1953 1183292 319135 45.8
Source: Folketinget 2017a.
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a political wish to lower the voting age. This would require constitutional reform, 
and although a parliamentary committee was set up for that purpose in 1946, not 
much happened for years (Eigaard 1993).
A social democratic government had been formed after the elections in 1947 
and continued after the 1950 elections but resigned after less than two months. In 
Denmark, this is known as the time when Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft slipped 
and fell in butter: Parliament had passed a resolution, against the wish of the gov-
ernment, to lift the rationing of butter and margarine as soon as possible. Impor-
tantly, the liberal-conservative government that took over was not the result of an 
electoral victory. While the conservative party had gained seats in the elections, 
the liberal party had lost more seats (which was only due in part to a change in 
the electoral system), and the government parties combined controlled the same 
number of seats as the social democrats by themselves. Not only was the new non-
socialist government a minority government but it was also a vulnerable minority 
government at that, depending on the goodwill of the other side in Parliament 
(Nissen 2004). The dormant constitutional reform project was picked up by the 
non-socialist government in 1951. The social democrats and the social liberals 
wanted constitutional reform that included abolition of the Landsting, and by giv-
ing into this demand, the government could count on sufficient support to stay in 
power (Kaarsted 1977; Nissen 2004). The constitutional reform was passed by 
two consecutive Parliaments, and in 1953, the constitutional reform was passed in 
a referendum with 45.8 per cent of all voters in favour.
Party tactics played a key role in the abolition of the Danish upper house. The 
weak non-socialist government under Prime Minister Erik Eriksen needed to give 
the opposition something to be able to rule, and the new constitution abolished the 
Landsting. His motivation was mainly, though not purely tactical. He also wanted 
a revised constitution (Eigaard 1993; Arter 1991). Thorsen adds that there was a 
general perception that the Landsting had become redundant (Thorsen s.d.). When 
the social democrats and the social liberals gained a majority in the Senate, it no 
longer served as a conservative bulwark (Wendel-Hansen 2016). It was also dif-
ficult to see the Landsting as an additional and clearly separate arena for debate 
and deliberation, as the parties of the Landsting and Folketing members held their 
meetings together (Nissen 2004).
If the constitutional amendment had passed in the referendum in 1939, Den-
mark could have kept an upper house for some time. It would not have been the 
old Landsting, and eventually the Rigsting might also have been abolished, but 
an explanation of the abolition of the Danish upper house also needs to address 
the differences between the referenda in 1939 and in 1953. The two most striking 
differences are that, in 1939, the liberal party did not support the new constitu-
tion, while in 1953 all the parties in Parliament, except the communists (Dan-
marks Kommunistiske Parti), joined the agreement (Kaarsted & Trommer 2004; 
Kaarsted 1977; Eigaard 1993). This time, the referendum also concerned royal 
succession, which may have contributed to the necessary turnout (Eigaard 1993). 
Until then, succession had been strictly male. After the reform, the eldest of the 
king’s daughters, provided he only had daughters, would become queen. If he had 
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one or more sons, the oldest son would become king. This was highly relevant, 
since the King had three daughters and no sons. According to Gallup polls, the 
percentage in favour of female succession had risen to 69 per cent by 1952. Thus, 
the popularity of the principle and perhaps the relative popularity of Princess Mar-
grethe (the king’s oldest daughter) compared with that of Prince Knud (the king’s 
brother and successor under the old Constitution) might have added the necessary 
votes in favour of the constitutional reform (Eigaard 1993). If the king had had a 
son, changing the law on royal succession would have been less interesting, and 
this is one example of how (more or less) uncontrollable factors may have been 
involved in the abolition of the Landsting. On the other hand, the inclusion of the 
matter of royal succession into the constitutional reform was tactical and a delib-
erate attempt to increase voter turnout (Eigaard 1993).
The explanations presented so far have been mainly internal to Denmark, but 
inspiration from abroad also deserves to be discussed. Norway provided inspira-
tion for the unsuccessful 1939 reform attempt, and David Arter has argued that 
the Norwegian and the Finnish cases helped pave the way for the abolition of the 
Landsting. The Norwegian system was studied and rejected, while, it is argued, 
the Finnish case helped convince non-socialists that unicameralism could have 
sufficient moderating elements (cf. Pekonen, this volume). The specific new main 
conservative element in Denmark, a new type of referendum, was not inspired by 
Finland, though. Swedish white papers on referenda were studied, but Sweden did 
not have the binding type of referendum that was introduced in Denmark (see fol-
lowing section) (Arter 1991; Forfatningskommissionen 1953; Sveriges Riksdag 
2018).
The functioning of Danish unicameral democracy  
and current debates
The Danish upper house was abolished more than sixty-five years ago, which 
means that it is now possible to evaluate Danish unicameral democracy. Are there 
any functional equivalents to an upper house? What is the overall evaluation of 
Danish democracy – according to Danish voters and political scientists? Are there 
any problems in the Danish legislative system worth mentioning?
In terms of functional equivalents, one might think that the people had taken 
over the role of the Landsting. Although voters themselves cannot initiate a ref-
erendum, referenda are quite frequent, and there are six types of national refer-
enda, five of which are mentioned in the constitution. One of them was explicitly 
introduced to compensate for the abolition of the Landsting. Section 42 of the 
Constitution grants a minority in the Folketing of at least one-third of its members 
the right to hold a referendum on a bill passed in Parliament. There are important 
exceptions, including the budget bill and bills on taxation. For a bill to be rejected, 
a majority of the participating voters and at least 30 per cent of the eligible voters 
must vote ‘no’. Indeed, this served as a protection of the minority in the Folket-
ing and a conservative bulwark when four bills on land usage were rejected in a 
referendum in 1963. However, this is also the only time this option has been used. 
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It is possible that the mere option that a minority in Parliament could use this 
type of referendum may also have had a restraining effect, protecting or support-
ing parliamentary minorities of some size in other cases. It should also be noted, 
however, that bills on land usage that were somewhat similar to those rejected 
were passed about five years later by the Folketing (Svensson 2003; Nissen 2004; 
Folketinget 2014, 2017a).
Referenda have most frequently been held on lowering of the voting age and 
particularly on EU integration. After 1953, referenda on lowering the voting age 
have always been based on the combination of two sections in the constitution. 
There have been three types of referenda on EU integration, with referenda on 
ceding power to international authorities (such as those of the EU) being the most 
commonly used (Folketinget 2017a). Interestingly, both this type and the rule on 
changing the voting age were introduced to facilitate change, not to impede it. 
The old constitution stipulated a particular voting age (Himmelstrup & Møller 
1932) and, as indicated earlier, it was very hard to change. The 1953 constitution 
allowed the Folketing to lower the voting age without changing the constitution, 
resorting instead to a referendum that could reject the change (a majority of at 
least 30 per cent of all eligible voters would have to oppose the change). The new 
rules for ceding authority to international organisations had also been proposed 
to promote international cooperation rather than to make it harder for Denmark 
to participate. A majority of five-sixths of the Folketing can cede authority on its 
own, but any majority of MPs of less than five-sixths of the Folketing, however, 
must first check that a majority of at least 30 per cent of the eligible voters are 
not opposed to the decision. Since three of these referenda have led to rejection 
(Folketinget 2017a), this could, in effect, be considered a conservative bulwark. 
However, it was believed in 1953 – and it still is to this day – that without this type 
of referendum, constitutional reform would have been needed to cede authority to 
an international organisation, which would certainly have been more conservative 
(even though constitutional reform today ‘only’ requires two consecutive Parlia-
ments and a majority of 40 per cent) (Folketinget 2017a; Nissen 2004; Kaarsted 
1977; Svensson 2003; Eigaard 1993; Christensen, Jensen & Jensen 2012).
While the section 42 referendum on bills described earlier was explicitly intro-
duced as a conservative element and minority protection, and another type of ref-
erendum (ceding authority to international organisations) might, to some degree, 
be considered conservative in its effects, the Danish referenda do not constitute a 
functional equivalent to the Landsting prior to 1936. Besides the new option for 
demanding a referendum on bills, the constitutional reform in 1953 provided only 
little with a resemblance to the old Landsting, but the Landsting did manage to get 
a minor new rule included that allows two-fifths of the members of the Folketing 
to postpone the third reading of bills (with some limitations) for twelve weekdays 
(Eigaard 1993; Arter 1991).
An upper house can serve other purposes than conserving the current situation. 
For instance, it can provide a forum for local representation. A person knowledge-
able about the Danish political system might ask if the ninety-eight Danish may-
ors and their powerful interest organisation, ‘Local Government Denmark’, in 
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particular, could be a functional equivalent to this. ‘Local Government Denmark’ 
is involved in the legislative process as well as the ensuing execution of decisions. 
Thus, on a number of issues, the government asks ‘Local Government Denmark’ 
to participate in workgroups, and it is also consulted on the drafting of bills and 
administrative regulations. However, its powers are limited in ways that would be 
untypical of an influential senate: its influence is mainly restricted to areas such as 
primary education and child care, and it can only wield true power if all munici-
palities are in agreement (Blom-Hansen 2004).
The Danish political system does have conservative elements, and local inter-
ests are not only represented through the Folketing (where the electoral system is 
based in part on ten multimember districts). Nevertheless, neither referenda nor 
‘Local Government Denmark’ is a functional equivalent to the pre-1936 Landst-
ing or an influential senate with other functions. Does this mean that the Danish 
political system does not work well? Not according to Danish voters or most 
social scientists. Ninety per cent of Danes polled by Eurobarometer in 2018 were 
satisfied ‘with the way democracy works in’ Denmark (very satisfied, fairly sat-
isfied). Here, Denmark showed the highest degree of satisfaction among all EU 
countries. More specifically, 63 per cent of the Danes who participated in the poll 
stated that they tended to trust the Danish Parliament. Only the Swedish and the 
Dutch scored more highly in the poll (European Commission 2018).
In 1997, the Folketing was worried that Danish democracy was deteriorating. It 
wanted an investigation into the state of Danish democracy and the developments 
in the preceding years. The abolition of the Senate was not mentioned among the 
reasons for the investigation, but there was a concern that the Danish Parliament 
might have lost power. A main report was published in 2003, and an English 
article based on the project was released in 2006. The title of the article revealed 
the overall conclusion: ‘Power and Democracy in Denmark: Still a viable Democ-
racy’ (Christiansen & Togeby 2006; Togeby et al. 2003). The findings were sum-
marised in the abstract:
In its final report, the Danish Democracy and Power Study (1998–2004) 
pointed to a number of serious democratic problems such as declining politi-
cal party membership, a growing gap between a competent and resourceful 
majority and a marginalised minority, the growing influence of the media, the 
transfer of power from the political to the judicial system, and the democratic 
deficit associated with European Union membership. However, the report 
also concluded that overall democratic development in the last 30–40 years 
has been surprisingly positive. [. . .] in the case of Denmark, democratic 
development has not – as the parliamentary committee initially expected – 
resulted in a systematic weakening of the parliamentary chain of governance.
(Christiansen & Togeby 2006)
While the overall conclusion was positive, the study did express several concerns. 
Nevertheless, a special issue of the journal Økonomi & Politik in 2018 updated the 
analysis and found that things were still fine. Clearly, these observations do not 
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show that unicameralism is a necessary condition for a well-functioning democ-
racy. Still, the Danish case does show that bicameralism is not a precondition for 
a well-functioning democracy either. In a review of the study’s summary report, 
Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen argues that the positive conclusion was sound at 
the time and that Danish democracy is still robust and functions well. He does, 
however, raise concerns about package deals and executive orders. The editor of 
the special issue, Peter Munk Christiansen, also expressed concern that trust in 
politicians has dropped and that the political decision process may have become 
less public in recent years (Christensen 2018a, 2018b).
A senate might help ensure high-quality legislation. Prof. Jens Peter Chris-
tensen, a Supreme Court judge, has addressed the issue of the quality of legislation 
and concludes that it is unlikely to be as bad as people often claim (Christensen 
2008). He traces the quest for high-quality legislation back to the creation of a 
position in the state apparatus (generalprokurør) at the time of the introduction 
of absolutism in 1660. The post was abolished in 1872, and a permanent replace-
ment came in place as late as 1958, when a position was created in the ministry 
of justice. This position developed into the legislative section of the ministry of 
justice, which advises not only the government but also the Folketing. Christensen 
himself, however, does not mention the abolition of the Landsting to have caused 
a drop in the quality of legislation (Christensen 2008). Another observation about 
legislation in Denmark should also be brought up. A legislative agreement from 
1933 was briefly mentioned earlier (Kanslergadeforliget). Arter (1991) makes 
the point that, underpinned by a great many minority governments, the tradition 
for legislative agreements between the government and at least one opposition 
party has continued in Denmark after the abolition of bicameralism. Legislative 
agreements are often broad in terms of parties included, and the use of legislative 
agreements has increased. Within the duration of a legislative agreement, parties 
that are members of the agreement must agree if changes are to be made, and 
legislative agreements can easily last for years. They are not formal and thus not 
supported by formal sanctions in case of breaches, but it cannot be ruled out that 
they sometimes work in a stabilising way (Christiansen 2008; Pedersen 2005; 
Stokkink & Van Kersbergen 2015; Finansministeriet 2019).
The investigations mentioned earlier do not point to the abolition of the Landst-
ing as an explanation for current problems, and only rarely is the reintroduction 
of a senate or something similar proposed as a solution. However, if the search is 
widened a bit, there are voices that might qualify as a low-intensity debate sug-
gesting a new additional chamber as a solution to existing problems. Blaming the 
media for creating waves of public feeling, Per Stig Møller (then minister and 
MP for the conservatives) has in fact suggested the reintroduction of a second 
chamber that would slow down the speed of legislation in order to facilitate reflec-
tion. One idea is to have elections two years after the elections for the Folketing; 
another, to have equal representation of all ninety-eight municipalities. However, 
he does express concern that this could result in an eternal election campaign, 
which could make it difficult or impossible to govern and carry through reforms 
(Møller & Jensen 2010).
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In an article in the special update issue of the Power and Democracy Study, 
Ellersgaard and Larsen show that the one hundred largest Danish corporations are 
better connected to other powerful actors than the five hundred smallest of the one 
thousand largest companies (Ellersgaard & Larsen 2018). More generally, they 
have expressed concern that Denmark has a narrow and highly influential power 
elite. Thus, they titled a recent book ‘The Power Elite: How 423 Danes Rule the 
Country’ (Larsen, Ellersgaard & Bernsen 2015). Following up on that analysis, 
they have published a book with the title ‘Taming the Elite: From Power Elite to 
Citizen Democracy’ (Mulvad, Larsen & Ellersgaard 2017). One of two propos-
als they make is to introduce an additional chamber, the Borgerting, the citizens’ 
chamber. They propose that three hundred adult citizens residing in Denmark be 
selected by lottery for a three-year term. Membership should be mandatory, mem-
bers would be paid, and the chamber should have far-reaching competencies: it 
should approve controversial bills in the Folketing, it should have the power to 
initiate bills and if the Folketing blocks a bill from the Borgerting, a qualified 
minority of the Borgerting should be able to call a referendum. It should also 
have the power to reject the national budget, which could result in new general 
elections. Finally, it should have the power to investigate ministers and top civil 
servants (Mulvad, Larsen & Ellersgaard 2017).
Their motivation is anti-elitist: to become a member of the Borgerting, you do 
not have to be wealthy, well connected to organisations, rhetorically gifted or even 
especially motivated and hard working. In particular, they point out that persons 
with a university degree constitute a far larger proportion of the Folketing than 
they do of the population, which would not be the case in a chamber selected by 
lottery (Mulvad, Larsen & Ellersgaard 2017). This is correct. According to the 
Folketing’s own fact sheet, after the general elections in 2015, 50.3 per cent of all 
members of the Folketing had a master’s degree or equivalent; the same is true of 
only 8.8 per cent of the adult population (Folketinget 2015).
Drawing on theory of representation, it is possible to expand their argument. 
The field of representational theory is highly complex (Pitkin 1972; Marker 1999), 
but through the lens of descriptive representation, we can ask if a chamber is rep-
resentative of a population by comparing the composition of the chamber with 
that of the population. Descriptive representation theory may be subdivided into 
proportional representation and demographic representation (Marker 1999). From 
a proportional perspective, the Folketing represents the Danish voters very well. 
The Danish electoral system is highly proportional – the main deviation from 
perfect proportionality being the 2 per cent threshold generally needed for a party 
to get seats in Parliament (Folketinget 2011). Thus, the opinions of the voters, 
as reflected in their party choices, are proportionally represented in the Folket-
ing. From a demographic perspective, the current one-chamber system leaves 
room for improvement. The sizes of various groups in society are not matched by 
the corresponding group sizes in the Folketing. As noted earlier, people without 
master’s degrees or an equivalent are underrepresented. In addition, the female 
share of the adult population is 50.7 per cent, but after the 2015 election, women 
account for only 37.4 per cent of the Folketing (Folketinget 2015). This share has 
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hovered between 36.9 per cent and 39.1 per cent from 1998 to 2015, without a 
clear rising trend. After the introduction of female suffrage in 1915, the share of 
women in the Landsting was always somewhat higher than in the Folketing. In 
fact, in 1950 Ingeborg Hansen (social democratic party) was appointed chairper-
son of the Landsting. The Folketing did not see its first female speaker until 2015, 
when Pia Kjærsgaard of the Danish people’s party (Dansk Folkeparti) obtained 
this position (Folketinget 2017b).
A new chamber, with members selected by lottery, would, as the Landsting 
did, improve female representation. In fact, the Borgerting’s representation of 
demographic groups would be close to perfect in most terms (and could, with 
correction, be perfect in all terms on selected parameters, if wanted). Thus, Den-
mark would have a Parliament with near-perfect proportional representation in 
the Folketing and near-perfect demographic representation in the Borgerting. This 
would not only be an immediate improvement from the perspective of descrip-
tive representation; the Borgerting could also serve as a training ground, allowing 
more women and persons with little education to acquire political skills that could 
lead to membership of the Folketing.
Is it conceivable that this proposal will actually be implemented? Not really. 
The Borgerting, as envisioned by Mulvad, Larsen and Ellersgaard (2017), 
would demand a reform of the constitution, and even though the threshold of 
favourable votes is now ‘only’ 40 per cent, Constitutional reform is still hard 
to achieve. This is perhaps particularly true after the law on royal succes-
sion was revised in 2009 to achieve full gender equality. Thus, this issue can 
no longer be used to create public interest and raise turnout. A substantially 
scaled-down version of the Borgerting that would not require constitutional 
reform is somewhat more realistic. Denmark has recently demonstrated a will-
ingness for democratic innovation and experimentation. In 2017, a majority 
in the Parliament decided to allow voters to make proposals. If 50,000 vot-
ers support a proposal, the parties behind the arrangement will (or are sup-
posed to) make it their decision proposal in the Folketing (Folketinget 2019a). 
This setup has been implemented without constitutional reform. Currently, 
a scaled-down version of the idea of a Borgerting selected by lottery as an 
additional chamber has been picked up by the political party ‘the alternative’ 
(Alternativet 2019).
Conclusion
A senate in crisis can recover or it can cease to exist. The Landsting was abol-
ished in 1953. This chapter has pointed to several internal explanations for the 
abolition of the Danish Senate. For a weak non-socialist government, offering 
constitutional reform and abolition of the Landsting was a means to stay in power. 
In addition, it had become redundant because parties formed joint parliamentary 
party groups, with their members from both chambers, and because the majority 
in the Landsting in 1936 switched away from the non-socialist parties. Finally, the 
abolition of the Landsting was interwoven with other matters, most notably the 
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voting age and royal succession. Externally, the Finnish case may have provided 
reassurance that a unicameral system could work.
Since the abolition of the Landsting, the Danish unicameral political system 
has functioned for more than sixty-five years, and Danish political experience is 
an example that a unicameral system can function well. Most social scientists, as 
well as Danes in general, are satisfied with it. This is not to say that there have not 
been or will not be any problems. Still, the Danish political system is not in a state 
of crisis, even without a senate. Perhaps indicative in the current low-intensity 
debate on introducing an additional chamber, is that while an upper house is men-
tioned as a possibility, a recent proposal elaborated at some length is to introduce 
a chamber even more popular than the Folketing: a chamber of citizens selected 
by lottery.
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Legislatures are the cornerstone of representative democracy, and the decision to 
have one (unicameral) or two (bicameral) chambers within the national legislature 
(or parliament) is a decision of great significance. Typically, this decision is made 
during the design or redesign of a country’s constitutional framework (Martin & 
Rasch 2013). Tsebilis and Money (1997), who note that the ‘defining character-
istic of bicameral legislatures is the requirement that legislation be deliberated in 
two distinct assemblies’, find that approximately one-third of countries around 
the world have a bicameral legislature. Looking at larger democracies only (with 
a population of at least four million people), Martin and Strøm (forthcoming) find 
that just under half (thirty-three of sixty-eight) countries have a bicameral legis-
lature. Comparatively, then, bicameralism as a form of legislative organization 
remains popular but not typical.
In many countries, the status of senates (sometimes referred to as upper cham-
bers or second chambers) has been and continues to be the subject of significant 
attentiveness from political elites, commentators and voters. Bicameralism can be 
precarious. Some senates have been abolished recently (for example, in Croatia 
in 2001 and in Peru in 1993). Others face calls for fundamental reform, with a 
reduction in their powers and/or change in their mode of selection (for example, in 
Italy and the United Kingdom). Other countries have amended their constitutions 
to establish or re-establish a senate (for example, Kenya in 2010).
Some senates have faced the threat of elimination but survived. This chapter 
explores one such case – the nature and fate of bicameralism in the Republic of 
Ireland. In a national vote held on 4 October 2013, voters in the Irish Republic 
were given the opportunity to abolish Ireland’s Senate – Seanad Éireann (here-
after the Seanad). The proposal to abolish the Seanad was defeated by a narrow 
margin, being rejected by just under 52 per cent of those voting, albeit on a turnout 
of less than 40 per cent of eligible voters.
The uncertain position of the second parliamentary chamber in Ireland is not, 
however, a new phenomenon and the 2013 referendum was in keeping with the 
problematic if not controversial role senates have faced in Ireland over centuries. 
In order to set more recent events in historical relief, this chapter briefly traces the 
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evolution of the upper chamber on the island of Ireland beginning with the period 
from the Middle Ages to pre-twentieth-century constitutional arrangements. 
Following this, a more detailed analysis is presented of bicameralism in post- 
independent Ireland until recent decades. The latter half of the chapter considers 
the 2013 referendum to abolish the Senate, as well as post-referendum attempts at 
reform of the chamber.
Senates in Ireland from the fourteenth to  
twentieth centuries
The Irish experience of bicameralism is heavily influenced by and a response to 
its colonial history and to contemporaneous English thinking about the design and 
function of political institutions. As Coakley (2013) identifies, in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries the then Irish Parliament, like those elsewhere in Europe 
during the ancien régime, was in fact tricameral, with the estates of peers (Lords) 
and Commons conjoined to a third chamber for the ‘proctors’, or representa-
tives of the clergy. This latter chamber ceased in 1536 following its opposition to 
Reformation-inspired legislation, and clerical representation transferred to the 
Lords. The resulting bicameral Parliament resembled that of the emerging British 
state (following the 1707 Act of Union between England and Scotland) and by 1800 
the Irish House of Lords was almost equal in size to the three-hundred-member Irish 
House of Commons, consisting of twenty-two spiritual and 225 temporal peers.
However, although it mirrored Westminster in structure and operation and fol-
lowed the emerging party-political divisions there, the Irish parliament retained 
what Foster called ‘a different, querulous, and often impotent relationship vis-à-vis  
the apparatus of government’ (Foster 1989, p. 135). Tensions between Ireland and 
Britain grew during the eighteenth century and culminated in a failed rebellion 
in 1798 inspired by those which had recently occurred in America and France. In 
1800, the Acts of Union by the Parliament of Ireland and the Parliament of Great 
Britain respectively resulted in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
the end of the Irish Parliament in Dublin, and the representation of Ireland in the 
United Kingdom’s House of Lords by means of four clerical and twenty-eight 
secular peers and in the House of Commons by means of one hundred elected 
representatives (Mansergh 2005).
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, demands grew for the restora-
tion of some form of autonomous government in Ireland – known as Home Rule – 
including institutional safeguards, such as senates, for the protection of Protestant 
interests in what was an overwhelming Catholic polity. The defeated Home Rule 
Bills of 1886 and 1893 both proposed some form of upper house, the former bill 
providing for 103 members; the latter, forty-eight. The electorate for these seats 
was envisaged as primarily comprising those with property qualifications, in the 
process excluding the majority Catholic population from the franchise for those 
chambers. The third Home Rule Bill of 1912 was passed into law by Westminster, 
this time with substantially revised proposals for a forty-member upper house 
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initially involving a combination of nomination and direct election (using a form 
of proportional representation) and later solely by means of direct election.
With the onset of the First World War, the new Act was put into suspension and 
never implemented. Nonetheless, the idea of a bicameral domestic parliament had 
taken shape and was to reappear in the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, passed 
by Westminster in the middle of a militant Irish nationalist uprising seeking full 
autonomy from Westminster rule. The new Act envisaged the partition of Ireland 
into two entities with devolved semi-autonomous status – Northern Ireland (which 
came into existence) and Southern Ireland (which did not). Each jurisdiction was 
to have a bicameral legislature comprising a house of commons, a senate and an 
umbrella ‘Council of Ireland’ comprising representatives from the four chambers.
The Parliament of Northern Ireland survived for a half-century, until 1972, 
when it was suspended and then abolished the following year. Its twenty-six-
member Senate had an unusual composition and electoral system, with the Lord 
Mayor of Belfast and the Mayor of Londonderry (i.e. local authority positions) 
having ex officio seats and the remaining twenty-four members being elected by 
the house of commons for eight-year terms. In contrast, the system devised for the 
sixty-four-member Senate of Southern Ireland was more complex and involved a 
variety of corporate interests (Coakley 2013, p. 110). They included
• the lord mayors of Dublin and Cork (the two largest cities in southern Ireland) 
and the lord chancellor (the highest judicial office) as ex officio members;
• fourteen local authority representatives, elected regionally;
• seventeen members nominated by the lord lieutenant (the Crown’s represent-
ative in Ireland);
• six bishops (four Catholic and two Church of Ireland) elected by their respec-
tive peers;
• sixteen peers, elected by the Irish peerage;
• eight privy councillors, elected by the Irish Privy Council (an advisory body 
to the Crown).
This Senate only ever met twice and was fatally undermined by the non-participation 
of secessionist Sinn Féin in the sister House of Commons, where it held virtually 
all 128 seats. But this did not mean the end of bicameralism in Ireland. Rather, a 
new form of senate appeared in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921, which 
was agreed between Irish nationalists and British constitutionalists in a bid to 
bring to an end the Irish War of Independence.
The Senate in independent Ireland
The Anglo-Irish Treaty, approved by Dáil Éireann by sixty-four votes to fifty-
seven (as well as by the House of Commons of Southern Ireland to meet British 
constitutional requirements, though anti-Treaty members did not attend), created 
the Irish Free State and its associated Irish Free State constitution. Following an 
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agreement that the new state would have a senate in which the Protestant popula-
tion would be represented, the bicameral Oireachtas was one of the central insti-
tutions to be created under this constitution. This was an uncontroversial decision. 
The size of the chamber was more controversial. The new government wanted a 
chamber of forty seats but following concessions to the unionist minority, Arti-
cle 31 provided for a sixty-seat Senate – to be called Seanad Éireann – with all 
members required to be at least 35 years of age. The number of seats in the lower 
house, Dáil Éireann, was not specified but rather left to be determined by law 
according to certain provisions. In its initial incarnation, the Seanad was to be 
directly elected for a period of twelve years, with a quarter of senators being 
replaced every three years – a form of staggered membership commonly seen 
in upper chambers (Willumsen & Goetz 2015). Like the senate which had been 
proposed under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, Seanad Éireann had an 
explicitly representative function in that it was designed to ensure Protestant par-
liamentary representation in the new and overwhelmingly Catholic state (Murphy 
forthcoming).
This Protestant minority was largely Unionist in political outlook and concerned 
about their place in the new political dispensation which, although still within the 
Commonwealth, had the ambition to further loosen its political and constitutional 
ties with the British Crown. In a transitional arrangement, half of the seats in the 
first Free State Seanad were elected by the Dáil, and half were appointed by the 
‘President of the Executive Council’ (the prime minister). Of those appointed by 
that president, a large number were prominent artistic and landowning figures 
from within the Irish Protestant tradition, including the chamber’s first chairper-
son. Gallagher (2018) argues that, by providing a forum for minority voices, a set 
of values and perspectives that might otherwise not have been heard were given 
a voice in the new polity.
Apart from its representative function, the new Senate became quite an active 
legislative chamber, achieving the withdrawal of some proposed government 
legislation and developing a reputation for the quality of its debates (O’Sullivan 
1940). This reputation became increasingly problematic, however, following the 
election to office of the strongly nationalist Fianna Fáil party, led by Éamon de 
Valera in 1932, which was keen to advance an ambition of complete constitutional 
independence from Britain (and reunification with Northern Ireland). A series of 
conflicts emerged between the chambers over constitutional reform issues, and 
there were increased grumblings over what was perceived to be a privileged posi-
tion enjoyed by the Unionist minority in the Seanad. These conflicts culminated 
in the government using its majority position in the lower chamber to introduce 
legislation to abolish the Seanad immediately following the chamber’s refusal to 
support yet another government bill in 1934. The Seanad could only delay rather 
than permanently veto legislation, and a constitutional provision provided that 
only parliamentary rather than popular approval was necessary for constitutional 
amendments. Thus, after fourteen years in existence, Seanad Éireann ceased to 
exist in 1936.
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Creation and evolution of the modern Irish Senate
De Valera had by this stage created a committee to draft a new constitution to 
replace the much-maligned Irish Free State constitution. In a most unusual about-
turn, the new draft constitution, published in 1937, contained provision for the 
re-establishment of Seanad Éireann, which had been abolished the previous year. 
The precise reason for this change of heart on the principle of bicameralism by 
de Valera, who held extraordinary influence over the content of the new constitu-
tion, has never been definitively understood. We may however find some rationale 
for the form and role of the revised House during the debates concerning the re-
establishment of the chamber, when he stated, ‘The new House must never be in 
a position to challenge the Government as the old one had’ (Dáil Debates, Vol.69: 
Col. 1611, 2 Dec. 1937). He also noted that ‘it would pass the wit of man to devise 
a really satisfactory Second Chamber [senate]’ (Dáil Debates, Vol. 69: Col.1607, 
2 Dec. 1937). Clearly, then, the ambition was to have a senate, but a senate inca-
pable of impeding or challenging in any significant way the work of the executive.
A Commission on the Second House of the Oireachtas had been established 
by de Valera in 1936 to examine the issues, and the three reports produced by the 
Commission all supported the creation of a senate. It proposed that the new senate 
should retain the powers it had but with a reduction in the length of time it could 
delay legislation. One idea that caught the particular attention of de Valera was 
that the composition of the House would be based around vocational principles, 
an idea that had come to the fore in Catholic social teaching at that time, which 
sought to curb the influence of Marxist ideas concerning social class. The papacy 
of Pope Pius XI had endorsed the idea of vocational representation in the Roman 
Catholic encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, published in 1931, which supported the 
incorporation of vocational interests into societal decision-making processes.
The end result was to retain the size of the new Senate at sixty seats, whose 
life would be co-terminus with the lower house, and comprising three different 
groups of senators. The first group would comprise six senators elected by the 
graduates of the two universities then in existence – Dublin University (which had 
one constituent college, Trinity College) and the National University of Ireland 
(NUI, which had four constituent colleges: University College Dublin, NUI May-
nooth, NUI Galway and University College Cork). The second group of senators 
was to consist of forty-three seats, elected by an electoral college of approxi-
mately a thousand people comprising the members of Dáil Éireann (each known 
as a ‘TD’ or Teachta Dála, a member of Dáil Éireann) and the elected members 
of all city and county councils. These forty-three seats would be allocated among 
five vocational ‘panels’ as follows:
• an Administrative Panel (public administration and social services): seven 
seats;
• an Agricultural Panel (including fisheries): eleven seats;
• a Cultural and Educational Panel (education, arts, literature): five seats;
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• an Industrial and Commercial Panel (including architecture and engineering): 
nine seats;
• a Labour Panel (primarily organised labour groups): eleven seats.
The final group of eleven senators would be chosen by the Taoiseach (Prime 
Minister), granting that office-holder extensive patronage appointment power as 
well as an insurance policy against any government not having a majority in the 
chamber. These senators, known as Taoiseach’s nominees, came from a variety of 
quarters in Irish life, including distinguished public servants, artists, academics 
and even long-serving political party officials. In keeping with the profile of the 
Irish Free State Seanad, prominent members of the Protestant community were 
appointed in the early decades of the new Seanad, as well as Irish-language enthu-
siasts, but as these interests waned there was more focus on gender and repre-
sentatives from Northern Ireland (Coakley 2013, p. 124).
In practice, despite the attempt to create a chamber representative of societal 
interests and values, the nature of the electorate and the government’s desire to 
control the agenda of the Seanad ensured that it quickly became organised around, 
and by, parties – similar to the central role of parliamentary party groups in the 
lower house (Martin 2014). With society itself not structured according to voca-
tional principles, it was largely wishful thinking to assume that Parliament could 
do so (Chubb 1954). In keeping with de Valera’s expressed desire, the new 1937 
constitution of Ireland made it clear that the Seanad would be the less important 
of the two chambers, giving it no role in the election or removal of government 
and delaying power only in respect of legislation. Even then, its proposed amend-
ments to legislation could be rejected by Dáil Éireann. Indeed, between 1937 and 
2013, only two bills were successfully voted down by the Senate. The effect of 
this over time was to diminish public interest in the role and performance of the 
upper house, with many senators also holding other forms of paid employment.
The 1937 constitution does, however, allow the Taoiseach of the day to appoint 
up to two Senators to the cabinet, which cannot be larger than fifteen members. 
Since 1937, this has only happened on two occasions, and given the Taoiseach’s 
primary reliance on members of the lower house for his or her government to 
survive, the pressure to appoint members of that House is intense. Indeed, there 
was considerable resentment among TDs to the appointment of the senators to the 
cabinet in 1954 and 1981 (Manning 2010, p. 162).
As a result of its design and constitutional limitations, the Seanad came to 
be seen as a ‘crèche’ for aspiring members of the more powerful Dáil Éireann 
(who had perhaps failed in their most recent election attempt to that house but 
had ambitions to do so again), as well as a ‘retirement home’ for long-serving 
members of that House who wished to retain a parliamentary career but with less 
constituency pressures (the electoral system used to elect the lower chamber is 
highly candidate centred, requiring incumbents seeking re-election to devote sig-
nificant attention to local and parochial issues). Some of the most famous senators 
have emerged from those elected from the six university seats, which freed them 
from party political constraints to pursue specific causes.
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A number of reports into the electoral system and role of Seanad Éireann have 
taken place since 1937. The most prominent of these formed part of Constitution-
wide reviews. The 1966–1967 Committee on the constitution recommended the 
retention of the Senate along vocational, or what it termed ‘functional’, lines but 
little guidance on how this might be achieved in practice (Committee on the con-
stitution 1967, pp. 29–31). Three decades later the constitution Review Group 
gave a scathing opinion of Seanad Éireann, stating that as currently constituted, 
it did ‘not appear to satisfy the criteria for a relevant, effective and representative 
second house’ (1996, p. 71). A body established subsequent to this report, titled 
the ‘All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution’, produced two reports 
concerning the Seanad and in both cases recommended its retention – but with 
changes to the systems of appointing senators. These recommendations, which 
included such ideas as electing senators using European Parliament constituencies 
or a national list electoral system were, however, never acted upon.
In general, the Seanad remained the unloved institution of Irish politics for the 
remainder of the twentieth century, with a number of reports commissioned to try 
to reform it and its electoral system. A report by the chamber’s own Committee on 
Procedures and Privileges, published in 2004, had no difficulty in defining what 
it saw as the key problems facing the Seanad: 1) that it has no distinctive role in 
the Irish political system and 2) that its arcane and outdated system of nomination 
and election diminished senators’ public legitimacy (Seanad Éireann Committee 
on Procedures and Privileges Sub-Committee on Seanad Reform 2004).
The report also queried the legitimacy of the system of university representation 
given that it privileged some citizens with voting rights on the basis of educational 
achievement alone. However, no government was sufficiently motivated to act on 
these recommendations, and it was only with the onset of a grave economic crisis 
that a sustained spotlight of national attention was focused on Seanad Éireann.
The 2013 referendum
As noted earlier, the profile of Seanad Éireann from 1937 has been such that there 
have been relatively few occasions where it can be said to be the focus of public 
attention or the origin of major policy initiation or change in Ireland. Ironically, it 
was the occasion of the proposed referendum on its abolition that served to put a 
much-needed focus on the role and performance of the chamber. In a referendum 
held on 4 October 2013, with a turnout of 39.17 per cent, the proposal to abolish 
the upper chamber at the next general election was rejected by 51.7 per cent of 
those voting (MacCarthaigh & Martin 2015). The abolition of the Seanad was 
meant to have been a centrepiece of political reform for the governing coalition 
elected in 2011 following an economic crisis which included the need to rescue a 
number of banks, a fiscal crisis and ultimately an external intervention involving 
the International Monetary Fund (Breen 2012). The referendum result produced 
a surprising outcome: Irish voters, despite being heavily disillusioned with the 
political system and political elites in the midst of a major economic crisis, voted 
to retain a two-chamber legislature. The origins of the referendum and its results 
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raised important questions about the place of the often maligned and already 
once-abolished Senate in modern Ireland.
This 2008 economic crisis had resulted in much public criticism of the admin-
istrative and regulatory systems that failed to prevent it, as well as of the state’s 
political institutions. In the lead-in to the first post-crash general election, in 
2011, all political parties committed to closing the chamber following a sur-
prise announcement by the then-leader of the main opposition party, centre-right 
Fine Gael, in 2009, that he wished to see it abolished. The coalition agree-
ment approved by Fine Gael and the centre-left Labour Party – which held the 
largest-ever majority by an Irish government – pledged to hold a referendum on ‘a 
number of urgent parliamentary reform issues’, including abolition of the Seanad. 
As the initiators of the proposal, Fine Gael focused its referendum campaign on 
three major themes: the underperforming and unreformable nature of the current 
Seanad, its cost, and the populist argument that abolition would result in fewer 
politicians. Its claims that abolishing the chamber would save €20 million annu-
ally were hotly contested by its opponents, and even the politically neutral par-
liamentary bureaucracy (the Houses of the Oireachtas Commission) struggled to 
determine a sum that a switch to unicameralism would save.
Within all political parties there were problems convincing incumbent senators 
to campaign actively for their place of work to be closed, and those lower-chamber 
parliamentarians charged with leading pro-abolition campaigns subsequently 
noted the lack of enthusiasm on the part of their party colleagues to support the 
proposal. Indeed, many of the government’s own senators were unhappy at the 
timing of the referendum, which, if passed, would leave them in a political no-
person’s land until the next election and the chamber’s closure.
The left-wing, nationalist and anti-system Sinn Féin party decided to also cam-
paign to abolish the upper chamber, principally on the basis of its elitist and nar-
row electorate, which the party viewed as inherently undemocratic. The Socialist 
Party also supported the chamber’s abolition. The left-of-centre and historically 
dominant Fianna Fáil formally opposed abolition, instead publishing a policy 
document calling for complete reform of the chamber and a reduction of its mem-
bership from sixty to fifty-one. It proposed that forty Senators would be directly 
elected by the public and the Irish diaspora, with a further eight appointed by the 
Taoiseach, with the final three members coming from Northern Ireland. Its plan, 
titled A Seanad for the People, argued that a reformed Seanad could thus play a 
stronger role in North-South political links (though this was not elaborated on), 
better scrutinise EU legislation and help tackle gender inequality in public life. 
The party also proposed a cut in a Senator’s basic salary from €65,000 to €50,000.
As is usual for referendums in Ireland, the state’s independent provider of 
information on the matter, the Referendum Commission, was established some 
four months before polling day, on June 6. It estimated that abolition of the 
Seanad would require forty changes to the text of the constitution, ranging from 
simple deletions to more substantive re-engineering. Its guide identified fourteen 
major changes, of which all but one would result in a transfer of powers to Dáil 
Eireann.
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The lead-in to the referendum featured prominent campaigns by academics, 
media commentators and former parliamentarians. Prominent on the pro-abolition 
side was the One House group, which included a number of prominent former 
cabinet ministers. The Green Party also campaigned in favour of retention, as did 
the Reform Alliance, a collection of former Fine Gael parliamentarians who had 
been expelled from the party.
For the abolitionists, much was made of the upper chamber’s ineffectiveness 
since its re-establishment in 1937, with the ‘crèche’ and ‘retirement home’ moni-
kers featuring prominently. The constitutional provision for university seats was 
deemed archaic if not illegal, given that the constitutional amendment approved 
in the late 1970s to extend the franchise to all third-level institutions outside the 
colleges of the University of Dublin and National University of Ireland had never 
been acted upon. Equally, the original concept of vocational representation by 
means of the five vocational panels in the Senate was pointed to as redundant 
given the reality of parliamentary party control of the chamber, supplemented by 
the patronage appointment of eleven members by the Taoiseach of the day. The 
Yes campaign also pointed to the absence of Seanad involvement in the election 
or dismissal of the executive and its ability to merely delay rather than stop the 
progress of legislation.
Those arguing for retention and reform (as no party or group argued for reten-
tion of the status quo) claimed the government was using the Seanad as a high-
profile sacrificial lamb to compensate for the deep political failures that had 
contributed to the economic crisis. The ‘Democracy Matters’ group, including 
a number of incumbent senators who had formed the ‘Seanad Reform Group’ 
some months prior, argued that an already centralised system of parliamentary 
government would become even more insulated from necessary checks on power 
were the Seanad abolished. They argued the chamber has provided a platform for 
some of Ireland’s most prominent public figures (and representatives of minority 
groups) to speak out, particularly those elected to the six university seats.
A month before the referendum, and in expectation of victory, the government 
hurriedly produced a list of proposals for reforming Dáil Éireann should a uni-
cameral parliament emerge. These included proposals for external experts and 
members of the public to be involved in discussions preceding detailed legislative 
drafting. Other reforms to Dáil Éireann included longer working hours for TDs, 
less use of the guillotine (a control on timetabling through which the government 
can limit time for debate) and more effective regulation of the legislative process 
to avoid the rush of bills through Parliament before recesses. For a chamber that 
had proved largely resistant to calls for reform in how it conducted its business 
from the 1970s (MacCarthaigh 2005), these proposed changes were relatively 
dramatic.
Polls suggested that although a large portion of the electorate remained unde-
cided as to how they would vote, the numbers in favour of abolition steadily 
dropped as the campaign continued. An Ipsos MRBI poll published by the Irish 
Times in June 2013 suggested 72 per cent of voters in favour of abolition (when 
those who were undecided were excluded), but less than a week before the ballot, 
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another poll by the same company suggested 44 per cent in favour of abolition 
against 27 per cent in favour of retention, with 21 per cent undecided (or 62 per 
cent in favour when excluding those undecided), with the cost savings argument 
being the biggest motivating factors for abolitionists.
Turnout may be the key issue in explaining the remarkable turnaround in the 
last few weeks of the campaign, with those wishing to retain the Seanad more 
motivated to vote than those who preferred unicameralism. A follow-up survey 
commissioned by the Referendum Commission asked respondents whether or not 
they voted, and if they did not vote, what the reason was. The results are reported 
in Figure 17.1.
The primary explanation for choosing not to vote in the Seanad referendum 
was lack of interest: almost 30 per cent of non-voters said they had little to no 
interest in the topic to warrant voting. A quarter of people responded that practi-
cal reasons, such as travel or not having the time to attend the polling station, 
prevented them from voting. Despite significant media coverage and the efforts of 
the Referendum Commission (including a booklet distributed to each household 
in the country), a further 25 per cent of non-voters cited a lack of understanding 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
No interest in it
Circumstances didn't allow, etc…
Didn’t understand referendum
Didn’t know enough 
I’m not registered
Didn’t know which way to vote 
Didn’t receive vong/polling card 
Hadn’t transferred vote from home polling staon 
Figure 17.1 Reasons given for not voting in the Seanad referendum in Ireland
Source: Referendum Commission 2013
Notes: Based on post-referendum survey conducted on behalf of the Referendum Commission. 
Respondents who indicated that they had not voted were asked, ‘For what specific reasons did you not 
vote in the Seanad Referendum?’
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Costs too much/save money
It is unnecessary/not needed
Wanted to get rid of Seanad (unspecified)
It is inefficient/badly run
Vong system is elist/undemocrac
Tired of waing for it be reformed
Wanted to retain Seanad (ie voted wrong…
Other
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Figure 17.2 Reasons given for not voting in the Seanad referendum in Ireland
Source: Referendum Commission
Notes: Based on post-referendum survey conducted on behalf of the Referendum Commission. 
Respondents who indicated that they had voted yes were asked, ‘Why did you vote yes?’
or not knowing enough about the topic as the reason for not participating in the 
referendum.
In terms of demographics, the official post-referendum report of the Referen-
dum Commission found that voting levels among younger and less well-off voters 
had been lowest, with the stated proportion of the age 18–25 group who said they 
had voted standing at just 19 per cent (Referendum Commission 2013, p. 15). 
Among the over 65s, the equivalent turnout figure for the Seanad referendum was 
reported to be 77 per cent. Some 59 per cent of the better-off ABC1 group and 60 
per cent of farmers said they voted in the referendum.
For those who voted, the same survey canvassed reasons for voting ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’. Figure 17.2 reports the reasons voters who were surveyed gave for voting 
to abolish the Seanad. A plurality of respondents cited the financial savings as 
the main reason for voting to abolish the Seanad. Despite the debate around the 
real savings that would arise from terminating the Senate, the argument clearly 
won favour with some voters. The other single most important factor encourag-
ing a ‘Yes’ vote was the feeling that bicameralism was not needed in Ireland. 
Again, this was a central plank of the Yes campaign, based on the observation that 
small unitary states tend not to have bicameralism and countries which abolished 
bicameralism saw no obvious negative consequences.
An interesting aspect of the final results, as broken down by electoral bounda-
ries, was a general increase in the margin in favour of abolition as one moved 
outside Dublin and its surrounding commuter-belt environs. The highest ‘Yes’ 
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vote was recorded in the Taoiseach’s home county of Mayo (57 per cent), while 
support for retention was highest in the most affluent and traditionally liberal con-
stituencies around the capital, peaking at 61 per cent against the Senate’s closure 
in Dublin South-East.
Figure 17.3 reports the rationales provided by those respondents who indicated 
that they had voted to retain the Seanad. Among those who voted ‘No’, the ‘power 
grab’ argument seems to have held some importance. The No campaign had 
argued, clearly with some level of persuasiveness, that the Irish political system 
was already heavily centralised, with significant legislative and executive powers 
concentrated in the governing executive. Thus, while almost everyone agreed that 
the Seanad had not been a particularly effective watchdog, the removal of a Sen-
ate would nevertheless grant too much control to the government (and the remain-
ing chamber, which in effect is dominated by the government). This rationale may 
also explain the more general sentiment, reported by 21 per cent of respondents, 
that the Seanad was an important institution that they wanted to keep. While a 
positive desire to retain bicameralism dominated the reasons for voting ‘No’, 10 
per cent of those who voted ‘No’ said they did so out of a dislike or distrust of 
the incumbent government – a common feature in midterm elections and refer-
endums. Finally, it is worth noting that 4 per cent of ‘No’ voters said they did 
so because the Taoiseach declined to participate in live debates with other party 
leaders on the topic.
As can also be seen from Figures 17.2 and 17.3, there is some suggestion that 
the wording of the proposal on the ballot paper caused some confusion. Research 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Would grant Gov't/Dail too much control
Seanad is important/wanted to keep it…
Want to see the Seanad reformed instead…
Don’t like/trust the Government
Campaign was rushed/mismanaged
Other
Enda Kenny's refusal to debate
Wanted to get rid of the Seanad (ie voted…
Actual savings would have been insufficient
Don't know/Not stated
Didn't believe 20m figure
Didn't want the constuon changed
Figure 17.3 Reasons given for having voted to retain the Seanad in Ireland
Source: Referendum Commission
Notes: Based on post-referendum survey conducted on behalf of the Referendum Commission. 
Respondents who indicated that they had voted no were asked, ‘Why did you vote no?’
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by the Referendum Commission found that 13 per cent of those surveyed and who 
said they voted ‘Yes’ actually wanted to retain the Seanad. Fifty-five per cent of 
those surveyed agreed that it was quite difficult or very difficult to tell from the 
Seanad referendum ballot paper what they were being asked to vote for (Referen-
dum Commission 2013).
Post-referendum reform proposals and the  
role of senates today
It is probably fair to say that Irish senators – saved from extinction – returned to 
work after the referendum result with a renewed desire to perform their duties and 
reform the Seanad. In response to the referendum result, the government estab-
lished a Working Group on Seanad Reform which included politicians and aca-
demics, among others. The group’s terms of reference noted that their principal 
focus should be on possible reforms of how the Seanad is elected, although only 
within the current constitutional framework. The working group was also charged 
with exploring the internal organization and the legislative process within the 
Senate. The group reported in early 2015 and made a number of arguably major 
suggestions for reform (Working Group on Seanad Reform 2015). The group’s 
recommendations were prefaced by the assessment that that the current bicameral 
system in Ireland suffered from three fundamental problems:
1 an electoral system which was elitist and which disfranchised a majority of 
citizens;
2 a concept of vocational representation which had little substance in 
practice;
3 the absence of clear defining guidelines or public understanding of the Sen-
ate’s role.
The group recommended a number of reforms, including
1 that thirty-six of the sixty seats be directly elected from five vocational panels 
and from the university constituency;
2 that thirteen of the sixty seats be indirectly elected from an electoral college 
of all elected county and city councillors, members of Dáil Éireann and out-
going Senators;
3 that citizens who are eligible to vote in the university constituency must opt 
to vote either in that constituency or on one of the five panels available to all 
citizens;
4 that the vote be extended to include Irish citizens in Northern Ireland and to 
holders of Irish passports living overseas.
With regard to role and function, the working group concluded that:
a clear statement of the constitutional role of the Seanad as subordinate to the 
Dáil but with a very special and distinct role in the legislative and political 
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process is a proper starting point for a redefinition of the role and contribution 
of the Seanad.
(Working Group on Seanad Reform 2015, p. 10)
To date, the working group’s report has been largely ignored. Six years on from 
the referendum, virtually no significant reforms to the Seanad have taken place. 
In April 2018, one prominent campaigner to retain the Seanad went on the record 
to suggest:
There are a dozen other reports over the last 40 years. Lots of them have good 
ideas but I don’t see any political will and in that context I remain deeply 
frustrated and disheartened. I think there is potential for the Seanad but as it 
exists it is not worth saving.
(McMorrow 2018)
Indeed, it took until April 2018 for the government to agree to establish a group 
of Oireachtas members to be known as the Seanad Reform Implementation Group 
(SRIG). The group was charged with considering and reporting on the implemen-
tation of the recommendations of the Working Group on Seanad Reform – but 
again with the stipulation that it do so within the present terms of the constitution.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that Irish Senates have from the outset held an 
uncertain place in Irish public life that resonates with the comments of the Abbé 
Sieyès during the French revolution, who is alleged to have said ‘if a second 
chamber [senate] dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees with it, it is 
superfluous’ (quoted in Campion 1953, p. 17). Since the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the dominant view of the Irish Senate’s role has been to give voice to 
regional, minority or sectional interests, with a particular emphasis on the Protes-
tant Unionist tradition, though in practice it is hard to determine the effect of these 
representational arrangements on the quality of legislation and other activities by 
the Senate. Yet no other Irish political institution has had its role, composition, 
electoral system and indeed its very existence persist as matters of controversy 
as it has.
The 2013 referendum campaign engaged those in the media and academia quite 
vigorously. Despite the use of populist soundbites on both sides of the campaign, 
the general public seemed to lose whatever interest they had had as the campaign 
wore on, which concluded with one of the lowest turnouts in Irish referendum 
history, at just under 40 per cent of eligible voters. It seems that the cameral struc-
ture of the national legislature never became the hotly contested issue that other 
referendums (and particularly those on social policy issues) frequently produce in 
Ireland. While the governing parties were blocked in their attempt to abolish the 
Seanad a majority of the electorate, by declining to vote, simply chose to ignore 
the issue.
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At time of writing, it is unlikely that a minority government will commit the 
necessary political capital required to engage in the major constitutional re- 
engineering involved in substantial reform of the chamber. Instead, it is in the 
hands of senators themselves to map out a future for an institution that has little 
profile or recognition in Irish daily life. In the context of changing demograph-
ics, Brexit and Ireland’s place in the EU, as well as copious reports and recom-
mendations for reform in recent years, there may yet be fruitful new roles found 
for Seanad Éireann as a parliamentary chamber. For example, alongside their 
traditional roles interrogating the executive’s legislative agenda and providing a 
forum of public policy debate, new challenges now arise from the technologi-
cal revolution in government, demands for more participatory forms of decision-
making and the need for greater trust in democratic institutions. If this were to be 
addressed, it would represent a marked reverse in fortunes for senates in Ireland.
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There has been a tendency throughout the twentieth century to abolish higher 
chambers. Portugal was one of the first countries, in 1910, to abolish its Senate, 
a tendency that become stronger in the second half of the twentieth century and 
appeared to have become the norm. Nevertheless, a new trend emerged in the 
course of the 1980s: a number of countries restored their senates, such as South 
Africa in 1994. Other countries installed new senates, such as Kazakhstan in 1995 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003. Preliminary analysis of parliamentary websites 
internationally indicates that the number of senates has increased from forty-five 
in 1970 to seventy in 2000 (Delfosse & Dupont 1999; Gélard 2005–2006).
Experts on bicameralism agree there are numerous advantages to having an 
upper chamber (Gélard 2005–2006; Smith 2009; Watts 2009). For example, as an 
institution it is often viewed as a means for power sharing and the recognition of 
diversity in contemporary democracies (Paterson & Mulghen 1999; Uhr 1999). 
Canadian experts on bicameralism also underline the key role of the Canadian 
Senate for the representation of minorities (Watts 2009; Smith 2003, 2009). How-
ever, when experts write about minorities in Canada, they usually imply French 
speakers from Quebec and not those living outside Quebec – as this chapter dis-
cusses. There are exceptions. In 1963, Kunz and McKay suggested, in their classic 
books on Canadian institutions, that Francophones outside Quebec, in particular 
those living in the Western provinces, had a right to be represented in the Senate 
(Kunz 1963; MacKay 1963). In 1968, Orban argued in his history of the Senate in 
Quebec that the Senate was an institution for the representation of the province’s 
English-speaking minority (Orban 1969). Unfortunately, recent research on sen-
ate reform in Canada has avoided discussing its role for Francophone communi-
ties (Smith 2009). Filling this void is thus important because existing research, by 
focusing solely on Quebec, neglects important historical practices and data.
More specifically, in 2015, with the change of government from Conserva-
tive to Liberal, an important shift in the Canadian Senate appointment process 
was introduced in favour of group representation. The Government of Canada 
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established the Independent Advisory Board for Senate Appointments to preside 
over senatorial nominations (Government of Canada 2019). Notably, the Com-
mittee’s mandate entails recommending persons with disabilities, visible minori-
ties or ethno-cultural minorities, linguistic minorities (i.e. Anglo-Quebeckers 
and Francophones living outside Quebec), indigenous peoples and women to the 
Prime Minister’s office for him or her to choose among a list of five candidates. 
Between 2016 and 2018, the governor general of Canada, following a recom-
mendation by the Prime Minister of Canada, has appointed forty-five senators 
from those groups, including twenty-six women, eight members of First Nations, 
four members of Francophone communities outside Quebec, persons belonging 
to a visible minority and persons with disabilities (Parliament of Canada n.d.; cf. 
Griffiths 2017). This is an important move for group representation in Canada. 
At the time of writing, of the 105 senators currently in office, women represented 
46 per cent; indigenous senators, 11 per cent; Francophone senators from outside 
Quebec, 8 per cent.
This chapter focuses on the historical role of the Canadian Senate as a repre-
sentative chamber for Francophones living outside Quebec since its inception in 
1867 (cf. Cardinal & Grammond 2017). Asserting a distinct identity from Franco-
phone Quebeckers, they represent around 4 per cent of the Canadian population 
outside Quebec (Statistics Canada 2018). Being appointed to the Canadian Senate 
is thus an important way to compensate for their lack of effective representation 
in the House of Commons (Cardinal & Grammond 2017). More specifically, this 
chapter discusses the importance of constitutional conventions for the representa-
tion of Francophones outside Quebec in the Canadian Senate. Data show that his-
torically the appointment of Francophones outside Quebec to the Canadian Senate 
has been guaranteed by constitutional convention. Briefly put, the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) determines a constitutional convention by asking three ques-
tions, which it borrows from Sir W. Ivor Jennings’s The Law and the Constitution. 
Those questions are as follows: ‘first, what are the precedents; secondly, did the 
actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is 
there a reason for the rule?’ (Supreme Court of Canada 1981). For the SCC,
A single precedent with a good reason may be enough to establish the rule. 
A whole string of precedents without such a reason will be of no avail, unless 
it is perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded them as bound by it.
(Supreme Court of Canada 1981)
Although the new process put in place by the Canadian government in 2015 
represents an important step for group representation, this chapter suggests that 
constitutional conventions are still relevant for discussing the representation of 
Francophones outside Quebec in the Canadian Senate.
This chapter does not address all types of group representation, since it is a 
recent phenomenon for which there is still very little available data (Massicotte 
2016; Griffiths 2017). As alluded to earlier, the chapter also makes an impor-
tant distinction between Quebec, where one finds the majority of Francophones 
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in the country, and Francophones in the other provinces. Most commentators 
view Francophones in Canada as synonymous with French Canadians living 
in Quebec. Furthermore, since the 1980s, philosophers such as Will Kymlicka 
and Charles Taylor have defined Quebec as a national minority or a minority 
nation with the understanding that its unique situation in Canada deserves to 
be recognised both politically and constitutionally (cf. Kymlicka 1996, 1998; 
Taylor 1994).
However, this emphasis put on Quebec needs to be placed in its broader con-
text. Francophones, or French Canadians, as they were called until the 1960s, do 
not all live in Quebec. They also have demands of their own, most of which date 
back to the nineteenth century. To be sure, while Quebeckers claim their recogni-
tion as members of a nation, Francophones outside Quebec claim that they have 
a right to autonomy ( Cardinal & Gonzales-Hildago 2012). They also call on the 
federal government for the protection of their rights and for better representation 
in Parliament, in particular in the Canadian Senate. They insist on their status as 
official language minority communities at both the federal and the provincial lev-
els. Thus, their specific history makes it appropriate to treat Francophones outside 
Quebec as a separate category.
First, this chapter reviews, briefly, the literature on the representation of minori-
ties in bicameral institutions and further discusses the relevance of studying Fran-
cophones living outside of Quebec. Second, it presents a historical overview of 
their ongoing presence in the Canadian Senate since 1867. Third, this chapter 
further explores the impact of constitutional conventions on the representation 
of Francophones outside Quebec in the Senate in the context of the new process 
introduced by the Canadian government in 2015.
Bicameralism and the political representation  
of minorities in Canada
A history of the Canadian Senate, even with a focus on Francophones living out-
side Quebec, needs to acknowledge the important role of Quebec in the develop-
ment of the institution. At the time of Confederation (1867), the population of 
Canada was 3.2 million people, of which 1 million were French Canadian. As the 
English-speaking population of Canada was growing at a quicker pace – 4.35 per 
cent per year in Upper Canada (Ontario) – adopting the principle of representation 
by population in the new House of Commons was disadvantageous to Quebec. It 
was thus necessary to find a compromise in order to ensure and protect the inter-
ests of French Canadians and particularly those living in Quebec. This explains 
why the creation of the Canadian Senate owes so much to the debate on minori-
ties. Because of Quebec, the new institution would be based on the principle of 
equal representation at the regional level in order to limit the negative effects 
of political representation solely based on population. Lower Canada (Quebec) 
would have a fixed and guaranteed representation to compensate for its growing 
numerical disadvantage in the Commons (cf. Grittner, this volume; Smith, D. E., 
this volume).
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Combined with the regional principle, the principle of minority interests, 
including linguistic minority rights, is thus a founding principle of the Canadian 
Senate. At the time, in Canada, the concept of minority interests also included the 
representation of the wealthy few (Ajzenstat 2003). The hereditary principle of 
the British House of Lords could not be reproduced in Canada, but it has informed 
the position that the Canadian Senate should not be elected (Province du Canada 
1865, p. 87).
Even though the distribution of seats in the Senate has been guided by a prin-
ciple of regional equality, the 1867 Constitution Act is not explicit to that effect – 
despite the fact that commentators of the Canadian Senate often describe the 
Senate as a regional chamber. The principle of minority rights or interests has also 
informed the representation of Francophones living outside Quebec in the Senate 
despite any specification to that effect in the 1867 Constitution Act. As the chapter 
shows (see Figure 18.1), there is a tradition of representing members coming from 
those communities since the inception of the Senate. Furthermore, from the 1960s 
to the 1990s, a period well known in Canada for its constitutional debates on the 
status of Quebec in the federation, the federal and provincial governments were 
fully aware of the constitutional importance of Francophones living outside Que-
bec (and of indigenous peoples) for the country (Cardinal & Grammond 2017).
In the 1999 Reference on Quebec Secession, the Supreme Court of Canada also 
asserted that the Canadian constitution rests on four unwritten principles, includ-
ing of the protection of minority rights (Supreme Court of Canada 1998). In 2014, 
in its Reference on the Senate Reform (2014, paragraph 16), the Supreme Court of 
Canada further recognised that the Canadian Senate had among its attributes the 
role of representing ‘minority interests’ (Kinsella 2014). Thus, in Canada, with the 
regional principle, the representation of minority interests constitutes an impor-
tant compromise with the principle of representation by population. It is a guiding 
principle for the appointment of senators, in particular for Francophones living 
outside Quebec.
This is most important because Francophones living outside Quebec have not 
been particularly well treated historically by their governments. To be sure, in 
1867, the adoption of federalism was meant to provide specific protection to Fran-
cophone culture and language, in particular in Quebec. Since the 1950s and 1960s, 
the Quebec government has been well known for using federalism to develop its 
own approach to public policy (cf. Béland & Lecours 2008). At the time of Con-
federation, French Canadian senators from Quebec used their voice in the Senate 
to argue for more protection for the French language and culture. In contrast, 
in the other Canadian provinces, the presence of Francophone communities was 
seen more often than not as a threat to the Anglo-Protestant character of those 
provinces (Berger 1970; Cardinal 2015).
In Canada, language is an area of ancillary jurisdiction. This means that all 
governments can adopt legislation pertaining to the use or recognition of lan-
guages. At the time of Confederation, provincial governments were relatively tol-
erant towards their Francophone communities. However, with the development of 
Anglo-conformist movements across the country during the nineteenth and early 
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twentieth century, all provincial governments adopted legislation prohibiting 
French as a language of schooling – even in their legislative assemblies in some 
cases (cf. Cardinal & Foucher 2017). Even though those policies were challenged 
by many actors from Francophone associations and vehemently denounced by the 
Quebec government at the time, those provincial governments which prohibited 
the French language were considered to be acting within their own sphere of com-
petence, as constitutionally defined.
In the 1960s the situation in many provinces started to change for the better 
(Cardinal 2015). New Brunswick and Ontario, for example, adopted legislation 
and policies more favorable to their Francophone minorities. In 1968, New Brun-
swick became Canada’s first and only officially bilingual province. In 1986, the 
government of Ontario adopted its first legislation on French Language Services.
At the same time, Francophone senators from outside Quebec used their posi-
tion to promote their communities and the need for more language rights. For 
example, in 2001, while Francophones outside Quebec gained greater recognition 
as constitutional actors in their own right, the Senate created a permanent commit-
tee for official languages under the leadership of Franco-Ontarian Senator Jean-
Robert Gauthier (cf. Senate of Canada 2002). This institutionalisation of official 
languages by the Senate has had an impact. Since its inception, the committee has 
conducted many studies, held numerous consultations on issues relevant to Fran-
cophone communities and led major initiatives to improve the Official Languages 
Act. More specifically, in 2005, the committee succeeded in amending the Official 
Languages Act in order to include the mention that the Canadian government 
must adopt ‘positive measures’ for the enhancement and development of its offi-
cial language minorities. In 2017, the committee was invited to lead a major study 
on whether the Canadian government should modernise the Official Languages 
Act. In 2018, the Prime Minister of Canada announced that he would go ahead 
with the project.
To summarise, while the Senate is viewed as a chamber for regions, the prin-
ciple was not written into the 1867 Constitution Act, but it helped guarantee 
Quebec’s presence in the Senate. The protection of minority rights is another 
important founding but unwritten principle which also has had its impact. It was 
meant to protect French Canadian culture in Quebec, but minority rights or minor-
ity interests have also informed the appointment of members from Francophone 
communities in the Senate. The chapter will show, successive prime ministers 
have felt bound or obliged to appoint senators from those communities.
Francophone representation in the Canadian  
Senate since 1867
In the nineteenth century, the majority of Francophones living outside Quebec 
were found in Ontario and in the Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Newfound-
land and Labrador, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island). In Ontario at the 
time, there were roughly 75,000 Francophones (Bonenfant 1966). Their pres-
ence dates back from the French presence in the seventeenth century, where they 
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were found mostly in the southern part of the province, in particular in the areas 
of Toronto and Windsor. They also lived in the north, where they formed small 
villages around the Lake Huron and Lake Superior – with indigenous peoples; 
many moved further west to what would become the province of Manitoba in 
1870, followed by the creation of the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 
1905, where Francophones and Métis people (people of mixed indigenous and 
European ancestry) also emigrated. During the nineteenth century, Francophones 
from Quebec emigrated from their province to Upper Canada, where they formed 
villages and small cities on the eastern border with Quebec. Soon they formed 
the majority of the population in the area and have maintained their (relative) 
numbers ever since.
While many Francophones in Ontario and in the Western provinces, such as 
Manitoba, have roots in Quebec, in the Atlantic provinces, Francophones have 
a distinct history and identity. They call themselves Acadians and still claim this 
identity since their coming to New France in the sixteenth century. In contrast 
to other Francophones, they were found mostly in the province of Nova Scotia. 
However, in 1755, Acadians were deported by the British for refusing to pledge 
allegiance to the King. After their deportation, they could be found in other Atlan-
tic provinces as well as in the United States – Louisiana in particular. Some also 
returned to France, and many moved to eastern parts of Quebec. However, Acadi-
ans are specifically identified with the Atlantic provinces of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Today, in New 
Brunswick more specifically, they represent 32 per cent of the population.
At the time of Confederation, Acadians were more numerous than Franco-
phones in Ontario, representing approximately 87,000 people at the end of the 
nineteenth century. However, as was the case for Francophones from Ontario, 
no representatives from the Acadian population were invited to participate in 
the Confederation debates. This may explain why Acadians, in particular, were 
quite active in opposing the new constitution (Migneault 2016). That said, 
once Confederation was established, Acadians lobbied actively for senatorial 
appointments.
Figure 18.1 provides a first overview of all appointments to the Senate since 
1867, with a particular focus on Francophones living outside Quebec. It shows 
that appointments to the Senate of members from those groups were made as early 
as 1871. It also shows more explicitly the evolution of senatorial nominations of 
Francophones outside Quebec made by the different prime ministers.
In 1871, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald appointed the first Francophone 
senator from outside Quebec to represent Manitoba, followed by the first Acadian 
in 1885 and the first Francophone from Ontario (or Franco-Ontarian) in 1887. 
In 1895, Prime Minister Mackenzie Bowell appointed the first Francophone, or 
Acadian, from Prince Edward Island. In 1906, Prime Minister Wilfird Laurier 
appointed the first Francophone senator from Alberta. In 1907, he also appointed 
the first Francophone from Saskatchewan and the first Acadian from Nova Scotia. 
In 1975, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau appointed the first Francophone 
from the Yukon. Some provinces and territories, such as British Columbia and 
Francophones outside Quebec, 1867–present 261
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, have never 
had a Francophone senator.
Figure 18.1 illustrates that Canadian prime ministers have established a solid 
tradition of appointing Francophone members from outside Quebec to the Senate. 
Since its creation, a total of 958 individuals have been appointed to the Senate. 
The number includes sixty-six senators (fifty-six male and ten female) from Fran-
cophone communities outside Quebec.
In the succession of twenty-three Canadian prime ministers, of which twenty-
one made senatorial appointments, seventeen have nominated one or more 
Francophone senators from outside Quebec. Representatives of Francophone 
communities were thus among the first cohorts of senators appointed by Prime 
Minister Macdonald. For example, both Manitoba’s and Alberta’s first senatorial 
nominations of Francophones were made with the creation of the two provinces. 
In 1884, Joseph Tassé, editor of the Montreal newspaper La Minerve, called for 
the appointment of a Franco-Ontarian senator. Interestingly, Prime Minister Mac-
donald responded to Tassé that he would do his best and, in 1887, appointed the 
first Franco-Ontarian senator. Moreover, Prime Minister Macdonald and those 
who followed continued to appoint Francophone senators in other provinces. In 
doing so, they ensured continuity and confirmed the importance of maintaining a 
Francophone presence in the Senate.
In 1928, a total of seven senators representing Francophone and Acadian com-









Figure 18.1  Senatorial nominations of Francophones living outside Quebec under succes-
sive Prime Ministers since 1867
Source: Library of Parliament (2018)
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group with common interests as French Canadians and Acadians, of which three 
were from New Brunswick, two from Ontario, one from Nova Scotia and one 
from Manitoba. Together, they represented 7.3 per cent of the ninety-six sena-
tors. They were eight in 1931, when another senator from Saskatchewan joined 
the group, which means 8.4 per cent of all ninety-six senators. At the time, this 
percentage was the same as the proportion of Francophones living outside Quebec 
(Statistique Canada 2018).
In 1935, another confirmation of how prime ministers felt bounded by the con-
vention of appointing Francophone senators came from the campaign to have an 
Acadian from Nova Scotia nominated to the Senate by Prime Minister Bennett. 
In a letter about this appointment, Bennett writes, ‘The real difficulty is that the 
vacancy in Nova Scotia representation to the Senate belongs to the Acadian sec-
tion of the population’ (Cardinal & Grammond 2017, pp. 37–38). He does ‘not 
see how it would be possible to appoint other than an Acadian as a successor to 
Senator Girroir’.
The convention of appointing Francophone senators from outside Quebec has 
continued into the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries in almost all provinces. 
In 1968, a total of nine senators represented Canadian Francophone communities. 
Figure 18.1 also shows that, from the 1980s onwards, appointments of Franco-
phones were steady although never numerous. They were ten in 1979, 1985, and 
1995. In 1996, they were eleven: six from New Brunswick, two from Ontario, one 
from Nova Scotia, one from Yukon and one from Manitoba. In 2010, the number 
decreased to nine; in 2012, to eight. In 2018, there were eight senators from Fran-
cophone communities.
The appointment of the first Francophone women from outside Quebec came from 
Ontario and New Brunswick and were made in 1995 by the governor general under 
the advice of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Since then, a total of nine Francophone 
women have been appointed from Ontario, New Brunswick, Alberta and Manitoba.
The prime ministers who appointed the most senators from Francophone commu-
nities have been Liberals. Jean Chrétien appointed the largest number: eleven during 
his tenure, followed by Pierre Elliott Trudeau (nine), William Lyon Mackenzie King 
(eight), Wilfrid Laurier (six), Louis St. Laurent (five) and Justin Trudeau (five). 
Conservative nominations are less frequent. But one must also remember that, his-
torically, the Conservatives have held power less frequently than the Liberals: sixty-
five years for the Conservatives in comparison with eighty-six years for the Liberals. 
Admittedly, the numbers of Francophones Senators from outside Quebec are very 
small relative to the total number of senators appointed. However, their presence is 
constant, which attests to the fact that there is a solid tradition of appointing senators 
from Francophone communities since the creation of the Senate. This presence also 
reflects their percentage of the general population.
Constitutional conventions and the future of Francophone 
representation in the Canadian Senate
As suggested earlier, the historical role of the Canadian Senate in the representation 
of Francophones outside Quebec depends much on an established constitutional 
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convention. However, in 2018, when Prime Minister Trudeau appointed new 
members from Nova Scotia to the Senate, Francophones from the province were 
disappointed to learn that for the first time since its creation, no Acadian from 
Nova Scotia would be representing them (Vachet 2018). This is an important turn-
ing point for Acadians in the province. It may also be viewed as a breach with the 
existing constitutional convention.
In the past, debates on Senate reforms have given rise to a number of propos-
als to guarantee the appointment of Francophones outside Quebec. In 1990, the 
Federation of Francophone and Acadian communities of Canada even proposed 
the creation of Francophone senatorial ridings. The Federation also invited the 
Canadian government at the time to increase senatorial representation of Acadians 
from New Brunswick from three to four and Francophones in Ontario from one 
to two and to ensure a proper representation of Francophones in British Colum-
bia, which has never had a Francophone senator appointed. However, these rec-
ommendations were never taken up by the government (Cardinal & Grammond 
2017).
With the new process put in place by the Canadian government in 2015, the 
requirement that the Independent Advisory Board (the Board) recommends per-
sons from linguistic minority groups suggests that constitutional conventions are 
still relevant for discussing the representation of Francophones outside Quebec 
to the Canadian Senate. To be sure, the Board is composed of three members 
appointed by the federal government and two members appointed by the prov-
ince from which Senators should be named, should that province wish to take 
part in the process. The committee assesses candidates in connection with a list 
of criteria that include character and ethics, experience with the legislative pro-
cess, service to the community and an outstanding record of accomplishments. 
For each vacancy, the committee proposes a list of five names, and the prime 
minister takes this list into consideration. In addition, the government states that 
it seeks to achieve gender parity in the Senate and will give priority to indigenous 
candidates or those from minority linguistic and cultural communities ‘with a 
view to ensuring representation of those communities in the Senate consistent 
with the Senate’s role in minority representation’ (www.canada.ca/en/campaign/
independent-advisory-board-for-senate-appointments.html).
This more formal process constitutes a commitment by the Prime Minister 
to follow a predetermined process according to a set of pre-established criteria 
before exercising the power of appointment conferred to him by the constitu-
tion. This procedure is similar to the one used over the past three decades for the 
appointment of superior court judges (Cardinal & Grammond 2017). This senato-
rial appointment procedure does not (officially) limit the (constitutional) power of 
the prime minister and does not, in itself, undermine patronage and partisanship in 
a fundamental way. At best, the current process could lead to the establishment of 
a new constitutional convention (MacFarlane 2017; Verrelli 2017). As a new con-
vention, it is becoming an important force in the organisation of the Senate since 
it structures a part of the appointment process. For the SCC, ‘the requirements 
for establishing a convention bear some resemblance with those which apply to 
customary law. Precedents and usage are necessary but do not suffice. They must 
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be normative’ (Supreme Court of Canada 1959, p. 139). In this context of creat-
ing a new convention, the existing constitutional convention accounting for past 
appointments of Francophones outside Quebec to the Canadian Senate should 
also be acknowledged, given the constant concern from past prime ministers to 
the effect that Francophones outside Quebec will continue to ask to be repre-
sented in the Senate. Acknowledging the normative force behind the practice of 
appointing members from those communities would, more generally, also confirm 
the important interaction between constitutional conventions and the principle of 
minority rights in the development of Canada’s Senate.
Acknowledging the importance of constitutional convention as a step forward, 
any government wishing to guarantee the representation of Francophones outside 
Quebec in the Senate could also go another step further and adopt federal leg-
islation that would formally constrain the discretion of the prime minister with 
respect to the recommendations of senators for appointment. This would insti-
tutionalise a process that is so far based only on a government’s statement of 
intent. A law would be more difficult to modify, and it would apply to subsequent 
governments – at least until they chose to amend it, which would lead to public 
debate.
The fact that the power to appoint senators is provided through a constitutional 
provision does not prevent Parliament from enacting legislation to govern this dis-
cretion, provided that Canada’s constitutional architecture is not modified. As an 
analogy, the constitution also gives the federal executive power to appoint judges, 
while an act of Parliament imposes conditions on the exercise of that power by 
requiring that the person appointed has been a member of the bar for at least ten 
years. It also seems possible that a law could determine how to prepare a list of 
candidates to be presented to the minister of justice.
It is thus possible to imagine the adoption of legislation dealing with a senatorial 
appointment procedure. First of all, the law would formalise the existence of the 
Independent Advisory Board and provide for provincial participation in that com-
mittee. For example, the law could fix a minimum number of Francophone sena-
tors for certain provinces – a proposal echoing that of the Federation in the 1990s, 
mentioned earlier. These numbers could be determined by taking into account the 
total size of the Francophone population of a province, its proportion relative to 
the population of a province and the number of seats the latter has in the Senate.
More ambitious reforms would require a constitutional amendment, which 
would protect negotiated procedures from hostile parliamentary majorities. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that such reforms are possible, which inno-
vations would be beneficial in terms of increasing group representation in the Sen-
ate? We can conceive of both a formal distribution of seats and a selection process 
that better guarantees inclusion of Francophones outside Quebec.
Conclusion
To conclude, data on Francophone senators outside Quebec show that they have 
been appointed steadily even though they are never they are NOT numerous. This 
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tradition of appointing Francophone senators outside Quebec dates from the foun-
dation of the Canadian Senate. This chapter has also insisted that this tradition 
constitutes a constitutional convention which should be more explicitly acknowl-
edged. Moreover, the representation of minority interests is one of the fundamen-
tal attributes of the Senate, as pointed out by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 
Senate Reference (Cardinal & Grammond 2017).
However, the tradition of appointing members from Francophone communities 
to the Senate remains fragile. This is why the chapter suggests that the debate for 
more guarantees for their representation continues to be relevant. It also proposed 
the adoption of a legislation within the existing constitutional framework or, more 
ambitiously, that the Canadian government enshrines constitutionally minority 
group representation for Francophone communities. There is a compelling case 
for arguing that Canada’s democracy is not solely based on the principle of popu-
lar representation. Canada’s history of representation includes minority interests.
References
Ajzenstat, J. (2003), ‘Le bicaméralisme et les architectes du Canada’, in: Joyal, S. (ed.), 
Protéger la démocratie canadienne (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 
pp. 3–34.
Béland, D. and Lecours, A. (2008), Nationalism and Social Policy (Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press).
Berger, C. (1970), The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 
1867–1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
Bonenfant, J-C. (1966), Les Canadiens Français et la naissance de la Confédération 
(Ottawa: Société historique du Canada).
Cardinal, L. (2015), ‘Language regime and language politics in Canada’, in: Cardinal, 
L. and Sonntag, S. (eds.), Language Regimes and State Traditions (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press), pp. 29–43.
Cardinal, L. and Foucher, P. (2017), ‘Minority languages, education and the constitution 
in Canada’, in: Oliver, P. (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Canadian Constitutionalism (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press), pp. 553–574.
Cardinal, L. and Grammond, S. (2017), Une tradition et un droit. La représentation de 
la francophonie canadienne au Sénat (Ottawa: Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa).
Cardinal, L. and Gonzales-Hildago, E. (2012), ‘L’autonomie de minorités francophones 
hors Québec au regard du débat sur les minorités nationales et les minorités ethniques’, 
Minorités linguistiques et société 1(1), pp. 51–65.
Delfosse, P. and Dupont, J-P. (1999), ‘Des Sénats’, Revue internationale de politique com-
parée 6(1), pp. 7–11.
Gélard, P. (2005–2006), Rapport sur les secondes chambres en Europe: Complexité parle-
mentaire ou nécessité démocratique ? Study No. 335 (Strasbourg: Commission europée-
nne pour la démocratie par le droit).
Government of Canada (2019), ‘Comité consultatif independent sur les nominations au 
Sénat’. Available at: www.canada.ca/fr/campagne/comite-consultatif-independant-sur-
les-nominations-au-senat.html (accessed 7 April 2019).
Griffiths, A. (2017), ‘Diversity in the senate’, Policy Options. Available at: http://policyop 
tions.irpp.org/magazines/february-2017/diversity-in-the-senate/ (accessed 4 March 
2019).
266 Linda Cardinal
Independent Advisory Board for Senate Appointments, “Assessment criteria”, Ottawa, 
Government of Canada. Available at: www.canada.ca/en/campaign/independent-advi 
sory-board-for-senate-appointments.html (accessed 11 Décembre 2015).
Kinsella, N.A. (2014), ‘The senate – an essential house of parliament’, Canadian Parlia-
mentary Review. Available at: www.revparl.ca/37/1/37n1e_14_kinsella.pdf (accessed 11 
April 2019).
Kunz, F.A. (1963), The Modern Senate of Canada, 1925–1963: A Re-appraisal (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press).
Kymlicka, W. (1996), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press).
Kymlicka, W. (1998), Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada 
(Don Mills: Oxford University Press).
Library of Parliament (2018), PARLINFO. Available at: www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo (accessed 
4 Nov. 2018).
Macfarlane, E. (2017), ‘Senate reform: The good, the bad, and the unconstitutional’, Pol-
icy Options. Available at: http://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/september-2015/
the-future-of-the-senate/senate-reform-the-good-thebad-and-the-unconstitutional/ 
(accessed 4 March 2019).
MacKay, R. (1963), The Unreformed Senate of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart).
Massicotte, L. (2016), ‘Le Sénat a-t-il changé depuis 1980? Quelques indicateurs statis-
tiques’, Revue parlementaire canadienne Spring, pp. 14–18.
Migneault, G. (2016), ‘Le Canada français et la Confédération: les Acadiens du Nouveau-
Brunswick’, in: Caron, J., Martel, M. and Pelletier, R. (eds.), Le Canada français et 
la Confédération: fondements et bilan critique (Québec: Les Presses de l’Université 
Laval), pp. 9–28.
Orban, E. (1969), ‘La fin du bicaméralisme au Québec’, Revue canadienne de science 
politique 2(3), pp. 312–326.
Parliament of Canada (n.d.), Parlementaires. Available at: https://bdp.parl.ca/sites/Par 
lInfo/default/fr_CA/Personnes/parlementaires?refiners=4-1&refiners=4-2&refiners=5-
5&refiners=1-2&refiners=1-1&refiners=1-3&projectionCode=1&q=&parlType=all&pa
rlinfo_parliamentarians_length=25 (accessed 11 April 2019).
Paterson, S. and Mulghen, A. (eds.) (1999), Senates. Bicameralism in the Contemporary 
World (Columbus: Ohio State University Press).
Province du Canada (1865), Assemblée législative, Débats parlementaires sur la question 
de la Confédération des provinces de l’Amérique britannique du Nord, 8e parlement 
provincial, 3e session (s.l.).
Savoie, D. (2009), I’m from Bouctouche, Me (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press).
Senate of Canada (2002),Comité sénatorial permanent du règlement, de la procedure et 
des droits du parlement. Moderniser le sénat de l’intérieur: actualisation de la struc-
ture des comités senatoriaux. Available at: https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/cham 
ber/371/journals/122ap_2002-06-11-f#B.%20Un%20Comit%C3%A9%20des%20
langues%20officielles (accessed 11 April 2019).
Smith, D.E. (2003), ‘L’adaptation possible du Sénat sans avoir à réformer la Constitution’, 
in: Joyal, S. (ed.), Protéger la démocratie canadienne (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press), pp. 246–289.
Smith, J. (ed.) (2009), The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian Senate (Mon-
treal: McGill-Queen’s University Press).
Statistics Canada (2018), French and the Fracophonie in Canada. Available at: https://
www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-314-x/98-314-x2011003_1-
eng.cfm (accessed 11 April 2019).
Francophones outside Quebec, 1867–present 267
Statistique Canada (2018), L’évolution des populations de langue maternelle au Canada, 
de 1901 à 2016. Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-
x2018001-fra.htm (accessed 11 April 2019).
Supreme Court of Canada (1981), Reference: Resolution to amend the Canadian Consti-
tution [5th edition; 1st edition 1959]. Available at: https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/
scc-csc/en/item/2519/index.do (accessed 11 April 2019).
Supreme Court of Canada (1998), Reference re Secession of Quebec. Available at: https://
scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do?site_preference=normal 
(accessed 11 April 2019).
Taylor, C. (1994), Multiculturalism. With commentary by K. Anthony Appiah, Jürgen 
Habermas, Steven C. Rockefeller, Michael Walzer, and Susan Wolf Edited and intro-
duced by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Uhr, J. (1999), The Senate and Proportional Representation: Public Policy Justifications of 
Minority Representation (Canberra: Australian National University).
Vachet, B. (2018), ‘Trudeau ignore la demande des Acadiens de la Nouvelle-Écosse’, 
ONFR. Available at: https://onfr.tfo.org/trudeau-ignore-la-demande-des-acadiens-de-
nouvelle-ecosse/ (accessed 11 April 2019).
Verrelli, N. (2017), ‘The senate: Should it stay or should it go?’, Policy Options. Available at: 
http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/september-2015/the-future-of-the-senate/the- 
senate-should-it-stay-or-should-it-go/ (accessed 4 March 2019).
Watts, R. (2009), ‘Federal second chambers compared’, in: Smith, J. (ed.), The Demo-
cratic Dilemma: Reforming the Canadian Senate (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press), pp. 35–48.
Names of North Atlantic small nation in the 19th and 20th century
Country Name of Upper House Name of Lower House





English: House of Commons




Finland – Finnish: Suomen eduskunta
Swedish: Finlands Riksdag
Ireland Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann






Note: Page numbers in italics indicate a figure and page numbers in bold indicate a table 
on the corresponding page.
Index
abolition of the senate 41, 143, 144
absolutism 60, 62, 65, 143, 233
Acadian (communities) 263; Acadians 260
Act of Union 240
Adams, John 16 – 18
Addams, Jane 190
Adler, Johan Gunder 32, 33, 38
Adler, Victor 124
Adolf, Gustav, Crown Prince, Sweden 142
Age of Revolution 2, 6, 15
American Revolution 6, 221
Anglo-Irish Treaty 154 – 158, 163 – 165, 
202, 241
anti-democratic ideology 91 – 101, 194, 
199
Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), and the 
Netherlands 176
aristocracy 16 – 17; and Canada 192; and 
Denmark 60, 64; and Finland 119 – 123; 
and Ireland 159; and the Netherlands 
147, 150 – 152; and the Southern 
Netherlands 43 – 48, 51 – 54; and Sweden 
134 – 136, 143, 217 – 218; see also 
populism
Army Comrades Association, and Ireland 
165
Austria 1, 44, 48, 69, 78, 124, 174
Baltic states 124, 142
Batavian Republic 2, 5, 15 – 25, 33, 45
Battle of Leipzig 31
Baxter, Patrick 209, 212
Belgium 1, 6 – 7, 43 – 58, 65, 106 – 115, 
174, 178, 181; see also Southern 
Netherlands
Bennett, Richard Bedford 262
Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste 6, 31, 34, 39
bicameralism 1 – 3, 6, 8 – 9; and the 
Batavian Republic 20 – 24; and Belgium 
106; and British North America 91; and 
Canada 77 – 78, 81, 84, 255, 257 – 259; 
and Denmark 60, 64 – 67, 69 – 70, 
233; and Finland 116 – 123, 125 – 130; 
and France 15 – 18; and Ireland 202, 
204, 239 – 253; and the Netherlands 
173 – 174, 184; and Norway 31 – 41; 
in revolutionary Europe 15, 24 – 25; 
and the Sister Republics 18 – 20; and 
the Southern Netherlands 44, 46, 51; 
surrogates for bicameralism 127 – 130; 
and Sweden 133 – 134, 136 – 137, 143, 
216 – 223
Binchy, Daniel A. 202, 204
Bismarck, Otto 151
Boissy d’Anglas 16, 17, 18
Bolshevik coup 142
Bondevennerne see ‘Friends of the 
Peasants’
Borden, Robert Laird 188
Borgerting 234
Bosnia Herzegovina 255
Boström, Erik Gustaf 140
bourgeoisie 218
Bowell, Mackenzie 260
Branting, Hjalmar 140, 142
British Commonwealth 157
British North America Act 1867 200
Brown, George 1, 78
Brown, Michael (Bishop) 210
Bruun, Mads Pagh 67 – 68
270 Index
constituent assemblies: and the Batavian 
Republic 22; and Denmark 60, 63 – 71; 
and Finland 126; and Ireland 158; 
and the Netherlands 175; and Norway 
30 – 32, 34 – 36, 38; and the Southern 
Netherlands 45, 51
constitutional conventions 255 – 265
constitutional monarchy xi – xii, 29, 60, 
75, 146
constitution of Year III 15, 18, 20, 24
Cosgrave, William T. 158
Counihan, John Joseph 206, 212
Craig, James 162 – 163
Croatia 239
Cromie, Robert J. 198
Crown (British) 166
Cumann na nGaedheal, and Ireland 163, 203
D66 (Democrats 1966), and the 
Netherlands 182
Dafoe, J.W. 193
Danielson, J.R. 120, 125 – 126
De Coninck de Merckem, Charles, Baron 112
De Geer, Louis 119, 134 – 135, 218
De Mérode, C., Count 44 – 46
democracy 2, 5, 9, 17; and British North 
America 92, 100; and Canada 77, 84, 
191, 195, 199, 255, 265; and Denmark 
60, 64 – 66, 70 – 71, 225, 230 – 235; and 
Finland 123; and Ireland 166 – 167, 
204 – 205, 210, 239, 247; and the 
Netherlands 152; and the Southern 
Netherlands 56; and Sweden 137 – 143, 
216, 219, 222; see also anti-democratic 
ideology; democratisation
democratisation 6 – 7, 122, 125, 127, 128, 
129, 130, 133, 142; and Belgium 108, 
111 – 115; and Finland 120, 122, 125, 
127 – 130; and Sweden 133, 141 – 142
De Nieuport, Viscount 48
Denmark 1 – 8, 29 – 31, 60 – 73, 78, 119, 
121 – 122, 143 – 144, 225 – 238
De Royer de Woldre, Alexander (also 
known as De Royer de Dour) 109 – 111
despotism 21, 45, 126
De Thiennes, C., Count 44, 46, 48
De Tornaco from Huy, Camille, Baron 111
de Valera, Eamon 154, 160, 163 – 167, 
202 – 212, 242 – 244
dictatorship 165, 203 – 204, 212
Directoire 18
Donker Curtius, Dirk 175
Dotrenge 46
Douglas, James 160 – 161, 164
Buys, Joannes Theodorus 146 – 152
Bulgaria 78, 128
bulwark (senate as) 45, 52, 129, 143, 173
burghers 117, 121 – 122, 134, 136; see also 
bourgeoisie
Campbell, James 159
Canada 1 – 2, 4 – 5, 7 – 9, 75 – 87, 91 – 101, 
167, 188 – 201, 255 – 267; see also 
Quebec
Carré de Malberg, Raymond 106
Catholics: and Belgium 112; and Canada 
77, 80; and Ireland 154 – 162, 203 – 204, 
210 – 212, 240 – 243; and the Netherlands 
150, 176, 179 – 180; and the Southern 
Netherlands 47 – 48, 50 – 52, 54
chamber(s) de réflexion, chamber of sober 
second thought 23, 60, 66, 81, 83, 143
Chrétien, Jean 262
Christensen, Jens Peter 233
Christian Democrats 182
Christiansen, Peter Munk 233
Church of England 196
Cisalpine Republic 18
civil war: and Ireland 154 – 155, 158 – 160, 
163, 203; and the United States 1, 
154 – 155
clergy 3, 147
Comité de Salut Public 15
Communist International 149
Communist Party: and Denmark 
(Kommunistiske Parti) 229; and Sweden 
220
conservatism 3 – 7; and Belgium 106 – 108, 
113 – 115; and British North America 
91 – 101; and Canada 77, 84 – 85, 
188 – 189, 191 – 193, 195 – 199, 262; 
and Denmark 60, 63 – 71, 225 – 233; 
and Finland 123 – 125, 129; and Ireland 
155, 164; and the Netherlands 146, 149, 
152, 175 – 176, 181; and Norway 30, 36, 
38 – 39; and the Southern Netherlands 
47, 51 – 52, 54 – 56; and Sweden 
134 – 135, 138, 139 – 143
conservative party: and Canada 98, 
99, 188, 196, 199; and Denmark 
(Konservative Folkeparti) 225 – 229
conservatives: and Belgium 106 – 107; and 
Canada 85, 91 – 101, 188, 189, 192, 195, 
197, 199, 262; and Denmark 60, 63 – 68, 
70 – 71, 225 – 228, 233; and Finland 
(Old Finns) 123, 125, 126, 127; and the 
Netherlands 146; and Sweden 138, 140, 
141, 142
Index 271
Fine Gael 165, 205, 208, 246 – 247
Finet, Théophile 113
Finland 1 – 3, 6 – 7, 29 – 31, 116 – 132, 133, 
142, 230
First World War 188
Forke, Robert 197
France 1 – 2, 5 – 6, 15 – 25, 31, 33, 43 – 46, 
48, 50, 52, 55, 75, 112 – 113, 143, 
151 – 152, 240, 260; see also French 
Revolution
Francophones 77, 255 – 267
Frederik, Christian, Prince, Sweden 31
Frederik III, King, Denmark 62
Frederik VI, King, Denmark 62
Frederik VII, King, Denmark 62
Frederik VIII, King, Denmark 40
French Canadians 83, 257 – 259, 262
French Revolution 16 – 17, 44, 79, 114, 
126, 147, 252
‘Friends of the Peasants’ (Bondevennerne) 
63, 64, 65, 71
Gallup polls 230
Gauthier, Jean-Robert 259
Germany 1 – 2, 10, 44, 60 – 62, 68 – 69, 71, 
78, 151, 128, 175, 139 – 142, 180 – 181, 
202, 228
Gladstone, William 155
Great Britain 17, 21, 32, 22, 75 – 79, 82, 
119, 121 – 123, 140, 142, 174 – 175, 




Gripenstedt, Johan August 134
Groen van Prinsterer, Guillaume 175,  
176
Gustaf V, King, Sweden 142





Holland 1, 146 – 147, 152, 175, 177 – 179; 
see also Netherlands, the
Holstein, duchy of 60 – 63, 74
Home Rule 154 – 157, 159, 203, 240
House of Orange 49, 51, 53
Hungary 1, 142
International Monetary Fund 245
Ireland 1, 4, 6 – 9, 80, 154 – 168, 122, 192, 
202 – 215, 239 – 254
Douglas, James Green 209
Dumon-Dumortier, Augustin 108 – 109
elective legislative councils 91 – 101; and 
conservative legislation 95 – 100; in 
historiography 92 – 93; in principle and 
in practice 100 – 101; and responsible 
government 93 – 95
electoral system 23; and Denmark 
226 – 230, 228, 232, 234; and Ireland 
162, 206 – 207, 209, 241, 244 – 245, 
251 – 252; and the Netherlands 175, 
177 – 179, 182; and Sweden 219 – 220, 
222
eligibility 13; and Belgium 107, 112, 
113 – 114; and Canada 76, 97 – 100; 
and Denmark 63, 65, 67, 68; and the 
Netherlands 176, 177, 179; and Norway 
32, 33; and the Sister Republics 19; and 
Sweden 141, 142 – 143
elitism 76, 133, 143, 178 – 179, 234, 246, 251
England 1 – 2, 9, 43, 45, 75, 77, 80, 147, 
151, 159, 161, 191 – 193, 196, 199, 232, 
240
equality: and Canada 81, 258; and 
Denmark 64, 235; and Finland 123; and 




estate system: and Denmark 62; and 
Finland 116, 117, 120 – 121, 122, 130; 




European Union (EU) 130, 217, 231 – 232, 
246, 253
Falsen, Christian Magnus 32, 33, 38
farmers: and Canada 188; and Denmark 
71; and Ireland 159, 166, 208, 249; and 
the Netherlands 180; and Norway 39; 
and Sweden 135 – 140, 143
Farmers’ Party: and Finland 
(Lantmanna Party) 120; and Sweden 
(Lantmannapartiet) 138 – 139
Fearon, William 210
February Manifesto of 1899 124
federalism 9, 76 – 77, 80, 83, 92 – 93, 258
Fennoman nationalists 120, 122 – 127
Ferdinand VI, King, the Two Sicilies 20
Fianna Fáil 7, 154 – 155, 163 – 166, 
202 – 203, 208, 211, 242, 246
272 Index
146, 175, 176, 177, 180 – 182; and 
Norway; and Sweden 134, 137 – 143
Lloyd George, David 192
London Protocol 68 – 69
Luxembourg 41, 174
MacDermot, Frank 208, 210
Macdonald, John A. 100 – 101, 260 – 261
MacEntee, Seán 206
Mackenzie, William Lyon 189
Madvig, Johan Nicolai 67







Mill, John Stuart 119
minority 77, 83, 128
modernisation 133, 136 – 138, 143, 182, 259
Møller, John Christmas 228
Møller, Per Stig 233
monarchy 4, 6, 17; and Belgium 109; and 
Canada 79, 82; and Denmark 61 – 63, 
68; and Finland 129; and Norway 
29 – 31, 34 – 38, 40; and the Southern 
Netherlands 45 – 46, 51 – 52; and Sweden 
216, 220 – 221; see also constitutional 
monarchy
Monrad, Ditlev Gothard 63, 65 – 66, 72
Montesquieu 17, 18, 45, 52
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor, France 6, 
31, 35, 43, 55, 61, 109, 114, 116, 126
Napoleon III, Emperor, France 152
National Centre Party, and Ireland 165
national character 22, 126
National Court 34, 37, 40
nationalism 1 – 2, 6; and Denmark 60 – 62, 
64 – 65, 68 – 69, 71; and Finland 118; and 
Ireland 154 – 155, 158 – 159, 161 – 164, 
204, 241 – 242, 246; and the Netherlands 
146; and Sweden 138
nation state 61, 91
Netherlands, the xi – xii, 1 – 8, 59, 91, 107, 
112, 146 – 153, 173 – 187, 232; see also 
Batavian Republic; Holland; Southern 
Netherlands
Nicholas II, Tsar and Grand Duke, Finland 
123 – 124
Nispen Van Sevenaer, C.J.H. 150
nobility 3, 9; and Denmark 61; and Finland 
117, 121 – 123; and the Netherlands 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 155, 157, 
159 – 160, 165
Jackson, Andrew 190
Jacobinism 5, 45, 52
Jean, Charles see Karl Johan, Crown 
Prince, Sweden
Jespersen, Christian Magdalus 67
Karl Johan, Crown Prince, Sweden 31
Karnebeek, Herman Adriaan 181
Kazakhstan 255
Kenya 239







landowners: and Finland 123; and the 
Netherlands 174, 178 – 179; and Norway 
30; and the Southern Netherlands 48, 51, 
53 – 54; and Sweden 136 – 137, 140, 143
language 61, 62, 69, 79, 80, 97, 120
Lantmanna Party see Farmers’ Party
Lapointe, Ernest 190
Lauenburg, duchy of 61 – 62
Leopold I, King, Belgium 57
Laurier, Wilfrid 188, 190, 260, 262
Leopold III King, Belgium 106
liberalism 6; and Belgium 106 – 109, 111, 
113; and British North America 98 – 99; 
and Canada 85, 188 – 200, 255, 262; 
and Denmark 60 – 70, 72, 225 – 229; and 
Finland 118 – 121, 123, 125; and Ireland 
155, 204, 211, 250; and the Netherlands 
146, 148, 151, 173, 175 – 177, 179 – 182, 
184; and Norway 36 – 37; and the 
Southern Netherlands 45 – 46, 49 – 52, 
56; and Sweden 134 – 135, 137 – 143
liberal party: and Belgium 109; and 
Canada 188 – 200; and Denmark 
(Venstre) 225, 226, 227, 228; 
and Finland; and Ireland; and the 
Netherlands; and Norway (Venstre) 37, 
85; and Sweden 142
(Liberal) Progressives 188
liberals: and Belgium 49, 50, 52, 103, 
107 – 108, 111; and Canada 98, 
188 – 200, 262; and Denmark 62 – 71, 
226 – 229; and England 155; and Finland 
119, 120, 121, 125; and the Netherlands 
Index 273
Ireland 158, 163, 166, 203, 239 – 240, 
245 – 252, 248, 249; and Norway 30, 40
Reformation 147, 240
Reform Party and Canada 77
Reign of Terror 15, 17, 21, 44
Rein, Th. 120, 125
representation: and Belgium 106; and 
Finland 119, 121, 126 – 127; national 
116 – 117, 126 – 127; proportional 68, 
126, 129, 157, 177 – 178, 191, 206, 234, 
235, 241; regional 47, 173, 179; and 
Sweden 133
republicanism 91 – 93
Republic of the Seven United Netherlands 
147
Rerum Novarum 204responsible 
government 77, 80, 84, 91 – 101
Révellière-Lépeaux, Louis Marie La 22
Revolution 1830 1, 43, 51, 106
Revolution 1848 xi, 62, 71, 108
Riker, William 84
Robespierre, Maximilien 15, 17, 45
Rogers, Norman McLeod 198
Roman Republic 18
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 17, 110
Russia 1 – 2, 6 – 7, 29, 31, 68, 123 – 125, 
127, 129 – 130, 133, 139; see also 
Russian Empire
Russian Empire 31, 116 – 118
Russian Revolution 7, 116, 124, 130; see 
also Bolshevik coup
Scandinavia 3, 41, 130; see also Denmark; 
Norway; Sweden
Schleswig, duchy of 10, 60 – 63, 66, 
68 – 69, 74
Scotland 240
Second World War 227
separation of powers see theory
Setälä, E.N. 128
Sinn Féin 156 – 157, 162 – 163, 241, 246
Sister Republics 2, 5, 15, 18 – 20, 23 – 24
slaperdijk, senate as 181
social democratic party (Socialist Party, 
Labour Party): and Belgium 111; and 
Denmark 226, 227, 235; and Finland 
124, 125; and Ireland 162, 163, 204, 207, 
209, 210, 212, 246; and the Netherlands 
148; and Sweden 139, 140, 142, 144
social democrats: and Denmark 226, 227, 
228, 229; and Finland 125, 127, 128, 
129; and the Netherlands 179, 181, 
182; and Sweden 217, 220, 223, 139, 
141 – 143
150, 174; and Norway 30 – 32; and the 
Southern Netherlands 43 – 48, 51 – 56; 
and Sweden 134, 216 – 218
Nordic countries 2, 5, 42; see also 
Denmark; Finland; Norway; Sweden
North America, British 91 – 101, 189; see 
also Canada; United States
Northern Ireland 156, 169, 241 – 242, 244, 
246, 251
Norway 1 – 2, 5 – 6, 29 – 42, 61 – 62, 65, 
120, 128, 138, 205, 228, 230
Novelle 183





Outis (Donal O’Sullivan) 211
Paasikivi, J.K. 126
Pagano, Mario 20
parliamentarism 4, 7 – 8, 50, 121 – 122, 
225
party politics (partisan politics) 81, 83 – 85, 
144
patronage 47
peasantry: and Denmark 62 – 65, 67, 
70 – 71; and Finland 117, 120 – 122, 
124; and Norway 30, 35; and Sweden 
134 – 137, 139, 216, 218
People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) 235
Peru 239
Pius XI, Pope 243
Polak, Henri 179
Poland 1, 117, 124populism 77, 164, 246, 
252; aristocratic 106 – 115
primogeniture 44
Protestants: and Canada 258; and Ireland 
154 – 157, 159 – 161, 203, 240, 242, 244; 
and the Netherlands 175, 179 – 180, 182; 
and the Southern Netherlands 51




Quebec 75, 78 – 80, 91, 101, 188, 190; 
Francophones living outside of 255 – 265
Quirke, William 209
Raepsaet, J. 44, 46
referenda 8; and Belgium 106; and 
Denmark 228 – 232, 228, 234; and 
274 Index
Norway 29 – 30, 32 – 34, 36 – 38, 40 – 41; 
and Sweden 144, 216, 222 – 223
Unionist 242
United Kingdom 75, 78, 82, 84, 155, 
174, 239 – 240; see also England; Great 
Britain; Ireland; Scotland
United States 2, 17 – 18, 21, 92; and 
Belgium 113; and Canada 75, 78 – 79, 
189 – 191, 260; and Finland 119, 127; 
and Ireland 210; and the Netherlands 
151; and Norway 32
unity see national unity
universal suffrage see suffrage
Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837 189
Valvoja group 120 – 122, 125
Van den Dooren, Emile 113 – 114
Van Hogendorp, G.K. 43, 45, 147
Vasa, Gustaf, King, Sweden 220
Vatican 205, 212
Verzuiling 179
veto 18, 34, 37, 121, 133, 135, 181
vocationalism 166, 203 – 210, 212
war 3, 6 – 7, 10; and British North America 
101; and Canada 77, 79, 188, 190, 
192 – 193; and Denmark 60 – 61, 63, 
66, 68, 71, 228; and Finland 116 – 117; 
and Ireland 156 – 157, 208, 210 – 213, 
241; and the Netherlands 177, 181; 
and Norway 30 – 31; and the Southern 
Netherlands 56; and Sweden 139, 
141 – 142, 221; see also civil war; First 
World War; Second World War; trade 
war
William I, King, Netherlands 43, 46 – 47, 
51, 53 – 54, 174 – 175
William II, King, Netherlands 175
William IV, King, England 192
Wilson, Woodrow 190
women: and Canada 83, 256, 262; and 
Denmark 62, 234 – 235; and Finland 
124; and Ireland 154, 161 – 163, 208; 
and the Netherlands 177; and the 
Southern Netherlands 56; and Sweden 
134 – 135, 139 – 142, 219, 222
Yeats, W.B. 161 – 162
Young Finns (Fennomans) and Finland 
123, 125, 127, 128
socialism: and Belgium 111; and Finland 
122 – 124; and Ireland 211, 246; and the 
Netherlands 148, 151, 177, 179 – 180; 
and Sweden 142
social liberal party and Norway (Radikale 
Venstre) 226
Social Majority 146, 151 – 152
Söderblom, Nathan 142
South Africa 96, 255
Southern Netherlands 52 – 56
suffrage 3, 6 – 7; and Belgium 106 – 107, 
112, 114; and Canada 83; and Denmark 
60, 63 – 68, 70 – 72, 226, 235; and 
Finland 116, 122 – 127, 130; and Ireland 
154, 162 – 163; and the Netherlands 
146 – 148, 151 – 152, 176 – 177; and 
Sweden 139 – 142, 221
Supreme Court 41, 77, 83
Sweden 1 – 2, 6 – 8, 29 – 33, 35 – 37, 39, 61, 
72, 78, 92, 116 – 117, 119, 133 – 145, 
151, 216 – 224, 230, 232




theory 8 – 10; Catholic social theory 204; 
of equality 53; of mandate politics 190; 
of mixed government 16 – 18, 96; of 
representation 234; separation of powers 
18, 38, 217, 221
Thermidor 5
Thermidorean Reaction 15 – 17
Thorbecke, Johan Rudolph xi – xii, 151, 
175 – 176
Tjeenk Willink, Herman 183
t’Kint de Roodenbeke de Naeyer, Henri, 
Baron 112 – 113Torppa, Juho 126
Tory 195
trade unions 176
Treaty of Kiel 31, 35, 61
Troelstra, Pieter Jelles 180
Trudeau, Justin 262 – 263
Trudeau, Pierre Elliott 77, 260, 262
unicameralism 5, 15, 22; and Canada 
78, 84; and Denmark 60, 63 – 67, 
71, 225 – 236; and Finland 116, 118, 
121 – 130; and Ireland 204 – 205, 239, 
246, 248; and the Netherlands 174; and 
